Tag Archives: semiotics

01/10/26

Looking at Ekaterina Velmezova and Kalevi Kull’s Article (2017) “Boris Uspenskij…” (Part 19 of 19)

0627 Today, we no longer are who we evolved to be.

What does this imply?

We can no longer be who we evolved to be.

Our current Lebenswelt is not the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0628 Today, the general ego interscope presents a purely relational structure (a suite of triadic relations) that may be processed implicitly.  This is the configuration of langue, as opposed to parole.

Here is a picture.

0629 Almost all of the elements of the interscope are filled with explicit abstractions.

A trace of Aristotle’s philosophy resides in the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics. Upwellings from deep within Slavic civilization breathe into explicit abstractions. 

An archaeology can be seen in the structure of the content- and situation-level actualities.  According to Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter [substantiates] form.  But, this Christianized pagan civilization realizes the inverse is also a thing.  Form [entangles] matter.

0630 In the example, the form of a small bird entangles the matter of a young initiate.

The claim coheres with the crucial claim of Razie Mah’s book on hominin evolution, The Human Niche.  Our niche is the potential of triadic relations. 

The lesson appears like a banner on the perspective level.

0631 This brings me to the joke about Juri Lotman’s soulful encounter with St. Methodius.

During the first ascent of the Tartu-Moscow School in the USSR, structural3b semiological3a models2c are on the scientific side of the fence.  The fence demarks the academic turfs of science (Marxist theory) and superstition (Christian faith, in all its diversity).

Now, the second ascent of the Tartu-Moscow School occurs as the USSA, the maven of technology without meaning,claims the mantle of science (psychometric theory) as opposed to superstition (still Christian faith, in all its diversity).

0632 Does the second ascent of TMS forgo occupation of the science side of the fence?

Or does it straddle the fence?

0633 It may sound uncomfortable, but take a look at the following sequence of perspective level nested forms.

0634 In regards to the universe of signs, Lotman challenges Marx’s paradigm.

Do material arrangements [substantiate] the human condition2cf?

Lotman begs to differ.

0635 In regards to the evolution of humanity, Peircean diagrams turn out to be useful for depicting the relational beings inherent in implicit abstraction.  

Consider Comments on Michael Tomasello’s Arc of Inquiry (1999-2019), by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0636 In regards to the human as a semiotic animal, one must not forget that both exemplar and interventional signs intercalate in the perspective level of an interscope.

The specifying, exemplar and interventional signs appear in Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”.  This sequence of blogs appears in Razie Mah’s website in October 2023.

0637 What wonderful opportunities for the second ascendance of the TMS!

0638 But, that is not the only challenge that comes from this examination of the interview with Boris Uspenskij in the early 2010s and published in Sign Systems Studies in 2017.

I suppose that there is more than one way to denote primary, secondary and tertiary modeling systems, so why not advance one more?

0639 Here is another proposal.

Consider three tiers of interscopes, with the perspective-level of each tier displaying the following nested forms.

0640 To me, this sequence of primary, secondary and tertiary modeling systems suggest that Peirce’s diagrams may assist in knitting biosemiotics and TMS together into one overarching theoretical framework.

Three tiers of interscopes works well in the chapter on presence in Razie Mah’s How To Define The Word “Religion”.  So, this might be a diagram worth mulling over.

0641 I thank the interviewer, Kaveli Kull, and Boris Uspenskij for engagements worthy of examination.  I thank Ekaterina Velmezova for the translation into English. 

01/9/26

Looking at Boris Uspenskij’s Article (2017) “Semiotics and Culture”  (Part 1 of 8)

0642 The article before me is published by Sign System Studies (volume 45(3/4), 2017, pages 230-248) by Boris Uspenskij (1937-present), one of the members of the first ascent of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, in the 1960s through the 1980s.  The full title is “Semiotics and culture: The perception of time as a semiotic problem”.  The paper was originally presented as a lecture held in Madrid in 2010.  Plus, the paper is based on a two-part article published under the title “History and Semiotics (the perception of time as a semiotic problem)” in 1988 and 1989.

0643 The first ascent of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics builds a fundament of semiology3a, structuralism3b and disciplinary languages3c that retain formal and final causations along with material and efficient causalities (called “exact methods3c“).  The result is an actuality2c, a semiological structural model2c (SVi), that stands for a dyadic actuality2a where {the literary text2af (SOi) [entangles] a language2am of meaning, presence and message1a}.

0644 Here is a diagram of the fundament interscope.

0645 Exact methods3c?

Think of it3c as flying a probe2bm into a cloud of phenomena1c that cannot fully objectify the noumenon of a literary text2bf.  This scholarly data-collector2bm extracts observations and measurements1c that will be evaluated (using exact methods) on the basis of signification3a(1a) and structure3b(1b).

0646 Semiological structural model2c?

According to the empirio-schematic judgment, a disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings a mechanical or mathematical model (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness).  

A parallel construction follows.

A disciplinary language of exact methods3c (relation, thirdness) brings a semiological structuralist model2c (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena1c within a literary text2bf (what is,firstness).

0647 Phenomena1c?

Phenomena are observable and measurable facets of a noumenon, a thing itself.

According to Kant’s slogan, a phrase that Kant may have never uttered but which is attributed to him in the same way that the entire Pentateuch is attributed to Moses, a noumenon cannot be fully objectified as its phenomena.  A thing itself cannot be reduced to its observable and measurable facets.

0648 Language2bm?

Language2bm is the situation-level matter (as opposed to form) constituted by Saussure’s definition of language2aentering into a structure (or system)3b, such as a mother tongue3b, a genre3b, a style3b, an artistic community3b, a tradition3b, and other civilizational beings3b.

0649 Clearly, the semiological3a structuralist3b model2c aims to capture an Aristotelian expression of how language as matter2bm substantiates a literary text as form2bf.

Without the literary text2bf, a semiological structural model2c cannot coalesce because there is nothing to delimit free-floating, unanchored language from the phenomena that an inquirer is interested in.  It is like matter without a form to substantiate.  It’s useless.

0650 So, in the fundament interscope, language as matter2bm gives substance to the literary text as form2bf.

At the same time, the literary text as form2bf allows the entire situation-level hylomorphe2b to take a shape where language2bm may be regarded as phenomena.

0651 Say what?

Language2bm substantiates the literary form2bf and, at the same time, may be regarded as phenomena of the literary form2bf.

It2bm is substantiating matter2bm (esse_ce) because it virtually situates the content-level actuality2a, {langue2am[substantiates] parole2af}.

It2bm is regarded as literary phenomena by the perspective-level potential1c.

0652 The substantiated form2bf (essence) is like a noumenon and its2bf substantiating matter2bm (esse_ce) serves as its2bf observable and measurable facets (that is, its phenomena).

12/31/25

Looking at Igor Pilshchikov and Mikhail Trunin’s Article (2016) “The Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics” (Part 1 of 27)

0001 The article before me is published by Sign System Studies (44(3) (2016) pages 368-401) by two professors, Igor Pilshchikov and Mikhail Trunin, hailing from Tallinn University in Estonia.  The title is “The Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics”. The subtitle is “A transnational perspective”.

0002 The abstract promises to situate the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics of the 1960s through 1980s.  The article delivers more than promised.

How so?

0003 The authors sketch dynamic developments among intellectual circles within the (now former) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

0004 The term, “transnational”, indicates that there are nations within the former Soviet Union.

During this period in history, the governments of Estonia and Russia (along with Czechoslovakia and Poland) owe fealty to an empire with the title, “Socialist”, in its name.

So, “transnational” tells me that the article looks back from the present, into a past era, with the intent of portraying ‘something’ historical, without acknowledging that the “Union” and the “Socialist” descriptors no longer apply (at least, not in the way that they once did).

0005 “Transnational” applies to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, 1918-1989) as well as the upcoming… um… Eurasian convergence?

Here is a picture with three city-sites.  Tartu and Moscow belong to the title.  Tallinn is the location where the authors write their article.  The blue is the Baltic Sea.

0006 “Transnational” steps over the boundaries depicted in black in the above figure.

Never mind the fact that the above territories reside behind, what American pundits once called, “the Iron Curtain”.

0007 Perhaps, one must appreciate an ambiguity to the term, “transnational”, given that there is another transit.  This transit is in time.  Or, even better, this transit is across a boundary between battles among Enlightenment gods.

Consider where the time period of 1960s to 1980s resides in the following timeline of Western civilization in the twentieth century.

Also consider the year when the article under examination is published.

Notice the boundary.

0008 The Tartu-Moscow School of Semiology constellates within one battle, as a transnational collaboration.

The TMS is remembered during another battle, which is not resolved, and so cannot be objectified as “historical”.  I suppose that it can be objectified as “cultural”.  Better yet, “theodramatic”.

Already, there is more to this article than meets the eye.

10/31/25

A First Look at Julian Jaynes’s Book (1976) “The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind” (Part 1 of 21)

0236 Why do I examine this work?

I reviewed Steven Mithen’s book, The Language Puzzle: Piecing Together The Six-Million-Year Story Of How Words Evolved (2024, Basic Books, New York).  See Razie Mah’s blog for September 2025.  The examination concludes on point 0235.

During the examination, I recall a book that Julian Jaynes publishes in 1976. 

I wonder, “Why does Mithen’s book remind me of Jaynes?”

I now have a copy of The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (First Mariner edition (2000), New York, New York) before me.

This explains why I start the current examination on point 0236.

0237 Julian Jaynes (1920-1997 AD) earned master and doctoral degrees in psychology at Yale University.  He lectured in psychology at Princeton from 1966 to 1990.  In 1990, he writes a postscript that appears in the Mariner edition.

This afterward lists the four hypotheses in Books I and II.  Plus, the postscript expands on Part III, by discussing the psychological transition from the bicameral mind to subjective consciousness at the end of the Bronze Age in the Near East.

0238 Here is the list.

0239 So, why does Mithen’s book remind me of Jaynes’s work?

My review of The Language Puzzle led me to conclude that Mithen’s explicit rejection of a gestural origin of languageprevents him from realizing that his information implicitly supports the very position that um… he rejects.

Yes, if I ignore his declaration against a gestural origin to language, then I can start to recognize that speech is added to fully linguistic hand-talk after the domestication of fire, when the community becomes a social circle under pressure from natural selection.

0240 That reminds me of a curious pun that seems to have import in the year 2025AD.

The Russian word for “no” is “nyet”.

To the American ear, “nyet” sounds like “not yet”.  And, that means, “Yes, but not now.”

So, when Mithen says, “nyet”, to the gestural origins of language, his English speaking bicameral mind hears, “not yet”.  So, Mithen unwittingly drops clues to his nyet hypothesis within his own subjectively conscious argument.  These hints offer a weird twist to Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) The Language Puzzle.  It is as if Mithen’s own bicameral mind offers – what I will call – “a nyet hypothesis”.

0241 Now, consider the first two hypothesis (A and B) in Jaynes’s Books I and II.

First (A), subjective consciousness relies on spoken language.  Mithen consciously proposes that spoken words are built over millions of years through synaesthesia, cross modal “leakage” of sensations, from visual things and events to auditory vocalizations.

0242 Of course, this proposal comes across as sketchy.  Why would early hominins, such as the australopithecines and the early species in the Homo genus (3.5 to 0.6Myr – millions of years ago) do this?  And how?  The voice is most likely not under voluntary control.  Involuntary calls rule the day.

But, the vocal tract changes over time.  Most likely, the voice is on the verge of coming under voluntary control by the time that Homo heidelbergensis appears in the fossil record (perhaps, over 600kyr – thousands of years ago).

On top of that, Homo heidelbergensis shows up during the period when hominins domesticate fire (800-400kyr).  So, Mithen consciously and cautiously suggests that the synaesthesia business really takes off around that time.

0243 The nyet hypothesis?

Well, of course, proto-linguistic hand talk has plenty of time to evolve without cross-modal leakage during the early period (3.5 to 0.6Myr) and even has a couple of hundred-thousand years to become fully linguistic after hominins start to play with fire (0.8 to 0.6My).

So, synaesthesia would not make a jump from things themselves to vocal utterances, but from manual-brachial word-gestures to vocal utterances.

Suddenly, synaesthesia no longer seems implausible.

0244 Second (B), compare Mithen’s nyet hypothesis with Jaynes’s proposal of the bicameral mind.

To me, the idea that manual-brachial word-gestures provide stimuli allowing synaesthetic crossover from visual to auditory sensations seems like “auditory hallucinations”.

0245 My goal in this first examination is to develop this impression.

09/30/25

Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 1 of 23)

0001 The full title of the book before me is The Language Puzzle: Piecing Together The Six-Million-Year Story Of How Words Evolved (2024, Basic Books, New York).  Dr. Mithen is a Professor of Early Prehistory at the University of Reading.  He has published before.  More on that later.

The book works on the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle.  Fourteen chapters present the pieces.  The introduction and conclusion stage and arrange them.

0002 This current metaphor is very different than a glorious historical metaphor used in a book published almost three decades earlier.  The Prehistory of The Mind (1996) offers the historical development of the architecture of cathedrals in Europe as a lens for considering cognitive evolution.  The metaphor works well because the nave associates to general intelligence and side chapels associate to specialized mental modules.

0003 From the genetic divergence from chimpanzees to the start of bipedalism, the simple nave of general intelligenceadapts to cognitive challenges.

From the appearance of bipedalism to the domestication of fire, specialized modules are added to general intelligence, but the two do not integrate.  Indeed, both specialized modules and general intelligence are supported by their own, thick, walls.  The metaphor is the Romanesque cathedral.

From the domestication of fire until the first singularity (think, “the potentiation of civilization”), general intelligence integrates with specialized modules, presumably due to talk becoming fully linguistic.  Language becomes the walls, supported by flying buttresses of automatic decoding.   The metaphor is the Gothic cathedral.

0004 Here is a picture.

0005 The metaphor is so wonderful that Razie Mah publishes the e-book, Comments on Steven Mithen’s Book (1996) The Prehistory of The Mind as one of the readers that accompanies the masterwork, The Human Niche, in the series A Course On The Human Niche (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

0006 Mithen’s approach is also echoed in the work of another evolutionary anthropologist, Michael Tomasello, working at the Max Planck Institute in Leipzig, Germany, as discussed in Comments on Michael Tomasello’s Arc of Inquiry (1999-2019) (by Razie Mah, also see blogs for January through March, 2024).

0007 Mithen’s approach is also reflected in another review that belongs to the series, A Course On The Human Niche.  The title is Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big.  In this review, social circles turn out to be very important in hominin evolution.  Mammalian brain size roughly correlates to group size.  So, the larger the hominin brain grows, the larger the group.

Not surprisingly, Mithen’s metaphor indicates the social circle under the most intense selection pressure, irrespective of group size.

0008 What does this imply?

Obviously, group size is not the crucial factor in hominin evolution.

Whatever is increasing hominin brain size is.

0006 To me, it is not surprising that Mithen has not encountered Razie Mah’s review of his 1996 work, even though it is one of the few more-than-surface reflections on The Prehistory of The Mind available.

Perhaps, the same will go for this blog, which will take Mithen’s metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle quite literally. 

09/4/25

Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 23 of 23)

0229 So, what is The Language Puzzle about, in an implicit sort of way?

It is about how speech gets added to hand talk after the domestication of fire.

The irony of the work is found in Mithen’s explicit denial of the gestural origins of language, while…

… at the same time, the author provides a solution to a question that he cannot even pose.

0230 Examinations don’t get better than this.

This examination adds value to Mithen’s work in a surprising fashion.

0231 This examination suggests that a tremendous amount of theoretical reformulation needs to be done.  In particular, the following juxtaposition of events is suggestive.

0232 I ask, “Does Homo sapien’s encounter, love affair, then divorce from the Neanderthals create a condition where speech becomes more and more independent as a mode of talking?  Does speech become capable of operating linguistically, independent of hand talk, yet remain integrated into the natural-sign references of hand-talk?”

0233 Take a look at the artifact of the lion-man, pictured in figure 3 on page 28 of Mithen’s text.

Maybe, we can ask him.

Do you think that he has something to say to us?

Surely, he cannot perform hand-talk.

So, the lion-man must speak for itself.

0233 Yes, it’s like synaesthesia gone wild.

0234 But, “wild” is not even close to this last implication, which tells me that our current Lebenswelt is not the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

What about the item in red?

See Razie Mah’s e-books, The First Singularity and It’s Fairy Tale Trace (for a technical proposal) and An Archaeology of the Fall (for a dramatic rendering), available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0235 With that said, I thank Steven Mithen for publishing a book that can be fruitfully read both explicitly and implicitly.

Also, the story does not end here, because this examination plays a prominent role in the next commentary, Looking at Julian Jaynes’s Book (1976) “The Origin of Consciousness in The Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind”.

07/31/25

Looking at Hugh Ross’s Book (2023) “Rescuing Inerrancy” (Part 1 of 25)

0001 The full title of the book before me is Rescuing Inerrancy: A Scientific Defense (2023, Reasons To Believe Press, Covina California).  The author, Hugh Ross, is an excellent writer and a Christian scientist.  The qualifier is crucial here, because biblical inerrancy is mysteriously conjunct the modern construct of scientific inerrancy.  “Conjunct” means “stuck with”.

0002 The book has both a greek and a semitic architecture.  As noted in The Instructor’s Guide to An Archaeology of the Fall (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), the two literary styles represent different types of recognition.

The greek argument presents a variety of opinions, weeds out the inadequate ones, then proclaims the one left standing, the winner.  One might call it “linear thinking”.  The greek style dominates the second half of the book (chapters 12 through 20), concluding with the proposal of a “model approach”.

The semitic style presents various rhetorical tricks, aiming to induce the reader to recognize a possibility.  Am I saying that the Bible is full of rhetorical tricks?  I suggest the reader look at the appendix of Ross’s book on that one.  Or, consider the Genesis use of the word, “day”, in the Creation Story.  The word leads to a flight of fancy, so to speak, asking the reader to recognize that the reported events are themselves, a flight of… what?… not of fancies, but of revelations… or significations… that become more and more esoteric (or hidden) even as they appear more and more exoteric (or obvious).

0003 What about Adam and Eve, fashioned from dust and rib, respectively?

Oh, they end up getting fooled by a talking snake.

0004 Christians are fine following the exoteric lessons and scratching their heads about some of the esoteric implications.

The problem is that Christians are stuck with the sciences.  Conjunct!  Science is all about truncated material and efficient causalities.  Truncated?  Scientific causalities are shorn of formal and final causation.  Formal and final causes are metaphysical (a step beyond physics) because they concern triadic relations.  It is like being able to account for all the motions (the truncated material and efficient causes) of a mechanical clock without acknowledging that the clock has a design (formal cause) and purpose (final cause)

And, the purpose has ‘something’ to do with us!

0005 The positivist intellect has a rule.  Metaphysics is not allowed.

So Christians are conjunct with a positivist intellect who has no idea that the purpose of the Genesis text may have something to do with us, right now, not as we once were at some time in the not-so-distant past.  The positivist intellect cannot consider that the first chapter of Genesis may be like a clock or whatever mechanical analogy one wants to use.  Is it a story designed to set the “time”?  The time of what?

Truncated material and efficient causalities cannot ideate what Christians observe (and sort of… measure, in the sense of “weighing”) in Scripture.  Christians struggle to discern what the early chapters of Genesis could possibly reveal.  Plus, those possibilities are not obvious at all.  Even a plain reading of these stories tells the inquirer, “A plain reading of this text is not enough.”

0006 The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics, published in 1982, says as much.  Ross lists the relevant articles in chapter three.

For example, in article eighteen, the convening theologians confirm that the text of Scripture is to be interpreted by grammatical and historical exegesis, so that Scripture is used to interpret Scripture.  Then, they reject the legitimacy of various modern quests, including postulating extra-Biblical civilizational sources, relativizing the text by comparing it to evolutionary science, demonstrating that the accounts are not “historical” in the modern sense of the word, and rejecting the Bible’s claims to authorship.

Here is a picture.

0007 I ask, “Are these theologians affirming that Genesis 1-11 confronts the reader with the possibility of ‘something’, and that ‘something’ is not obvious from a plain reading of the text?”

They say, “Look at the grammar.  Look at what the stories are saying in regards to history, in the widest sense of the term.”

0008 I ask, “Are these theologians denying that Genesis 1-11 can be assessed, compared to, and explained by scientific empirio-schematic inquiry?”

It sure looks that way.

And, that is a problem in a civilization where science appears triumphant.

07/1/25

Looking at Hugh Ross’s Book (2023) “Rescuing Inerrancy” (Part 25 of 25)

0211 This examination adds value to Ross’s project in five ways.

First, it introduces a history that encompasses the modern conundrum presented in this text.

Hugh Ross and the Reasons To Believe Team are actors in a theodrama that is at least 800 years old.

Plus, that theodrama is about to undergo a pivot that is captured in the following figure.

0212 Yes, the redemption2c offered by the party that exalts grace3c over nature3c and the protocols2c offered by the party that exalts nature3c over grace3c, are now entangled because, on the content level, the Creation Story is a sign of the evolutionary record and the Primeval History is an insider’s view of the start of our current Lebenswelt.

0212 Second, this examination offers a semiotic way to view what Ross is trying to articulate.  Theologians should be interested in sign-relations.  Scientists take sign-relations for granted.  Ross’s book is titled as if a scientific defense will rescue Biblical inerrancy.  This makes no sense unless its taken from a semiotic point of view.  Inerrancy draws the Bible, especially Genesis 1-11, into hitherto unimagined triadic relations with scientific inquiry.  The empirio-schematics of artistic concordism and the first singularity are variations of what ought to be for the Positivist’s judgment.

When, you think about it, signs tend to share certain characteristics with the term, “inerrancy”.  Every sign-vehicle stands for its sign-object in regards to its sign-interpretant.  Even if the interpretant is camouflage, the sign-relation purports to be flawless and honest in its own way.  Indeed, all signs are “inerrant” in the eyes of God.

0213 Third, this examination offers a way of appreciating how Ross’s efforts aesthetically derive from the Positivist’s and the empirio-schematic judgments.  Indeed, Ross’s project towers head and shoulder above other projects in the Venn diagram of science and religion because his aesthetics are one step away from the ways that scientists operate.

0214 Fourth, this examination offers a slightly different version of concordism than Ross.  Mah’s artistic version may assist Ross’s moderate version in future research.  In particular, I pray for a science book on the Earth’s evolutionary history to accompany Exercises in Artistic Concordism.  Wouldn’t that be fantastic?

Fifth, this examination offers a wonderful endpoint, in the form of a label for the single actuality implied by the intersection of redemption2c and protocols2c.  The early scholastics knew this label well.   And now, perhaps, the following dyad will be born again.

0215 My thanks to Hugh Ross and this team at Reasons To Believe for publishing a book worthy of examination.

06/30/25

Looking at George Mikhailovsky’s Chapter (2024) “Meanings, Their Hierarchy, and Evolution” (Part 1 of 9)

1053 The text before me is chapter six of Pathways (see point 831 for book details, pages 101 through 136).  The author is one of the editors of Pathways.

1054 To me, the abstract introduces evolution writ large.

The abstract suggests that the interventional sign-relation precedes semiotic agency, as far as evolution writ large goes.  Evolution writ large includes the evolution of the inanimate universe along with the evolution of life.

1055 Before life, inanimate objects manifest only as meanings-in-themselves.  An evolving macroscopic thing may be labeled an “eventity”, which seems like a real initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs) or an action that could be goal-directed2c (SVi).

Surely, some eventities rely on lower-level entities.  But, what about agency and subagency?

With non-human life, hierarchies of sub-agents3 operate within each living agent3 (or “holobiont”).

With human life, persons3, who are holobionts in terms of anatomy and physiology, operate as subagents within… what?… social circles?

1056 The introduction (section 6.1) starts with an observation.  The term, “meaning” is typically used in three situations.

Here is the list along with associated sign-elements.

1057 This coincidence is remarkable.  At the very start of the introduction, the author offers situational instances of “meaning” that correlate to the three sign-objects intrinsic to a three-level interscope.

The author then writes that he is interested in the first two types (the ones associated with semiotic agency) but not so much the third type (the one associated with the interventional sign relation), because this one is already well-developed in linguistic semiotics.

1058 But, there is another coincidence to note.

Recall that Peirce’s typology of natural signs is based on the categorical qualities of the sign-object.

The icon is a sign-relation whose sign-object is based on the qualities of firstness, including images, pictures, unities, wholes.  The logic of firstness is inclusive and allows contradictions.  A sign-vehicle stands for its sign-object on the basis of similarity or imagery.

The index is a sign-relation whose sign object is based on the qualities of secondness, including contact, contiguity, pointing, influence, cause and effect and so on.  The logic of secondness includes the law of noncontradiction.  A sign-vehicle stands for its sign-object on the basis of indication and pointing.

The symbol is a sign-relation whose sign-object is based on the qualities of thirdness, including normal context, mediation, judgment, habit, tradition and so on.  The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment.  A sign-vehicle stands for its sign-object on the basis of convention.

1059 Since all sign-objects belong to secondness, I can assign Peirce’s typologies on the basis of the category of the level in a three-level interscope.  Icon goes with the level of content.  Index associates the situation level.  Symbolmatches the perspective level.

1060 Here is a list of associations.

1061 I ask, “How well do the two coincidences correspond?

1062 I start with thirdness, an exemplar sign is a symbol whose sign-object, SOe, denotes a goal2c on the perspective level.  The sign-object has the qualities of both acquired habit and innate disposition.  So, the assignment of symbolworks.

1063 For secondness, a specifying sign is an index whose sign-object, SOs, denotes a symptom2b on the situation level. I suppose that corresponds to information2b.  A symptom2b virtually situates its phenomenon2a in the same way that information3b virtually situates an initiating (semiotic) event2a.  The sign-object holds the qualities of indication and pointing.  So, the assignment of index works.

1064 For firstness, an interventional sign is an icon whose sign object, SOi, denotes something that is indicated or expressed in spoken words or symbols2a on the content level.  Does that correspond to intention expressed2a (SOi)?  Or, better yet, does that correspond to an image of intention expressed2a (SOi) that is contiguous with a real initiating event2a (SVs) in the dyadic content-level actuality2a?

Is the third situation for “meaning” an image that is indicated or expressed in spoken words and symbols.

Imagine that!

‘Something’ is an image.

06/20/25

Looking at George Mikhailovsky’s Chapter (2024) “Meanings, Their Hierarchy, and Evolution” (Part 9 of 9)

1137 The material that I cover in my portrayal of C1 and C2 using Frege’s triangle goes with section 6.3, titled “Potential Meanings During the Abiotic Period of the Evolution of the Universe”.

Here is a picture.

C4 (is missing because it) covers the genesis of atoms with masses greater than helium.  Technically, C4 follows C5, as written above.  Why?  Atoms with masses greater than helium are produced by nuclear fusion in stars.  The story bifurcates from the cosmic sequence to the substance sequence.  The substance sequence starts with atoms with masses greater than helium and proceeds through the emergence of life.

1138 The Frege triangles for C1 and C2 are easy compared to what follows in section 6.4 (“Evolution of Meanings in Biological Systems”) and 6.5 (“The Evolution of Meanings in Human Societies and the Relationship between Hierarchies of Substance (that is, biology) and Semantics (that is, within our current Lebenswelt)”).

Nevertheless, my exercises demonstrate the utility of Frege’s triangle in the extension of the biosemiotic interscope into all aspects of postmodern inquiry, including into abiotic noumena, the domains of physics and chemistry.

1139 There are many threads to follow in this demonstration.

The first thread is obvious.  Can this be done for all noumena listed in Table 6.2?

The answer is yes.  Once one starts a spiral, other spirals follow, and they diverge, and they coalesce, and who knows what else.

1140 The starting point of the author’s cosmos chain (C1) is obviously the Big Bang.

But, one can say that other starting points can be imagined, hence theories of the multiverse.  The multiverse consists of many universes, each with different energy, space, natural laws and constants.  Physicists can simulate these many “universes”.  Hollywood movie makers can fashion plotlines from the conceptc.  It is all very theatrical, including the name for the start of our own universe, “the first singularity”.

1141 The starting point of the author’s substantial chain (S1) is atoms, made in stellar furnaces because (up to the atomic configuration of iron) fusing atoms releases a tremendous amount of energy, enough to keep a star from falling in on itself from gravity.

Anyone who has cracked a chemistry textbook knows that there is no “first singularity” to be found in this discipline.  One can imagine that each element in the periodic table constitutes its own singularity.  Spirals diverge and coalesce in the most fantastic ways, so there is no telling which molecules are the precursors to life and which are not.

1142 This is where Frege’s terms complement Peirce’s.

Frege’s terms serve as spoken labels.  Labels are used for symbolic operations.  Symbolic operations undergird grammar (that is, language).  So, Frege’s terms point to the somewhat disturbing intimation that speech-alone talk (or a theoretical equivalent) is intercalated into semiotic agency and, by way of bridging, to significance that is outside of semiotic agency (that is, the interventional sign-relation).

Here is a picture.

1143 Peirce’s terms also serve as spoken labels.  These labels apply to the contiguities between real elements in the actualities of all interscopes.  These labels apply to something like [substance], in a contiguity between something like matter and something like form.  To a greater or lesser extent, all dyads in Peirce’s secondness pay tribute to Aristotle’s hylomorphe as an exemplar.

1144 The biosemiotic interscope reifies into the biosemiotic noumenal overlay, including both semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation.

This chapter presents an impossible challenge.  Spirals (or hierarchies) go back to the first singularity, thirteen billion years ago.  Each spiral brings the inquirer to a new level.  Some spirals write small, others write large, but they all begin … for us … with a clot.  A pen touches paper, then moves to portray a diagram, a purely relational structure, portraying what all living things have in common.

1145 This examination recites all that has gone before.

This examination is a refutation to those who think that modern science knows enough to weave these spirals into a vision of our universe, as well as of us, the images of the one who speaks the universe into being.

1146 I say, “Diagram spirals!”

Perhaps, the author agrees and anticipates that Frege’s triangles will reveal a hierarchy… or is it?… a spirality that portrays meanings and their evolution.