0611 Ah, I see a pattern.  The titular terms of “sentience” and “cell” label the same noumenal elements where subagents reside.  Plus, these are the elements that need to be modeled.  They are not the elements associated to phenomena.

0612 Here are the key words and their respective sign-interpretants.

The specifying sign-interpretant (SI_s) derives from Kull’s criteria for semiotic agency (see points 0026 through 0037). Self-governance associates to a situation-level normal context_3b and a choice of actions goes with situation-level potentials_1b.

The exemplar sign-interpretant (SI_e) is may be labeled, “salience_3c,1c“, in order to avoid articulating (or explicitly abstracting) the perspective-level normal context_3c and potential_1c.  The descriptions in the preceding figure constitute my rough guesses.

After all, what does the spoken word, “salience”, mean?

Why is it present in this particular instance?

Does this particular word send a message?

0613 I suppose that I can compare my descriptions of the specifying and the exemplar sign-interpretants to the scholastic interscope for how humans think, appearing in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) “New Beginning” (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), as well as Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Razie Mah’s blog for October, 2023).

John Deely (1942-2017) is quite the scholar.  His books plumb scholastic literature for insights into postmodern semiotics.

0614 What does he discover in these explorations?

He finds that Charles Peirce (in the 1800s) comes up with the same definition of the sign-relation as Baroque scholastic, John Poinsot (in the 1600s).

Quite a discovery.

He also sets the stage for Mah’s diagram of the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

0615 The following is a hybridization of terms from the S&T noumenal overlay and features from that scholastic interscope.

0616 At this point, the authors’ language-manipulations become more obvious.

Their title is “the sentient cell”.

The aim of their chapter is to model the cellular basis for consciousness.

And, right away, this examination associates the key titular terms to the sign-interpretants in Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay.

Yes, these sign-interpretants contain subagents.

0617 The authors claim that life and sentience are coterminous (section 13.1 and 2).

Then (section 13.2.1), they assert that unicellular organisms have sensory and perceptual mechanisms (SI_s).  They learn and remember (SI_s and SI_e).  They make decisions (SI_e).

0618 Then (section 13.2.2), the authors explore how biomarkers play roles among these sign-interpretants.  These biomarkers include the actions (SO_e(?)) by one subagent that serve as real initiating semiotic events (SV_s) for another subagent.  One subagent sends a message.  The other subagent receives it.  A biomarker released from one subagent provides information to another subagent.  This information contributes to a goal that, for all practical purposes, both subagents have in common.

0619 At this point (section 13.2.3), the authors explicitly mention the term, “information”.

They note that biological information, unlike “information” in the computer sciences, is ambiguous.  Why?  The computer sciences focus on the transmission of information.  The biological sciences are curious how information_2b(SV_e) stands for a goal_2c (SO_e) with respect to making sense_3c (or, should I say, “sentience”) enough to take action_1c(SI_e).  They also wonder how a real initiating event_2b (SV_s) stands for information_2b (SO_s) in regards to the living cell_3b facing possible courses of action_1b (SI_s).

0620 In section 13.2.4, the authors insist that life and sentience cannot be attributed only to phenotypic expression of the cell.  Yes, DNA allows reproduction to unfold from a template.  But, the genome does not define the nature of biological agency.

What defines semiotic agency?

0621 May I compare the category-based nested forms for agent₃ and definition₃?

Perhaps, such a comparison would assist in addressing the question, “If a sentient cell is conscious… or is conscious by analogy to human consciousness… then what is the sentient cell conscious of?”

0622 Surely, the sentient cell is not conscious of its own membrane.

But, it would be if it were conscious.

The cellular membrane is precisely what is needed for both life and sentience.  So, the cellular membrane is a prime subagent.  It is a foundational subagent.  It is… so to speak… ground floor for both life and consciousness.  Along with a host of other subagents, the cellular membrane gives rise to sentience, but it is not conscious of itself.

0623 Does that answer the question? 

If life and sentience associates to sign-interpretants, then what the cell is conscious of must associate to the respective sign-vehicles and sign-objects.

How obvious is that?

0624 Here is a picture of what a sentient cell is “conscious” of, as it appears in a three-level interscope.

0625 Yes, this interscope is both a category-based and a semiotic arrangement.  The interscope is not suitable for empirio-schematic inquiry because science investigates actualities.  In Semiotic Agency, Sharov and Tonnessen fashion a way to express this interscope in terms of Peirce’s secondness.  The S&T noumenal overlay supports empirio-schematic research.

0626 Now, I want to take my examination in a different direction.

In section 13.2.5, the authors claim that non-biological entities cannot become sentient agents.  This claim reminds me of the problem faced by biologists, in contrast to physicists and chemists.  Semiotic agency₂ is composed of both being (relationality) and matter (physicality).  Consequently, in order to understand the actuality of semiotic agency₂, it₂ must be placed in a normal context₃ with potential₁.

0627 Ironically, the same goes with the spoken word.

Here is a picture.

0628 The juxtaposition is suggestive.

0629 An agent₃ and a definition₃ both follow the logics of thirdness.  The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment.  Here, one agent₃ excludes other agents₃.  The cell membrane₂ plays a role in that exclusion.  Similarly, the definition₃ of one spoken word₂ must exclude the definitions₃ of other spoken words₂ .

Notably, definition₃ does has not have anything like a cell membrane₂.  Rather, spoken words (parole) constitute a system of differences₃.  The Greimas square proves useful for teasing out how one spoken word is distinct from other spoken words.  (See points 0586 through 0591.)

0630 Semiotic agency₂ and a spoken term₂ follow the logics of secondness.  These logics include the laws contradiction and noncontradiction.  If a contradiction exists, then there must be a way to either resolve or formalize the contradiction.

For semiotic agency₂, one source of contradiction comes from the hierarchy of agent and subagents, as well as cooperation (and competition) among subagents.  If the agent and the subagents have difficulty coordinating₂, then the agent₃ may fail in regards to its intentions₁.

0631 But, what are those intentions₁?

Are those intentions₁ what the living cell₃ is sentient of₂?

If so, then I suppose that semiotic agency₂ involves being conscious of ‘something’₁ and this ‘something’₁ could be labeled with spoken words₂, as if a living sentient cell could speak.

0632 ‘Final causality’₁ and ‘meaning, presence and message’₁ follow the logics of firstness.  Firstness is inclusive and allows contradictions.  So, the intentions₁ of an agent₃ cohere to the meaning, presence and message₁ of a… hmmm… spoken word₂?

Uh oh.

The comparison starts to break up.  It is as if definition₃ is what an agent₃ does.  An agent₃ actualizes something₂ that may compare to definition₂₍₃₎ in order to bring semiotic agency₂ into relation with the possibility of ‘final causality’₁.

What does this imply?

Is definition₂₍₃₎ is built into semiotic agency₂?

Can spoken words₂₍₂₎ label what the agent₃ is conscious of?

0633 To me, this suggests that final causality₁ undergirds the actualities of semiotic agency₂ through a passage into meaning, presence and message₂₍₁₎, as if meaning, presence and message₂₍₁₎ (now incorporated into semiotic agency₂) reify final causality₁ for the agent₃.

0634 In other words, the agent₃ defines₂₍₃₎ through its life and sentience (SI_s and SI_e) actualities that it is conscious of₂₍₂₎ (SV_s, SO_s, SV_e and SO_e) by embodying meaning, presence and message₂₍₁₎ as manifesting the potential of ‘final causality’₁.

Here is a picture.

0635 Does this make sense?

The entire nested form that we (humans in our current Lebenswelt) associate with definition₃ becomes a characteristic of semiotic agency₂.  Therefore, all the elements of how to define a spoken word enter into the realm of actuality₂. Definition₃ gets transubstantiated (a change of category) down to actuality₂.  Meaning, presence and message₁ gets transubstantiated up to actuality₂.  And, the spoken word₂ becomes what the living entity would be conscious of, if it were conscious₂.

0659 In section 14.3, the authors report evidence that supports the hypothesis.

0660 What do bacterial researchers observe?

The authors provide examples “hyperstructures” in Table 14.1.  These include cytoskeletal filaments, structures made from enzymes, microcomponents, membrane-associated structures, external appendages, DNA-containing structures, phase separation condensates and more.

0661 What do the hyperstructures tell the researcher?

Hyperstructures vary depending on how much energy is available… oh, I meant to say… nutrients are available.

So, the authors propose two temporal phenotypes, corresponding to the appearance of hyperstructures that use lots of energy (NE, non-equilibrium conditions) and ones that conserve current integrity (E, equilibrium conditions).

0662 Here is a picture.

0663 As one might suspect, the two models of hyperstructure maintenance (SI_s) and plasticity (SI_e) work in tandem.  Some transitions from one temporal phenotype to another are easy.  Some are not so easy.

As one might have anticipated, a tremendous amount of scientific research has gone into almost all aspects of the hyperstructures, especially in regards to genomic regulation of bacterial DNA.  Empirio-schematic research abounds.  The problem is that research discoveries appear to have little in common.  It’s the problem of inquiry into each leaf occludes the reality of the tree.

0664 The authors provide an example, in section1 4.3.2, for the case when lactose is among the nutrients.

The lac operon, when expressed, contributes to NE hyperstructures.  Lactose… transformed into one isomer, allolactose… induces synthesis of the lac operon by binding to a LacI protein that clings to bacterial DNA and represses genomic expression.  Allolactose binds to LacI protein and changes it conformation.  The allolactose-bound LacI protein lets go of the strands of DNA that it is holding on to, providing the opportunity for formerly suppressed genes to be converted into mRNA.

In sum, for bacteria, lactose is both a nutrient and a cue (SV_s) that ultimately says, “Fatten up and divide (SO_e).”

0665 Section 14.3.4 describes cell-cycle hyperstructures and signaling.  That is to say, “The NE route.”  The density of scientific detail stuns the reader.  By my estimate, every two sentences summarizes a doctoral thesis.  In some paragraphs, every sentence boils down years of research by a doctoral student.  The section reads like a biochemical textbook.

After this tour de force of supporting evidence, the authors propose (in section 14.4) that semiotics can be used to explain cues and signals (SV_s) in bacteria.

0666 This is where the authors stand today, in 2024, at the threshold of appreciating the um… message, presence and meaning… that biosemioticians observe and measure, in order to construct models of [being alive] and [sentience].

0667 As noted earlier, message (SV_s), presence (SO_s [&] SV_e) and meaning (SO_e) go with phenomena.

[Being alive (SI_s)] and [sentience (SI_e)] are what need to be modeled.

0668 What does this suggest?

The authors do not need to call for semiotics to explain cues and signals in bacteria.

Cues and signals are already specifying sign-vehicles (SVs) in the specifying sign-relation.

0669 Phenomena do not need to be explained.

Phenomena need to be observed and measured by humans who innately recognize sign-elements.  Plus, in our current Lebenswelt, we can label those sign-elements through explicit abstraction.

Biosemiotic observations and measurements (what is, firstness) are used to build models (what ought to be, secondness) within the purview of a scientific disciplinary language (relation, thirdness).  Such is the empirio-schematic judgment.

0669 Biologist Jakob von Uexkull intuitively senses this.  He does not have the advantage of Peircean diagrams of judgment or interscopes.  He cannot formulate the category-based nested form, where the normal context of definition₃brings the actuality of a spoken word₂ into relation with the potential of ‘meaning, presence and message’₁.  But, he intuitively senses that definition₃, spoken words₂ and the potential of explicit abstraction₁ fit into the conceptualization of semiotic agency.  That is why he frames his research in terms of theoretical biology and theories of meaning.

0670 Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen, in their 2021 book, Semiotic Agency, also intuitively grasp this.  Unlike von Uexkull, they have loads of scientific research into biological systems, from the micro to the macro, at their disposal.  However, like von Uexkull, they do not have the disciplinary language to articulate… um… diagram… their noumenal overlay.

The only way to get to the point of picturing a noumenal overlay is to use diagrams of triadic relations.  One value of this examination comes precisely in the act of diagramming the authors’ arguments using triadic relations. Another value of this examination comes in the act of framing the history of biosemiotics as a historical response to the Positivist’s judgment.

0671 Yes, we stand on the shoulders of giants.

Charles Peirce (1839-1914), Edmund Husserl (1859-1939), Jakob von Uexkull (1864-1944), Thomas Sebeok (1920-2001) and John Deely (1942-2017) are giants upon whose shoulders both the authors (and Razie Mah) stand.

Nonetheless, diagrams can really be useful.

0672 In section 14.4, the authors announce that they intend to use semiotics to explain cues and signals in bacteria.

On one hand, this is a fool’s errand, since cues and signals are specifying sign-vehicles (SV_s) in the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay for semiotic agency.  They are real initiating (semiotic) events.

On the other hand, the very fact that the authors see a need to explain cues and signals in bacteria suggests that biosemiotics encompasses more than semiotic agency.  But what is that “something more”?

0673 Section 14.4.1 is titled, “Types of Semiosis, Signs and Effectors”.  The authors enter into a curious discussion concerning the appearance of greater and greater complexity on Earth.  Does semiotics play a role?  Does a change in semiosis accompany each major transition in evolutionary history, such as the transition from prokaryotic to eukaryotic life?

This debate winds its way into a ranking of semiosis into proto- or primitive semiosis and eu- or more advanced semiosis.  “Protosemiosis” applies to prokaryotes and “eusemiosis” to eukaryotes. 

0674 With that in said, there arises a question of definition.

In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, language evolves in the milieu of hand talk.

The spoken word, “definition”, does not appear in the lexicon of any hand-talk language.

What is there to picture or point to?

So, where does the potential of meaning, presence and message come from?

Hand-talk words picture and point to their referents.  Meaning, presence and message are built into the natural-sign qualities of icons and indexes.  Icons and indexes promote implicit abstraction.

Speech-alone words cannot picture or point to their referents.  So, they must be defined.  That is where the nested form for definition turns out to be handy, as noted in Razie Mah’s e-book How To Define The Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

Speech-alone words label anything.  Purely symbolic labels permit explicit abstraction.

0675 Now, putting the evolution of complexity and the histories of particular labels aside, I return to the title of section 14.4., “Using Semiotics to Explain Cues and Signals in Bacteria”.  How do these keywords figure into the category-based nested form for definition?

Here is my guess, concentrating on the word, “explanation”.

0676 The author’s normal context of definition₃ brings the actuality of a spoken explanation₂ into relation with the possibility of ‘the meaning and semiotics (presence) of bacterial cues and signals (message)’₁.

0677 Maybe I am too cautious in my associations.  The authors’ discussion seems to imply that the spoken word₂should be “complexity” and the meaning should be “explanation”.

0678 If that is the case, then I may associate the author’s potential₁ in definition₃ to the bacteria’s potential₁ of defining₃ its own semiotic agency₂ within its Umwelt₃.

Explanation associates to meaning and to a bacterium maintaining its identity (SO_e).

Semiotics associates to presence and to competitive competition maintaining one or another “temporal phenotype” (SO_s[and] SV_e).

Cues and signals associates to message and to what a bacterium encounters in its Umwelt (SV_s).  At this juncture, a word coined by Jakob von Uexkull floats into view.  The Umwelt consists of all the sign-vehicles (SV_s) that an organism can specify (SI_s).

0679 What does this imply?

Well, let me display my more daring guess.

I ask, “Is the author’s focus on ‘complexity’, rather than ‘explanation’?  Does ‘complexity₂‘ emerge from (and situate) the potential of explanations (meaning), using semiotics (presence), of cues and signals (message)₁ in the normal context of definition₃?  And, is it any coincidence that this label₂ might apply to the S&T noumenal overlay?”

Does an increase in “complexity” entail an increase in “semiotic agency”?

0710 The intersection is a mystery because two actualities constitute one actuality.  Two category-based nested forms come together because their actualities apply to the same entity.

That is sort of confusing, especially when the single actuality₂ has yet to be framed with a normal context₃ and potential₁.

0711 Let me consider each actuality₂ on it own.

The first actuality is adaptation₂.  Adaptation₂ corresponds to the “darwinism” of “neodarwinism”.   The normal context of natural selection_3b brings the actuality of an adaptation_2b into relation with an organism’s niche_1b.  The subscript, “b”, denotes the situation level.  So, there must be a content-level actuality_2a (at a minimum).  The niche_1b serves as the potential of that content-level actuality_2a.

0712 Here is a picture.

0713 Yes, a niche_1b is the potential_1b of an actuality independent of the adapting species_2a.

This formula applies to all sorts of “niches” fashioned within the boutiques of academic biology.

For example, “niche construction” fits the formula.  Beavers build a dam on a fast moving stream and the stream becomes a glen that provides plenty of food for the beavers.  The dam serves as a home.  Surely, when one dams a fast moving stream, the result is a glen that beavers can flourish in.  So, the term “niche construction” points to the fact that the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a may be a process.  Plus, “niche construction” does not not stop there.  “Niche construction” indicates that the actuality independent of the adapting species_2a may be purely relational structures, such as… um… triadic relations.

0714 I shudder to think what type of genus would adapt into a niche containing the potential of triadic relations.

0715 The second actuality is phenotype₂.  Phenotype₂ corresponds to the “neo” of “neodarwinism”.  The normal context of body development_3b brings the actuality of a phenotype_2b into relation with the organism’s genotype_1b.  Or maybe, I should use the word, “genome_1b“.  I guess the words are both different and the same.  The subscript, “b”, denotes the situation level.  DNA_2a is the content-level actuality.

0716 Ah, the genotype_1b is the potential_1b of DNA_2a.

0717 What else is curious about the two-level interscope for phenotype_2b?

0718 The situation and content levels constellate a specifying sign-relation.  DNA_2a (SV_s) stands for the phenotype_2b(SO_s) in regards to body development_3b operating on the variety of ways that DNA can be translated into proteins (the genotype_1b) (SI_s).

If this is the case, then I wonder, “Does this specifying sign-relation fit into Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay?”

The answer is, “Yes, here is a picture.”

0719 Isn’t that curious?

The specifying sign-object (SO_s) of phenotype_2b does not take the inquirer to the biosemiotic fullness of semiotic agency. The exemplar sign-relation remains occluded.  Remember that the exemplar sign-relation associates with emergence (points 0280 through 0292).  It also associates with a goal_2c that a biosemiotician recognizes as meaning_2c.

0720 What does the biosemiotician recognize with respect to the “neo” component of neodarwinism?

The biosemiotician recognizes DNA_2a (SV_s) as message and phenotype_2b (SO_s) as presence.

0718 What about the “-darwinism” of “neodarwinism”?

The same principle applies.  The situation and content levels constellate a specifying sign relation.  The exemplar sign remains occluded.  An actuality independent of the adapting species_2a (SV_s) stands for an adaptation_2b (SO_s) in regards to natural selection_3b operating on an organism’s niche_1b (SI_s).

0719 The first point (S) is stated in points 706 and 707.  NeoDarwinism may be a factor in evolution.  But, it is not the only one.

Maybe I went down the wrong rabbit-hole by raising the fact that neodarwinism is an intersection, because the lesson is not that intersections are mysterious (even though this lesson is true).  The lesson turns out to be that the two-level interscopes of natural selection_3b and body development_3b recapitulate the specifying sign-relation in independent ways.

0720 Why is that lesson important?

Consider the second point in the conclusion (T): The single actuality, the living being, operates on the basis of self-reinforcing cycles.

What does that imply?

Ah, the author shifts the reader’s focus in an unexpected manner.

Living being₂ is the intersection of two actualities.

For non-human agency, self-reinforcing cycles are both adaptive and phenotypically expressed.

0721 What is natural selection selecting for?  Self-reinforcing cycles exploit opportunities and avoid dangers in regards to real initiating (semiotic) events.  If I drop a 2% glucose solution in the center well of a petri-dish containing a maze, the slime mold on the periphery of the dish will start making its way through the maze.  Glucose signals opportunity.

What is body development selecting for?  Self-reinforcing cycles allow the slime mold to move.  Also, receptors allows the slime mold sense a glucose gradient.  Plus, when the slime mold hits a wall and has to backtrack, a slime mold can deposit a chemical agent that says, “I’ve been here before.”  Yes, the slime mold is using its tools to solve the maze.

0722 So, how does this change of focus manifest when I return to the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlays?

To me, self-reinforcing cycles replaces natural selection_3b because the operations of these cycles_3b pursue objective opportunities_1b.

The adaptive presence_2b is slime mold moving towards the source of glucose_2a.  Glucose_2a (SV_s) sends a message, meaning food_2c (SO_e).  

0723 Here is a picture.

0724 Yes, the slime mold tries to find a way to the source of glucose (SO_s) because glucose (SV_s) objectively means food (SO_e).

Why do I say, “Objectively.”?

In the introduction, section 15.1, the author distinguishes between objectivity and subjectivity.  Here, the presence of glucose is objective (SV_s).  So is the reality that glucose means food (SO_e).

Indeed, the biosemiotician considers these (SV_s, SO_s [&] SV_e, SO_e) to be the bases of phenomena.  Observations related to these phenomena go into modeling [the self-reinforcing cycles], as well as [objective salience], that is [SI_s] and [SI_e], respectively.

The author’s shift of focus, along with the example, transfers the concept of adaptation_2b, within the normal context of natural selection_3b and arising from a niche_1b, into the milieu of semiotic agency.  The shift may be rhetorical, but it is effective nonetheless.  Adaptations go with the objective world, that is, the Umwelt as the world of signs.

0725 Well, then, what about “subjectivity”?

Well, maybe “subjectivity” can be called “relative objectivity”.

Relative to what?

The slime mold in the petri-dish.

0726 Here is a picture.

0727 “Subjective” is the right word in so far as, from a modern point of view, “subjective” means “self”.  The scholastics offer a different view, “subjective” means “the subject that has the attention of the self”.  Indeed, the latter view associates to the real initiating (semiotic) event (SV_s).

As before, capturing attention of a slime mold in a petri dish_2a (SV_s) stands for its sensing, moving and marking_2b(SO_s) in regards to self-reinforcing cycles_3b manifesting the slime mold’s subjective capabilities_1b (SI_s).  Plus, the exemplar sign-relation is now relevant.  The goal_2c is to solve the maze (SO_e) that the researcher has imposed.

0728 And, that raises the question, “If the slime mold were to be conscious, what would it be thinking?”

I suspect that the answer would be the objective opportunity and its salience.

0729 In section 15.2, the author dwells on the distinction between subjectivity and relative objectivity.

So, I guess I got it wrong.  Subjective is not “relatively objective”.  Objective is.

0730 I attribute the error to my own incoherent self-reinforcing cycles.

Maybe, my confusion may be lifted, if I make a distinction between my Umwelt-oriented self-reinforcing cycles and Innerwelt-oriented self-reinforcing cycles.

The former can be objective (or “relatively objective”) and the latter can be subjective.

0731 This works as long as I remember that they both contribute to semiotic agency₂ for a single individual (or species or genus).

Here is a picture of semiotic agency that tells me what Neodarwinism cannot convey (see S and point 707).

0732 Yes, semiotic agency is a bit of a mystery.

That brings me to (U) the third point.

Point (S) says that Neodarwinism is not all there is.

Point (T) says that the living entity lives by way of self-reinforcing cycles.

Point (U) says that subjectivity and objectivity should be regarded as “equivalent”.

Yes, they are two actualities that constitute the single actuality that is semiotic agency₂.

Is that the same as equal (“equi-“) in combination (“-valence”)?

0733 That brings me to the sad reality that the author has never had the opportunity to cast eyes upon the diagram of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay.

Point (V) says that the “equivalence” uses Peirce’s natural signs, that is, icons, indexes and symbols.

0734 The author elaborates this point in sections 15.2, 15.3, 15.4 and 15.5 and arrives at the conclusion that directionality and originality are indispensable concepts in evolutionary science.  Indeed, they are.  Directionalityassociates to the objective presence of message_2H.  Originality associates to the subjective presence of message_2V.

Yes, directionality and originality constitute semiotic agency as a singular actuality.

The inquirer does not have to explain the mechanisms of self-reinforcing cycles that are crucial for sign-processing.  Instead, the inquirer may appreciate what biosemiotics really accomplishes.

Biosemiotics offers an account of the one thing that all living processes and organisms have in common.

In doing so, it makes biology comprehensible.

0765 Section 17.2 deals with models.

Is it possible to couple concepts of modeling with semiotics?

Thomas Sebeok and Marcel Danesi collaborate on a book, titled Forms of Meaning: Modeling Systems Theory and Semiotic Analysis (2000, Morton de Gruyter, Berlin, Germany).  They conclude that a model is a sign-vehicle (a form, real or imagined) that stands for a sign-object (referring to the matter at hand) in regards to a sign-interpretant (a referential domain).

Instead of “is”, may I say, “appears to be”?

0766 Sebeok and Danesi’s formulation of “model” as a sign-relation may be reconfigured into into a category-based nested form, where each categorical element takes on the appearance of belonging to a sign-relation.

0767 Here is a diagram.

0768 Notice that a simplification has occurred. For Sebeok and Danesi, a “model” mimics a sign-relation.  In this reconfiguration, a form (SV_app) [stands for] matter at hand (SO_app).

Yes, a sign-relation simplifies into a hylomorphe.

The subscript says that “is” may be changed to “appears to be”.

0769 But, really – and this is a little confusing – I can configure the dyad another way, so that it looks even more like Aristotle’s hylomorphe of matter [substance] form.

In this switcheroo, a “model” is a hylomorphe where the matter at hand (apparent SO) [makes present] its form(apparent SV).

0769 Here is a picture.

0770 Does this make sense, especially when it comes to danger?

Well, how about an example?

I am walking on a forest trail.  I can see, far up the trail, that there is something and it appears to be blocking the path.  It is hard to determine what it is.  But, if it is a bear, I am going to turn around before it sees me.

0771This fits a situation-level nested form.

Plus, a few caveats are in order.

Recall that the situation-level normal context_3b and its potential_1b contribute to a specifying sign-interpretant (SI_s).  The situation-level actuality_2b goes contains the dyad, {SO_s [&] SV_e}_2b.

Plus, for the S&T noumenal overlay, the situation-level_2b actuality is labeled, “information_2b“.

0772 This raises the questions, “Does information_2b contain a ‘model’?  Does that ‘model’ fit Sebeok and Danesi’s formulation of a ‘model as a sign-vehicle?”

0773 Section 17.2 addresses the question, “Is it possible to couple concepts of modeling with semiotics?”

The answer is yes and now I am going to repeat myself.

Indeed, Sebeok and Danesi demonstrated one coupling.  The model participates as a sign-vehicle in the appearance of a sign-relation.  The model is a form (SV_app) that stands for the matter at hand (SO_app) in regards to a referential domain(SI_app).

The sign-relation is in appearance because there does not seem to be any categorical changes.  All the elements appear on the same categorical level.

0774 In what follows, I assign all the elements to the situation-level of an interscope.  The elements retain the appearance of a sign-relation.  At the same time, the elements correspond to features in a category-based nested form.

Domain₃ becomes the normal context.  The qualifiers, “representational” and “referential”, enter the realm of potential₁.  Then, the two real elements in Peirce’s secondness, matter at hand₂ and form/model₂, are arranged in actuality_2, along the lines of Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter [substance] form₂.  The actuality₂ becomes the matter at hand [makes present] the form or model₂.

0775 Section 17.3 addresses the question, “Can the inquirer characterize the coupling?”

The answer is yes.

Or, I should say, “This examiner’s answer is yes, as shown in the following comparison.”

Both category-based nested forms occur in the situation level.

0776 One aspect of the apparent sign-relation associates to the specifying sign.

0777 The sign interpretant for Sebeok and Danesi’s approach (SI_app) says, “The situation-level normal context of domain_3b operates on the possibilities inherent in reference and representation_1b.”

This compares to the specifying sign-interpretant in semiotic agency.  The normal context of self-governance_3b operates on potential courses of action_1b.

0778 What about the apparent sign-vehicle and sign-object for Sebeok and Danesi’s approach (SO_app [makes present] SV_app).

The author suggests that the coupling is like a gestalt.  A gestalt is a spontaneous recognition.  Often, something in background becomes foreground in a gestalt shift.  For the example of log down the trail (SV_s) [specifying] a bear(SO_s), a gestalt moment transits from something that may be blocking the path further along (SO_s) to what if that something is a bear (SV_e).

0779 SO_app [makes present] SV_app seems to be a two-way street.

The author’s suggestion changes the character of information_2b from {SO_s [&] SV_e} to {SO_s [presence] SV_e].  [Presence] is the contiguity between the specifying sign-object (SO_s) and the exemplar sign-vehicle (SV_e).  The contiguity entails a gestalt moment.

0780 Have I learned something new about the S&T noumenal overlay?

In section 17.3, the author offers a diagram that pictures the model of semiosis that he has in mind.  Here is a reproduction.  The three dimensions correspond to three corners of a triangle.

0781 While this diagram may seem far less sophisticated than the pictures of semiotic agency developed in this examination, there will be a lesson to learn.

How so?

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay acts like an amoeba, it engulfs whatever it can devour.

0782 So, let me look at how the S&T overlay embraces this depiction of a model and semiosis with its pseudopods.

0783 The first concession to make is that the incident where a fallen tree appears to be a bear fits nicely into the author’s model.

The model is a bear.  Or, a bear is the model.

0784 When the author uses the term, “gestalt”, to describe the congruence of model and semiosis, the author means that the entire relation comes into being as a whole.  The sign-relation is not a sum of dyadic causes [and] effects.  The sign is an indivisible, purely relational being.

Matter enters into the being through existential (as SV), representational (as SO) and interpretive (as SI) portals or “dimensions”.

0785 Of course, I tend to work with a very different looking picture of sign-relations.  A category-based nested form is one of the simpler triadic relations.  Thirdness bring secondness into relation with firstness.  Normal context₃ brings actuality₂ into relation with the possibility of ‘something’₁.

The category-based nested form is fractal.  An interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.  Perspective_c brings situation_b into relation with the potential of content_a.

In the framework of category-based nested forms, a sign-relation crosses levels of an interscope.  The specifying sign-relation crosses from content (SV_s) to situation (SI_s and SO_s).  The exemplar sign-relation crosses from situation (SV_e) to perspective (SI_e and SO_e).

0786 The problem is that an interscope containing specifying and exemplar sign-relations is not available to science.  It is sort of like a model.  And, triumphalist scientists love to place successful models into the slot for the noumenon in the Positivist’s judgment.  Then, the model (as a substitute for the noumenon) [can be objectified by] its phenomena.  That is the nature of the laboratory sciences.  The goal is to replace the noumenon with a successful model.  The model becomes as real as the noumenon, the thing itself.

0787 Compare a tree falling in a forest and the concept of gravity.

Which is more real?

0788 Now, look at the above figure and see how it models why I turn around in my hike when I think I see a bear on the path in the distance.

Which is more real, me seeing a bear or the sign-relation of a log way ahead?

0789 Now comes the amoeba business.

The sign-relation depicted above is a specifying sign-relation.

The specifying and exemplar sign relations are incorporated into Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay.

0790 One of the benefits of engulfing the morsel of Sebeok and Danesi’s concept of “model” as a sign-vehicle that stands for the matter at hand is that I arrive (through two steps, conversion into a situation-level nested form and re-arrangement of the actuality into a dyad similar to Aristotle’s hylomorphe) at a familiar label for the contiguity between the real elements of actuality_2b.  Instead of [&], the contiguity is [presence].

0792 This raises two questions.

0793 One, in S&T’s noumenal overlay, the sign-vehicles and sign objects support phenomena and the sign-interpretants are what needs to be modeled by biosemioticians.  So, an explicit scientific “model” is not the same as the semiotic “model” of [SI_s] or [SI_e].

The question takes off from there, asking, “If the sign-interpretants that need to be modeled are contiguities in semiotic agency, and if [presence] is the contiguity between SO_s and SV_e, does [p] need to be explained as well?”

My abbreviation for “presence” is [p].

0794 Two, I thought that “presence” associated to the entire situation-level actuality, {SO_s [&] SV_e}_2b and now “presence” replaces [&].  Then, what about the “message” for the content-level actuality, {SV_s}_2a, and what about “meaning” for the perspective-level actuality, {SO_e}_2c?

Where are the contiguities [mg] for “message” and [mn] for “meaning”?