Category Archives: Hylomorphism and Secondness

12/24/24

Looking at Tomasz Duma’s Article (2023) “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations…” (Part 1 of 14)

0001 In 2017, the author publishes a book, in Polish, with the English title, “The Metaphysics of Relation: At the Basis of Understanding the Relations of Being”.  This article slices out one topic among many.

Thomas Aquinas uses the Latin term, relationes secundum dici, in ways that lead to a variety of interpretations.  Consequently, the complete title of this work is “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations in St. Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics”.  The article appears in Studia Gilsoniana 12(4) (October-December 2023), pages 589-616.

0002 I know that this article is scholarly, because the summary (abstract) appears at the end of the text.

0003 Why does this article capture my attention?

The term translates into relations (relationes) according to (secundum) speech (dici)… er… talk (dici).

I don’t think the Romans have a word for forms of talking other than speech.

They are so civilized.

0004 The term applies to various questions, such as when a pagan calls his god, “Lord of the heavens”, as well as the relation between matter and form, the relation between accident and substance, qualities of things, one’s orientation in labeling one side of an auditorium “right” or “left”, and so.  These are just samples.  Duma presents five cases in detail.

0005 The dici term contrasts to a similar term, relationes secundum esse.

The latter translates into relations (relationes) according to (secundum) existence (esse)… er… esse_ce (esse).

Esse_ce?

Esse_ce is a written play on the Latin term, esse.

Esse_ce is the complement to essence.

Whatever has esse_ce also has essence.  Whatever has essence also has esse_ce.

0006 Those two statements sound like relationes secundum esse even though they may be relationes secundum dici.

Why?

The relation between esse_ce and essence is another way to state the relation between matter and form.

0007 Plus, the relation between matter and form is an exemplar of Peirce’s category of secondness, the dyadic realm of actuality (that contrasts with thirdness, the triadic realm of normal contexts, and firstness, the monadic realm of possibility).

Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  For Aristotle’s hylomorphe, the real elements are matter and form.  The contiguity is not named.  However, a name stands ready-at-hand.  That name is “substance”.  So, I can take the word, “substance”, and place it in brackets (for notation), to arrive at the following figure.

0008 Now, my interest in Duma’s article begins to clarify.

The relation between matter and form is a relation where the terminus of the relation is a word, so to speak, that denotes either the presence (matter) or the shape (form) of a thing.  But, it does not denote a thing (which expresses both esse_ce and essence).

The same goes for the creature calling his creator, “master”.

When I watch the ritual proclamation, I encounter two real elements, the creature and the proclaimed word.  I must figure out the contiguity between these two real elements.  Both real elements are locked in a literal relationes secundum dici (a relation according to talk).

So, I place my guess into the slot for contiguity.

0009 Because Aristotle’s hylomorphe is a premier example of Peirce’s secondness, the creature [calling Creator] aspect of the dyad carries the feel of matter [substance], esse_ce, or “existence”.  Also, the [calling Creator] “Master” aspect carries the feel of [substantiating] form or essence.

May I go as far to say that much of Aquinas’s philosophy carrries the feel of matter [substance] form, even as Aquinas transcends the esse_ce and essence of Aristotle’s philosophy in an intellectual flight towards a recognition that is so… so… divine?

God is Substance.

God is the contiguity between all real elements in Peirce’s secondness.

0010 According to John Deely’s massive book, Four Ages (2001 AD), Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) is an important waystation between St. Augustine (354-430), who poses the question of sign-relations, and John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot (1589-1644)), who finally and correctly identifies signs as triadic relations.

Aquinas mentions relatives in his discourses on various theological and philosophical questions and disputes.  The diciand esse relations stand out.  They are are similarly worded. The formula is relationes secundum X, where X is either esseor dici.  Esse relations pose few difficulties.  Dici relations lead to confusion and debate.

0011 Here is a table listing some of the characteristics of each.

0012 In this examination, I have already brought Duma’s article into relation with one aspect of Peirce’s philosophical schema.

I hope that no one is surprised.

The next step adds another layer and that may take the reader off guard.

12/11/24

Looking at Tomasz Duma’s Article (2023) “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations…” (Part 14 of 14)

0119 The conceptual-flow apparatus of A,B,&C also applies to Peirce’s category of firstness as explicit matter (A).

0120 An explicit definition of firstness (B) stands as form in the dicey bucket, then as matter in the esse bucket.  

In the esse bucket, dici (speech-alone talk acting as hand-talk) relates to whatever follows the logics of inclusion and allows contradictions.

0121 Rather than giving another example, I proceed to section four, where the author formulates how we should understand relationes secundum dici.

Since this examination is already disruptive, let me proceed to some suggestions that sort of correspond to the author’s points and some that do not.

0122 First, let go of the distinction between categorical and transcendental.  Even though the distinction is helpful, it does not appear to be critical to the speculations at hand.

0123 Second, all dici relations have two termini, the relation itself (portrayed as a hylomorphic dyad consistent with Peirce’s definition of secondness) and the elements that go into the relation (for Aristotle’s hylomorphe, “matter” and “form”, and for the dici relation, “dici” and “relationes“).

0124 Third, as soon as relationes secundum X (where X = esse or dici) is formulated as a dyad in the realm of actuality, the relation is subject to the laws of contradiction and noncontradiction.  The label for the contiguity is placed within brackets for clear notation.  The contiguity’s label is selected on the basis that [it] minimizes contradictions between the two real elements.

[Secundum] may be regarded as a contiguity that minimizes contradictions.

0125 Fourth, relationes secundum X (where X = esse or dici) is an actuality2.  A normal context3 and potential1 are required to attain understanding.   An entire (filled-in) category-based nested form associates to understanding.  Understanding encompasses the three distinctly different logics of thirdness, secondness and firstness.

In hominin evolution, our genus adapts to the potential of triadic relations, including “understanding”, defined as “the completion of a category-based nested form”.  Implicit abstractions produce complete nested forms holistically (that is, without explicit articulation of the three elements).  Hand-talk favors implicit abstraction.

Explicit abstractions may articulate elements within a relation, by using the purely symbolic labels of speech-alone talk.  At the same time, the conceptual-flows of A,B,&C suggest that speech-alone talks engages implicit abstraction (and visa versa).

Nonetheless, A and C are not precisely the same relationes, even though they are contiguous with B, dici.

Nor, are A and C the same dici, even though they are contiguous with B, relationes.

0126 Fifth, what does [secundum] (translated as [according to]) in relationes secundum X (where X = esse or dici) imply?

Secundum compares to substance, in Aristotle’s hylomorphe of “matter [substance] form”.

Secundum also associates to either implicit abstraction or explicit abstraction, depending on the dyad.

Secundum entangles the distinction between categorical and transcendental relations, for those who cannot let go (see first point).

0127 Sixth, Peirce’s diagrams allow an inquirer to consider labels (from explicit abstractions) within a visual framework (that coheres with implicit abstraction).

0128 This examination adds value to Tomasz Duma’s contribution to our current appreciation of relationes secundum X,by suggesting that the philosophies of Aristotle, Aquinas and Peirce are (1) congruent and (2) illuminate cognitive features of both our current Lebenswelt as well as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0129 Furthermore (3), this congruence allows contemporary philosophers to consider the difference between explicitly abstracted relations that act as matter to dici (speech-alone talk) as form and implicitly abstracted relations that act as form to dici (hand talk) and esse as matter.

Now, that is one complicated “furthermore”.

0130 Oh, one more “furthermore”!

Recall that Duma gives five cases where relatives appear in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.

In this examination, I also provide five examples for relationes secundum X.

The Oldowan stone tool is a case for X=esse.

The hand-talk gesture-word, [RAVEN], is a case for X=dici (hand talk).

[WOLF][FINGER] is a case for X=dici (hand talk) and then X=dici (speech-alone talk).

“Ravenous chairperson”, “cushy job” and “drought” are cases for X=dici (speech-alone talk).

“A bridge that meets code” is a case for X=dici (speech-alone talk).

0131 Is this what the author anticipated when he sent his article for publication?

I suppose not.

0132 Okay, the author may chuckle during the course of this examination, as it tracks from Aquinas’s relatives straight into a key question concerning human evolution.

Why is our current Lebenswelt not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

Are relationes secundum dici integral to an answer to this question?

What if.

0133 Indeed, laughter is an appropriate response.

Who would have guessed that Aristotle, Aquinas and Peirce, all strangely brilliant yet incomplete philosophers, are (inadverently) in the business of illuminating differences between who we are and who we evolved to be?

0134 My thanks to Tomasz Duma for his article on this very intriguing topic.

06/29/24

Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2024) “Theistic Evolution” (Part 1 of 21)

0644 The full title of the book before me is Theistic Evolution: A Contemporary Aristotelian-Thomistic Perspective(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: UK). The book arrives on my doorstep in October 2023.  The copyright is dated 2024.

How time flies.

0645 This examination builds on previous blogs and commentaries.

Here is a picture.

0646 A quick glance backwards is appropriate.

Tabaczek’s story begins in the waning days of the Age of Ideas, when the Positivist’s judgment once thrived.

0647 The Positivist judgment holds two sources of illumination.  Models are scientific.  Noumena are the things themselves.  Physics applies to models.  Metaphysics applies to noumena.  So, I ask, “Which one does the positivist intellect elevate over the other?”

The answer is obvious.

So, the first part of the story is that the positivist intellect dies, and lives on as a ghost (points 0001-0029).

0648 Tabaczek buries the positivist intellect and places the two sources of illumination against one another.  It is as if they reflect one another.

But, the two sources also have their advocates.

In Emergence, Tabaczek argues that models of emergence require metaphysical styles of analysis.

In Divine Action and Emergence, he sets out to correct metaphysical emanations reflecting scientific models of emergence.  It is as if these emanations are reflections of science in the mirror of theology.  Intellectuals inspired by science want to see ‘what is’ of the Positivist’s judgment in the mirror of theology.  But, note the difference between the picture of the Positivist’s judgment and the two hylomorphes in Tabaczek’s mirror (points 0039-0061).

0649 Why do I mention this?

In the introduction of the book before me, Tabaczek discusses his motivations.  He, as a agent of theology, wants to exploit an opportunity.  That opportunity is already present in the correction that he makes to what an agent of science sees in the mirror of theology (pictured below).

0650 What an opportunity!

Tabaczek offers the hope of a multidimensional, open-minded, and comprehensive (say nothing of comprehensible) account of evolutionary theory.

How so?

The positivist intellect is dead.  The positivist intellect ruled the Positivist’s judgment with the maxim, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”

0651 Now that the positivist intellect is dead, the two illuminations within the former Positivist’s judgment may transubstantiate into the realm of actuality and become two hylomorphes, standing like candles that reflect one another in Tabaczek’s mirror.

Tabaczek, as an agent of theology, witnesses how a scientist views himself in the mirror of theology.  The scientist sees the model as more real than the noumenon (the thing itself, which cannot be objectified as its phenomena).  Indeed, the scientist projects ‘what is’ of the Positivist’s judgment into the mirror of theology.

0652 Tabaczek wants to project his philosophical construction of the noumenon (in concert with its dispositions and powers, as well as its matter and form) into the mirror of science.

But, I wonder whether any agent of science is willing to stop listening to the ghost of the positivist intellect long enough to discern what theologians project into the mirror of science.

0653 Yes, Tabaczek’s inquiry is all about optics.

0654 So, who are the players involved in the intellectual drama of Tabaczek’s mirror.

Tabaczek identifies three.

To me, there must be four.

0655 The first is the agent of science.  The scienceagent is the one that makes the models.  Two types of scienceagent stand out in the study of biological evolution: the natural historian and the geneticist.

0656 The second is the agent of theology.  Tabaczek limits theologyagents to experts in Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.).

In a way, this self-imposed limit is a handicap, since Aristotle and Aquinas philosophize long before Darwin publishes On The Origin of Species (1859).

In another way, this self-imposed limit is a blessing, since it provides me with an occasion for examining his argument from the framework of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914).  According to the semiotician and Thomist John Deely (1942-2017), Peirce is the first postmodern philosopher.  Peirce is also a co-discoverer of the triadic nature of signs, along with the Baroque scholastic (that is Thomist) John Poinsot (1589-1644), otherwise known as John of Saint Thomas.

Peirce’s semiotics begins where Baroque scholasticism leaves off.

0657 The third is the image that the scientist projects into the mirror of theology.  I label this image: theologymirror, in contrast to scienceagent.  The theologyagent can see the image in theologymirror, but is not the source of that image.  I have already shown the initial image that the agent of science sees in the mirror of theology.  I have also noted that Tabaczek aims to correct that projection.

0658 The fourth is the image that the theologian casts into the mirror of science.  I label this image: sciencemirror, in contrast to theologyagent.  The scienceagent can see the image in sciencemirror, but is not the source of that image.  I have already indicated that the scienceagent (more or less) does not care what is in sciencemirror, because the ghost of the positivist intellect whispers in the ear of scienceagent, “All that metaphysical stuff is completely unnecessary.”

06/6/24

Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2024) “Theistic Evolution” (Part 21 of 21)

0824 Even though the bill is paid, and the public curtain closes on this examination of Tabaczek’s book, the flavors of the dessert still linger.

The associations in chapter seven suggest a retrogression into the house of evolutionary creation.

At the same time, the associations intimate a moment when the author can go direct into the house of theistic evolution.

0825 How so?

Can a scientist observe and measure the actuality2 within a category-based nested form?

Yes.

What about the normal context3 and potential1?

No, the scientist can only observe and measure phenomena associated with a category-based nested form.  Phenomena go with the actuality2.  The noumenon associates to the normal context3 and potential1.

0826 Well, if that is the case, and if the Kantian slogan of the noumenon applies (that is, the noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena), then the normal context3 and potential1 [cannot be objectified by] the actuality2.

But, this is what human constantly do.  Humans understand actuality2 in terms of its2 normal context3 and potential1.  So humans intuitively sense that the normal context3 and potential1 can be objectified by the corresponding actuality2.

0827 Indeed, the fact that the four causes work together to elucidate a category-based nested form constitutes one reason why Aristotle’s four causes are superior to attributions to the four elements (earth, water, fire and air).

Aristotle’s four causes are built into human nature.

0827 So, let me re-imagine the dessert, even as I digest it.

To start, a theologyagent (B1) realizes that Aquinas’s use of primary, secondary and instrumental causation in evolutionary creation can be formulated in terms of a category-based nested form.

Next, the agent of theology (B1) begins to appreciate the reason why Aristotle’s four causes are so appealing.  The four causes work together to elucidate all three elements of a category-based nested form.  The category-based nested form is the first step in understanding.

Yes, the category-based nested form is a purely relational structure that is independent of the human mind.

But, it seems that the category-based nested form is embedded in the human body and brain.

0828 A question appears in the sciencemirror (C2), asking, “Is our capacity to intuitively construct category-based nested forms adaptive?  Is the human niche the potential of category-based nested forms, in particular, and triadic relations, in general?”

0829 An answer is already prepared for the slot for scienceagent (A3).

Razie Mah’s e-book, The Human Niche, is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

The claim?

The human niche is the potential of triadic relations.

0830 This is what theistic evolution can produce that evolutionary creation cannot.

In order to taste what Tabaczek’s meal (B1) does to the mirrorscience (C2) consider two of Razie Mah’s blogs (A3), both of which claim that current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us how humans evolved to recognize the noumenon, the thing itself, through implicit abstraction.

Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us where we came from.

Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us what we evolved to be.

Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us what went wrong.

0831 Here is a picture of one Greimas square for the optics of Tabaczek’s mirror.

0832 Oh, the two blogs?

Looking at Mark S. Smith’s Book (2019) “The Genesis of Good and Evil”, appears in Razie Mah’s blog from Jan 13 through 31, 2022. 

Looking at Carol Hill’s Article (2021) “Original Sin with Respect to Science”, appears from February 7 through 25, 2022.

With that said, I thank Dr. Mariusz Tabaczek O.P. for this wonderful banquet for thought.

But, my work is not done. I now retreat to Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) in order to examine chapter eight.

05/6/24

Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2021) “Divine Action and Emergence” (Part 22 of 22)

0331 My sudden turn to semiotics does not occur in Tabaczek’s text.

Such is the examiner’s prerogative.

At this point, I stand at the threshold of section 1.3.4, almost precisely in the middle of the book.

My commentary on this book is significant.

Shall I review?

I represent the Positivist’s judgment as a content-level category-based form and discuss how it might be situated (points 0155 to 0184).

I suggest how reductionists can game emergent phenomena.  Plus, I follow Tabaczek back to the four causes (points 0185 to 0239).

I present a specific example of an emergent phenomenon, building on the prior example of a hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell.  Then, I return to Deacon’s general formula for emergence (points 240 to 0276).

Finally, I examine Tabaczek’s “philosophical history of panentheism” up to the section on Hegel (points 0277 to 0330).

0332 These are notable achievements.

But, my commentary is not more significant than Tabaczek’s text.

At this point, it is if I look through Tabaczek’s text and see something moving, something that catches my eye.  It is not for me to say whether it is an illusion or a registration.  It is enough for me to articulate what I see.

0333 At this point, I draw the veil on Razie Mah’s blog for April and May of 2024 and enter the enclosure of Comments on Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024), available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  Comments will cover the rest of Part Two of Divine Action and Emergence.  June 2024 will look at the start of Tabaczek’s next book, Theistic Evolution and Comments will complete the examination.

My thanks to Mariusz Tabaczek for his intellectual quest.

0334 But, that is not to say that I abandon Tabaczek’s text.

No, my slide into sign-relations is part of the examiner’s response.

This occurs in Comments.

There is good reason to wonder whether the response is proportionate.

I let the reader decide.

12/12/23

What Is A Meme? (C of G, Part 11 of 20)

0101 With a single chomp of her mighty mouth, along with some head thrashing, Daisy can put an end to the neighbor’s cat.  I suppose that I restrain her from what her species expressa2b calls her to do, because I have her on a leash.  The leash puts Daisy’s species expressa2b into perspective.

0102 Does this imply that there is another sign?  Does this sign connect the situation and perspective levels?

Daisy’s fear and loathing of the cat2b (SVe) stands for her being restrained by the leash and thereby confounded2c (SOe) in regards to the question, “Does this makes sense?”3c, contextualizing the possibility of putting the situation into perspective1c (SIe).

The subscript, “e”, stands for “exemplar”.

Here is a picture.

0103 The exemplar sign-vehicle (SVe) coincides with the specifying sign-object (SOs).

Correspondingly, the exemplar sign-object (SOe) puts the specifying sign-object (SOs) into perspective.  This perspective includes both Daisy and myself, along with the catnip, the cat and my trash-toting neighbor.

0104 Plus, there is a question about nomenclature.

For scholastics, the specifying sign starts with subjective content and ends with objective situation.  The exemplar signstarts with an intersubjective situation and ends with a suprasubjective perspective.  So, the situation-level actuality is “objective” (SOs) for the former and “intersubjective” (SVe) for the latter.

For moderns, only two terms are employed, “subjective” and “objective””.  Scholastic terms shift when stepping from the specifying sign to the exemplar sign.  For moderns, “subjective” opinions often address the question, “What does it mean to me?”3b, while “objective” facts raise the question, “Does this make sense?”3c.

This terminological shift is discussed in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2023, Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”.

0105 The exemplar sign object2c (SOe) makes sense3b because it may be true, or believable, or commonly accepted, or logical with respect to an affordance.  What is that affordance?  May I call it, “intelligibility”?  Oh, that could bring a smile to the face of a philosopher and a grimace to the face of a scientist.

0106 Let me return to the scholastic manifest image for the example of Daisy, my dog, who I knowingly place into proximity to the neighbor’s miserable feline, soon after the neighbor lady takes out her trash.  Is there a problem with planting catnip in the verge near where we regularly stroll?  Surely, the neighbor’s husband, who is rarely at home to tend the verge, does not mind.  Plus, the cat clearly loves the mint.

Here is a picture.

0107 The exemplar sign-object (SOe) contains a judgment.

Recall, a judgment is a relation between what is and what ought to be.

0108 In order to arrive at my judgment2c, I first look at the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality.

To me, Daisy’s confoundedness2c serves as a virtual normal context that brings the actuality of unnerved Daisy2b into relation with the possibilities inherent in her tail tucked between her legs2a.

I next transfer the virtual nested form into the triadic structure of judgment.

Daisy’s confoundedness (relation, thirdness) brings her tucked tail as an universal being (what is, secondness) into relation to Daisy’s fear and loathing as an intelligible being (what is, firstness).

0109 Yes, whatever is going on in Daisy’s mind2c contributes to my judgment2c, even though it (whatever “it” is) cannot be articulated.

0110 For Daisy, a relation that I am not privy to2c virtually brings fear and loathing2b into relation with that catnip-addled feline2a.

0111 The triadic structure of judgment fits neatly into the sign-object of the exemplar sign as well as the perspective-level actuality2c of the scholastic’s three-level interscope.

09/29/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 1 of 18)

0028 This is the second blog in a series.

 Looking at Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “Intersection” appears in Razie Mah’s blog from May 15 through 18, 2023.  In that brief examination (points 0001-0027), a technical category-based definition of the term, “intersection” is shown to mesh with the theme of Kemple’s book, whose full title is The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter, Boston/Berlin).

To me, that is fascinating.

0029 In this series of blogs, I examine Kemple’s appendices.

Yes, he has more than one appendix.

Plus, there are subdivisions.

0030 Appendix 1.1 is titled, “Presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence”.  My associations will draw upon A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, as well as A Primer on Natural Signs, Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, and Comments on Newell Sasha’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.  These primers and comments touch base with Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion”, which is available, along with the other mentioned e-works, at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0031 The title of Appendix 1.1 contains two technical terms.

“Presentative forms” is a term coined by Jacques Maritain and literally means a form that is substantiated by its presentation, rather than by matter.  The hylomorphe is presentation [substantiates] form, rather than matter [substantiates] form.

“The grounding of transcendence” is a phrase used by Martin Heidegger.  It conveys what the presentative form accomplishes.  The presentative form accomplishes more than matter-substantiated form, because it leads to (grounds) another form, which is located at a higher categorical level (transcendence).

Figure 01

0032 Surely, this implies that presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence coincide in a particular way.  The “matter” of the presentative form associates to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”. 

Is this is a general feature of presentative forms?

Well, the claim is a good working hypothesis.

09/28/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 2 of 18)

0033 So why are presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence important?

It seems that they govern the ways in which the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness appear.  The process is not straightforward.  After all, if one category associates with what is expressed and the adjacent higher category goes with what is experienced (with the caveat that thirdness in what is presented wraps around to firstness in form), then each presentative form expresses two categories.

Oh yeah, that makes sense.

0034 But, it does not make sense.

Kemple quotes from Peirce’s 1903 essay, “Sundry Logical Conceptions”, concerning the modes of appearance for the categories of experience.  In the following table, nine presentative forms are listed.  Vertical columns correspond to the category of experience for the presentative form.  The rows correspond to expression according to category.

Figure 02

The columns denote forms and the rows denote appearance (presentation).

0035 For example, consider the form of firstness (first column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to an idea of secondness.  Here, I depict it as ‘something’  in the realm of actuality.  An idea pertains to ‘something’ actual.

Here is another example from the above table.  The form of secondness (second column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to the fact of relations.  To me, these relations are hylomorphic, consisting of two contiguous real elements, characterizing Peirce’s category of secondness.  A thing is a fact of (hylomorphic) relation.

One more example will help.  The form of thirdness (third column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to signs of secondness. Actions are signs of secondness.  So are modes of conduct.

0036 Each element in the above table embodies a form in one category and an appearance in another category.  So, two categories are involved for each item in the table.  Plus, the matrix is exhaustive.

Figure 03

0037 What about the idea that transcendence is grounded in crossing categories?

My head swims.  But, it’s not Kemple’s fault.  It is the idea that the presentative form has a hylomorphic structure and that the element that corresponds to “matter” belongs to one category and the element that corresponds to “form” belongs to the adjacent higher category.

This idea is not apparent in Peirce’s table, pictured above.

Kemple continues…

0038 Going down the first column, forms in firstness may be labeled as “ideas”.  So, the element in the first row and the first column, is an idea of possibility (or, ‘something’ in the realm of possibility).  Likewise, ‘something’ in the realm of actuality corresponds to the idea of secondness.  ‘Something’ in the realm of normal context goes with the idea of thirdness.

Going down the second column, forms in secondness may be labeled as “facts”.  So, qualia are facts of firstness.  Relations in the style of hylomorphes are facts of secondness.  Signs and other triadic relations are facts of thirdness.

Going down the third column, forms in thirdness may be labeled as “signs”.  Feelings, such as awareness of a thing of beauty, are signs of firstness.  Actions, such as modes of conduct, are signs of secondness.    Thoughts are signs of thirdness.

0039 Still, I have a problem.

Even though each element in the above table references two categories.  The rows and columns do not highlight the hypothesis about transcendence developed in the previous blog, where the “matter” of a presentative form belongs to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”.

Is there a ghost of a chance that Heidegger’s ground of transcendence haunts Perice’s table of presentative forms.

Figure 04

0040 Perhaps, I can conjure its specter by coloring a sequence of presentative forms, following the proposed hypothesis.

For each transition, from idea to fact, from fact to sign, and from sign to idea, there is a corresponding transition from firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.  

The result is a seqence of novel presentative forms that are composed of elements of the table.  The lower category presentative form for both appearance (row) and form (column) serves as “matter”… er, I mean “presence”… and the higher-category presentative form in both appearance (row) and category (column) serves as “form”.   

0041 In the following diagram, sequences appear in color.

Figure 05

0042 The hylomorphic structure, lower-category presence [substantiates] higher-category form, embodies transcendence, defined as moving from one category to the adjacent higher category in both form and appearance.  So, ways to imagine the coincidence of presentative forms and grounds of transcendence track the colors in the table above. 

09/27/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 3 of 18)

0043 Okay, allow me to explore the most obvious diagonal.

Figure 06

0044 Consider ‘something’ in the realm of possibility [substantiates] the form of a hylomorphic relation.  According to the hypothesis on grounding transcendence, the novel presentative form is ‘something’ possible [substantiates] a thing.   An idea in firstness causes (or is contiguous with) the facts of a cause-and-effect relation.  Element (column 1, row 1) substantiates element (column 2, row 2).

Figure 07

0045 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Moglichkeit (translated into English as “possibility”)?

Yes, Moglichkeit applies when ‘something’ in the realm of possibility serves as grounds for a cause-and-effect fact.

‘Something’ presents itself as a thing.

Okay, that sounds plausible.

0046 Let me consider the next novel presentative form.

Consider hylomorphic relations [substantiate] thoughts.  A fact of secondness grounds a sign of thirdness.   The thing is like matter.  The thought is like form.  Element (column 2, row 2) substantiates element (column 3, row 3).

Figure 08

Facts of secondness [substantiate] signs of thirdness.  Things [substantiate] thoughts.

0047 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Ausweisen (previously rendered as “account” and now translated by Kemple into “pointing out”)? 

A thing has significance.

Okay, here are two successes in a row.  But, the trend is making me nervous.

The form of the first movement, presents itself as a fact and that presentation substantiates a sign in the realm of thirdness,corresponding to a thought.

I am afraid that this trend will end up as a tortuous run-on sentence.

0048 One more step.

Consider thoughts [substantiate] ‘something’ in the realm of possibility.  A sign of thirdness grounds an idea of firstness.   Thoughts are like matter.  ‘Something’ in the realm of possibility is like form.

Figure 09

0049 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Boden (previously translated as “basis” and now translated by Kemple as “surroundedness”)?

Is the originating ‘something’ in the realm of possibility subsumed into a form that is substantiated by a thought?

Okay, I am not nervous anymore.

I am perplexed, yet intrigued.

0050 Of course, the questionable character of the following hypothesis cannot be doubted.

Otherwise, I could present the following claims as fiat accompli.

First, presentative forms in the table in Appendix 1.1 are hylomorphes, where the column conveys experience (form) and the row represents appearance (presentative).

Second, presentative forms may contribute to a novel presentative form, corresponding to Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence.

Third, tabular presentative forms that cross adjacent categories constitute a grounding of transcendence.  This is a hypothesis.

In other words, the grounding of transcendence follows diagonals within Kemple’s table of presentative forms.

0051 What transitions do Moglichkeit, Ausweisen and Boden correspond to?

How about passages from idea to fact, fact to sign, and sign to idea?

Another option is firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.

One more option is that both passages are implicated.

0052 In section 6.3.1, Kemple notes that Peirce’s categories and Heidegger’s groundings do not map onto one another perfectly.  Peirce’s categories pertain to semiosis.  Heidegger’s labels are contained within a framework of ontic-ontological transcendent grounds that are specific to human beings.

0053 So far, my associations to Kemple’s appendix 1.1 yields a hypothesis and a challenge.

The hypothesis is that Maritain’s presentative forms and Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence coincide with the construction of novel presenative forms, composed of presentative forms.   A tabular element in one categorysubstantiates the tabular element in the adjacent higher category, for both columns and rows, with a wrap-around at thirdness.

The result is three sequences of three transitions, depicted in colors in the above table.

0054 If this result is plausible, the elements in the table are not only presentative forms, but they are also elements in a novel hylomorphic structure: presentative (column A, row B) [substantiates] form (column A+1, row B+1).

Heidegger’s terms seem to jive with these novel presentative forms.

0055 Is that confusing?  If so, then I wonder.

Does Moglichkeit (possibility) start with the column of idea or with the row of firstness?

09/26/23

Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 4 of 18)

0056 I repeat.  Here is a table that colors in the hypothesis of the coincidence between a sequence of novel presentative forms and grounding of transcendence, with one diagonal strand colored in bold.

Figure 10

0057 First, I associate two contiguous elements, ‘something’ in the realm of possibility (presentative) and hylomorphic relations or things (form) to Heidegger’s term, Moglichkeit.  ‘Something’ (presentation, idea in firstness) substantiates a thing (form, fact in secondness).

Kemple elaborates in section 6.3.1.  Heidegger identifies the dimensions of Moglichkeit (possibility) as Shiften (translated as establishing, finding, causing, as well as inducing) and Weltenwurf (translated as projection of world).

0058 What do these dimensions suggest?

Following the argument of the previous blog, the presentation of Moglichkeit rests primarily in firstness, rather than the idea of firstness and the form of Moglichkeit rests in secondness, rather that the fact of hylomorphic relations.

That would associate Moglichkeit with a contiguity between firstness and secondness, more or less mirroring the relation between contenta and situationb-level actualities2 for a two-level interscope.

0059 If this association to Moglichkeit is plausible, then the presentation of Ausweisen rests primarily in secondness (the row), rather than the fact of secondness (the column), and the form of Ausweisen touches base with thirdness (the row), instead of signs of thirdness (the column).  Maybe, I should say, essentially with thirdness, and accidentally with signs of thirdness.

How to translate the term, Ausweisen?  Kemple recommends the term, “pointing out”, while other translators choose the term, “account”.  “Pointing out” distinguishes an object from its surroundings.  An object is “laid out in consciousness”.

Finally, Boden (surroundedness) connects thirdness (the row) with firstness (the row) in the same manner as Moglichkeitand Ausweisen.  The presentation belongs to row 3 and column N.  The form belongs to row 1 and column N+1, unless N+1 equals four, then the column returns to idea (the form of firstness).

Here is the summary for the ongoing diagonal.

Figure 11

0060 Does Moglichkeit, Ausweisen and Boden associate to pairs of elements in a sign relation?

Here is a guess.

Figure 12

0061 For Moglichkeit, the sign-vehicle (SV) associates to novel presentation in firstness (row) and the sign-object (SO) associates to novel form in secondness (row).  The columns shift as well.

For Ausweisen, the SO associates to novel presentation in secondness (row) and the SI associates to novel form in thirdness (row).  The columns shift as well.

For Boden, the sign-interpretant (SI) associates to novel presentation in thirdness (row) and a corresponding nacent SV associates to novel form in firstness (row).  The columns shift as well.  The nascent SV may sustain the next Moglichkeit.

0062 Here is a picture of how sign-elements key into the tabular presentative forms along one diagonal.

Figure 13

Each novel presentative form expresses the tabular presentative form (row M, column N) [contiguity based on the two manifesting sign elements] the tabular presentative form (row M+1, column N+1), with wrap-around from thirdness to firstness.

0063 Here is a picture of the flow of Heidegger’s terms and how they might associate to the elements of Peirce’s sign-relation for this particular diagonal.

Figure 14

0064  In general, Moglichkeit moves diagonally from the first to the second row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from firstness to secondness.  A sign-vehicle makes a sign-object possible.

Ausweisen moves diagonally from the second to the third row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from secondness to thirdness.  A sign-object points to the facet of a sign-interpretant in thirdness.

Boden wraps around diagonally from the third to the first row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from thirdness to firstness.  The facet of the sign-interpretant in thirdness joins with the facet of the sign-interpretant in firstness.

0065 So far, I suggest that Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence corresponds to novel presentative forms.

Plus, these novel presenatitive forms further correspond to elements in a sign relation.

In the previous figure, couplings of sign-elements label the contiguity between the two tabular presentative forms that contribute to the novel presentative form.

0066 If these associations make sense, then I may claim the following.

Heidegger’s grounds of transcendence may be technically written as a novel presentation [substantiates] form.  Plus, the novel presentation belongs to one category (foremost in appearance (row) and secondarily in experience (column)) and the novel form belongs to the adjacent higher category (for both row and column, with wrap around).

A sequence of dyads may be depicted by focusing on diagonals in a table of appearances versus forms.  A table of presentative forms contains nine ” presentative forms” (or better, “tabular presentative forms”) according to the current normative use of the term, and supports three sequences of “novel presentative forms”.  Each sequence associates to Heidegger’s three terms describing the grounds of transcendence.

0067 Finally, the contiguity between novel presentation and novel form along one particular diagonal juxtaposes two elements within a sign relation.