Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 1 of 18)

0028 This is the second blog in a series.

 Looking at Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “Intersection” appears in Razie Mah’s blog from May 15 through 18, 2023.  In that brief examination (points 0001-0027), a technical category-based definition of the term, “intersection” is shown to mesh with the theme of Kemple’s book, whose full title is The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter, Boston/Berlin).

To me, that is fascinating.

0029 In this series of blogs, I examine Kemple’s appendices.

Yes, he has more than one appendix.

Plus, there are subdivisions.

0030 Appendix 1.1 is titled, “Presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence”.  My associations will draw upon A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, as well as A Primer on Natural Signs, Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, and Comments on Newell Sasha’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.  These primers and comments touch base with Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion”, which is available, along with the other mentioned e-works, at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0031 The title of Appendix 1.1 contains two technical terms.

“Presentative forms” is a term coined by Jacques Maritain and literally means a form that is substantiated by its presentation, rather than by matter.  The hylomorphe is presentation [substantiates] form, rather than matter [substantiates] form.

“The grounding of transcendence” is a phrase used by Martin Heidegger.  It conveys what the presentative form accomplishes.  The presentative form accomplishes more than matter-substantiated form, because it leads to (grounds) another form, which is located at a higher categorical level (transcendence).

Figure 01

0032 Surely, this implies that presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence coincide in a particular way.  The “matter” of the presentative form associates to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”

Is this is a general feature of presentative forms?

Well, the claim is a good working hypothesis.


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 2 of 18)

0033 So why are presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence important?

It seems that they govern the ways in which the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness appear.  The process is not straightforward.  After all, if one category associates with what is expressed and the adjacent higher category goes with what is experienced (with the caveat that thirdness in what is presented wraps around to firstness in form), then each presentative form expresses two categories.

Oh yeah, that makes sense.

0034 But, it does not make sense.

Kemple quotes from Peirce’s 1903 essay, “Sundry Logical Conceptions”, concerning the modes of appearance for the categories of experience.  In the following table, nine presentative forms are listed.  Vertical columns correspond to the category of experience for the presentative form.  The rows correspond to expression according to category.

Figure 02

The columns denote forms and the rows denote appearance (presentation).

0035 For example, consider the form of firstness (first column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to an idea of secondness.  Here, I depict it as ‘something’  in the realm of actuality.  An idea pertains to ‘something’ actual.

Here is another example from the above table.  The form of secondness (second column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to the fact of relations.  To me, these relations are hylomorphic, consisting of two contiguous real elements, characterizing Peirce’s category of secondness.  A thing is a fact of (hylomorphic) relation.

One more example will help.  The form of thirdness (third column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to signs of secondness. Actions are signs of secondness.  So are modes of conduct.

0036 Each element in the above table embodies a form in one category and an appearance in another category.  So, two categories are involved for each item in the table.  Plus, the matrix is exhaustive.

Figure 03

0037 What about the idea that transcendence is grounded in crossing categories?

My head swims.  But, it’s not Kemple’s fault.  It is the idea that the presentative form has a hylomorphic structure and that the element that corresponds to “matter” belongs to one category and the element that corresponds to “form” belongs to the adjacent higher category.

This idea is not apparent in Peirce’s table, pictured above.

Kemple continues…

0038 Going down the first column, forms in firstness may be labeled as “ideas”.  So, the element in the first row and the first column, is an idea of possibility (or, ‘something’ in the realm of possibility).  Likewise, ‘something’ in the realm of actuality corresponds to the idea of secondness.  ‘Something’ in the realm of normal context goes with the idea of thirdness.

Going down the second column, forms in secondness may be labeled as “facts”.  So, qualia are facts of firstness.  Relations in the style of hylomorphes are facts of secondness.  Signs and other triadic relations are facts of thirdness.

Going down the third column, forms in thirdness may be labeled as “signs”.  Feelings, such as awareness of a thing of beauty, are signs of firstness.  Actions, such as modes of conduct, are signs of secondness.    Thoughts are signs of thirdness.

0039 Still, I have a problem.

Even though each element in the above table references two categories.  The rows and columns do not highlight the hypothesis about transcendence developed in the previous blog, where the “matter” of a presentative form belongs to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”.

Is there a ghost of a chance that Heidegger’s ground of transcendence haunts Perice’s table of presentative forms.

Figure 04

0040 Perhaps, I can conjure its specter by coloring a sequence of presentative forms, following the proposed hypothesis.

For each transition, from idea to fact, from fact to sign, and from sign to idea, there is a corresponding transition from firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.  

The result is a seqence of novel presentative forms that are composed of elements of the table.  The lower category presentative form for both appearance (row) and form (column) serves as “matter”… er, I mean “presence”… and the higher-category presentative form in both appearance (row) and category (column) serves as “form”.   

0041 In the following diagram, sequences appear in color.

Figure 05

0042 The hylomorphic structure, lower-category presence [substantiates] higher-category form, embodies transcendence, defined as moving from one category to the adjacent higher category in both form and appearance.  So, ways to imagine the coincidence of presentative forms and grounds of transcendence track the colors in the table above


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 3 of 18)

0043 Okay, allow me to explore the most obvious diagonal.

Figure 06

0044 Consider ‘something’ in the realm of possibility [substantiates] the form of a hylomorphic relation.  According to the hypothesis on grounding transcendence, the novel presentative form is ‘something’ possible [substantiates] a thing.   An idea in firstness causes (or is contiguous with) the facts of a cause-and-effect relation.  Element (column 1, row 1) substantiates element (column 2, row 2).

Figure 07

0045 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Moglichkeit (translated into English as “possibility”)?

Yes, Moglichkeit applies when ‘something’ in the realm of possibility serves as grounds for a cause-and-effect fact.

‘Something’ presents itself as a thing.

Okay, that sounds plausible.

0046 Let me consider the next novel presentative form.

Consider hylomorphic relations [substantiate] thoughts.  A fact of secondness grounds a sign of thirdness.   The thing is like matter.  The thought is like form.  Element (column 2, row 2) substantiates element (column 3, row 3).

Figure 08

Facts of secondness [substantiate] signs of thirdness.  Things [substantiate] thoughts.

0047 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Ausweisen (previously rendered as “account” and now translated by Kemple into “pointing out”)? 

A thing has significance.

Okay, here are two successes in a row.  But, the trend is making me nervous.

The form of the first movement, presents itself as a fact and that presentation substantiates a sign in the realm of thirdness,corresponding to a thought.

I am afraid that this trend will end up as a tortuous run-on sentence.

0048 One more step.

Consider thoughts [substantiate] ‘something’ in the realm of possibility.  A sign of thirdness grounds an idea of firstness.   Thoughts are like matter.  ‘Something’ in the realm of possibility is like form.

Figure 09

0049 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Boden (previously translated as “basis” and now translated by Kemple as “surroundedness”)?

Is the originating ‘something’ in the realm of possibility subsumed into a form that is substantiated by a thought?

Okay, I am not nervous anymore.

I am perplexed, yet intrigued.

0050 Of course, the questionable character of the following hypothesis cannot be doubted.

Otherwise, I could present the following claims as fiat accompli.

First, presentative forms in the table in Appendix 1.1 are hylomorphes, where the column conveys experience (form) and the row represents appearance (presentative).

Second, presentative forms may contribute to a novel presentative form, corresponding to Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence.

Third, tabular presentative forms that cross adjacent categories constitute a grounding of transcendence.  This is a hypothesis.

In other words, the grounding of transcendence follows diagonals within Kemple’s table of presentative forms.

0051 What transitions do Moglichkeit, Ausweisen and Boden correspond to?

How about passages from idea to fact, fact to sign, and sign to idea?

Another option is firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.

One more option is that both passages are implicated.

0052 In section 6.3.1, Kemple notes that Peirce’s categories and Heidegger’s groundings do not map onto one another perfectly.  Peirce’s categories pertain to semiosis.  Heidegger’s labels are contained within a framework of ontic-ontological transcendent grounds that are specific to human beings.

0053 So far, my associations to Kemple’s appendix 1.1 yields a hypothesis and a challenge.

The hypothesis is that Maritain’s presentative forms and Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence coincide with the construction of novel presenative forms, composed of presentative forms.   A tabular element in one categorysubstantiates the tabular element in the adjacent higher category, for both columns and rows, with a wrap-around at thirdness.

The result is three sequences of three transitions, depicted in colors in the above table.

0054 If this result is plausible, the elements in the table are not only presentative forms, but they are also elements in a novel hylomorphic structure: presentative (column A, row B) [substantiates] form (column A+1, row B+1).

Heidegger’s terms seem to jive with these novel presentative forms.

0055 Is that confusing?  If so, then I wonder.

Does Moglichkeit (possibility) start with the column of idea or with the row of firstness?


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 4 of 18)

0056 I repeat.  Here is a table that colors in the hypothesis of the coincidence between a sequence of novel presentative forms and grounding of transcendence, with one diagonal strand colored in bold.

Figure 10

0057 First, I associate two contiguous elements, ‘something’ in the realm of possibility (presentative) and hylomorphic relations or things (form) to Heidegger’s term, Moglichkeit.  ‘Something’ (presentation, idea in firstness) substantiates a thing (form, fact in secondness).

Kemple elaborates in section 6.3.1.  Heidegger identifies the dimensions of Moglichkeit (possibility) as Shiften (translated as establishing, finding, causing, as well as inducing) and Weltenwurf (translated as projection of world).

0058 What do these dimensions suggest?

Following the argument of the previous blog, the presentation of Moglichkeit rests primarily in firstness, rather than the idea of firstness and the form of Moglichkeit rests in secondness, rather that the fact of hylomorphic relations.

That would associate Moglichkeit with a contiguity between firstness and secondness, more or less mirroring the relation between contenta and situationb-level actualities2 for a two-level interscope.

0059 If this association to Moglichkeit is plausible, then the presentation of Ausweisen rests primarily in secondness (the row), rather than the fact of secondness (the column), and the form of Ausweisen touches base with thirdness (the row), instead of signs of thirdness (the column).  Maybe, I should say, essentially with thirdness, and accidentally with signs of thirdness.

How to translate the term, Ausweisen?  Kemple recommends the term, “pointing out”, while other translators choose the term, “account”.  “Pointing out” distinguishes an object from its surroundings.  An object is “laid out in consciousness”.

Finally, Boden (surroundedness) connects thirdness (the row) with firstness (the row) in the same manner as Moglichkeitand Ausweisen.  The presentation belongs to row 3 and column N.  The form belongs to row 1 and column N+1, unless N+1 equals four, then the column returns to idea (the form of firstness).

Here is the summary for the ongoing diagonal.

Figure 11

0060 Does Moglichkeit, Ausweisen and Boden associate to pairs of elements in a sign relation?

Here is a guess.

Figure 12

0061 For Moglichkeit, the sign-vehicle (SV) associates to novel presentation in firstness (row) and the sign-object (SO) associates to novel form in secondness (row).  The columns shift as well.

For Ausweisen, the SO associates to novel presentation in secondness (row) and the SI associates to novel form in thirdness (row).  The columns shift as well.

For Boden, the sign-interpretant (SI) associates to novel presentation in thirdness (row) and a corresponding nacent SV associates to novel form in firstness (row).  The columns shift as well.  The nascent SV may sustain the next Moglichkeit.

0062 Here is a picture of how sign-elements key into the tabular presentative forms along one diagonal.

Figure 13

Each novel presentative form expresses the tabular presentative form (row M, column N) [contiguity based on the two manifesting sign elements] the tabular presentative form (row M+1, column N+1), with wrap-around from thirdness to firstness.

0063 Here is a picture of the flow of Heidegger’s terms and how they might associate to the elements of Peirce’s sign-relation for this particular diagonal.

Figure 14

0064  In general, Moglichkeit moves diagonally from the first to the second row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from firstness to secondness.  A sign-vehicle makes a sign-object possible.

Ausweisen moves diagonally from the second to the third row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from secondness to thirdness.  A sign-object points to the facet of a sign-interpretant in thirdness.

Boden wraps around diagonally from the third to the first row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from thirdness to firstness.  The facet of the sign-interpretant in thirdness joins with the facet of the sign-interpretant in firstness.

0065 So far, I suggest that Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence corresponds to novel presentative forms.

Plus, these novel presenatitive forms further correspond to elements in a sign relation.

In the previous figure, couplings of sign-elements label the contiguity between the two tabular presentative forms that contribute to the novel presentative form.

0066 If these associations make sense, then I may claim the following.

Heidegger’s grounds of transcendence may be technically written as a novel presentation [substantiates] form.  Plus, the novel presentation belongs to one category (foremost in appearance (row) and secondarily in experience (column)) and the novel form belongs to the adjacent higher category (for both row and column, with wrap around).

A sequence of dyads may be depicted by focusing on diagonals in a table of appearances versus forms.  A table of presentative forms contains nine ” presentative forms” (or better, “tabular presentative forms”) according to the current normative use of the term, and supports three sequences of “novel presentative forms”.  Each sequence associates to Heidegger’s three terms describing the grounds of transcendence.

0067 Finally, the contiguity between novel presentation and novel form along one particular diagonal juxtaposes two elements within a sign relation.


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 5 of 18)

0068 So far, I have considered one diagonal in a table of presentative forms.

Here is a different diagonal.

Figure 15

0069 I arrive at the following associations.

Figure 16

0070 These associations touch base with the following story about how Sam got a new job.

Sam recently graduated from IIT with a degree in accounting.  He lost his job at a tax-assistance company because of the impact of inexpensive computer software programs designed for tax returns.  He hears from one his professors that there may be a job at a small accounting software company on Halstead.  So, he calls, and they tell him to come by.  When?  How about tomorrow at 11?  Oh, by the way, could you e-mail us your resume?

The next day, Sam gets off the bus in front of a chicken-baking restaurant.  Where is the company?  Oh, there, on the second floor.  How to get there?  The only other door is in the back of the restaurant.  Plus, there are outside stairs. 

0071 Obviously, Sam has to enter the restaurant.  They are broiling chicken for lunch.  It smells just like grandma’s house (presentation of qualia as a fact).  Gramma had a saying, “Don’t judge a book by its cover.”  (form signifying mode of conduct).  So, Sammy asks one of the cooks. The broiler points to the stairs halfway down the restaurant.

At the foot of the stairs, Sammy remembers what gramma counseled (presentation of an action or mode of conduct), and tells himself, “Remember why you are here.”  (form as an idea of a normal context).  Up the stairs he goes.  He recounts to himself the parts of his resume having to do with understanding accounting programs.  By the time he stands at the door, the only door, at the top of the stairs, Sam already asks his Grandma to be a guardian angel looking over him (presentation of a normal context).  The chicken restaurant is the cover.  The software company is the book (form is a fact of qualia).

0072 In terms of Peirce’s formulation of the sign-relation, the smell of chicken (sign-vehicle) stands for Sam’s grandmother (sign-object) in regards to Grandma advising Sam and her advice applying to the current situation (sign-interpretant).

In terms of Heidegger’s three features in the grounding of transcendence, Moglichkeit (possibility) is the presentation of the smell of broiling chicken substantiating the form of a slogan, “Don’t judge a book by its cover”, Ausweisen (pointing-out) is the presentation of asking for directions, going to and going up the stairs substantiating the formation of a normal context that literally manifests the slogan, and Boden (surroundedness) presents a manifestation of the slogan as the door at the top of the stairs.

0073 Both Peirce’s sign-relation and Heidegger’s three components grounding transcendence play into the table of presentative forms, each in a different manner.  If Peirce’s and Heidegger’s approaches pertain to a single reality, then I may say that the single reality contains the nine presentative forms in the table.


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 6 of 18)

0074 One diagonal remains.

Figure 17

Here are the suggested associations.

Figure 18

0075 Sam knocks on the door.  He hears a shuffling and the door opens just a bit, “Are you Sam Johnson?”

“Yes”. Sam has a feeling that this book is going to be more interesting than the cover (presentation of feelings as a sign).

The door opens wide and Sam is beckoned to enter by two nerdy fellows.  Both wear glasses.  Both are around the same age as Sam.  The room is full of computers and books and… everything one would expect from a start-up software company.  The big room is obviously once the living room of the family who once owned the restaurant below.

The pale one says, “Hi, I am Mel Kandusky.  This is Isaac Viruda.”

Isaac is of Indian descent.  Not Native American, but southcentral Asian.

Sam says, “Are you any relation to Professor Kandusky, at IIT?”

Mel says, “I’m his son.”

0076 Sam realizes that he is already written into the book (form as the idea of actuality).

Mel continues, “Have a seat.  Isaac and I went over the resume that you sent.  We have some issues.”  Mel looks at Isaac.  Isaac smiles, then tries to look serious.

“We think that you may be too earnest for this software startup.”

“What do you mean?”, Sam says, “Your dad told me to apply!” (presentation of the idea of the actuality.  The question and comment serves to define the sign-object by raising the fact that this interview is a sign that Professor Kandusky had told Sam about the job).

Isaac starts smiling again.

“Well, we don’t come to work before 11 and we leave right after the restaurant closes at 6.  So, we are not working eight hours a day.  Plus, we rotate the morning help desk daily, so whoever gets the job will be on call from 7 to 11 while at home for around… “, Mel pretends to count the number of people in the room, “… two days per week.  So, we were thinking that may not meet your high standard of earnestness (presentation of the sign of Professor Kandusky’s intrinsic recommendation as fact).”

0077 Sam laughs, and is about to say… when an old woman walks out from the hallway into the former living room.  She is obviously a Kandusky.

“Oh, I hope that I’m not interrupting.  I’m just passing through.  Oh, you are the new…?”

Mel does the introductions, “Sam, this is my grandmother.  She owns the restaurant on the first floor.  Gramma, this is Sam, he’s going to work with us.”

Mrs. Kandusky says, “Nice to meet you.  If you ever want some chicken or fixins, just come downstairs.” (possible sign-vehicle, presentation of feeling as a thing of beauty)

She then proceeds to the door and down the stairs.

0078 So, that is the story of how Sam got a new job.

In terms of Peirce’s formulation of the sign-relation, the feeling that a book is opening (sign-vehicle) stands for the goofy interview (sign-object) in regards to Professor Kandusky’s invitation to Sam to join a family enterprise (sign-interpretant).

In terms of Heidegger’s three features in the grounding of transcendence, Moglichkeit (possibility) is the presentation a feeling inspired by Sam’s grandmother substantiating the idea that the book is actualAusweisen (pointing-out) is the presentation of the book of Sam’s resume substantiating the fact that the interview itself is a sign of the Professor’s intention to hire Sam, and Boden (surroundedness) re-presents this sign as an invitation to join the Professor’s family-based team.

0079 Both Peirce’s sign-relation and Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence play into the table of presentative forms,each in a different manner.  If Peirce’s and Heidegger’s approaches pertain to a single reality, then I may say that the single reality contains the nine presentative forms in the table.


Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 7 of 18)

0080 This is the third blog in a series. 

The first blog, posted from May 15 through 18, 2023 at www.raziemah.com, performed a cursory examination of Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter, Boston/Berlin).  The book is volume twenty in the Semiotics, Communication and Cognition series, edited by Paul Cobley and Kalevi Kull.

The second blog precedes this blog, depending on how one defines, “proceeds”, and covers appendix 1.1.

At present, I have appendix 1.2 of Kemple’s book before me.  

0081 Peirce’s vision of a complex sign-relation contains one sign-vehicle, two sign-objects and three sign-interpretants.  Altogether, there are six elements.

Figure 19

0082 Kemple presents five different possible configurations of semiosic structure.  He calls this sequence, “the semiotic ladder”.  Here is a table of the five rungs.

Figure 20

Clearly, the semiotic ladder offers a variation of Peirce’s vision of the complex sign-relation.

0083 I ask, “How would I translate the semiotic ladder into category-based nested forms?”

Peirce’s formulation of a complex sign-relation starts with a single sign-vehicle.  The immediate sign-vehicle triggers an immediate sign-object and immediate sign-interpretant.  Then, a dynamical sign-object and dynamical sign-interpretant follow.  Then, if the sign-vehicle repeats and the dynamical interpretant becomes a habit, that habit is a final interpretant.

0084 In contrast, a three-level interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.  Each of three levels (contenta, situationb and perspectivec) contains a nested form with three elements (potential1, actuality2 and normal context3).  There are nine elements altogether.

So, is there a way to mesh a paradigm with six elements with one with nine?

0085 Well, yes and no.

Yes, category-based nested formulations of signs are developed in several of Razie Mah’s e-works, including Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings and Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.

No, the formulations do not quite match Peirce’s paradigm.

0086 Nevertheless, an attempt to explain Peirce’s paradigm in terms of the three-level interscope may prove insightful, even though it may not be fully satisfying.

To this I attend, using the example of a landslide.


Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 8 of 18)

0087 Step one concerns virtual semiosis.

Virtual semiosis contains an immediate vehicle, an immediate object and an immediate interpretant.

Yet, it is not a sign-relation.

So, “virtual” means “in simulation”.

Or does it mean “in virtue”?

0088 Perhaps, the category-based nested form can assist. 

If the term is not familiar, then see A Primer on the Category-based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah.  These e-works are available at smashwords, as well as other e-book venues.  They are brief and informative.

0089 Can the category-based nested form assist in appreciating the nature of virtual semiosis?

Well, what is an immediate interpretant?

Does an immediate interpretant describe ‘what is happening’3?

If so, then the immediate interpretant serves as a normal context3.

A normal context3 arises from an actuality2 and a potential1.  If the immediate interpretant3 arises from an immediate object2 and an immediate vehicle1, then the immediate vehicle1 is the potential of ‘something’ happening1.

Also, the immediate object2 is a thing or event2.  This immediate object2 will then serve as a sign-vehicle in a true semiotic act.

0090 Here is a picture of the immediate vehicle1, object2 and interpretant3.

Figure 21

0091 A landslide is a good example of virtual semiosis.

The landslide is a content-level actuality2 with a hylomorphic structure, composed of two contiguous real elements (which is how Peirce defines the category of secondness).  The two real elements are heavy wet earth and landslide.  The contiguity is placed in brackets.  [Gives way] sounds like formal causality.

The hylomorphe, heavy wet earth [gives way] landslide2a, is an immediate object that exists independently from what we think about it.

0092 The normal context3a, stormy weather3a, is also mind-independent and aids understanding when a mind recognizes that heavy rain is a normal context for certain types of landslides.   So, stormy weather3a serves as an immediate interpretant.

Similarly, the potential of ‘rainwater’1a is mind-independent and aids in understanding when a mind recognizes landslides as consequences of rainwater.  So, rainwater serves as an immediate vehicle.

0093 Here is a diagram.

Figure 22

Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 9 of 18)

0094 Step two concerns actual semiosis.

A discussion of actual semiosis in terms of category-based nested forms appears in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  This examination is (more or less) consistent with that discussion.

According to Kemple, actual semiosis adds the dynamical object and interpretant to the immediate vehicle, object and interpretant of virtual semiosis.

The term, “immediate”, associates to the content-level and firstness.  The term, “dynamical”, suggests the situation-level and secondness.  Thus, actual semiosis crosses from one level of an interscope to another.  Virtual semiosis does not.

0095 As mentioned in the prior blog, a landslide2a may serve as a sign-vehicle.  The landslide belongs to the category of secondness (hence the subscript “2”) and to the category of firstness (hence the subscript “a”).  So, even though this sign-vehicle is actual, it stands on a level associated with possibility.

Notably, the immediate object2a (not the immediate vehicle1a) serves as the sign-vehicle (SV) for actual semiosis.

What does this note imply?  Hmmm.  Uh-oh.  Never mind.  Where am I?  Okay, I continue.

0096 What about the sign-object for actual semiosis?

A situation-level actuality2b virtually emerges from and situates a content-level actuality2a, in the same way that a sign-object is formally and extrinsically specified by a sign-vehicle.

Plus, this situation-level actuality2b (serving as the specified sign-object, SO) occurs in a situation-level normal context3band arises from a situation-level potential1a.  Both constitute a sign interpretant (SI).

0097 Here is a picture.

Figure 23

0098 I may ask, “What does a landslide mean to me?”

Well, it may not mean much, unless it blocks a road.

Then, the landslide (SV) stands for a blocked road (SO) in regards to my transportation options (SI).  How badly is the road damaged?

0099 The landslide is extrinsic to the blocked road.  The landslide specifies a blocked road.  Damages must be formally determined.

Thus, in the terminology of the scholastics, this example of actual semiosis may be labeled specified extrinsic formal causality.

Figure 24

0100 If I used a ruptured appendix as the example, the example would be called specified intrinsic formal causality.


Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 10 of 18)

0101 Here is what I have covered so far in the semiotic ladder.

Figure 25

0102 If I were to continue with Peirce’s schema of one sign-vehicle (immediate), two sign-objects (immediate and dynamical) and three sign-interpretants (immediate, dynamical and final), then I would try to figure a way to add a final interpretant.

Indeed, step three of the ladder adds a final interpretant, and this final interpretant is extrinsic to the human individual.  The human being appears in step four, adding an intrinsic final interpretant.

0103 In short, steps three and four are entangled, which may not be too safe when the analogy is a ladder.

Be that as it may, allow me to add a perspective level to the example of the specified sign that arises from a landslide.

Figure 26

0104 According to the category-based nested form, there are two signs in play.

The first sign-relation embodies specified extrinsic formal causality.  The immediate object serves as the material for the sign-vehicle.  This does not quite match Peirce’s schema (discussed above).  But, that does not mean that it does not belong to Peirce’s grand vision.  After all, the immediate object captures two features of most sign-vehicles.  First, the sign-vehicle is material.  Second, the sign-vehicle formally denotes a sign-object in regards to a sign-interpretant.

The second sign-relation embodies a different style of formal causality.  Plus, this different style comes in two flavors.   The causality associates to Peirce’s final interpretant.

Peirce’s use of the word, “final”, does not correspond to the scholastic definition of a final cause.  Or does it? The flavors are extrinsic and intrinsic.

0105 To obtain the name for this different style of formal causality, consult Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, mentioned in a prior blog.

What matters here is that the dynamical object of a blocked road cannot avoid engaging a final interpretant, consisting of the network of paths that includes the road (extrinsic) and the individual’s options with and without a landslide (intrinsic).

0106 This apparently dualistic final interpretant covers the third and fourth rungs of the semiotic ladder.

Here is a picture.

Figure 27