Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 5 of 18)

0068 So far, I have considered one diagonal in a table of presentative forms.

Here is a different diagonal.

Figure 15

0069 I arrive at the following associations.

Figure 16

0070 These associations touch base with the following story about how Sam got a new job.

Sam recently graduated from IIT with a degree in accounting.  He lost his job at a tax-assistance company because of the impact of inexpensive computer software programs designed for tax returns.  He hears from one his professors that there may be a job at a small accounting software company on Halstead.  So, he calls, and they tell him to come by.  When?  How about tomorrow at 11?  Oh, by the way, could you e-mail us your resume?

The next day, Sam gets off the bus in front of a chicken-baking restaurant.  Where is the company?  Oh, there, on the second floor.  How to get there?  The only other door is in the back of the restaurant.  Plus, there are outside stairs. 

0071 Obviously, Sam has to enter the restaurant.  They are broiling chicken for lunch.  It smells just like grandma’s house (presentation of qualia as a fact).  Gramma had a saying, “Don’t judge a book by its cover.”  (form signifying mode of conduct).  So, Sammy asks one of the cooks. The broiler points to the stairs halfway down the restaurant.

At the foot of the stairs, Sammy remembers what gramma counseled (presentation of an action or mode of conduct), and tells himself, “Remember why you are here.”  (form as an idea of a normal context).  Up the stairs he goes.  He recounts to himself the parts of his resume having to do with understanding accounting programs.  By the time he stands at the door, the only door, at the top of the stairs, Sam already asks his Grandma to be a guardian angel looking over him (presentation of a normal context).  The chicken restaurant is the cover.  The software company is the book (form is a fact of qualia).

0072 In terms of Peirce’s formulation of the sign-relation, the smell of chicken (sign-vehicle) stands for Sam’s grandmother (sign-object) in regards to Grandma advising Sam and her advice applying to the current situation (sign-interpretant).

In terms of Heidegger’s three features in the grounding of transcendence, Moglichkeit (possibility) is the presentation of the smell of broiling chicken substantiating the form of a slogan, “Don’t judge a book by its cover”, Ausweisen (pointing-out) is the presentation of asking for directions, going to and going up the stairs substantiating the formation of a normal context that literally manifests the slogan, and Boden (surroundedness) presents a manifestation of the slogan as the door at the top of the stairs.

0073 Both Peirce’s sign-relation and Heidegger’s three components grounding transcendence play into the table of presentative forms, each in a different manner.  If Peirce’s and Heidegger’s approaches pertain to a single reality, then I may say that the single reality contains the nine presentative forms in the table.


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 6 of 18)

0074 One diagonal remains.

Figure 17

Here are the suggested associations.

Figure 18

0075 Sam knocks on the door.  He hears a shuffling and the door opens just a bit, “Are you Sam Johnson?”

“Yes”. Sam has a feeling that this book is going to be more interesting than the cover (presentation of feelings as a sign).

The door opens wide and Sam is beckoned to enter by two nerdy fellows.  Both wear glasses.  Both are around the same age as Sam.  The room is full of computers and books and… everything one would expect from a start-up software company.  The big room is obviously once the living room of the family who once owned the restaurant below.

The pale one says, “Hi, I am Mel Kandusky.  This is Isaac Viruda.”

Isaac is of Indian descent.  Not Native American, but southcentral Asian.

Sam says, “Are you any relation to Professor Kandusky, at IIT?”

Mel says, “I’m his son.”

0076 Sam realizes that he is already written into the book (form as the idea of actuality).

Mel continues, “Have a seat.  Isaac and I went over the resume that you sent.  We have some issues.”  Mel looks at Isaac.  Isaac smiles, then tries to look serious.

“We think that you may be too earnest for this software startup.”

“What do you mean?”, Sam says, “Your dad told me to apply!” (presentation of the idea of the actuality.  The question and comment serves to define the sign-object by raising the fact that this interview is a sign that Professor Kandusky had told Sam about the job).

Isaac starts smiling again.

“Well, we don’t come to work before 11 and we leave right after the restaurant closes at 6.  So, we are not working eight hours a day.  Plus, we rotate the morning help desk daily, so whoever gets the job will be on call from 7 to 11 while at home for around… “, Mel pretends to count the number of people in the room, “… two days per week.  So, we were thinking that may not meet your high standard of earnestness (presentation of the sign of Professor Kandusky’s intrinsic recommendation as fact).”

0077 Sam laughs, and is about to say… when an old woman walks out from the hallway into the former living room.  She is obviously a Kandusky.

“Oh, I hope that I’m not interrupting.  I’m just passing through.  Oh, you are the new…?”

Mel does the introductions, “Sam, this is my grandmother.  She owns the restaurant on the first floor.  Gramma, this is Sam, he’s going to work with us.”

Mrs. Kandusky says, “Nice to meet you.  If you ever want some chicken or fixins, just come downstairs.” (possible sign-vehicle, presentation of feeling as a thing of beauty)

She then proceeds to the door and down the stairs.

0078 So, that is the story of how Sam got a new job.

In terms of Peirce’s formulation of the sign-relation, the feeling that a book is opening (sign-vehicle) stands for the goofy interview (sign-object) in regards to Professor Kandusky’s invitation to Sam to join a family enterprise (sign-interpretant).

In terms of Heidegger’s three features in the grounding of transcendence, Moglichkeit (possibility) is the presentation a feeling inspired by Sam’s grandmother substantiating the idea that the book is actualAusweisen (pointing-out) is the presentation of the book of Sam’s resume substantiating the fact that the interview itself is a sign of the Professor’s intention to hire Sam, and Boden (surroundedness) re-presents this sign as an invitation to join the Professor’s family-based team.

0079 Both Peirce’s sign-relation and Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence play into the table of presentative forms,each in a different manner.  If Peirce’s and Heidegger’s approaches pertain to a single reality, then I may say that the single reality contains the nine presentative forms in the table.


Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 7 of 18)

0080 This is the third blog in a series. 

The first blog, posted from May 15 through 18, 2023 at www.raziemah.com, performed a cursory examination of Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter, Boston/Berlin).  The book is volume twenty in the Semiotics, Communication and Cognition series, edited by Paul Cobley and Kalevi Kull.

The second blog precedes this blog, depending on how one defines, “proceeds”, and covers appendix 1.1.

At present, I have appendix 1.2 of Kemple’s book before me.  

0081 Peirce’s vision of a complex sign-relation contains one sign-vehicle, two sign-objects and three sign-interpretants.  Altogether, there are six elements.

Figure 19

0082 Kemple presents five different possible configurations of semiosic structure.  He calls this sequence, “the semiotic ladder”.  Here is a table of the five rungs.

Figure 20

Clearly, the semiotic ladder offers a variation of Peirce’s vision of the complex sign-relation.

0083 I ask, “How would I translate the semiotic ladder into category-based nested forms?”

Peirce’s formulation of a complex sign-relation starts with a single sign-vehicle.  The immediate sign-vehicle triggers an immediate sign-object and immediate sign-interpretant.  Then, a dynamical sign-object and dynamical sign-interpretant follow.  Then, if the sign-vehicle repeats and the dynamical interpretant becomes a habit, that habit is a final interpretant.

0084 In contrast, a three-level interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.  Each of three levels (contenta, situationb and perspectivec) contains a nested form with three elements (potential1, actuality2 and normal context3).  There are nine elements altogether.

So, is there a way to mesh a paradigm with six elements with one with nine?

0085 Well, yes and no.

Yes, category-based nested formulations of signs are developed in several of Razie Mah’s e-works, including Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings and Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.

No, the formulations do not quite match Peirce’s paradigm.

0086 Nevertheless, an attempt to explain Peirce’s paradigm in terms of the three-level interscope may prove insightful, even though it may not be fully satisfying.

To this I attend, using the example of a landslide.


Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 8 of 18)

0087 Step one concerns virtual semiosis.

Virtual semiosis contains an immediate vehicle, an immediate object and an immediate interpretant.

Yet, it is not a sign-relation.

So, “virtual” means “in simulation”.

Or does it mean “in virtue”?

0088 Perhaps, the category-based nested form can assist. 

If the term is not familiar, then see A Primer on the Category-based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah.  These e-works are available at smashwords, as well as other e-book venues.  They are brief and informative.

0089 Can the category-based nested form assist in appreciating the nature of virtual semiosis?

Well, what is an immediate interpretant?

Does an immediate interpretant describe ‘what is happening’3?

If so, then the immediate interpretant serves as a normal context3.

A normal context3 arises from an actuality2 and a potential1.  If the immediate interpretant3 arises from an immediate object2 and an immediate vehicle1, then the immediate vehicle1 is the potential of ‘something’ happening1.

Also, the immediate object2 is a thing or event2.  This immediate object2 will then serve as a sign-vehicle in a true semiotic act.

0090 Here is a picture of the immediate vehicle1, object2 and interpretant3.

Figure 21

0091 A landslide is a good example of virtual semiosis.

The landslide is a content-level actuality2 with a hylomorphic structure, composed of two contiguous real elements (which is how Peirce defines the category of secondness).  The two real elements are heavy wet earth and landslide.  The contiguity is placed in brackets.  [Gives way] sounds like formal causality.

The hylomorphe, heavy wet earth [gives way] landslide2a, is an immediate object that exists independently from what we think about it.

0092 The normal context3a, stormy weather3a, is also mind-independent and aids understanding when a mind recognizes that heavy rain is a normal context for certain types of landslides.   So, stormy weather3a serves as an immediate interpretant.

Similarly, the potential of ‘rainwater’1a is mind-independent and aids in understanding when a mind recognizes landslides as consequences of rainwater.  So, rainwater serves as an immediate vehicle.

0093 Here is a diagram.

Figure 22

Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 9 of 18)

0094 Step two concerns actual semiosis.

A discussion of actual semiosis in terms of category-based nested forms appears in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  This examination is (more or less) consistent with that discussion.

According to Kemple, actual semiosis adds the dynamical object and interpretant to the immediate vehicle, object and interpretant of virtual semiosis.

The term, “immediate”, associates to the content-level and firstness.  The term, “dynamical”, suggests the situation-level and secondness.  Thus, actual semiosis crosses from one level of an interscope to another.  Virtual semiosis does not.

0095 As mentioned in the prior blog, a landslide2a may serve as a sign-vehicle.  The landslide belongs to the category of secondness (hence the subscript “2”) and to the category of firstness (hence the subscript “a”).  So, even though this sign-vehicle is actual, it stands on a level associated with possibility.

Notably, the immediate object2a (not the immediate vehicle1a) serves as the sign-vehicle (SV) for actual semiosis.

What does this note imply?  Hmmm.  Uh-oh.  Never mind.  Where am I?  Okay, I continue.

0096 What about the sign-object for actual semiosis?

A situation-level actuality2b virtually emerges from and situates a content-level actuality2a, in the same way that a sign-object is formally and extrinsically specified by a sign-vehicle.

Plus, this situation-level actuality2b (serving as the specified sign-object, SO) occurs in a situation-level normal context3band arises from a situation-level potential1a.  Both constitute a sign interpretant (SI).

0097 Here is a picture.

Figure 23

0098 I may ask, “What does a landslide mean to me?”

Well, it may not mean much, unless it blocks a road.

Then, the landslide (SV) stands for a blocked road (SO) in regards to my transportation options (SI).  How badly is the road damaged?

0099 The landslide is extrinsic to the blocked road.  The landslide specifies a blocked road.  Damages must be formally determined.

Thus, in the terminology of the scholastics, this example of actual semiosis may be labeled specified extrinsic formal causality.

Figure 24

0100 If I used a ruptured appendix as the example, the example would be called specified intrinsic formal causality.


Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 10 of 18)

0101 Here is what I have covered so far in the semiotic ladder.

Figure 25

0102 If I were to continue with Peirce’s schema of one sign-vehicle (immediate), two sign-objects (immediate and dynamical) and three sign-interpretants (immediate, dynamical and final), then I would try to figure a way to add a final interpretant.

Indeed, step three of the ladder adds a final interpretant, and this final interpretant is extrinsic to the human individual.  The human being appears in step four, adding an intrinsic final interpretant.

0103 In short, steps three and four are entangled, which may not be too safe when the analogy is a ladder.

Be that as it may, allow me to add a perspective level to the example of the specified sign that arises from a landslide.

Figure 26

0104 According to the category-based nested form, there are two signs in play.

The first sign-relation embodies specified extrinsic formal causality.  The immediate object serves as the material for the sign-vehicle.  This does not quite match Peirce’s schema (discussed above).  But, that does not mean that it does not belong to Peirce’s grand vision.  After all, the immediate object captures two features of most sign-vehicles.  First, the sign-vehicle is material.  Second, the sign-vehicle formally denotes a sign-object in regards to a sign-interpretant.

The second sign-relation embodies a different style of formal causality.  Plus, this different style comes in two flavors.   The causality associates to Peirce’s final interpretant.

Peirce’s use of the word, “final”, does not correspond to the scholastic definition of a final cause.  Or does it? The flavors are extrinsic and intrinsic.

0105 To obtain the name for this different style of formal causality, consult Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, mentioned in a prior blog.

What matters here is that the dynamical object of a blocked road cannot avoid engaging a final interpretant, consisting of the network of paths that includes the road (extrinsic) and the individual’s options with and without a landslide (intrinsic).

0106 This apparently dualistic final interpretant covers the third and fourth rungs of the semiotic ladder.

Here is a picture.

Figure 27

Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 11 of 18)

0107 Here is what I have covered so far in the semiotic ladder.

Figure 28

0108 Peirce’s semiotic ladder expands a single immediate sign-vehicle with each rung.

In contrast, the category-based nested approach puts more and more of its three-level interscope into play.  Indeed, with steps three and four, Peirce’s final interpretant starts with a single situation-level actuality2b as sign-vehicle, produces a single perspective-level actuality2c as sign object, and allows two normal-contexts3c and potentials1c, corresponding to extrinsic and intrinsic final sign-interpretants.

Here is a picture of corresponding features in a three-level interscope.

Figure 29

0109 Say what?

Steps three and four are entangled.

Where does the third… er… fourth rung of the semiotic ladder lead?

Oh, they must lead to the fifth rung.

0110 I imagine that the fifth rung leads back to the content-level normal context3a and potential1a.

Why do I say this?

Here, I turn to ancient Greek mythology and suggest a cultural normal context3a and potential1a for the actuality of a landslide2a.

Figure 30

0111 Yes, this suggests a third sign, where the sign-vehicle is where the (blocked) road goes2c and the sign-object is the landslide2a and the sign-interpretant is the divine anger1a of the premier god of weather3a.  This third sign is crucial to the field of anthropology.

0112 In short, the category-based nested form associates to Peirce’s semiotic ladder, but not in a facile manner.

The associations yield three types of signs.

The first two types are introduced in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings.

The third type is introduced in Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.


Looking at Appendix 1.3 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 12 of 18)

0113 How can a sign-vehicle serve as a symbol and as an icon?

Author Brian Kemple raises the question in Appendix 1.3 of his 2019 book, The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter, Boston/Berlin).

0114 Well, Kemple is not talking about the sign-vehicle for any sign-relation.

He is referring to the sign-vehicle of the intellectual concept.

Or, should I say, “He is referring to the intellectual concept as a sign-vehicle.”?

0115 How would the category-based nested form approach wrestle with these statements?

I proceed by way of example.

I left off with the a sign-relation where the sign-vehicle corresponds to a perspective-level actuality2cthe sign-objectgoes with a content-level actuality2a and the sign-interpretant corresponds to the content-level normal context3a and potential1a.

Figure 31

0116 Does the sign-vehicle fit the label, “intellectual concept”?

I suspect that it does.  After all, the perspective-level actuality2c offers itself as a sign-object to two sign-relations that span the situation and perspective levels.

0117 Say what?

Recall the examination of appendix 1.2, where the perspective-level actuality2c engages an extrinsic and an intrinsic final interpretant.

Figure 32

0118 I can isolate the sign-object as an intellectual concept.  Surely, a network of roads and the challenges to my travelsare one level beyond situational dynamics.  A roadmap and a plan are intellectual concepts.

Figure 33

0119 What happens when these two sign-objects contribute to a single sign-vehicle?

Oh, let me read the first line of this examination (point 0113).

0120 The roadmap is like an icon.  An icon is a sign-relation whose sign-object is based on the character of firstness… as in… similarity.  The roadmap (SV) stands for a network of roads (SO) in regards to the principle of proportion (SI).

Perhaps, it is odd to consider a SO repurposing itself into a SV keying into the same principle of proportion as a roadmap (SI, extrinsic final) as well as into the challenges to travel brought on by the landslide (SI, intrinsic final).  So, an act of Zeus contextualizes a principle of proportion (characteristic of maps) as well as a principle of divine retribution(characteristic of how devastating storms challenge travel).

0121 The challenge for my travels reflects the character of symbols.  A symbol is a sign-relation whose sign-object is based on the character of thirdness… as in… convention.  Surely, the conventional path from my town to other towns relies on the road that is now blocked by a landslide.  So, the blocked road becomes a symbol for Zeus’s anger at our particular city.  I bet that it has something to do with our new king, Oedipus.

Yes, he solved the riddle of the Sphinx that once made that road so treacherous.  But, people are also getting sick and now a landslide blocks the road to medical expertise.

0122 Kemple offers a figure.  It is the second figure in the entire book.  Here is how I imagine it.

Figure 34

0123 The intellectual concept of where a (blocked) road goes serves as a sign-vehicle that hybridizes map (icon) and divine Zeus’s thunderbolts (symbol).  The corresponding sign-object serves as an image even though the sign-interpretant operates as if the sign-object is a symbol. 

Here is a picture.

Figure 35

The interventional sign produces a content level that recapitulates the original immediate vehicle, object and interpretant of virtual semiosis.

0124 Here is a comparison.

Figure 36

00125 The implications?

Here is one option.

Can a sign-vehicle (a perspective-level actuality2c) generate an imagistic sign-object (a content-level actuality2a) and a symbol-istic sign-interpretant (content-level normal context3a and potential1a)? 

Do human conventions generate artifacts for virtual semiosis?

Do cultural artifacts serve as immediate objects?

Consider Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.


Looking at Appendix 2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 13 of 18)

0126 Appendix 2 is titled, “Language”.

Surely, one’s education should include histories of spoken words.

After all, spoken words are all we have.

0127 Take the word, “education”.  

It derives from the Latin word, educare, which translates as “to train or to mold”.

That is not all.

It also derives from the Latin word, educere, which translates as “to lead out”.

0128 Such a dual inheritance reminds me of the distinction between the words, “deduce” and “educe”.  Deduction follows the rules of logic, particularly the principle of non-contradiction.  Eduction brings out, figures out and sheds light on the topic at hand.

After considering the previous blogs on appendices 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, it is easy to imagine that deduction applies to secondness (the realm of actuality) and that eduction applies to thirdness and firstness (the realms of normal contexts and potentials).  Or, maybe I cans say that deduction applies to sign-objects and eduction applies to sign-vehicles and sign-interpretants.

“Education” combines “deduction” (educare) and “eduction” (educere).

“Education” is a spoken word.

So, what is the nature of spoken words?

0129 At the turn of the 20th century, Ferdinand de Saussure revolutionizes linguistics by proposing that speech-alone words are placeholders in two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole (speech) and langue (whatever is going on in one’s head when hearing or generating spoken words).

Of course, cognitive psychologists can observe and measure parole.  They can build models.  They can discuss these models using a specialized disciplinary language. As such, parole (speech acts) are similar to phenomena.  If phenomenaare observable and measurable facets of their noumenon, then parole are observable and measurable facets of langue.

0130 Well, that is my suggestion, for the moment.

0131 If I think in terms of secondness, then I think in terms of two contiguous real elements.  For spoken language, the two real elements are parole and langue.  The contiguity is an arbitrary relation.  For science, the two real elements are phenomena and their noumenon.  The contiguity is not arbitrary, nor is it obvious.  Rather, it is a slogan that goes back to Immanuel Kant.  A noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.

The hylomorphic structure of a noumenon and its phenomena, attributed to Kant in the same manner that the Pentateuch is attributed to Moses, corresponds to ‘what is’ of the Positivist’s judgment.  This is discussed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

0132 The above discussion suggests that I juxtapose two hylomorphic structures.

Figure 37

0133 If the juxtaposition sparks a feeling, then the feeling says, “No matter how well we observe, measure, model and technically discuss parole, we can never objectify langue, unless the relation between parole (as an external system of differences) and langue (as an internal system of differences) becomes motivated, and a comparison with Kant’s slogan is no longer secure.  If the relation between parole and langue is motivated, then the phenomena of talk can objectify the noumenon of the way that we cognitively process that talk.”


Looking at Appendix 2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 14 of 18)

0134 The English word, “education”, arises from two Latin terms, meaning “to train” and “to lead out”.

Perhaps, German is superior to English in simultaneously evoking more than one kernel in a single word.  In German, word-elements concatenate effortlessly.  There could be a German word for “the relation of arbitrariness between langueand parole” or for “the impossibility of phenomena fully objectifying their noumenon“.

0135 Does German-speaking Martin Heidegger hold an advantage?

Maybe, maybe not.  After all, he could not concatenate das Sein (Being) and des Seienden (beings).  Oh, what am I saying?  That is what he did, more or less.  So, when I place Heidegger’s not-fully melded concatenation against what isfor science, I get the following juxtaposition.

Figure 38

0136 How curious.

Am I suggesting that Heidegger’s phrase, das Sein des Seienden (the Being of beings), conceals a contiguity, and that contiguity is the same as the one that applies to all scientific things?

0137 Recall, the noumenon is the thing itself.  Its phenomena are its observable and measurable facets.  Plus, according to Kant’s slogan, a noumenon cannot be fully objectified as its phenomena.  This applies to all things in the natural sciences.  Empirio-schematic inquiry observes and measures phenomena.  Their noumenon is ignored.

By juxtaposition, das Sein is Being itself.  Des Seienden are beings that we encounter in our daily lives.  Plus, according to the implicit contiguity between these two real elements, Being cannot be fully objectified as beings that we encounter in our daily lives.  This applies to all modern things.

0138 Plus, as discussed in the prior blog, during the early 20th century, hylomorphic structures that juxtapose with ‘what is’ in the Positivist’s judgment seem to be in style.  The ground-breaking linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, comes up with a similar structure, allowing me to say the following.

By juxtaposition, langue is language itself.  Parole are spoken words that we encounter in our daily lives.  Plus, according to the arbitrary relation between langue and parole, language cannot be fully objectified by speech acts.  This applies to everything we say. 

0139 What does this imply?

That is a good question.