Tag Archives: exemplar sign

04/30/25

Looking at Arthur Reber, Frantisek Baluska and William Miller Jr.’s Chapter (2024) “The Sentient Cell” (Part 1 of 4)

0600 The text before me is chapter thirteen of Pathways (2024).  See point 0474 for book details.  The chapter title is “The Sentient Cell”.  The chapter is the first in Part III, titled “Meaning in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.  The chapter covers pages 281 to 298.

The authors of the chapter hale from diverse locations.  Arthur Reber works in the Department of Psychology at the University of British Columbia, Canada.  Frantisek Baluska is located at the Institute of Cellular and Molecular Botany, at the University of Bonn, Germany, and William Miller Jr. resides in the delocalized Bioverse Foundation.

0601 Delocalized?

Where else is one to locate bioversity?

0602 The abstract covers, in so many words, familiar territory (1 and 2).

First (1), semiotic agents3,1 are characterized by relationality, as well as thingness.  The category-based nested form serves to illustrate.

Semiotic agency is a dyadic “thing”.

The entire category-based nested form is a triadic “thing”.

0603 The category-based nested form includes all three of Peirce’s categories.  Each category expresses its own logic.  Category-based nested forms are fractal.  These lessons are garnered from two e-articles, A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0604 Second (2), agents3 and their potentials1 may be arranged hierarchically.  Lower-level subagents support the functionality of higher-level agency.  At the same time, higher-level agents call upon the operations of lower-level subagents.

Peirce has a technical term for the way thirdness contextualizes secondness and secondness situates firstness.  He calls it “precission”.

Some biologists offer a term for the way that higher-level agents appear to emerge from and situate lower-level agents.  They offer the word, “control”.  Unfortunately, “control” is already a technical term used in mechanical and electrical engineering.  I wonder whether these applications of the physical sciences are appropriate analogies for biosemiotics.

0605 So, I propose a word familiar to modern politics, and more appropriate to entities that are born, live and die.  The word starts like “precission”.  The word ends like “tide”.  And, the word conveys the impression of an agent1 calling subagents2 into a unified exercise of intentionity1.

The word is “presides”.

0606 A higher-level agent3 presides over subagents through the engagement of its semiotic agency2, arising from the potential of ‘something intentional’1.

Subagents are built into an agent’s semiotic agency2 and participate in its sign-interpretants of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations (SIs and SIe).

Here is a picture of semiotic agency and its sign-elements.

0607 The authors do not frame these now-familiar lessons (1 and 2) in terms of agent3((1) and semiotic agency2.

Instead, they marvel at the coterminality of life (cell) and awareness (sentience).

Why use the terms, “life” and “sentience”, as if they are separate concepts, the latter eventually qualifying the former?

Later in the article, the authors couple “sentience” and “consciousness” as if the latter is “what the cell would be if it were… um… subjectively experiencing the world like us (humans).”

0608 Of course, sentient cells are not “conscious” in the same way that humans are when awake (as opposed to asleep).

Clearly, the authors play a language game (typical for speech-alone talk in our current Lebenswelt).

0609 Sentience presides over life.  Life supports sentience.

To me, these key terms associate to the sign-interpretants of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations (SIs and SIe).

0610 Here is how that looks.

04/26/25

Looking at Arthur Reber, Frantisek Baluska and William Miller Jr.’s Chapter (2024) “The Sentient Cell” (Part 4 of 4)

0636 If the agent3 defines2(3) what it is conscious of2(2) within the actuality of semiotic agency2, then what it is conscious of2(2) emerges from and situates the potential of meaning, presence and message2(1) as if it2(1) is a real manifestation of the potential of ‘final causality’1.

Now I can ask, “If the sentient cell3 could speak2(2), how would it label the actualities2 within it3?”

0637 Here are my guesses.

0638 Message goes with firstness and the real initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs).  If there is no message, then why should I pay attention?

Presence goes with secondness and information2b (SOs, contiguous with SVe).  There is a certain ambiguity to information.  Sure, the real initiating event2a (SVs) stands for information2b (SOs) in regards to being alive3b((1b) (SIs).  But, information2b (SVe) also stands for a meaningful goal2c (SOe) in regards to my consciousness, if “consciousness” is the spoken word that applies3c((1c)).

Meaning goes with thirdness and a goal2c (SOe), which entails a judgment.  Do I (the agent3) act or not?

0639 Such a dramatic question.

As soon as I3 act, I express my intentions1. It is as if I3 act out my semiotic agency2 for gasp… all to witness, including those disinterested biologists.

Oh my, I feel exposed.

0640 At the end of the chapter (section 13.3), the authors raise the topic of subjective experience.

This topic concludes their discussion, in the same way that a dessert concludes a dinner.

But, I want to pass on that confection.

0641 Instead, let me review where this chapter has taken this examiner.

The authors offer a variation of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay that seems especially applicable to non-human agency.  Message, presence and meaning label phenomena.  Or, maybe they are conjectures that constitute observations and measurements of biological phenomena.  

Is the main reason that biosemioticians can draw upon these labels because the terms already exist in the lexicon of our civilization?

For example, Pavlov’s term, “anticipation”, turns out to be a productive guide for labeling a meaning, presence and message that biologists observe and measure.

Or, is something more significant going on?

0642 Here is a picture of semiotic agency and terminology discussed in this examination.

0643 Of course, technical words that apply to meaning, presence and message for the semiosis of a living creatureshould remain relevant.  Words that do not may be culled.

This speaks to a concern that is found in these examinations.  Biologists love to purloin common terms (such as “anticipation”) in order to construct their technical terminology (where “anticipation” codes for operant conditioning), leading to occasional confusion (as to whether “anticipation” is a conscious action or an unconscious process).

0644 Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay characterizes semiotic agency2, as occurring in the normal context of an agent3 and arising from the potential of Aristotle’s final causality’1.  This serves as a very attractive corrective to the indiscretions of certain biologists who fall in love with their terminology (including, I am afraid to say, the authors of the present chapter).

0645 Yes, I admit that “the sentient cell” is a fabulous label for models that arise from biological observations of message, meaning and presence in semiotic agency.

But still, one must be careful not to occlude the semiotics within the S&T noumenal overlay.

0646 Here is a picture of the thing itself against the beautiful… outrageously evocative… terminology at play in this chapter.

0647 Yes, I, too, suffer the temptation of falling in love with spoken words.

This is one of the difficulties of our current Lebenswelt.

I thank the authors for their clever and rhetorical excursion into a topic that they obviously cherish.

04/25/25

Looking at Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “…How Bacterial Cells… Change… in Response to Various Signals” (Part 1 of 4)

0648 The text before me is chapter fourteen in Pathways (see point 0474 for book details).  The chapter covers pages 299 to 324.  The authors are Vic Norris at the University of Rouen, France, and Alexei Sharov at Elixirgen Scientific in Baltimore, Maryland.

The full title is “Hypothesis about How Bacterial Cells Sustain and Change Their Lives in Response to Various Signals”.  The fullness of the title is significant.  Elements may be associated to the S&T noumenal overlay.

0650 Here are my associations.

The only term not in the association is “hypothesis”.

0651 Looking back to chapter 13, concerning the sentient cell, the model of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBB), illuminates what the authors are constructing.  They project sentience from human consciousness onto the behavior of living bacteria.  Life and sentience are coterminous.

I suppose the authors’ hypothesis proposes that such a project is scientifically legitimate.

I already know the answer from the S&T noumenal overlay.  Semiotic agency2 is a reification of a three-level interscope, a purely relational structure which contains the specifying and exemplar sign relations.  This allows the designation of features that are crucial for empirio-schematic inquiry: phenomena and what needs to be modeled.

0652 Message, presence and meaning associate to phenomena.

The contiguities of [life] and [sentience] are what need to be modeled.

0653 Unfortunately, the authors do not have tools to visualize Peirce’s philosophy, which opens a window to two realms that cannot be observed and measured by humans: normal context3 and potential1.  Indeed, these two realms constitute the sign-interpretants of level-crossing sign-relations.  Which explains why [life] and [sentience] are precisely what models need to explain.

0654 So, how to the authors proceed?

The abstract and the first two sections (14.1 and 14.2) inform the reader as to the character of the project.

The proposed model for [self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b (SIs)] describes bacteria as hierarchically structured.  Functional roles are performed by hyperstructures, assemblies of molecules and macromolecules operating in multiple-level coordination as subagents. “Hyperstructures” are functionally competent states (coordinating as “temporal phenotypes”).

This model envisions subagents scrambling to support the ongoing hyperstructure or to change to a more appropriate hyperstructure.  The authors label this scramble, “competitive coherence”. 

The proposed model for [salience3c((1c)) (SIe)] is “plasticity”.  The resulting coordinated order among subagentsmaintains or changes cellular integrity… er… “identity”, as conditions either remain the same or alter.  Plasticity addresses the question, “What is the bacteria going to do?”  In effect, competitive coherence establishes a stage for a phenotypic expression of the holobiont.

0655 Does this argument flow into the structure of the S&T noumenal overlay?

Here are my associations.

0656 For the specifying sign-relation, various cues and signals2a (SVs) stand for competitive coherence2b (SOs) in regards to bacteria cells responding3b by potentially sustaining or changing their hyperstructure (or “temporal phenotype”)1b (SIs).

For the exemplar sign-relation, competitive coherence2b (SVe) stands for maintaining the cell’s identity2c (SOe) through plasticity3c((1c)) (SIe), where plasticity is the ability to hold or shift from one temporal phenotype to another.

0657 Now, an expert in bacteria should be able to observe and (in experiments) measure phenomena related to cues and signals2a (which the researcher can control), competitive coherence2b (patterns of behavior among bacterial subagents) and the maintenance or change of cell identity2c (observed as what actions the holobiont takes).

0658 These noumena may be objectified as phenomena that the researcher observes and measures.

04/22/25

Looking at Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “…How Bacterial Cells… Change… in Response to Various Signals” (Part 4 of 4)

0680 Now I can draw another association between category-based nested forms.

0681 If biosemiotics is what all biological processes have in common, and if the authors are biologists who both study and participate in biological processes, then a technical discussion concerning how bacterial regulate their functions in response to various signals should contain a certain irony.

0682 So, it is no surprise that these biosemiotic researchers define3 “complexity”2 as situating the potential of ‘biological explanations of bacterial cues and signals using semiotics’1.

0683 The normal context of definition3 compares to how any biological organism defines itself within its Umwelt3.

0684 The actuality of the spoken word, “complexity”2, compares to what any biological organism is figuratively “conscious of”2 (especially in regards to a model of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness).  Or maybe, “complexity” describes what we are conscious of when we regard the semiotic interplay within any biological organism.

Plus, in the discussion section (14.5), “complexity” touches base with the “subjective experience” of an organism, from the point of view of a disinterested observer (the biosemiotician) looking in.  Perhaps, the organism is “conscious” of its “phenotype”.

0685 The potential of ‘explanations (meaning) of cues & signals (message) using semiotics (presence)’1 compares to the potential of ‘identity (meaning), competitive coherence (presence) and events within the Umwelt (message)’1 for any biological organism.

0686 Surely, this implies that Norris and Sharov’s hypothesis applies to any biological organism, not just bacteria.

How so?

In points 0634 and 0635, the category-based nested form for definition meshes with the actuality2 of semiotic agency.

Here is the same diagram applied to the bacterium.

Does it seem that speech-alone talk infiltrates semiotic agency?

It is as if a bacterium3 speaks2 its identity1.

0687 At the same time, I must keep in mind that biosemiotics dwells in the house of science.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay, that is semiotic agency2, is objectified by biological phenomena in regards to meaning, presence and message1.  Or, should I say, “…in regards to SOe, SOs [&] SVe, and SVs.”?

These phenomena (what is for the Positivist’s judgment) are observed and measured in order to produce models using the disciplinary languages (including diagrams) of biosemiotics (what ought to be for the Positivist’s judgment).

All this occurs under the auspices of a positivist intellect (relation for the Positivist’s judgment) who would rather do without metaphysics  But hey, semiotic agency2 is an actuality2 within a triadic relation.  Without a normal context3and potential1 for semiotic agency2, biosemiotics simply does not register.

0688 Perhaps, “the temporal phenotype that the agent seems to be conscious of”2(2) corresponds to what needs to be explained in the S&T noumenal overlay.  If so, then the agent is “conscious” by way of its specifying and exemplar sign-interpretants (SIs and SIe).

That is to say, two sign-interpretants constitute an organism’s figurative “consciousness”.

Surely, these sign-interpretants3((1)) cannot be reduced to actuality2 because they reside outside of Peirce’s category of secondness.  However, because the entire nested form in the above figure meshes with the actuality of semiotic actuality2, these sign-interpretants3((1)) are incorporated into the realm of secondness2 by an agent3 (say, a bacterium) on the basis of the potential of ‘a final causality’1.

So, what does a scientist do?

The scientist reaches for the label, “complexity”.

It is sort like asking a familiar civilized term to execute a tricky cognitive manipulation.

0689 Who would anticipate that?

Surely, Vic Norris and Alexei Sharov propose a worthy hypothesis on on how bacterial cells sustain and change their lives in response to various signals.  The phenomenon of competitive coherence is worth elevating, along with the phenomena of identity and cues within the Umwelt. These phenomena are observable and measurable sign-elements ofthe S&T noumenal overlay.

0690 At the end, I am left with the ambiguity of “definition”.

What compares to definition?

In general, the normal context of definition3 brings the actuality of a spoken word (or term)2 into relation with the potential of meaning, presence and message1.

For this chapter, the normal context of the agent defining itself with its Umwelt2(3) brings the actuality that the agent is “conscious” of its “phenotype”2(2) into relation with the potentials of ‘identity (meaning), competitive coherence (presence) and signals and cues (message)’2(1).

For the unfolded empirio-schematic judgment, the normal context of disciplinary language3 brings the actuality of (complex) models for “the phenotype”2 into relation with the potential of ‘observations and measurements of biological phenomena’1.

0691 Here is a picture of the last two category-based nested forms in the previous point.

Clearly, a comparison between a definition that meshes with semiotic agency and the empirio-schematic judgment is provocative.

Yet, that provocation is in tune with the author’s proposal.

0692 That proposal is constructed with spoken words.

Speech-alone talk can label anything.  And, now we can label the meanings, presences and messages within biological organisms as if they are phenomena.  We can also model our observations and measurements of these phenomena using spoken words that describe what needs to be explained, the sign-interpretants themselves.

0693 Here is one implication.

Biosemiotics is the field of inquiry3 that brings definitions that mesh with semiotic agency2 into relation with the potential of empirio-schematic inquiry1.

Perhaps, this is why the field of biosemiotics seems to be older than science as configured by modern Positivists (beginning with the mechanical philosophers of the 1600s).

And younger.

0694 For the modern Positivists, empirio-schematic inquiry (what ought to be, secondness) belongs to the realm of actuality and the noumenon [and] its phenomena (what is, firstness) belongs to the realm of possibility.

For the postmodern biosemiotician, empirio-schematic inquiry opens up to the categories of thirdness and firstness,which are the same categories encountered in Aristotle’s formal and final causalities.

The implications are difficult to fathom.

0695 I thank the authors for this chapter and hope this examination adds value to their inquiries.

04/21/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 1 of 5

0696 The text before me is chapter fifteen in Pathways.  Details on the book are found in point 0474.  Chapter fifteen covers pages 325 through 344.  This is the third chapter in Part III, titled, “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”, which is a long way of saying, “Non-human Agency”. The chapter’s full title is “Self-Reinforcing Cycles and Mistakes: The Emergence of Subjective Meaning”.

0697 Hmmm, I wonder, “Does the structure of the chapter’s title offer an example of a self-reinforcing cycle and a mistake?”

After all, the topic is the emergence of subjective meaning.

The proposed mechanism for the emergence is self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes.

0698 Putting the mechanism before the subject is like putting a cart before the donkey.  The cart contains the mechanism.  The donkey represents the emergent being.

This reminds me of the way that modern scientists are all about mechanistic and mathematical models (the cart).  They disregard the noumenon (the donkey).  They go so far as to say that the cart should take the place of the donkey.  But, who ever heard of a cart that pulls itself? 

0699 As far as the category-based nested form pictured below goes.  The donkey goes with agent3.  The cart associates to semiotic agency2.  The donkey3 contextualizes the cart2.  The donkey3 brings the cart2 into relation with the potential of ‘final causality’1, which does not appear in the title.  Or does it?

0700 The chapter’s title contains the terms “self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes”.  These go with actuality, just like the cart.

The chapter’s title contains the term “subjective meaning”.  I suppose that this goes with the normal context3, just like the donkey.  

0701 Okay, what about the word, “emergence”, where does that fit in?

Uh-oh.

0702 Let me step back and ask myself, “How could a cart reveal the donkey as a normal context, rather than an actuality?”

How could self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes reveal subjective meaning as a normal context, rather than an actuality?”

0703 Hmmm.  I suppose some adjustments are in order.

Emergence3 must be the normal context that brings the actuality of the dyad, donkey [pulls] cart2, into relation with well… the potentials that historically puts the donkey and the cart together1.  Now, there’s an empedoclement.

Also, emergence3 must be the normal context that brings the actuality of the dyad, subject [experiences] meaning2, into relation with the potentials of ‘self-reinforcing cycles and mistakes’1.  Ah, that suggests opportunities for empedoclements to happen.

0704 Usually, mistakes are impediments.

Occasionally, a mistake will be an empedoclement, which is the inverse of an impediment.

On top of that, some empedoclements seem (after the fact) to be inevitable.  During the Uruk period of southern Mesopotamia, the donkey is domesticated for long-distance trade.  The wheel is invented to make pottery.  In retrospect, the actuality of donkey [pulls] cart2 seems destined.

0704 Now, all that I need to do is to realize that subjective meaning2 is an actuality.  Actuality2 is dyadic.  So, subjective meaning2 can be rendered as a dyad, consisting of two contiguous real elements.  The two real elements?  I suppose they must be the subject and the experience.  After all, both are real.  That leaves [meaning] as the contiguity.

In the following figure, the lower category-based nested form parallels the upper.

0705 Okay, by analogy, the title of “Self-Reinforcing Cycles and Mistakes: The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” reminds me of an anthropological story about the invention of the donkey pulled cart during the Uruk archaeological period of southern Mesopotamia.

0706 Having concluded my examination of the author’s prowess is synthesizing titles, I proceed directly to the conclusion (section 15.8), where the author makes three points (and maybe, one more) by way of summary (S, T U and maybe, V).

0707 First (S), NeoDarwinism may be a factor in evolution.  But, it is not the only one.

On one hand, tell that to a modern biologist and watch the listener’s body-language say, “Oh no, am I talking to one of those intelligent design advocates?”

On the other hand, if I say, “Neodarwinism does not take triadic relations in account.  If it did, then biological evolution would have to be called ‘mysterious’.”

Then, the modern biologist might think, “Oh worse! It’s a postmodern semiotician!”

But, it is not my mission to point out that biosemiotics performs what Christian intelligent design enthusiasts want to do, but cannot.  Biosemiotics brings all of biology into the gambit of triadic relations, including Neodarwinism.

0708 How so?

In Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome, (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), Razie Mah shows that the living being (individual, species or genus) is the intersection of adaptation and phenotype.  Then, in How To Define The Word “Religion”, Razie Mah shows that intersections are mysterious, fulfilling the expectation that the word, “mystery”, accounts for the message underlying the word, “religion”.

0709 Here is a picture of where I am going with this.

One category-based nested form is horizontal.  The other is vertical.

Several steps are required to get there.

But, once I am there, the author’s claim that neodarwinism is insufficient will make sense in terms of semiotic agency.

04/8/25

Looking at Victoria Alexander’s Chapter (2024) “…The Emergence of Subjective Meaning” (Part 5 of 5)

0735 How is biology… er… NeoDarwinism… incomprehensible?

0736 First of all, neodarwinism is an intersection.  An intersection contains contradictions that cannot be resolved.  That is why intersections are mysteries.  Philosophers can elucidate the contradictions, but they can never resolve them without cognitively reconfiguring the single actuality.

0737 For example, there are two major branches of evolutionary science.  For the most part, natural historians ignore the vertical axis and geneticists ignore the horizontal axis.  Everyone else ends up confusing niche1H and genotype1V as if these potentials1b situate “equivalent” actualities2a.

0738 The mystery within neodarwinism may be of interest to those concerned about mysteries.

After all, the Positivist’s judgment does not anticipate anything like this.  How can terms for two radically different models for the origins of species simply be clapped together?  I suppose that speech-alone talk can label anything, even mysteries… even, “neodarwinism”.

Well, “neo” is not exactly “genetic”.

Genodarwinism?

Perhaps, “neodarwinism” should be called out for what it is.

0739 Another reason why neodarwinism is incomprehensible is because the (hidden) content-level actualities2a do not have normal contexts3a and potentials1a.  They are the foundations2a of situation-level potentials1b that support situation-level normal contexts3b (natural selection3b and body development3b).  Does ecology and environment (as actualities independent of the adapting species)2a have anything to do with DNA2a (as the template for reproduction and cellular organization)?

I think not.

0740 So, how does one make biology… er, the evolution of subjective meaning on Earth… comprehensible?

This is the question that the author wrestles with.

The answer is in the title.  It must have something to do with the operations of self-reinforcing cycles.  How does biological meaning evolve?

Occasionally, mistakes do not act as impediments, but serve as empedoclements.

0741 Plus, the answer may have something to do with Peirce’s natural signs and how brainless creatures behave according to what we expect in terms of these natural signs.  When the behavior of brainless creatures is regarded through the lens of Peirce’s natural-sign typology, directionality and originality are obvious.  These obvious concepts must be indispensable for an explanation of the evolution of subjective meaning within biological entities.

0742 Neodarwinism will not do (S, T, U).

That much is for sure.

The role of Peirce’s natural signs (V) is a guess.

Or, should I say, “an intelligent guess”?

0751 For me, one of the pleasures of examining these chapters comes from the fact that the authors do not have a diagram of the S&T noumenal overlay before them, but they write like they are fishing around for the diagram.

In this case, the author does not catch, but almost hooks, a much bigger fish than neodarwinism.  Indeed, directionality (the horizontal axis) and originality (the vertical axis) are built into the diagram of the semiotic agent as a mystery, in the style of neodarwinism.

0752 Remember, the author discusses non-human, or rather, brainless organisms and ends up with an alluring line for appreciating the evolution of meaning in the universe.

My thanks to the author for the fishing expedition.  What a wonderful cast.

04/7/25

Looking at Hongbing Yu’s Chapter (2024) “…Danger Modeling…” (Part 1 of 7)

0753 The text before me is chapter seventeen of Pathways (2024, see point 0474 for details. pages 363-375).  This chapter concludes Part III, titled, “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.  The related title in Semiotic Agency (2021, see point 0473) is “Nonhuman Agency”.  The author works at Toronto Metropolitan University, in the Department of Languages, Literatures and Cultures.

The full title of chapter seventeen is “The Peculiar Case of Danger Modeling: Meaning Generation in Three Dimensions”.

0754 Of course, danger offers great examples for semiotics.  The abstract says as much.  In 2022, Marcel Danesi publishes a book on the topic, titled Warning Signs: The Semiotics of Danger.

For example, when a dog growls at me2a, that serves as a sign-vehicle (SVs) that is interpreted by my self-governance3bcontextualizing the potentials of various courses of action1b (SIs) in order to construct information2b (SOs).

0755 Here is a picture, using the S&T noumenal overlay.

0756 Yes, semiotic agency looks like a noumenon that exhibits observable and measurable facets (phenomena) that may be used to construct models of [self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b (SIs)] and[sentience3c((1c)) (SIe)].

Does the reader notice my sleight of hand in the preceding statement?

I substitute “sentience” for “salience” in SIe.

0757 The substitution is justified because information2b (SOs [&] SVe) says, “Danger is present.”

The “danger” goes with SOs.  Its “presence” is what I am sentient of (SVe).

The exemplar sign-relation goes like this.  The danger2b (SVe) that I am sentient of3c,1c (SIe) stands for something that I can avoid or safely ignore2c (SOe).

0758 So, what is the problem?

The author does not have the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay, which is foundational for the Positivist’s judgment, when it comes to biosemiotics.

Consequently, the author proposes that Thomas Sebeok’s concept of modeling may be used as a productive approach.  After all, modeling offers a highly integrative framework for meaning generation.

0759 Shall we see?

If highly integrative frameworks for meaning (that is, Sebeok’s models) are um… “natural”… for humans, then they should support implicit abstractions, characteristic of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Implicit abstractions are holistic.

0760 But, there is a problem.

We no longer live in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices hand- and hand-speech talk, which is holistic and relies on Peirce’s natural sign-relations of icon and index.  Of course, symbols operate in the background, allowing hand talk to become linguistic.

0761 Our current Lebenswelt practices speech-alone talk.

0762 How is this relevant to the current discussion?

With speech-alone talk, different aspects of a holistic implicit abstraction can be explicitly labeled.

The author identifies three dimensions to Sebeok’s models (as highly integrative frameworks of meaning): existential, representational and interpretational.

0763 These three dimensions are explicit abstractions.  They label “dimensions” of a model that frames message{SVs}2a and integrates presence {SOs [&] SVe}2b into meaning {SOe}2c.

In short, these dimensions bring this examiner right back to semiotic agency.

0764 Say what?

These dimensions bring this examiner right back to specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

So, the direction that this examiner will take, with plenty of creativity (hence, mistakes), calls to mind the S&T noumenal overlay, as the purely relational structure that all biological entities and processes have in common, including the case of me, surprising an unfamiliar dog, who is snarfing something already dead, found in a pile of autumn leaves.  The incident occurs on my morning walk with Daisy (who is taken by surprise herself, along with me).

04/1/25

Looking at Hongbing Yu’s Chapter (2024) “…Danger Modeling…” (Part 7 of 7)

0819 In the interventional sign-relation, the agent3 and final causality1 are exposed in the same way that a helium balloon, suddenly rising above a carnival crowd, says, “Someone just let go of their balloon (SOe).” 

Semiotic agency reaches a terminus (SOe).  That terminus is contiguous with an interventional sign-vehicle (SVi).  The contiguity is [meaning, mn].  The balloon rises from a perspective-level actuality2c (SVi) into the mundane atmosphere of a content-level actuality2a (SOi) in the normal context of say, what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a (SIi).

The rising balloon2a sends a message [mg] that says, “Now that I’ve caught your attention3a((1a)), I will serve as the next real initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs).”

0820 Here is a picture.

0821 The interventional sign relation occupies the existential dimension.

The existential dimension seems so much more dangerous than the other two.

0822 The representative and interpretive dimensions belong to semiotic agency.

0823 I suppose I may say that – if I must choose the second most dangerous dimension – the interpretative dimensioncomes next.

Why?

If I have poor information2b (SVe) and have an unworthy goal (SOe), then {SOe [meaning] (SVi)}2c may yield an intervention that misses the mark.

I suppose I am trying to say, “If the interpretative dimension is wayward, then the existential dimension becomes more dangerous.”

0824 Section 17.5 concludes the article by dwelling on the three dimensions and their roles in modeling danger.

0825 However, the existential dimension contains a hidden and disturbing discovery.  The existential dimension is outside of semiotic agency.  The existential dimension contains the interventional sign-relation.  The existential dimension may reveal the agent3 and the final causality1 that make semiotic agency2 an actuality2.

0826 Here is a picture of how semiotic agency (containing the representative and interpretive dimensions) entangles the interventional sign-relation (constituting the existential dimension).

0827 I thank the author for this wonderful chapter, fully titled “The Peculiar Case of Danger Modeling: Meaning-Generation in Three Dimensions”, marking the conclusion of Part III of Pathways, titled “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.

This chapter marks the end of this examination of the biosemiotics of nonhuman agency and opens a portal to an examination of human agency.

0828 Biosemiotics is more than semiotic agency.  Biosemiotics includes the interventional sign-relation.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay, more creative and productive than any noumenal overlay that biology has seen so far, now entangles an existential dimension.

03/18/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Composite Agency” (Part 1 of 5)

478 The text before me is chapter 10 of Semiotic Agency (2021).  Details on the text may be found on point 0473.  Chapter 10 covers pages 291-312.

0479 The authors’ claim?

A multiplicity of subagents is a typical feature of agency and is necessary for a higher-level agent’s reliable self-construction, robustness and adaptability.

Subagents are semi-autonomous.  The co-exist in partially cooperative and partially antagonistic manners.  In many cases, semiogenesis occurs when one subagent provides the scaffolding that facilitates, represses or redirects the development of another subagent.

0480 Subagents characterize anatomy and physiology in animals.

Animals are subject to natural selection.

Plus, some parasites play the game of subagency very well.

0481 So, let me start with the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay.

0482 Obviously, subagents are employed in the specifying and exemplar sign-interpretants.

0483 The authors’ first example is a single-celled paramecium.  The length of the cell in 300 micrometers.  Is that one third of a millimeter?  Subagents include a macronucleus, micronucleus, pellicle, gullet, food vacuoles, anal pore and so forth.  None of the subagents are truly self-governing.  Each plays a role in various courses of action, depending on what the paramecium is going to do (SOe).

Here are my associations for a paramecium’s semiotic agency.

0484 If this is the noumenon, then what are the phenomena?

In order to find out, I take the paramecium into my laboratory (actually, it’s an academic biology lab) and vary its environmental conditions (SVs).  The paramecium is a holobiont (a whole, living organism).  At any given moment, it acts as an agent3, whose main motivation seems to be ‘staying alive’1.

That is where semiotic agency2 comes in.

Some conditions produce responses (SOe) that indicate that the paramecium responds to something in its environment (SOs and SVe).  Sign-vehicles and sign-objects give rise to phenomena.  Indeed, these sign-elements are objectified by my observations and measurements of those phenomena.

0485 But, what about the paramecium as an agent?

Here is a picture.

03/13/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Composite Agency” (Part 5 of 5)

0525 That brings me to empedoclements.

Recall, an empedoclement (a noun derived from the name of the Neoplatonic philosopher, Empedocles) is the inverse of an impediment (see points 0329 through 0341).  In this case, almost all institutional and personal interactions at the water fountain impede my boss (the macronucleus) from establishing a feedback to me (the contractile vacuole) that might mitigate my impulse to stir things up.

0526 For my reading of Empedocles, the SIs is strife.  The SIe is love.

In strife, form (SVs) attracts matter, {SOs [salience] SOe}.

Okay, technically, matter is really {(SOs [&] SVe)2b [salience3c((1c))] (SOe)2c}.

The form2a of what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a appeals to matter2b[]2c, and that matter2b[]2c itself is a thing, coupling the situation and perspective levels, as matter2b and form2c.

The appeal comes in [strife].  The coupling, the empedoclement as thing, comes with [love].

0527 Obviously, my boss (the macronucleus) has greater wisdom than me (the contractile vacuole).

He has to wait, for the moment when preparation meets opportunity, to establish a feedback loop where my humor, instead of causing trouble, can improve morale.

0528 Yes, evolution is all about empedoclements, which are impossible to predict in advance.

Only in hindsight, does an empedoclement become clear.

0529 In section 10.4, the authors discuss many examples.

In each step of the progression of evolution on Earth, the emergent holobiont is more stunning to behold.  At each step, the holobiont seems to have more and more of an identity.  At the same time, the holobiont appears more susceptible to subagent malfunctions.

0530 With this in mind, I assess my own self-affirmation and self-awareness as the human version of contractile vacuole.

On one hand, I like to have fun.

On the other hand, I better mind my boss.