07/27/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 4 of 26)

0044 One implication of the complete three-level interscope for the post-truth condition takes the title of chapter two, “Post-Truth Is About Finding A Game One Can Win”.

The relativist one3c operates a justified “true” belief system.

The key term is not “true”.

The key term is “operates”.

0045 Yes, “operates” has the same first syllable as “opportunity”.

What is opportunity1c beyond the potential of putting credentials2b into perspective?

0046 According to Fuller, the operational game of “axiology” starts with a continuum, such as the continuum between what must be done and what cannot be done, then explicitly divides the continuum according to two labels: “necessity” and “impossibility”.

In terms of on-the-ground impact, such a division may be regarded as nonsense, even when applied to a single topic.

0047 Consider a nagging issue faced by ancient Athenians.  The Kingdom of Syracuse!  What do we do about it?  When hearing the diverse facts and claims around the market2a, one would conclude that war with Syracuse is both necessary and impossible.  But, once a sophist3b opportunistically formalizes the issue in terms of an either/or proposition1b, then one party gathers under the banner of “necessity” and one party gathers under the banner of “impossibility”2b

The result is a hylomorphic structure, where the party of impossibility standing against the party of necessity occupies the slot for credentials2b.  At this juncture, the solution to the contention between the two parties becomes obvious.  The party saying that war is not possible does not want to do anything.  But, doing nothing is not an option.  Doing nothing will only make war more necessary.

0048 Does that sound like an opportunity1c?

Here is a picture of this unfolding drama.

Go from left to right.

0049 Now, I wonder, “Does the relativist one3c care whether Athens decides to go to war with Syracuse?  Or, does the relativist one3c only care about arriving at… what may be called… the actions associated with a justified belief… that is… success2c?”

07/26/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 5 of 26)

0050 Here is the the post-truth interscope for the ongoing example.

Diverse claims about Syracuse2a are virtually situated by one party under the banner saying that war is necessary2b and another party under the banner saying that war is not possible2b in the normal context of a public forum3b operating on the potential of ‘situating rumors about what to do about Syracuse’1b.

Does the relativist one3c know what will happen after Athens gathers a fleet and sails to Syracuse?  Or, is the relativist one3c clever enough to cast a veil of ignorance1b over a cauldron of irreconcilable claims2a thus constituting a post-truth game2b that results in a particular organized endeavor2c?  See page 21 of Fuller’s text for that question.

0051 Remember, for the post-truth condition, what matters is not whether something is true or false.

What matters is how something is decided.

The first statement concerns the intellect.  The second statement concerns the will.

0052 This reminder suggests a flaw in a preceding figure.

The starting point for a virtual nested form in the realm of firstness (the column in the realm of possibility) is not the various opinions of the people in Athens2a, it is their will1a.

Here, the virtual normal context is on the left and the virtual potential is on the right.

0053 The normal context of a resolution of contradictions between the parties of impossibility and necessity1c virtually brings the actuality of the formalization of impossibility in contrast to necessity1b into relation with the possibility of the wills of the people of Athens in regards to Syracuse1a.

Success2c takes the form of a judgment that leads to action.

07/25/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 6 of 26)

0054 “What type of guide is this?”, I ask myself as I turn to chapter three.

What are the fates of truth, reason (as we commonly imagine it to be, rather than as the normal context and potential of the scrappy player) and reality, when the post-truth condition is a game2b to arrive at a judgment2c that leads to action?

So let me leave the image of the ships of Athens burning in the harbor at Syracuse in favor of a more recent example.  Some contemporaries call this example, “The Cold War”, technically ranging from 1945 to 1989 anno domini.  I prefer to call it The Third Battle Among the Enlightenment Gods: The Cold War Among Materialist Ideologies.

Materialist ideologies?

Think capitalism versus communism.

0055 In this example, the opponents are mirror images.  Just swap USSR for USA, then swap them back.

0056 Both parties agree that a nuclear war must be ruled out, because neither party can achieve the victory of a completely nullifying first strike.

Both parties agree that war is necessary in order to advance a materialist ideology.

0057 Success2b turns out to be a series of proxy wars that leaves many relativized jurisdictions in ruin.  Success2b turns out to be an inversion of what “capitalism” means, because the USA markets are regulated in such a fashion as to maximize positive publicity for the “capitalist” materialist ideology and negative publicity for the opposing “communist” materialist ideology.  That means, for the most part, fighting the commies is good for business.

Plus, creating false flags into order to validate the so-called domino theory turns out to be advantageous.

One can say the same for the USSR, because “communism” turns out to be state-capitalism. Or, maybe “capital” has been redefined as “party membership”.  The state regulates every level of the organization tier in order to conduct various proxy wars that the proxies would rather not participate in.  That means, for the most part, pay is not so good to fight the capitalists.  

Such as the Taliban?

Or anti-materialist ideologies such as Christianity?

0058 I know that this is difficult to fathom.

Truth, reason and even, reality, must be sacrificed in order to maintain the opportunity1c underlying success2c, which may be defined as a judgment that leads to a course of action2c, rather than… what most scrappy players3a consider to be “success2a“.  

0059 Here is what happens after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Yes, the USA continues to conduct proxy wars, even after the USSR disintegrates.

Weirdly, established players in the USA preserve their Cold War post-truth success2cby confabulating a novel materialist ideology2b that weirdly distorts capitalist truth, reason and reality1b and then conducting a crusade2c as if their dynamic hybridization of materialist ideologies2b is more righteous than what capitalism used to be.

0060 Say what?

What is the name of this novel materialist ideology that preserves the necessity of proxy wars even though the USSR has fallen?

More on that, later.

07/24/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 7 of 26)

0061 Chapter four introduces two apparently successful attempts to construct value2b in the post-truth condition.  Value2band credentials2b are not identical.  But, they do not contradict one another.  They both fit into the slot for the situation-level actuality.

The two successful attempts are capitalism and scientism.

0062 I start with capitalism.  Capitalism substitutes the institution of the market3b for the situation-level forum for discourse3b.  Shall I say that money talks?  What is money saying?  It is formalizing knowledge as price1b.

Here is a picture of the resulting interscope.

0063 Of course, the experts3b are all about the market, but certain other elements stand out.

Yes, some elements stand out in comparison to other elements.

In the following figure, I put boxes around the most illuminating elements.

I call the result, “the questionable box of capitalism”.

0064 For Americans, the questionable box of capitalism has been a field of intense investigation by academics promoting both capitalism (as a materialist ideology that opposes communism) and the conceptual structure of social construction.

Why “social construction”?

I ask, “What creates value2b?  How can the term, ‘value’2b, occupy the slot for actuality2 on the level that corresponds to actualityb, when value2b seems to be anything but actual?”

Maybe, I can look at the four corners of the box.

The four elements that characterize the questionable box are the capitalist one3c, opportunity1c, intellect3a and will1a.

Maybe, they create value2b.

0065 But, does the box contain the actualities of success2c and diverse facts and claims2a that virtually contextualizes and virtually underlies value2b?

What a questionable box!

When I look into the box, I see that the normal context of the market3b brings the actuality of value2b into relation with the potential of price1b.

0066 According to Fuller, when Count Saint-Simon (1760-1825 AD) challenges the game of the capitalist one by promoting what he calls “socialism”.  He tries to re-enact Plato’s truth-regime as an alternative to the then-current unregulated market in capitalist sophistry.

Yes, the capitalists, like the sophists, promote minimal, but clear constraints.  Each individual may promote his or her own rightfulness, as long as others are not directly harmed and the social order is not disturbed.

No, the socialists, like the Platonists, proclaim the righteousness of order in conjunction with… you know… um… other manifestations of righteousness.  If I declare that these other manifestations of righteousness are “true”, then I can see why Fuller welcomes the post-“truth” condition.

0067 Here is the even more questionable box of socialism.

Order3b, value2b and righteousness1b govern the will1a and the intellect3a.  They define opportunity1c in the regime of the socialist one3c.

07/23/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 8 of 26)

0068 Chapter four is wonderful.  Fuller’s prose carries the reader on a rollercoaster of ideas, where each sudden twist and change of direction leaves unexplored territory.  I wonder, “What would Fuller say, had he not fashioned a turn at that particular moment?”  Further exploration is suspended.  But, I retain a snapshot of the Count Saint-Simon turn, and it looks like this.

How do capitalist and socialist ones3c exclude one another?

Each dwells within its own questionable box. 

Inside its respective box, each conjures its own expertise.

0069 On the cover of Fuller’s small paperback, a drawing of the head of a rabbit (or is it a duck?) appears.  Well, if I see the drawing as a rabbit, then the figure is a rabbit.  If I see the drawing as a duck, then the figure is a duck.

Taking the word, “value2b“, in the preceding figure, as the drawing, then the normal contexts of market3b and order3b are like gestalt recognitions for their respective potentials, price1b (which, to me, is like a rabbit) and righteousness1b (which, to me, is like a duck).  And if what is inside the questionable box changes, so does the box.

0070 Does that mean that the forty-year conflict, The Third Battle Among The Enlightenment Gods, The Cold War Between Materialist Ideologies (1945-1989 AD) can be reduced to a contest between The Packaging of the Rabbit and The Packaging of the Duck?

According to the nature of gestalts, opportunity1c resides in fixating on one or the other party, because that leads to an actionable judgment2c, which is the very definition of success2c to the relativist one3c, who really does not care whether it carries the banner of the rabbit or the duck, as long as it3c is the one who is in charge of actualizing the judgment2c.

0071 At this point, I return to the two elements that stand outside the questionable boxes of capitalism and socialism.

Success2c and diverse facts and claims2a are the two elements for capitalism that are not built into the box of questionability.

0072 In the capitalist game, success is capital2b defined, in the old fashioned way, as “money” (however one wants to define the word, “money”).  That is not questionable, is it?

Those with money2c aim to use that money to obtain more money2c.  In this regards, money2c defines the capitalist2c.  On the crappy-player level, people ask, “What do I need to do to earn a living?”  What is a living?  Well, it is certainly not absolute devotion to money, that is for sure.  Life is all about adventures and friends and romance and babies and growing old and dying nobly.  How do you put a price on that?

Can I sell you simulated versions of these items?

0073 So, how am I supposed to make a living?

This question does not concern the elements that compose the questionable box.  This question concerns my participation in capitalism.  I am within a post-truth game, trying to make my way.

The employment of capital2c by those with capital2c is like an interventional sign-vehicle (SVi) that cannot be directly witnessed by any scrappy player, except in so far as it manifests as action.  Action implies that a judgment has been made.  Look in the want ads.  Look what other people are doing.  I hear that someone is hiring down the street.  To the scrappy player, that judgment2c stands for a pursuit of success2a, a project2a or something to do2a, that defines “success2a” as getting ahead (that is, making a good living) (SOi), according to the intellect3a operating on the will1a (and remember that reason is the employment of intellect3a and will1a) (SIi).

0074 Uh-oh.  Am I suddenly talking about sign-relations?

A sign-vehicle (SV) stands for a sign-object (SO) in regards to a sign-interpretant (SI).

The interventional sign-relation is counterintuitive, to say the least.

0075 The interventional sign vehicle (SVi) is an actionable judgment2c (capital is put into action) that stands for opinions about what I need to do2a (SOi) in regards to the intellect3a operating on the will1a (SIi).

I may ask the opinions of others2a (SOi).  I may have my own opinions2a (SOi).  Furthermore, I can discern the intellects3a and wills1a (SIi) of myself and those around me.  But, I cannot actually see the sign-vehicle (SVi), because it2cresides on the perspective level. It is as if…

The interventional sign-vehicle (SVi) dwells inside someone’s head.  It is mind-dependent.

But, it2c (SVi) is mind-independent as well.

A judgment2c leads to actions (SVi), and because these actions become the source of various opinions, the interventional sign-object (SOi) comes into being through the working of people’s reason3a,1a (SIi).  These opinions2a (SOi) are about the possibility of ‘something happening’1a in the normal context of what is happening3a (SIi).  These opinions2a frame perceptions based on imagination working with the question, “What does this mean to me?”.  And, sometimes, these opinions2a will weigh one’s impressions and one’s perceptions, while asking, “Does this make sense?”

I suppose that this is the way that humans think.

What is happening (SIi1)?

What does it mean to me (SIi2)?

Does this make sense (SIi3)?

0076 Overall, the interventional sign-relation is the inverse of how a sign-relation ought to be.

For familiar sign-relations, the sign-vehicle is mind-independent and its sign-object is mind-dependent.

Here is an example of a specifying sign-relation.  The expert says that opinions about what people think that they need to do2a (SVs) stands for value2b (SOs) in regards to the market3b operating on the potential of pricing1b (SIs).

0077 Here is a picture of a capitalist expert’s specifying sign-relation.

Note how the specifying sign-vehicle (SVs) is mind-independent phenomena (what people say2a) of a mind-dependent noumenon (SOi) (what people think2a).

07/22/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 9 of 26)

0078 Let me dwell on two points (A and B).

0079 First (A), the post-truth condition, as we currently experience it, involves a frustrating inability of the expert to situate the scrappy player.  The situation level finds it difficult to virtually situate the content level.

One of the reasons comes from the structure of the questionable box of capitalism.  Two elements are not included, because these two elements assume the box without question (and that assumption is, of course, questionable).  The perspective-level actuality of success2c turns out to be the sign-vehicle (SVi) and the content-level actuality of what people say2a turns out to be the sign-object (SOi) of an interventional sign-relation, which the most upside-down sign-relation that one can imagine.

0080 Interventional and specifying sign-relations are discussed in Razie Mah’s blogs at the end of 2023 and the start of 2024, starting in earnest with Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (October 2023) and Looking atDaniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria, To Bach and Back” (December 2023).  Two commentaries that may be of interest are Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols” and Comments on Michael Tomasello’s Arc of Inquiry (1999-2019) by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0081 If the post-truth condition is working appropriately, then capitalist experts3b on the situation-level can say how price1b (SIsreflects various opinions2a (SVs) in the normal context of a market3b (SIs).  The assertion (SOs) is perceived as value2b.  The easily recognized specifying sign-relation says, “Opinions2a (SVs) stand for value2b (SOs) in regards to the specification of price1b within an open (unregulated) market3b (SIs).”

But, experts3b are not looking at all opinions2a.  They observe and measure only a small selection of opinions2a.  In particular, they register only those opinions2a that are relevant to building a model of value2b.  They call the relevant opinions, “phenomena2a“.

0082 An exemplar sign-relation follows the specifying sign-relation. Expertise-acknowledged value2b (SVe) is placed into perspective by the capitalist one3c operating on the possibilities inherent in opportunity1c (SIe), resulting in capital formation or destruction2c (SOe).  Value2b (SVe) stands for success or failure2c (SOe) in regards to a capitalist3coperating on the basis of opportunity1c (SIe).

Success or failure2c entails a judgment about whether the organization has capital or not, and what to do about it.

0083 Here is a picture of the capitalist box of the post-truth condition operating at face value.  Expertsb virtually emerge from (and situate) what people think2a and explicitly model value2b.  Then, expert valuations2b are contextualized as opportunities1c by those3c with capital2c.

A specifying sign-relation feeds into an exemplar sign-relation.

0084 Second (B), even though the interscope for socialism and capitalism look very similar, the expert level is significantly different.  Order3b (the potential underlying the state) is and is not like a market3b.  Righteousness1b (the potential underlying an institution within the state) is and is not like price1b.  Finally, value2b does not arise from the potential of price1b.  Instead, value2b arises from the potential of righteousness1b.

0085 Now I wonder, does success2c for the socialist one3c remain the same as capital2c

I suppose that depends on how one defines the word, “capital”.

Reframing of the word, “capital”, occurs in all ongoing post-truth global projects, as seen in Comments on Daniel Estulin’s Book (2021) “2045 Global Projects At War”.  A promo for this commentary appears in Razie Mah’s blog for the latter half of January 2023.

07/20/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 10 of 26)

0086 I continue to examine chapter four.

What about science?

What is valuable in science?

Surely, mathematical and mechanical models are valuable to science.

Mathematical and mechanical models figure prominently in the empirio-schematic judgment.

Models are what ought to be.

0087 The empirio-schematic judgment is initially diagrammed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, as an element of the more encompassing Positivist’s judgment.

Here is a picture.

0088 A judgment is a triadic relation with three elements: relation, what ought to be and what is.

When each element is assigned a unique Peircean category, then the judgment becomes actionable.

Actionable judgments “unfold” into category-based nested forms.

So the above diagram translates into, “Disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mechanical and mathematical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is,firstness).”

0089 Can I disperse the three… er four?… maybe five… elements in the preceding diagram into the interscope for the post-truth condition?

Here is my guess.

0090 On, the content level, the term, “phenomena2a“, is placed, like a mask, over diverse opinions about what is going on.  How is this accomplished?  Well, phenomena2a are the observable and measurable facets of a noumenon, a thing itself, which is supposed to be what all those unscientific opinions fixate on.

On the situation level, observations and measurements1b constitute the potential1b that characterizes phenomena2a.

Tautologies can be handy.

Phenomena2a are those features of all the opinions expressed by all sorts of people2a which have the potential of being observed and measured1b as phenomena2a.

0091 On the situation level, disciplinary language3b may occupy the same position as the expert3b.  Does one displace the other?  Or does an imaginative comparison of disciplinary language3b and experts3b suggest that the unfolded empirio-schematic nested form (on the situation level) is a variation of the nested form for certified expertise (also on the situation level)?

Here is the comparison.

0092 On the perspective level, one may wonder, “How can the empirio-schematic judgment as a judgment virtually contextualize the empirio-schematic judgment as a category-based nested form?  Isn’t there some sort of conflict of interest?  Or is this another one of those tautologies that are ready at hand?”

0093 Well, there is a trick.

The empirio-schematic judgment is actionable because each element is assigned to a unique Peircean category and, therefore, it can unfold into a category-based nested form.

Plus, the empirio-schematic judgment occupies the slot for what ought to be in the Positivist’s judgment.

0094 So, the empirio-schematic judgment as what ought to be in the Positivist’s judgment (on the perspective level) can virtually contextualize the empirio-schematic judgment as a category-based nested form (on the situation level).

Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment.

0095 The positivist intellect has a rule, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”  This mandate governs the situation level and assists in differentiating phenomena2a from the thing itself2a.  Phenomena2a cannot be regarded as metaphysical, while the noumenon2a (things that ordinary people are talking about) is commonly regarded in terms of outlawed metaphysical formal and final causalities.  In other words, a lot of things that people say2a are ignored by the observations and measurements1b of various experts3b.  If an opinion2a smacks of metaphysical connotations, or does not pertain to what contributes to the construction of a model, then it cannot be regarded as phenomena2a.

0096 Now, at the risk of overcrowding a diagram, I can place this nuanced explanation for why an actuality that looks like the empirio-schematic judgment2c can contextualize the situation-level unfolded empirio-schematic judgment in the interscope for the post-truth condition.

Here is a picture.

07/19/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 11 of 26)

0097 Well, let me go back to the original interscope.

The perspective-level actuality2c looks a little awkward.  Do I put the term, “empirio-schematic judgment2c” or “what ought to be of the Positivist’s judgment2c“?

How about “a triadic relation that ought to be empirio-schematic2c“?

Well, my solution is presented below in the cross of the positivist intellect.

0098 I ask, “Does this look anything like the questionable box of capitalism?”

The questionable box is presented below.

0099 Clearly, the answer is “no”.

Well, then, I ask, “Is there anything striking about a comparison?”

Clearly, the answer is “yes”.

The positivist cross is strong in regards to the perspective and content level actualities, precisely where highlights of the capitalist box are weak.  The capitalist box is strong with respect to the perspective and content level normal contexts and potentials, where the positivist cross is weak.

Does that mean that the positivist’s cross and the capitalist box complement one another?

Yes, indeed, the complementarity suggests an alliance between situation-level category-based nested forms.

0100 Here is a picture.

0101 In this alliance, market3b and disciplinary language3b align.  Discourse about the market3b takes on the character of a scientific disciplinary language3b.

0102 This alliance manufactures models3b that define valuations2b as if price1b is an apparatus for observing and measuring1b phenomena2a, consisting of opinions and facts2a that… um… somehow determine or influence prices1b.  If an opinion or a fact does not (somehow) convert into a price1b, then that opinion is disregarded by the capitalist expert3b.

An opinion or a fact2a can be converted into a price1b, that can be modeled2baccording to the disciplinary languages3bof some sales department, thereby creating opportunity1c in offering added value2b to a process1b that maximizes success2c for the capitalist one3c.  Success2c moves the inquirer from phenomena2a to commitment2c (that is, a market purchase).

In short, science and capitalism mesh in a psychometric inquiry into how to induce people to make a market purchase.

0103 Yes, forget religion!  Where is the money in that?

On second thought, how can one convert belief2a into a price1b?  Pay for pray?  Exactly what are we supposed to reckon as phenomena2a?  Shall I ask the experts on marketing, sales, finance, accounting and so on?  What fits the empirio-schematics?

Success2c for the capitalist one3c consists of something that seems to correspond to what ought to be (secondness) in the Positivist’s judgment.

At, the same time, success2c has the character of the positivist intellect.  Why?  Metaphysics is not allowed.

So, maybe I can oversimplify by saying, “Capital2c is a way of doing things that works… or… I should say… makes money.”

0104 Does this exercise of the scientific capitalist correspond to one portion of the title of chapter five of Fuller’s book?

That must be the “marketization of everything” portion.

0105 What about the “public relations as post-truth politics” portion?

Ah, there is another alliance.  This time the alliance is between the situation-level for the socialist one and the empirio-schematic judgment unfolded onto the situation level.

Does this alignment between science and socialism constitute the psychometric science of inducing people to buy into a political agenda?

0106 If so, then what does the public relations expert3b regard as phenomena2a?

An opinion or a fact2a can be converted into a righteousness1b, that can be modeled2b, according to the disciplinary language3b of a department of political “whatever”, who finds opportunity1c in demonstrating value2b with a process that maximizes success2c in moving someone from phenomena2a to commitment2c (that is, a political buy-in).

0107 So, what about a Christian who longs to save his soul from damnation?

Well, the expert at propaganda may regard this particular opinion2a as phenomena2a for a model2b that transforms longing for personal salvation2a into political action2b by promoting3b the notion1b that funding a particular government program devoted to poverty2b is an expression of Christian charity1b, rather than a government policy2c devoted to maintaining a political order3b that deprives poor souls2a of economic opportunities1c and convinces them3a that they are so worthless that this state-funded program is their only hope1a.

Does that one sentence cover all the bases?

07/18/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 12 of 26)

0108 Of course, these two alliances do not do justice to chapter five, whose full title is “Public Relations as Post-truth Politics, Or the Marketisation of Everything”.

Yet, they do add a disturbing twist.

Capital expertise goes with marketization.  Marketization constellates the capitalist one3c.  Success2c is a judgment leading to a purchase.  Experts are certified in sales, marketing, advertising and so on.

Social expertise goes with politicization.  Politicization constellates the socialist one3c. Success2c is a judgment leading to a political commitment.  Experts are certified in political science, social work and a myriad of other specialties.

Both constitute questionable boxes whose contents can hybridize with the positivist cross of scientism

109 When that happens, the actionable judgment2c takes the essence (as well as the esse_ce) of an empirio-schematic judgment.

But, it2c is not empirio-schematic.  It2c is empirio-normative.

It2c confounds what ought to be for the Positivist’s judgment with the structure of the empirio-schematic judgment.

Plus, it2c acts in the service of a relativist one3c.

0110 So, how is the fusion of capitalist and socialist expertise3b with scientific disciplinary language3b disturbing?

Remember the three battles among the enlightenment gods?

Their nominal dates are first, 1914 to 1918, second, 1938-1945 and third 1945-1989 AD.

The very last one was a cold, proxy-annihilating, contest between two materialist ideologies which could be labeled “capitalism” and “socialism”.

0111 These labels apply to the perspective-level normal contexts of interscopes containing two very different situation-level category-based nested forms.

Now (I am just wondering), if a hybridization of both the capitalist and the socialist questionable boxes and the positivist cross characterizes the post-truth condition that Fuller identifies, then doesn’t that imply that another battle among enlightenment gods is upon us?

Thank God, my bladder is empty!

Say nothing of my rectum.

0112 Okay, let me calm down and think about a scientific capitalist hybridization.

Here is a guess at what the perspective-level actionable judgment2c might be for a person3a,1a caught in the scientific capitalist one’s interscope.

A way of talking about a product that makes the client feel more valuable (which sounds like “marketing”; relation,thirdness,) brings observations of a client’s opinions (as well as others, including the general public; what is, firstness) into relation with a campaign leading a client to make a purchase (based on a psychometric model; what ought to be,secondness).

0113 Okay, that does not seem as potentially horrifying as the stories that the USSR told about the USA during the Cold War.

0114 Chapter six of Fuller’s book offers an example for a scientific socialist hybridization.

Perhaps, this one is more unsettling.

The example is an article by Byran Van Norden, appearing in a New York Times philosophy column in 2018. This article is acclaimed by the American Philosophy Association in 2019.  (Then, COVID-19 comes to America in 2020.)

Fuller chooses this thought-piece because it displays the post-truth condition as (1) a contest over what is true and false concerning knowledge and (2) a dispute over the ways that matters are to be decided.

0115 Does that indicate that Fuller uses Norden’s opinion piece as a phenomenon that can be observed and included in a model of the post-truth condition?

Uh-oh.

0116 May I summarize Norden’s argument, as reported by Fuller?

Norden presents a complaint by expertise3b to the court of the relativist one3c.

There is a problem.  And perhaps, one of the problems with my account of the problem is… um… me.  I am not an expert, or worse, I may be one of those scrappy players that reads disciplinary literature and asks embarrassingly pointed questions.  Or…

Well, let me not doddle. My bus arrives.  Let me get on board.

0117 As far back as anyone can remember, stalwarts of modern philosophy, such as Rene Descartes (1596-1650 AD) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), promote a naive universality to rationality that empowers charlatans (read: scrappy players), such as the memorable mouthpiece Kellyanne Conway (who stands for someone who lacks expertise), to lay claim to “alternate facts”.

Of course, these “alternate facts” do not sit well with the well-informed readers of the New York Times… er… I mean to say “the public”.  There is no need to explicitly formulate criteria whereby expert representatives of a right-minded “public”may set aside Conway’s claims as mere verbalizations that are both not legitimate and without merit.  Instead, this advocate sets forth the following proposition.

Free speech does not entail the right to an audience.

Oh, I suppose that explains the title of the philosophical opus in the Stone, “The Ignorant Do Not Have The Right To An Audience”.

0118 But, wait!  Stop the bus.

The inquirer will have to read the entire chapter in Fuller’s own excellent prose, because I have arrived at my destination.

Here is a picture of the resulting empirio-normative judgment.

0119 Norton offers an opportunity1c.

Norton offers a way of talking about how to order the political world in the face of the these scrappy players, such as Kellyanne Conway (relation, thirdness) that brings observations that the scrappy player’s opinions are not righteousness(what is, firstness) into relation with a model for how to proceed (what ought to be, secondness).

How should the scientismist one3c proceed?

Deny the scrappy player an audience.

This is Norton’s empirio-normative judgment2c.

0120 Empirio-normative?

Yes, success1c for the hybridization of the socialist one and the scientific one can be defined as a judgment that parodies the empirio-schematic judgment2c.

For this reason, when a Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, a Queen of Empirio-Normativism, proclaims, “Trust the science.”, she is really saying, “Trust my judgment.”

07/17/24

Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition” (Part 13 of 26)

0121 Chapter seven is titled, “Science As The Offer That Cannot Be Refused in the Post-Truth Condition”.

0122 How can this be?

Have you ever refused a gift?

I mean, like the gift of a famous politician’s trust in science?

Yeah, here is the gift2c that is fashioned into legislation that defines “success”2c in the post-truth condition.  Success2c is more than merely achieving an actionable judgment2c. Success2c leads to actions that set the stage for normal people asking, “What is happening?3a” in regards to the possibility that ‘something’ is happening1a.  Success2c opens a cognitive space2a that is observed and measured1b by experts3b in the psychometric sciences of marketing and advocacy.

0123 As an aside, I ask, “Does the one of scientism3c care whether its judgment2c leads to human flourishing or immolation?”

I don’t think so.

If “trust the science” means “trusting the judgment of the Queen Bee”, then I definitely don’t think so.

0124 Okay, instead of that distraction about a gift, let me blunder forward with another aside, this time asking, “How does an empirio-normative judgment2c serve as an interventional sign-vehicle (SVi) whose sign-object is what people think is happening2a (SOi).

The question, “What is happening?”, appeals to the intellect3a.  The intellect3a associates to the interventional sign-interpretant (SIi).

The issue of ‘something’ happening addresses the will1a.  The will1a also associates to the interventional sign-interpretant (SIi).

125 So, while Fuller frames the offer3c in terms of advertising and other ways that an expert can provide value by informing the scrappy player of options that are outside the cognitive space that the player is already familiar with, I frame the offer2c in terms of a general structure for the empirio-normative judgment.

For example, the disciplinary language of journalism (relation, thirdness) brings a normative narrative (what ought to be,secondness) into relation with observations of what people say (what is, firstness).  

Not everything that people say is regarded as phenomena.  Only opinions that are (1) not metaphysical and (2) pertinent to the topic at hand are so regarded.

0126 Just like a scientific discovery2c, the empirio-normative judgment2c is an offer2c, a gift2c, that cannot be refused.   Especially, an empirio-normative judgment2c cannot be refused once it is constellated as the purchase of a product or a legislative edict or decree.

0127 Of course, I3a,1a face a choice.

On one hand, I2a better get on the current paradigm bus if I want to be a certified expert2b and receive the blessings of opportunity1c.

On the other hand, I2a should seek to understand the gift2c that wants to transform my voice2a into phenomena2a that it can observe and measure1b.

0128 On one hand, I may accommodate the domination of the empirio-normative judgment and adjust what I say to what experts desire to observe and measure.

On the other hand, I may… what?.. say what I think regardless of what is happening3a and the potential of ‘something’ happening1a, only to have my voice2a simply disregarded as not phenomena2a?

0129 Fuller offers the example of the potlatch tradition among tribes of the Pacific Northwest.  British colonizerssuppress the native tradition because it makes no sense at all.  Why spend your time hoarding all sorts of things, such as barrels of seal fat and thousands of smoked salmon filets, in order to destroy and eat them all in one gigantic and crazy fun party?  It’s like those damn French in New Orleans with their Mardi Gras.  The bean-counting experts of the British Empire will not have it.

I suppose that the downside of the potlatch tradition is that everyone gets trapped in a weird competition in regards to “honor”, requiring that each person assist one or another big-man in showing that my big-man can throw a more magnificent party than your big-man.

0130 So, in regards to an empirio-normative judgment2c, here is the judgment of the Euro-centric administrators.

The disciplinary languages of the British colonizers (relation, thirdness) brings a normative narrative that the potlach tradition is an entrapment system (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations of claptrap about which big-man throws the best party (what is, firstness).

0131 Now, this actionable judgment makes sense in the post-truth fashion where two interrelated elements are contested.

‘What is’ and relation concern a contest between true and false, where “true” consists of British administrators’ observations and measurements of phenomena and “false” consists in all those opinions and facts than cannot be formalized through expert observations and measurements. Why?  Everything the natives say is rubbish about parties.

‘What ought to be’ and relation concern a contest over how the matter is to be decided.  The experts not only expect to have their way1c, but them having their way2c signals their virtue2b, which is more “objective” than the “subjective” opinions and facts2a that the experts might consider if they could accept them as ‘sensible enough to take into consideration’1b.  Fuller indicates how the matter is to be decided in the title of chapter seven.  Science is the offer that cannot be refused in the post-truth condition.

Trust our empirio-normative judgments.