Tag Archives: category based nested form

05/13/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 8 of 8)

0975 In the closing, section 7.8, the author mentions a confounding word.

0976 What is that word?

Communication.

0978 Well, at least I can offer two other labels, “inter” and “infold”, which apply when the message comes externally or internally.

I don’t think that either “inter” or “infold” correspond to “communicate”.

And yet, they must.

0979 To this examiner, the conceptual apparatuses of potential meanings and potential signs entangle two features of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay, [presence] and [message].  “Potential meaning” dwells within [presence] and seems integral when an SOs “causes” an SVe.  “Potential sign” dwells within [message] and seems crucial to two types of contiguity between SOi and SVs, [inter] and [infold].

0980 By way of conclusion for this chapter, which harkens back to the beginnings of life on Earth, yet ends with humans in our current Lebenswelt, I would like to repeat the transformation that Sharov and Tonnessen perform(perhaps, unwittingly, but leading to great insight) in Semiotic Agency.  They transform the specifying and the exemplar sign relations into a dyad, suitable to overlay over the noumenon of what all living systems have in common.

0981 Specifically, they transform a fairly mature three-level interscope (comparable to the scholastic interscope for how humans think) into a dyad (matter2b [salience] form2c}) within a dyad (matter2c(2b( [self-governance3b: courses of action1b] form(2a))).

0982 Now, I review.

But, this will be more than a review.

I want to re-enact Sharov and Tonnessen’s construction of semiotic agency.

Plus, I want to add a reification of the interventional sign-relation, which completes the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

0983 And most of all, I wish to perform this transformation and this re-enactment on the Deacon and Tabaczek interscope for emergence, appearing in Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues) and in the Razie Mah’s blogs for April through June, 2024.

0984 Here is a diagram of the three-level interscope for emergence.

0985 The element corresponding to the biosemiotic real initiating (semiotic) event is “the contained circulation of ingredients2a“.

For mitochondria, this is the separation of oxidative and reductive reactions involved in the combustion of glucose with oxygen.  On the oxidative side, glucose loses electrons to biomolecules capable of carrying them, generating a few ATP equivalents in the process.  On the reductive side, oxygen gains electrons from those electron-bearing biomolecules, generating lots of ATP equivalents in the process.

0986 The combustion of glucose with oxygen is disposed to move towards equilibrium3a and, when ignited1a, may do so with the release of lots of heat.

Mitochondria do not allow ignition.  Rather, they use the separation of the oxidative and reductive reactions1b in the normal context of utilizing the nonequilibrium dynamics (of what would be combustion)3b in order to generate emergent beings, ATP2b.  ATP2b then makes its way from mitochondria to various enzymatic sites in the eukaryotic cell.

ATP2b is a high-energy molecule and will decompose if left alone.  So, an enzyme3c that has the potential of using ATP2b “simplifies1c” the situation, by using the energy-released when ATP becomes ADP plus Pi (inorganic phosphate in solution) in order to perform a cellular actions2c, such as building a protein2c or transporting a molecule across a membrane2c.

0987 Back to the diagram.

The content-level category-based nested form for mitochondria “burning” glucose and oxygen follows.  The normal context of combustion3a brings the actuality of separated oxidation and reduction reactions2a into relation with the potential of ‘conducting these spontaneous reactions separately’1a.

For the situation level, the normal context of taking advantage of a nonequilibrium dynamic3b brings actual biosynthesis of ATP2b into relation with the agent’s ability to transfer free-energy from the oxidation of glucose and the reduction of oxygen to the emergent being1b.

For the perspective level, the normal contexts of enzymatic forms3c perform various biophysical operations2c based on the potential of coupling the energy-releasing degradation of ATP with an energy-requiring cellular operation1c.

0988 Here is the transformation to a dyad within a dyad coupled to an interventional sign-relation.

On the perspective level, the persistence of an eukaryotic cell2c [means] the power2c to accomplish various biochemical tasks.

For the interventional sign-relation, power2c (SVi) stands for a disposition2a (SOi) in regards to the normal context of chemical reactivities3a operating on the potential to displace chemicals to distinct compartments1a (SIi).

On the content level, the disposition2a to keep the reagents coming2a {(SOi) [message]} adds more new ingredients to the container2a (SVs).

0989 The actualities go with phenomena.  These are real elements.

The normal contexts and their respective potentials are what need to be explained.  These are the major contiguities between actualities on different levels.

A minor contiguity occurs within each level, [message] for content, [presence] for situation and [meaning] for perspective.

0990 These associations may be subject to revision.  That is the nature of exploration into the topic of “potential meanings”.

I thank the author for his well-referenced chapter and hope that this examination adds value to the text.

05/12/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 1 of 6)

0991 The text before me is chapter eight of Pathways (see point 0831 for book details, pages 167-185).  The full title is “A Constructivist Approach to Meanings in the Universe”.  The author is a linguist at Baikal University, Irkutsk, Russia.

0992 My examination, so far, identifies a biosemiotic noumenal overlay, composed of both semiotic agency (the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay) and the interventional sign relation.  The diagram reifies three sign-relations: specifying, exemplar and interventional.  The specifying and exemplar sign-relations belong to semiotic agency.  The interventional sign relation stands outside of semiotic agency, but is integrated with semiotic agency by way of its participation in a three-level interscope.  A three-level interscope contains all three sign-relations.

0993 The following figure of an interscope contains the three sign-elements (SV for sign-vehicle; SO for sign-object; SI for sign-interpretant) for each sign-relation (subscripts “s” for specifying; “e” for exemplar; “i” for interventional).

0994 An interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.

For each level, a triadic normal context3 brings a dyadic actuality2 into relation with a monadic potential1.

The dyadic actuality2 fits Peirce’s formula for the category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  For clear notation, the contiguity is placed in brackets.

0995 In the above figure, the real elements are sign-vehicles and sign-objects.  The contiguity in each level carries the same label as one of the three potentials1 underlying any spoken term2 in the normal context of definition3.

Finally, among levels, perspectivec brings situationb into relation with the potential of contenta.

0996 Hmmm.  I have an interruption.

Now, what was I saying?

Uh-oh, I better start over.

0997 My examination, so far, isolates a biosemiotic noumenal overlay, composed of both semiotic agency (the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay) and the interventional sign relation.  The biosemiotic noumenal overlay reifies three sign-relations: specifying, exemplar and interventional.  The specifying and exemplar sign-relations belong to semiotic agency.  The interventional sign relation stands outside of semiotic agency, but is integrated with semiotic agency by way of two contiguities, [meaning] and [message].

0998 Here is a picture of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

0999 So far, so good.

The author of this chapter addresses the existence of meaning in the universe from an epistemological perspective.  “Episteme” derives from the Latin word for “knowledge”.  “Logos” comes from the Greek word for “word”.  Or maybe, “intrinsic nature of”?   How about “study of”?

Looking at the above figure, I see a problem.

For this examination, [meaning] is the contiguity between the exemplar sign-object (SOe) and the interventional sign-vehicle (SVi).

Is that the same as “the meaning” that exists in the universe?

1000 It makes me wonder, “What is a contiguity?”

Here are some cases.

1001 Aristotle’s hylomorphe is exemplar.  The much-abused word, “substance”, weirdly captures the way that matter “causes” form.  The verb, “substantiates”, is just as effective.  Can I justify the choice of the term, “substance”?  Well, what is one more technical definition among the many dictionary definitions for the word, “substance”?  Is that good enough?

One thing for sure, [substance] is not one of the real elements.  [It] is neither matter nor form.  [It] is the contiguity between them.  So, what is [substance]?

1002 We (humans) know [substance] because we know [cause], [effect], [contact], [influence] and many more contiguities between real elements.  This is precisely why contiguities cry out to be modeled.  The real elements support phenomena.  The contiguities cry out to be explained.

We (humans) also know actuality2.  Semiotic agency begins with a real initiating (semiotic) event (SVs) (that is, an encounter).  The first step in natural philosophy (for Aristotle’s tradition) is to regard a thing as matter [substance] form.  See Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

Actuality2 belongs to the Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  Secondness is dyadic.

1003 With this said, I can see why there is a problem with [meaning].  [Meaning] is a contiguity between two real elements.  One of those elements (SOe) belongs to semiotic agency.  The other element (SVi) belongs to the interventional sign-relation.

1004 Earlier, in points 0887 through 0894, I portray [meaning] as the contiguity between the triadic structure of an actionable judgment (such as SOe) and the triadic structure of its category-based nested form (such as SVi).

In this case, another word for [meaning] is [unfolds].

An actionable judgment [unfolds into] a category-based nested form.

This very curious insight is not explored further in this examination.

05/6/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 6 of 6)

1049 Or, should I say?

SOi is what a disinterested observer would objectify if he were actually on the suprasubjective level, which he obviously claims to be.

So, where is the language game?

Is it in our brains or in our minds?

In section 8.4, the author raises a rather frightening option.

The agent3 may be the human nervous system3 rather than the human person3.

Does the potential of ‘final causality’1 implicate my brain1 or my mind1?

1050 Oh my, does my own brain3 bring forth the actuality of semiotic agency2 with the potential of ‘a final causality, where meaning and message bring forth my mind in an entanglement of the suprasubjective and the subjective (very similar to language and also very similar to the idea that both my Innerwelt and my Umwelt are Outerwelt to my nervous system)’1?

How about Daisy’s mind?

Or the duck’s?

1051 Here is a picture of the semiotic three-level interscope, with descriptive dyads for the perspective and content-level actualities displayed.

The colors indicate complementary pairs.

To me, these pairs look like human adaptations into the niche of triadic relations.  The human niche includes the potentials of interscopes and sign-relations.  The pairs link dyadic actualities on the perspective level and the content level of a three-level interscope.  These actualities contain contiguities that bridge the interventional sign-relation and semiotic agency.

1051 If [message] goes with “mind” and if [meaning] goes with the contiguity between two real elements, a goal2c and its expression as a real event2c, I may ask, “Are ‘meaning’ and ‘mind’ brought forth by a… gasp… brain?”

What about “language”?

Or, are mind and meaning organic to the reality that the three-level interscope also contains three sign-relations and the fact that the interventional sign-relation bridges to semiotic agency through the contiguities of [meaning] and [message]?

These are good questions.

1052 Sometimes, it is good to conclude an examination with a few of good questions.

My thanks to the author of this chapter, fully titled, “The Constructivist Approach to Meanings in the Universe”. 

04/30/25

Looking at Arthur Reber, Frantisek Baluska and William Miller Jr’s Chapter (2024) “The Sentient Cell” (Part 1 of 4)

0600 The text before me is chapter thirteen of Pathways (2024).  See point 0474 for book details.  The chapter title is “The Sentient Cell”.  The chapter is the first in Part III, titled “Meaning in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.  The chapter covers pages 281 to 298.

The authors of the chapter hale from diverse locations.  Arthur Reber works in the Department of Psychology at the University of British Columbia, Canada.  Frantisek Baluska is located at the Institute of Cellular and Molecular Botany, at the University of Bonn, Germany, and William Miller Jr. resides in the delocalized Bioverse Foundation.

0601 Delocalized?

Where else is one to locate bioversity?

0602 The abstract covers, in so many words, familiar territory (1 and 2).

First (1), semiotic agents3,1 are characterized by relationality, as well as thingness.  The category-based nested form serves to illustrate.

Semiotic agency is a dyadic “thing”.

The entire category-based nested form is a triadic “thing”.

0603 The category-based nested form includes all three of Peirce’s categories.  Each category expresses its own logic.  Category-based nested forms are fractal.  These lessons are garnered from two e-articles, A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0604 Second (2), agents3 and their potentials1 may be arranged hierarchically.  Lower-level subagents support the functionality of higher-level agency.  At the same time, higher-level agents call upon the operations of lower-level subagents.

Peirce has a technical term for the way thirdness contextualizes secondness and secondness situates firstness.  He calls it “precission”.

Some biologists offer a term for the way that higher-level agents appear to emerge from and situate lower-level agents.  They offer the word, “control”.  Unfortunately, “control” is already a technical term used in mechanical and electrical engineering.  I wonder whether these applications of the physical sciences are appropriate analogies for biosemiotics.

0605 So, I propose a word familiar to modern politics, and more appropriate to entities that are born, live and die.  The word starts like “precission”.  The word ends like “tide”.  And, the word conveys the impression of an agent1 calling subagents2 into a unified exercise of intentionity1.

The word is “presides”.

0606 A higher-level agent3 presides over subagents through the engagement of its semiotic agency2, arising from the potential of ‘something intentional’1.

Subagents are built into an agent’s semiotic agency2 and participate in its sign-interpretants of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations (SIs and SIe).

Here is a picture of semiotic agency and its sign-elements.

0607 The authors do not frame these now-familiar lessons (1 and 2) in terms of agent3((1) and semiotic agency2.

Instead, they marvel at the coterminality of life (cell) and awareness (sentience).

Why use the terms, “life” and “sentience”, as if they are separate concepts, the latter eventually qualifying the former?

Later in the article, the authors couple “sentience” and “consciousness” as if the latter is “what the cell would be if it were… um… subjectively experiencing the world like us (humans).”

0608 Of course, sentient cells are not “conscious” in the same way that humans are when awake (as opposed to asleep).

Clearly, the authors play a language game (typical for speech-alone talk in our current Lebenswelt).

0609 Sentience presides over life.  Life supports sentience.

To me, these key terms associate to the sign-interpretants of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations (SIs and SIe).

0610 Here is how that looks.

04/26/25

Looking at Arthur Reber, Frantisek Baluska and William Miller Jr’s Chapter (2024) “The Sentient Cell” (Part 4 of 4)

0636 If the agent3 defines2(3) what it is conscious of2(2) within the actuality of semiotic agency2, then what it is conscious of2(2) emerges from and situates the potential of meaning, presence and message2(1) as if it2(1) is a real manifestation of the potential of ‘final causality’1.

Now I can ask, “If the sentient cell3 could speak2(2), how would it label the actualities2 within it3?”

0637 Here are my guesses.

0638 Message goes with firstness and the real initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs).  If there is no message, then why should I pay attention?

Presence goes with secondness and information2b (SOs, contiguous with SVe).  There is a certain ambiguity to information.  Sure, the real initiating event2a (SVs) stands for information2b (SOs) in regards to being alive3b((1b) (SIs).  But, information2b (SVe) also stands for a meaningful goal2c (SOe) in regards to my consciousness, if “consciousness” is the spoken word that applies3c((1c)).

Meaning goes with thirdness and a goal2c (SOe), which entails a judgment.  Do I (the agent3) act or not?

0639 Such a dramatic question.

As soon as I3 act, I express my intentions1. It is as if I3 act out my semiotic agency2 for gasp… all to witness, including those disinterested biologists.

Oh my, I feel exposed.

0640 At the end of the chapter (section 13.3), the authors raise the topic of subjective experience.

This topic concludes their discussion, in the same way that a dessert concludes a dinner.

But, I want to pass on that confection.

0641 Instead, let me review where this chapter has taken this examiner.

The authors offer a variation of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay that seems especially applicable to non-human agency.  Message, presence and meaning label phenomena.  Or, maybe they are conjectures that constitute observations and measurements of biological phenomena.  

Is the main reason that biosemioticians can draw upon these labels because the terms already exist in the lexicon of our civilization?

For example, Pavlov’s term, “anticipation”, turns out to be a productive guide for labeling a meaning, presence and message that biologists observe and measure.

Or, is something more significant going on?

0642 Here is a picture of semiotic agency and terminology discussed in this examination.

0643 Of course, technical words that apply to meaning, presence and message for the semiosis of a living creatureshould remain relevant.  Words that do not may be culled.

This speaks to a concern that is found in these examinations.  Biologists love to purloin common terms (such as “anticipation”) in order to construct their technical terminology (where “anticipation” codes for operant conditioning), leading to occasional confusion (as to whether “anticipation” is a conscious action or an unconscious process).

0644 Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay characterizes semiotic agency2, as occurring in the normal context of an agent3 and arising from the potential of Aristotle’s final causality’1.  This serves as a very attractive corrective to the indiscretions of certain biologists who fall in love with their terminology (including, I am afraid to say, the authors of the present chapter).

0645 Yes, I admit that “the sentient cell” is a fabulous label for models that arise from biological observations of message, meaning and presence in semiotic agency.

But still, one must be careful not to occlude the semiotics within the S&T noumenal overlay.

0646 Here is a picture of the thing itself against the beautiful… outrageously evocative… terminology at play in this chapter.

0647 Yes, I, too, suffer the temptation of falling in love with spoken words.

This is one of the difficulties of our current Lebenswelt.

I thank the authors for their clever and rhetorical excursion into a topic that they obviously cherish.

04/25/25

Looking at Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “…How Bacterial Cells… Change… in Response to Various Signals” (Part 1 of 4)

0648 The text before me is chapter fourteen in Pathways (see point 0474 for book details).  The chapter covers pages 299 to 324.  The authors are Vic Norris at the University of Rouen, France, and Alexei Sharov at Elixirgen Scientific in Baltimore, Maryland.

The full title is “Hypothesis about How Bacterial Cells Sustain and Change Their Lives in Response to Various Signals”.  The fullness of the title is significant.  Elements may be associated to the S&T noumenal overlay.

0650 Here are my associations.

The only term not in the association is “hypothesis”.

0651 Looking back to chapter 13, concerning the sentient cell, the model of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBB), illuminates what the authors are constructing.  They project sentience from human consciousness onto the behavior of living bacteria.  Life and sentience are coterminous.

I suppose the authors’ hypothesis proposes that such a project is scientifically legitimate.

I already know the answer from the S&T noumenal overlay.  Semiotic agency2 is a reification of a three-level interscope, a purely relational structure which contains the specifying and exemplar sign relations.  This allows the designation of features that are crucial for empirio-schematic inquiry: phenomena and what needs to be modeled.

0652 Message, presence and meaning associate to phenomena.

The contiguities of [life] and [sentience] are what need to be modeled.

0653 Unfortunately, the authors do not have tools to visualize Peirce’s philosophy, which opens a window to two realms that cannot be observed and measured by humans: normal context3 and potential1.  Indeed, these two realms constitute the sign-interpretants of level-crossing sign-relations.  Which explains why [life] and [sentience] are precisely what models need to explain.

0654 So, how to the authors proceed?

The abstract and the first two sections (14.1 and 14.2) inform the reader as to the character of the project.

The proposed model for [self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b (SIs)] describes bacteria as hierarchically structured.  Functional roles are performed by hyperstructures, assemblies of molecules and macromolecules operating in multiple-level coordination as subagents. “Hyperstructures” are functionally competent states (coordinating as “temporal phenotypes”).

This model envisions subagents scrambling to support the ongoing hyperstructure or to change to a more appropriate hyperstructure.  The authors label this scramble, “competitive coherence”. 

The proposed model for [salience3c((1c)) (SIe)] is “plasticity”.  The resulting coordinated order among subagentsmaintains or changes cellular integrity… er… “identity”, as conditions either remain the same or alter.  Plasticity addresses the question, “What is the bacteria going to do?”  In effect, competitive coherence establishes a stage for a phenotypic expression of the holobiont.

0655 Does this argument flow into the structure of the S&T noumenal overlay?

Here are my associations.

0656 For the specifying sign-relation, various cues and signals2a (SVs) stand for competitive coherence2b (SOs) in regards to bacteria cells responding3b by potentially sustaining or changing their hyperstructure (or “temporal phenotype”)1b (SIs).

For the exemplar sign-relation, competitive coherence2b (SVe) stands for maintaining the cell’s identity2c (SOe) through plasticity3c((1c)) (SIe), where plasticity is the ability to hold or shift from one temporal phenotype to another.

0657 Now, an expert in bacteria should be able to observe and (in experiments) measure phenomena related to cues and signals2a (which the researcher can control), competitive coherence2b (patterns of behavior among bacterial subagents) and the maintenance or change of cell identity2c (observed as what actions the holobiont takes).

0658 These noumena may be objectified as phenomena that the researcher observes and measures.

04/22/25

Looking at Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “…How Bacterial Cells… Change… in Response to Various Signals” (Part 4 of 4)

0680 Now I can draw another association between category-based nested forms.

0681 If biosemiotics is what all biological processes have in common, and if the authors are biologists who both study and participate in biological processes, then a technical discussion concerning how bacterial regulate their functions in response to various signals should contain a certain irony.

0682 So, it is no surprise that these biosemiotic researchers define3 “complexity”2 as situating the potential of ‘biological explanations of bacterial cues and signals using semiotics’1.

0683 The normal context of definition3 compares to how any biological organism defines itself within its Umwelt3.

0684 The actuality of the spoken word, “complexity”2, compares to what any biological organism is figuratively “conscious of”2 (especially in regards to a model of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness).  Or maybe, “complexity” describes what we are conscious of when we regard the semiotic interplay within any biological organism.

Plus, in the discussion section (14.5), “complexity” touches base with the “subjective experience” of an organism, from the point of view of a disinterested observer (the biosemiotician) looking in.  Perhaps, the organism is “conscious” of its “phenotype”.

0685 The potential of ‘explanations (meaning) of cues & signals (message) using semiotics (presence)’1 compares to the potential of ‘identity (meaning), competitive coherence (presence) and events within the Umwelt (message)’1 for any biological organism.

0686 Surely, this implies that Norris and Sharov’s hypothesis applies to any biological organism, not just bacteria.

How so?

In points 0634 and 0635, the category-based nested form for definition meshes with the actuality2 of semiotic agency.

Here is the same diagram applied to the bacterium.

Does it seem that speech-alone talk infiltrates semiotic agency?

It is as if a bacterium3 speaks2 its identity1.

0687 At the same time, I must keep in mind that biosemiotics dwells in the house of science.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay, that is semiotic agency2, is objectified by biological phenomena in regards to meaning, presence and message1.  Or, should I say, “…in regards to SOe, SOs [&] SVe, and SVs.”?

These phenomena (what is for the Positivist’s judgment) are observed and measured in order to produce models using the disciplinary languages (including diagrams) of biosemiotics (what ought to be for the Positivist’s judgment).

All this occurs under the auspices of a positivist intellect (relation for the Positivist’s judgment) who would rather do without metaphysics  But hey, semiotic agency2 is an actuality2 within a triadic relation.  Without a normal context3and potential1 for semiotic agency2, biosemiotics simply does not register.

0688 Perhaps, “the temporal phenotype that the agent seems to be conscious of”2(2) corresponds to what needs to be explained in the S&T noumenal overlay.  If so, then the agent is “conscious” by way of its specifying and exemplar sign-interpretants (SIs and SIe).

That is to say, two sign-interpretants constitute an organism’s figurative “consciousness”.

Surely, these sign-interpretants3((1)) cannot be reduced to actuality2 because they reside outside of Peirce’s category of secondness.  However, because the entire nested form in the above figure meshes with the actuality of semiotic actuality2, these sign-interpretants3((1)) are incorporated into the realm of secondness2 by an agent3 (say, a bacterium) on the basis of the potential of ‘a final causality’1.

So, what does a scientist do?

The scientist reaches for the label, “complexity”.

It is sort like asking a familiar civilized term to execute a tricky cognitive manipulation.

0689 Who would anticipate that?

Surely, Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov propose a worthy hypothesis on on how bacterial cells sustain and change their lives in response to various signals.  The phenomenon of competitive coherence is worth elevating, along with the phenomena of identity and cues within the Umwelt. These phenomena are observable and measurable sign-elements ofthe S&T noumenal overlay.

0690 At the end, I am left with the ambiguity of “definition”.

What compares to definition?

In general, the normal context of definition3 brings the actuality of a spoken word (or term)2 into relation with the potential of meaning, presence and message1.

For this chapter, the normal context of the agent defining itself with its Umwelt2(3) brings the actuality that the agent is “conscious” of its “phenotype”2(2) into relation with the potentials of ‘identity (meaning), competitive coherence (presence) and signals and cues (message)’2(1).

For the unfolded empirio-schematic judgment, the normal context of disciplinary language3 brings the actuality of (complex) models for “the phenotype”2 into relation with the potential of ‘observations and measurements of biological phenomena’1.

0691 Here is a picture of the last two category-based nested forms in the previous point.

Clearly, a comparison between a definition that meshes with semiotic agency and the empirio-schematic judgment is provocative.

Yet, that provocation is in tune with the author’s proposal.

0692 That proposal is constructed with spoken words.

Speech-alone talk can label anything.  And, now we can label the meanings, presences and messages within biological organisms as if they are phenomena.  We can also model our observations and measurements of these phenomena using spoken words that describe what needs to be explained, the sign-interpretants themselves.

0693 Here is one implication.

Biosemiotics is the field of inquiry3 that brings definitions that mesh with semiotic agency2 into relation with the potential of empirio-schematic inquiry1.

Perhaps, this is why the field of biosemiotics seems to be older than science as configured by modern Positivists (beginning with the mechanical philosophers of the 1600s).

And younger.

0694 For the modern Positivists, empirio-schematic inquiry (what ought to be, secondness) belongs to the realm of actuality and the noumenon [and] its phenomena (what is, firstness) belongs to the realm of possibility.

For the postmodern biosemiotician, empirio-schematic inquiry opens up to the categories of thirdness and firstness,which are the same categories encountered in Aristotle’s formal and final causalities.

The implications are difficult to fathom.

0695 I thank the authors for this chapter and hope this examination adds value to their inquiries.

04/21/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 1 of 5

0696 The text before me is chapter fifteen in Pathways.  Details on the book are found in point 0474.  Chapter fifteen covers pages 325 through 344.  This is the third chapter in Part III, titled, “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”, which is a long way of saying, “Non-human Agency”. The chapter’s full title is “Self-Reinforcing Cycles and Mistakes: The Emergence of Subjective Meaning”.

0697 Hmmm, I wonder, “Does the structure of the chapter’s title offer an example of a self-reinforcing cycle and a mistake?”

After all, the topic is the emergence of subjective meaning.

The proposed mechanism for the emergence is self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes.

0698 Putting the mechanism before the subject is like putting a cart before the donkey.  The cart contains the mechanism.  The donkey represents the emergent being.

This reminds me of the way that modern scientists are all about mechanistic and mathematical models (the cart).  They disregard the noumenon (the donkey).  They go so far as to say that the cart should take the place of the donkey.  But, who ever heard of a cart that pulls itself? 

0699 As far as the category-based nested form pictured below goes.  The donkey goes with agent3.  The cart associates to semiotic agency2.  The donkey3 contextualizes the cart2.  The donkey3 brings the cart2 into relation with the potential of ‘final causality’1, which does not appear in the title.  Or does it?

0700 The chapter’s title contains the terms “self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes”.  These go with actuality, just like the cart.

The chapter’s title contains the term “subjective meaning”.  I suppose that this goes with the normal context3, just like the donkey.  

0701 Okay, what about the word, “emergence”, where does that fit in?

Uh-oh.

0702 Let me step back and ask myself, “How could a cart reveal the donkey as a normal context, rather than an actuality?”

How could self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes reveal subjective meaning as a normal context, rather than an actuality?”

0703 Hmmm.  I suppose some adjustments are in order.

Emergence3 must be the normal context that brings the actuality of the dyad, donkey [pulls] cart2, into relation with well… the potentials that historically puts the donkey and the cart together1.  Now, there’s an empedoclement.

Also, emergence3 must be the normal context that brings the actuality of the dyad, subject [experiences] meaning2, into relation with the potentials of ‘self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes’1.  Ah, that suggests opportunities for empedoclements to happen.

0704 Usually, mistakes are impediments.

Occasionally, a mistake will be an empedoclement, which is the inverse of an impediment.

On top of that, some empedoclements seem (after the fact) to be inevitable.  During the Uruk period of southern Mesopotamia, the donkey is domesticated for long-distance trade.  The wheel is invented to make pottery.  In retrospect, the actuality of donkey [pulls] cart2 seems destined.

0704 Now, all that I need to do is to realize that subjective meaning2 is an actuality.  Actuality2 is dyadic.  So, subjective meaning2 can be rendered as a dyad, consisting of two contiguous real elements.  The two real elements?  I suppose they must be the subject and the experience.  After all, both are real.  That leaves [meaning] as the contiguity.

In the following figure, the lower category-based nested form parallels the upper.

0705 Okay, by analogy, the title of “Self-Reinforcing Cycles and Mistakes: The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” reminds me of an anthropological story about the invention of the donkey pulled cart during the Uruk archaeological period of southern Mesopotamia.

0706 Having concluded my examination of the author’s prowess is synthesizing titles, I proceed directly to the conclusion (section 15.8), where the author makes three points (and maybe, one more) by way of summary (S, T U and maybe, V).

0707 First (S), NeoDarwinism may be a factor in evolution.  But, it is not the only one.

On one hand, tell that to a modern biologist and watch the listener’s body-language say, “Oh no, am I talking to one of those intelligent design advocates?”

On the other hand, if I say, “Neodarwinism does not take triadic relations in account.  If it did, then biological evolution would have to be called ‘mysterious’.”

Then, the modern biologist might think, “Oh worse! It’s a postmodern semiotician!”

But, it is not my mission to point out that biosemiotics performs what Christian intelligent design enthusiasts want to do, but cannot.  Biosemiotics brings all of biology into the gambit of triadic relations, including Neodarwinism.

0708 How so?

In Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome, (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), Razie Mah shows that the living being (individual, species or genus) is the intersection of adaptation and phenotype.  Then, in How To Define The Word “Religion”, Razie Mah shows that intersections are mysterious, fulfilling the expectation that the word, “mystery”, accounts for the message underlying the word, “religion”.

0709 Here is a picture of where I am going with this.

One category-based nested form is horizontal.  The other is vertical.

Several steps are required to get there.

But, once I am there, the author’s claim that neodarwinism is insufficient will make sense in terms of semiotic agency.

04/8/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 5 of 5)

0735 How is biology… er… NeoDarwinism… incomprehensible?

0736 First of all, neodarwinism is an intersection.  An intersection contains contradictions that cannot be resolved.  That is why intersections are mysteries.  Philosophers can elucidate the contradictions, but they can never resolve them without cognitively reconfiguring the single actuality.

0737 For example, there are two major branches of evolutionary science.  For the most part, natural historians ignore the vertical axis and geneticists ignore the horizontal axis.  Everyone else ends up confusing niche1H and genotype1V as if these potentials1b situate “equivalent” actualities2a.

0738 The mystery within neodarwinism may be of interest to those concerned about mysteries.

After all, the Positivist’s judgment does not anticipate anything like this.  How can terms for two radically different models for the origins of species simply be clapped together?  I suppose that speech-alone talk can label anything, even mysteries… even, “neodarwinism”.

Well, “neo” is not exactly “genetic”.

Genodarwinism?

Perhaps, “neodarwinism” should be called out for what it is.

0739 Another reason why neodarwinism is incomprehensible is because the (hidden) content-level actualities2a do not have normal contexts3a and potentials1a.  They are the foundations2a of situation-level potentials1b that support situation-level normal contexts3b (natural selection3b and body development3b).  Does ecology and environment (as actualities independent of the adapting species)2a have anything to do with DNA2a (as the template for reproduction and cellular organization)?

I think not.

0740 So, how does one make biology… er, the evolution of subjective meaning on Earth… comprehensible?

This is the question that the author wrestles with.

The answer is in the title.  It must have something to do with the operations of self-reinforcing cycles.  How does biological meaning evolve?

Occasionally, mistakes do not act as impediments, but serve as empedoclements.

0741 Plus, the answer may have something to do with Peirce’s natural signs and how brainless creatures behave according to what we expect in terms of these natural signs.  When the behavior of brainless creatures is regarded through the lens of Peirce’s natural-sign typology, directionality and originality are obvious.  These obvious concepts must be indispensable for an explanation of the evolution of subjective meaning within biological entities.

0742 Neodarwinism will not do (S, T, U).

That much is for sure.

The role of Peirce’s natural signs (V) is a guess.

Or, should I say, “an intelligent guess”?

0751 For me, one of the pleasures of examining these chapters comes from the fact that the authors do not have a diagram of the S&T noumenal overlay before them, but they write like they are fishing around for the diagram.

In this case, the author does not catch, but almost hooks, a much bigger fish than neodarwinism.  Indeed, directionality (the horizontal axis) and originality (the vertical axis) are built into the diagram of the semiotic agent as a mystery, in the style of neodarwinism.

0752 Remember, the author discusses non-human, or rather, brainless organisms and ends up with an alluring line for appreciating the evolution of meaning in the universe.

My thanks to the author for the fishing expedition.  What a wonderful cast.

04/7/25

Looking at Hongbing Yu’s Chapter (2024) “…Danger Modeling…” (Part 1 of 7)

0753 The text before me is chapter seventeen of Pathways (2024, see point 0474 for details. pages 363-375).  This chapter concludes Part III, titled, “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.  The related title in Semiotic Agency (2021, see point 0473) is “Nonhuman Agency”.  The author works at Toronto Metropolitan University, in the Department of Languages, Literatures and Cultures.

The full title of chapter seventeen is “The Peculiar Case of Danger Modeling: Meaning Generation in Three Dimensions”.

0754 Of course, danger offers great examples for semiotics.  The abstract says as much.  In 2022, Marcel Danesi publishes a book on the topic, titled Warning Signs: The Semiotics of Danger.

For example, when a dog growls at me2a, that serves as a sign-vehicle (SVs) that is interpreted by my self-governance3bcontextualizing the potentials of various courses of action1b (SIs) in order to construct information2b (SOs).

0755 Here is a picture, using the S&T noumenal overlay.

0756 Yes, semiotic agency looks like a noumenon that exhibits observable and measurable facets (phenomena) that may be used to construct models of [self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b (SIs)] and[sentience3c((1c)) (SIe)].

Does the reader notice my sleight of hand in the preceding statement?

I substitute “sentience” for “salience” in SIe.

0757 The substitution is justified because information2b (SOs [&] SVe) says, “Danger is present.”

The “danger” goes with SOs.  Its “presence” is what I am sentient of (SVe).

The exemplar sign-relation goes like this.  The danger2b (SVe) that I am sentient of3c,1c (SIe) stands for something that I can avoid or safely ignore2c (SOe).

0758 So, what is the problem?

The author does not have the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay, which is foundational for the Positivist’s judgment, when it comes to biosemiotics.

Consequently, the author proposes that Thomas Sebeok’s concept of modeling may be used as a productive approach.  After all, modeling offers a highly integrative framework for meaning generation.

0759 Shall we see?

If highly integrative frameworks for meaning (that is, Sebeok’s models) are um… “natural”… for humans, then they should support implicit abstractions, characteristic of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Implicit abstractions are holistic.

0760 But, there is a problem.

We no longer live in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices hand- and hand-speech talk, which is holistic and relies on Peirce’s natural sign-relations of icon and index.  Of course, symbols operate in the background, allowing hand talk to become linguistic.

0761 Our current Lebenswelt practices speech-alone talk.

0762 How is this relevant to the current discussion?

With speech-alone talk, different aspects of a holistic implicit abstraction can be explicitly labeled.

The author identifies three dimensions to Sebeok’s models (as highly integrative frameworks of meaning): existential, representational and interpretational.

0763 These three dimensions are explicit abstractions.  They label “dimensions” of a model that frames message{SVs}2a and integrates presence {SOs [&] SVe}2b into meaning {SOe}2c.

In short, these dimensions bring this examiner right back to semiotic agency.

0764 Say what?

These dimensions bring this examiner right back to specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

So, the direction that this examiner will take, with plenty of creativity (hence, mistakes), calls to mind the S&T noumenal overlay, as the purely relational structure that all biological entities and processes have in common, including the case of me, surprising an unfamiliar dog, who is snarfing something already dead, found in a pile of autumn leaves.  The incident occurs on my morning walk with Daisy (who is taken by surprise herself, along with me).