Summary of text [comment] page 42
[Maturity and fairness are crucial for understanding moral evil.
Now, allow me to go backwards and tackle the assertion that natural evil appears as moral evil.
We already know that both have the same categorical structure. Is this enough to account for our experiences? Or are we hardwired to confound the two in some other way?
Let us look at the two nested forms:
evilmetaphysical3(2()) & evilphysical2(1)
inherent limitations, privation of capacities3(2()) & challenges, privation of goods2(1)
determination of status of subject1 as person3 (the wolf) and the status of subject3 with inherent limitations and lacking certain capacities3(2()) (the sheep) & challenges, privation of goods by an agent, subject1 (the wolf)2(1)
The singular difference between natural and moral evil is that, for the latter, the subject committing the sin and the subject suffering the consequences are in intersubjective relation.
Since humans habitually recognize the natural evil as an example of moral evil, I must conclude that the latter is innate.
In other words, in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, recognition of moral evil (with culprits and victims) conferred adaptive advantage, while recognition of natural evil was not under equivalent selection pressures.
Perhaps, some evolutionarily ancient recognition of natural evil served as the foundation for our innate recognition of moral evil.
Or, perhaps, in all mammals, natural evil is personalized, making our recognition of natural evil the psychological feature that needs to be explained.]