The other agent, the human, practices hand-speech talk, and occasionally is faced with moments when consultation may be advisable. The community faces difficulties. What are we to do?
Let the community-leader ask the lion-man.
1218 The Neanderthal cannot do this, because Neanderthals only practice hand-talk.
The humans practice hand-speech talk. The ivory figure cannot hand talk. So, the lion-man must speak.
1219 At this point, I enter the terrain of a precocious book, proposing that modern consciousness rises from the ashes of the breakdown of whatever is going on when the Paleolithic community-leader is speaking to lion-man, or rather, hearing the disembodied voice of lion-man. The book is The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind(1976), by Princeton psychologist and psychohistorian, Julian Jaynes (1920-1997).
1220 The lion-man speaks in an interventional sign-relation.
Here is a picture.
Today, lion-man would be an app on an i-phone.
1221 This example brings this examiner through section 18.5 (“Material Anchors for Conceptual Blends”) and into section 18.6 (“Conclusion”).
1222 I rest my pen.
My thanks to the author, Lorenzo Magnani, and his team at the Computational Philosophy Laboratory. May they find a way to portray the semiotics of a world that does not compute, otherwise labeled, the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
1223 The text before me is chapter three of Semiotic Agency (2021, book details on point 830, pages 59-94).
1224 The abstract raises the question of evolution. The question is addressed earlier in this examination. Points 0710 through 0752 assert that the actualities of adaptation2b and phenotype2b are not the same. One does not situate the other. Instead, their nested forms intersect in such a manner as to constitute a single actuality2. Adaptation2b and phenotype2b intersect to constitute a living being2.
1225 How shall I proceed?
Semiotic Agency yields the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenaloverlay by taking an interscope that is similar to the scholastic interscope for how humans think and transubstantiating it from thirdness to secondness.
In thirdness, the scholastic interscope contains the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.
1226 Here is a diagram.
In secondness, the elements from these triadic sign-relations fit into a dyad, characteristic of Peirce’s secondness.
1227 The dyad consists of two contiguous real elements, very much in tune with Aristotle’s exemplar, matter [substance] form.
The following depicts a dyad within a dyad. Each dyad exhibits its own configuration.
For the fundament, the specifying sign, SOs is like matter, SVs is like form, and SIs is [substance]. In a sense, a form of the sign-vehicle calls forth the matter of a sign-object, in the way that say, the form of a traffic stop sign2a (SVs) calls forth the matter of stopping the vehicle2b (SOs).
For the resonant, the exemplar sign, SVe is like matter, SOe is like form, and SIe is like [substance]. The matter of me following the rules of the road2b (SVe) stands for my successful arrival at my driving destination2c (SOe) in regards to making sense3c operating on the possibility that if everyone obeys the rules of the road then each one of us will get where we are going to1c (SIe).
1228 This dyad within a dyad performs what phenomenology claims to do, that is, identify what the noumenon must be.
The noumenon of what?
Biosemiotics.
Or, should I say, “Biosemiotics as an exercise of the Positivist’s judgment, however compromised the positivist intellect may be.”?
1229 Of course, this is a fantastic claim. But, this examination of Semiotic Agency (see point 830 for book details) and Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (see point 831 for book details) bears me out. Sharov, Tonnessen and Mikhailovsky set the stage for a paradigm that not only is phenomenological, but accounts for how phenomenology works. This examination adds value by presenting the diagrams.
The current examination looks at two books, described in point 0830 and 0831..
Here is how the examination starts.
These two examinations are available as e-books, by Razie Mah, under the title, Biosemiotics as Noumenon, Parts 1 and 2. Part 1 is subtitled, “Semiotic Agency”. Part 2 is subtitles, “Origins of Life”.
0864 Part 3 concerns nonhuman agency. This examination is completed.
Part 4, concerning human agency, remains.
0865 The reading list for Part 4 starts with a discussion of Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) “New Beginnings”, by Razie Mah. The commentary is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
There is cause for this.
0866 The STI noumenal overlay (Sharov and Tonnessen’s semiotic agency along with the interventional sign-relation) not only explains why phenomenology works, but it also recovers some philosophical riches of the much-derided scholastic era. Modern histories of philosophy during the twentieth century often omit the period from the 500s to the 1400s, corresponding to the birth and development of universities throughout Christendom. Some call the period, “the dark ages”.
It is sort of like the way modern social sciences pooh-pooh phenomenology.
Academic turf must be protected. Who is more important, an expert in modern analytic philosophy or a so-called schoolman who can explicate Saint Thomas Aquinas?
0867 One of those treasures is uncovered by John Deely (1942-2017). Deely is both a Thomist and a semiotician (in the tradition of Charles Peirce). Deely figures out that Charles Peirce (in the 1800s) arrives at the same definition of the sign-relation as Baroque scholastic, John Poinsot (also John of St. Thomas, in the 1600s).
This discovery is discussed in New Beginnings. But, it is not the only surprise.
0868 What is of interest to me, in this examination of biosemiotics, is the fact that the specifying and exemplar sign-relations are embedded in a three-level interscope composed of category-based nested forms, which I call, the scholastic interscope for how humans think.
The reason is obvious. Semiotic agency2 is a reification of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.
0869 So, the trajectory of this examination proceeds by way of the following script.
0870 So, this juncture between non-human agency and human agency ends and the examinations continue.
0883 Here is a diagram showing the way that Sharov and Tonnessen bring a three-level interscope into a dyadic actuality suitable for laying over the noumenon of all biological processes.
Empirio-schematic inquiry into biosemiotics may now fruitfully employ this noumenal overlay as the thing that is objectified by biosemiotic phenomena.
0884 But, there is more.
The interventional sign-relation is difficult to fathom, because its sign-vehicle cannot be seen. It must be inferred. In biosemiotics, that inference represents phenomena. It is the goal2c as a sign-vehicle (SVi).
More on that in short order.
0885 Here is a picture of the interventional sign-relation within the scholastic interscope.
Before discussing the strangeness of the perspective-level sign-vehicle2c (SVi), I want to dwell on our (human) familiarity of the content-level.
What is more routine than asking the question, “What happening?”, as if this is a normal context3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening’1a?
The question asks for content, and the answer comes by way of sensation2a (SOi). For animals, sensations do not come packaged with loads of information. For humans, they do. A simple statement, like “Where did you put your token?”, which is really a question, gets rapidly decoded into the content-level {SOi}2a.
Yes, the SOi is a real element. The SVs is a real element. The contiguity between the two is [message].
That token (SVs) is a ticket to ride (SOs).
0886 The familiar character of the content-level SOi and SIi hides the unfamiliar nature of the perspective-level SVi.
0887 The judgment2c in the above figure contains two contiguous real sign-elements. One is the exemplar sign-object (SOe) and the other is the interventional sign-vehicle (SVi). As already discussed, the contiguity is [meaning]. For biosemiotics, the medieval scholastic term, “judgment2c“, corresponds to {SOe [meaning] SVi}2c.
0888 At the same time, for postmodern scholastics, judgment2c is a triadic relation.
Indeed, it is the triadic relation that stands at the start of this lengthy examination v(see point 0005).
0889 There are two types of judgment. The one depicted above is contemplative. The other is actionable. Once Peirce’s three categories are assigned, one category to one element, then the judgment becomes actionable. An actionable judgment unfolds into a category-based nested form.
Does “unfolds” sound like [meaning]?
0890 One example should suffice.
The scholastics harbor an ideal for judgment2c. As far as they are concerned, this judgment2c is the best. A rational intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the intelligibility of perception (what ought to be, firstness) into relation with the universality of sensation (what is, secondness).
This is a level-headed judgment, for sure. The scholastics are trying to be sensible, even when they face the nonsensical mysteries of life and revelation. No wonder they have such riotous and entertaining debates. In Latin, no less.
0891 Here is a picture of the scholastic’s ideal judgment.
0892 The assignments of the categories are crucial.
Thirdness goes into the normal context3.
Secondness goes into actuality2.
Firstness goes into the possibility of ‘something’1.
0893 Categorical assignments appear in the above figure.
If the assignments are different, then the judgment would unfold into a different category-based nested form.
This is critical, if I rotate the current assignments one notch counterclockwise, then the intelligibility of my perceptionsbecomes the normal context3, bringing the actuality of my “rational intellect”2 into relation with the possibility that ‘my sensations are universal’1. Replace “intelligibility of perceptions3” with “knowledge3“, “rational intellect2” with “don’t contradict me2“, and “universality of sensations1” with “universality of what I experience1“. Then, the unfolded nested form says, “The normal context of my knowledge3 brings the actuality of ‘don’t contradict me’2 into relation with the possibility that what I experience is universal1.”
0894 Doesn’t that sound like expertise?
Rotating the categorical assignments one notch counterclockwise takes the inquirer from the scholastic idea to modern expertise. Experts are knowledgable3, elevate their own experiences1 over others, and do not enjoy being contradicted2.
Scholastics are just trying to be rational intellects3, bringing the universality ofwhat they sense2 into relation with the possibility of ‘an intelligent perception’1.
0895 So, I have a working definition of [meaning], as a judgment2c (SOs) unfolding into a category-based nested form2c (SVi).
Also, from point 0862, I have a working definition of [message], as the continuity between an expression of intention (SOi) and an initiating (semiotic) event (SVs). Plus, the initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs) is not the same as the event that occurs after judgment2c unfolds into an action2c (SVi).
0896 Here is a picture of the interventional sign, along with its contiguities.
0897 These contiguities turn out to be the connections between semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation.
This is shown clearly in the biosemiotic (or STI) noumenal overlay.
In sum, the scholastic interscope for how humans think assists in appreciating the nature of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.
The scholastic interscope contains three boundary-crossing sign relations. Two belong to semiotic agency. One belongs to the interventional sign-relation.
The scholastic interscope also contains three contiguities between sign-relations. These correspond to content-level [message], situation-level [presence] and perspective-level [meaning].
0898 Finally, there is Peirce’s natural sign typology, consisting of icons, indexes and symbols.
An icon is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the qualities of images, pictures, unities, monads and so forth.
An index is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the characteristics of pointing, contact, cause and effect, and other dyads.
A symbol is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the stuff of habit, convention, law, agreement, and so on.
0899 I conclude with a list of the sign-relations that are embedded in the scholastic interscope for how humans think,along with the sign-object and type of natural sign.
0900 This information should prove handy in the upcoming examination of human agency.
0600 The text before me is chapter thirteen of Pathways (2024). See point 0474 for book details. The chapter title is “The Sentient Cell”. The chapter is the first in Part III, titled “Meaning in Organism Behavior and Cognition”. The chapter covers pages 281 to 298.
The authors of the chapter hale from diverse locations. Arthur Reber works in the Department of Psychology at the University of British Columbia, Canada. Frantisek Baluska is located at the Institute of Cellular and Molecular Botany, at the University of Bonn, Germany, and William Miller Jr. resides in the delocalized Bioverse Foundation.
0601 Delocalized?
Where else is one to locate bioversity?
0602 The abstract covers, in so many words, familiar territory (1 and 2).
First (1), semiotic agents3,1 are characterized by relationality, as well as thingness. The category-based nested form serves to illustrate.
Semiotic agency is a dyadic “thing”.
The entire category-based nested form is a triadic “thing”.
0603 The category-based nested form includes all three of Peirce’s categories. Each category expresses its own logic. Category-based nested forms are fractal. These lessons are garnered from two e-articles, A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
0604 Second (2), agents3 and their potentials1 may be arranged hierarchically. Lower-level subagents support the functionality of higher-level agency. At the same time, higher-level agents call upon the operations of lower-level subagents.
Peirce has a technical term for the way thirdness contextualizes secondness and secondness situates firstness. He calls it “precission”.
Some biologists offer a term for the way that higher-level agents appear to emerge from and situate lower-level agents. They offer the word, “control”. Unfortunately, “control” is already a technical term used in mechanical and electrical engineering. I wonder whether these applications of the physical sciences are appropriate analogies for biosemiotics.
0605 So, I propose a word familiar to modern politics, and more appropriate to entities that are born, live and die. The word starts like “precission”. The word ends like “tide”. And, the word conveys the impression of an agent1 calling subagents2 into a unified exercise of intentionity1.
The word is “presides”.
0606 A higher-level agent3 presides over subagents through the engagement of its semiotic agency2, arising from the potential of ‘something intentional’1.
Subagents are built into an agent’s semiotic agency2 and participate in its sign-interpretants of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations (SIs and SIe).
Here is a picture of semiotic agency and its sign-elements.
0607 The authors do not frame these now-familiar lessons (1 and 2) in terms of agent3((1) and semiotic agency2.
Instead, they marvel at the coterminality of life (cell) and awareness (sentience).
Why use the terms, “life” and “sentience”, as if they are separate concepts, the latter eventually qualifying the former?
Later in the article, the authors couple “sentience” and “consciousness” as if the latter is “what the cell would be if it were… um… subjectively experiencing the world like us (humans).”
0608 Of course, sentient cells are not “conscious” in the same way that humans are when awake (as opposed to asleep).
Clearly, the authors play a language game (typical for speech-alone talk in our current Lebenswelt).
0609 Sentience presides over life. Life supports sentience.
To me, these key terms associate to the sign-interpretants of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations (SIs and SIe).
0753 The text before me is chapter seventeen of Pathways (2024, see point 0474 for details. pages 363-375). This chapter concludes Part III, titled, “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”. The related title in Semiotic Agency (2021, see point 0473) is “Nonhuman Agency”. The author works at Toronto Metropolitan University, in the Department of Languages, Literatures and Cultures.
The full title of chapter seventeen is “The Peculiar Case of Danger Modeling: Meaning Generation in Three Dimensions”.
0754 Of course, danger offers great examples for semiotics. The abstract says as much. In 2022, Marcel Danesi publishes a book on the topic, titled Warning Signs: The Semiotics of Danger.
For example, when a dog growls at me2a, that serves as a sign-vehicle (SVs) that is interpreted by my self-governance3bcontextualizing the potentials of various courses of action1b (SIs) in order to construct information2b (SOs).
0755 Here is a picture, using the S&T noumenal overlay.
0756 Yes, semiotic agency looks like a noumenon that exhibits observable and measurable facets (phenomena) that may be used to construct models of [self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b (SIs)] and[sentience3c((1c)) (SIe)].
Does the reader notice my sleight of hand in the preceding statement?
I substitute “sentience” for “salience” in SIe.
0757 The substitution is justified because information2b (SOs [&] SVe) says, “Danger is present.”
The “danger” goes with SOs. Its “presence” is what I am sentient of (SVe).
The exemplar sign-relation goes like this. The danger2b (SVe) that I am sentient of3c,1c (SIe) stands for something that I can avoid or safely ignore2c (SOe).
0758 So, what is the problem?
The author does not have the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay, which is foundational for the Positivist’s judgment, when it comes to biosemiotics.
Consequently, the author proposes that Thomas Sebeok’s concept of modeling may be used as a productive approach. After all, modeling offers a highly integrative framework for meaning generation.
0759 Shall we see?
If highly integrative frameworks for meaning (that is, Sebeok’s models) are um… “natural”… for humans, then they should support implicit abstractions, characteristic of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. Implicit abstractions are holistic.
0760 But, there is a problem.
We no longer live in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices hand- and hand-speech talk, which is holistic and relies on Peirce’s natural sign-relations of icon and index. Of course, symbols operate in the background, allowing hand talk to become linguistic.
0761 Our current Lebenswelt practices speech-alone talk.
0762 How is this relevant to the current discussion?
With speech-alone talk, different aspects of a holistic implicit abstraction can be explicitly labeled.
The author identifies three dimensions to Sebeok’s models (as highly integrative frameworks of meaning): existential, representational and interpretational.
0763 These three dimensions are explicit abstractions. They label “dimensions” of a model that frames message{SVs}2aand integrates presence {SOs [&] SVe}2binto meaning {SOe}2c.
In short, these dimensions bring this examiner right back to semiotic agency.
0764 Say what?
These dimensions bring this examiner right back to specifying and exemplar sign-relations.
So, the direction that this examiner will take, with plenty of creativity (hence, mistakes), calls to mind the S&T noumenal overlay, as the purely relational structure that all biological entities and processes have in common, including the case of me, surprising an unfamiliar dog, who is snarfing something already dead, found in a pile of autumn leaves. The incident occurs on my morning walk with Daisy (who is taken by surprise herself, along with me).
0819 In the interventional sign-relation, the agent3 and final causality1 are exposed in the same way that a helium balloon, suddenly rising above a carnival crowd, says, “Someone just let go of their balloon (SOe).”
Semiotic agency reaches a terminus (SOe). That terminus is contiguous with an interventional sign-vehicle (SVi). The contiguity is [meaning, mn]. The balloon rises from a perspective-level actuality2c (SVi) into the mundane atmosphere of a content-level actuality2a (SOi) in the normal context of say, what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a (SIi).
The rising balloon2a sends a message [mg] that says, “Now that I’ve caught your attention3a((1a)), I will serve as the next real initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs).”
0820 Here is a picture.
0821 The interventional sign relation occupies the existential dimension.
The existential dimension seems so much more dangerous than the other two.
0822 The representative and interpretive dimensions belong to semiotic agency.
0823 I suppose I may say that – if I must choose the second most dangerous dimension – the interpretative dimensioncomes next.
Why?
If I have poor information2b (SVe) and have an unworthy goal (SOe), then {SOe [meaning] (SVi)}2c may yield an intervention that misses the mark.
I suppose I am trying to say, “If the interpretative dimension is wayward, then the existential dimension becomes more dangerous.”
0824 Section 17.5 concludes the article by dwelling on the three dimensions and their roles in modeling danger.
0825 However, the existential dimension contains a hidden and disturbing discovery. The existential dimension is outside of semiotic agency. The existential dimension contains the interventional sign-relation.The existential dimension may reveal the agent3 and the final causality1 that make semiotic agency2 an actuality2.
0826 Here is a picture of how semiotic agency (containing the representative and interpretive dimensions) entangles the interventional sign-relation (constituting the existential dimension).
0827 I thank the author for this wonderful chapter, fully titled “The Peculiar Case of Danger Modeling: Meaning-Generation in Three Dimensions”, marking the conclusion of Part III of Pathways, titled “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.
This chapter marks the end of this examination of the biosemiotics of nonhuman agency and opens a portal to an examination of human agency.
0828 Biosemiotics is more than semiotic agency. Biosemiotics includes the interventional sign-relation. Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay, more creative and productive than any noumenal overlay that biology has seen so far, now entangles an existential dimension.
0471 I have, under examination, two texts that bring the inquirer to the door of a truly postmodern discipline of biosemiotics. Biosemiotics adheres to the relational structure of the Positivist’s judgment, but with a caveat. Metaphysics is allowed. The positivist intellect must accept metaphysics in order to understand semiotic agency2, in the normal context of an agent3 operating on the potential of final causality1. Final causality is necessarily metaphysical.
0472 Here is a picture of the category-based nested form for semiotic agency2 as an actuality2 that requires understanding3((1)).
0473 The first book is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer (Switzerland) and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. Series editors are Kalevi Kull, Alexei Sharov, Claude Emmeche and Donald Favareau. These authors and editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the continuing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.
0474 The second book is Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe, edited by Alexei Sharov and George Mikhailovsky. Each chapter has its own author(s). The book is published in 2024 by Scrivener Press (Beverly, MA) and logs in as volume 1 in Scrivener’s Series on Astrobiology Perspectives on Life in the Universe. Series editors are Martin Scrivener and Phillip Carmical. Chapter authors and book editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the continuing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.
0475 Now, I look back.
The examination starts by examining Parts I and III of Semiotic Agency. This covers historical development and theory of the discipline of biosemiotics. The discussion covers points 0001 to 0270 and will be packaged under the title Biosemiotics As Noumenon 1: Semiotic Agency. The package, by Razie Mah, should be available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
The examination continues by looking at the end of Part II of Semiotic Agency (chapter 5) along with Part II of Pathways(chapters 9-12). The discussion covers points 0271 to 0470 and will be packaged under the title Biosemiotics as Noumenon 2: Origins of Life.
