Tag Archives: interventional sign

05/13/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 8 of 8)

0975 In the closing, section 7.8, the author mentions a confounding word.

0976 What is that word?

Communication.

0978 Well, at least I can offer two other labels, “inter” and “infold”, which apply when the message comes externally or internally.

I don’t think that either “inter” or “infold” correspond to “communicate”.

And yet, they must.

0979 To this examiner, the conceptual apparatuses of potential meanings and potential signs entangle two features of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay, [presence] and [message].  “Potential meaning” dwells within [presence] and seems integral when an SOs “causes” an SVe.  “Potential sign” dwells within [message] and seems crucial to two types of contiguity between SOi and SVs, [inter] and [infold].

0980 By way of conclusion for this chapter, which harkens back to the beginnings of life on Earth, yet ends with humans in our current Lebenswelt, I would like to repeat the transformation that Sharov and Tonnessen perform(perhaps, unwittingly, but leading to great insight) in Semiotic Agency.  They transform the specifying and the exemplar sign relations into a dyad, suitable to overlay over the noumenon of what all living systems have in common.

0981 Specifically, they transform a fairly mature three-level interscope (comparable to the scholastic interscope for how humans think) into a dyad (matter2b [salience] form2c}) within a dyad (matter2c(2b( [self-governance3b: courses of action1b] form(2a))).

0982 Now, I review.

But, this will be more than a review.

I want to re-enact Sharov and Tonnessen’s construction of semiotic agency.

Plus, I want to add a reification of the interventional sign-relation, which completes the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

0983 And most of all, I wish to perform this transformation and this re-enactment on the Deacon and Tabaczek interscope for emergence, appearing in Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues) and in the Razie Mah’s blogs for April through June, 2024.

0984 Here is a diagram of the three-level interscope for emergence.

0985 The element corresponding to the biosemiotic real initiating (semiotic) event is “the contained circulation of ingredients2a“.

For mitochondria, this is the separation of oxidative and reductive reactions involved in the combustion of glucose with oxygen.  On the oxidative side, glucose loses electrons to biomolecules capable of carrying them, generating a few ATP equivalents in the process.  On the reductive side, oxygen gains electrons from those electron-bearing biomolecules, generating lots of ATP equivalents in the process.

0986 The combustion of glucose with oxygen is disposed to move towards equilibrium3a and, when ignited1a, may do so with the release of lots of heat.

Mitochondria do not allow ignition.  Rather, they use the separation of the oxidative and reductive reactions1b in the normal context of utilizing the nonequilibrium dynamics (of what would be combustion)3b in order to generate emergent beings, ATP2b.  ATP2b then makes its way from mitochondria to various enzymatic sites in the eukaryotic cell.

ATP2b is a high-energy molecule and will decompose if left alone.  So, an enzyme3c that has the potential of using ATP2b “simplifies1c” the situation, by using the energy-released when ATP becomes ADP plus Pi (inorganic phosphate in solution) in order to perform a cellular actions2c, such as building a protein2c or transporting a molecule across a membrane2c.

0987 Back to the diagram.

The content-level category-based nested form for mitochondria “burning” glucose and oxygen follows.  The normal context of combustion3a brings the actuality of separated oxidation and reduction reactions2a into relation with the potential of ‘conducting these spontaneous reactions separately’1a.

For the situation level, the normal context of taking advantage of a nonequilibrium dynamic3b brings actual biosynthesis of ATP2b into relation with the agent’s ability to transfer free-energy from the oxidation of glucose and the reduction of oxygen to the emergent being1b.

For the perspective level, the normal contexts of enzymatic forms3c perform various biophysical operations2c based on the potential of coupling the energy-releasing degradation of ATP with an energy-requiring cellular operation1c.

0988 Here is the transformation to a dyad within a dyad coupled to an interventional sign-relation.

On the perspective level, the persistence of an eukaryotic cell2c [means] the power2c to accomplish various biochemical tasks.

For the interventional sign-relation, power2c (SVi) stands for a disposition2a (SOi) in regards to the normal context of chemical reactivities3a operating on the potential to displace chemicals to distinct compartments1a (SIi).

On the content level, the disposition2a to keep the reagents coming2a {(SOi) [message]} adds more new ingredients to the container2a (SVs).

0989 The actualities go with phenomena.  These are real elements.

The normal contexts and their respective potentials are what need to be explained.  These are the major contiguities between actualities on different levels.

A minor contiguity occurs within each level, [message] for content, [presence] for situation and [meaning] for perspective.

0990 These associations may be subject to revision.  That is the nature of exploration into the topic of “potential meanings”.

I thank the author for his well-referenced chapter and hope that this examination adds value to the text.

05/12/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 1 of 6)

0991 The text before me is chapter eight of Pathways (see point 0831 for book details, pages 167-185).  The full title is “A Constructivist Approach to Meanings in the Universe”.  The author is a linguist at Baikal University, Irkutsk, Russia.

0992 My examination, so far, identifies a biosemiotic noumenal overlay, composed of both semiotic agency (the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay) and the interventional sign relation.  The diagram reifies three sign-relations: specifying, exemplar and interventional.  The specifying and exemplar sign-relations belong to semiotic agency.  The interventional sign relation stands outside of semiotic agency, but is integrated with semiotic agency by way of its participation in a three-level interscope.  A three-level interscope contains all three sign-relations.

0993 The following figure of an interscope contains the three sign-elements (SV for sign-vehicle; SO for sign-object; SI for sign-interpretant) for each sign-relation (subscripts “s” for specifying; “e” for exemplar; “i” for interventional).

0994 An interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.

For each level, a triadic normal context3 brings a dyadic actuality2 into relation with a monadic potential1.

The dyadic actuality2 fits Peirce’s formula for the category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  For clear notation, the contiguity is placed in brackets.

0995 In the above figure, the real elements are sign-vehicles and sign-objects.  The contiguity in each level carries the same label as one of the three potentials1 underlying any spoken term2 in the normal context of definition3.

Finally, among levels, perspectivec brings situationb into relation with the potential of contenta.

0996 Hmmm.  I have an interruption.

Now, what was I saying?

Uh-oh, I better start over.

0997 My examination, so far, isolates a biosemiotic noumenal overlay, composed of both semiotic agency (the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay) and the interventional sign relation.  The biosemiotic noumenal overlay reifies three sign-relations: specifying, exemplar and interventional.  The specifying and exemplar sign-relations belong to semiotic agency.  The interventional sign relation stands outside of semiotic agency, but is integrated with semiotic agency by way of two contiguities, [meaning] and [message].

0998 Here is a picture of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

0999 So far, so good.

The author of this chapter addresses the existence of meaning in the universe from an epistemological perspective.  “Episteme” derives from the Latin word for “knowledge”.  “Logos” comes from the Greek word for “word”.  Or maybe, “intrinsic nature of”?   How about “study of”?

Looking at the above figure, I see a problem.

For this examination, [meaning] is the contiguity between the exemplar sign-object (SOe) and the interventional sign-vehicle (SVi).

Is that the same as “the meaning” that exists in the universe?

1000 It makes me wonder, “What is a contiguity?”

Here are some cases.

1001 Aristotle’s hylomorphe is exemplar.  The much-abused word, “substance”, weirdly captures the way that matter “causes” form.  The verb, “substantiates”, is just as effective.  Can I justify the choice of the term, “substance”?  Well, what is one more technical definition among the many dictionary definitions for the word, “substance”?  Is that good enough?

One thing for sure, [substance] is not one of the real elements.  [It] is neither matter nor form.  [It] is the contiguity between them.  So, what is [substance]?

1002 We (humans) know [substance] because we know [cause], [effect], [contact], [influence] and many more contiguities between real elements.  This is precisely why contiguities cry out to be modeled.  The real elements support phenomena.  The contiguities cry out to be explained.

We (humans) also know actuality2.  Semiotic agency begins with a real initiating (semiotic) event (SVs) (that is, an encounter).  The first step in natural philosophy (for Aristotle’s tradition) is to regard a thing as matter [substance] form.  See Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

Actuality2 belongs to the Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  Secondness is dyadic.

1003 With this said, I can see why there is a problem with [meaning].  [Meaning] is a contiguity between two real elements.  One of those elements (SOe) belongs to semiotic agency.  The other element (SVi) belongs to the interventional sign-relation.

1004 Earlier, in points 0887 through 0894, I portray [meaning] as the contiguity between the triadic structure of an actionable judgment (such as SOe) and the triadic structure of its category-based nested form (such as SVi).

In this case, another word for [meaning] is [unfolds].

An actionable judgment [unfolds into] a category-based nested form.

This very curious insight is not explored further in this examination.

05/6/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 6 of 6)

1049 Or, should I say?

SOi is what a disinterested observer would objectify if he were actually on the suprasubjective level, which he obviously claims to be.

So, where is the language game?

Is it in our brains or in our minds?

In section 8.4, the author raises a rather frightening option.

The agent3 may be the human nervous system3 rather than the human person3.

Does the potential of ‘final causality’1 implicate my brain1 or my mind1?

1050 Oh my, does my own brain3 bring forth the actuality of semiotic agency2 with the potential of ‘a final causality, where meaning and message bring forth my mind in an entanglement of the suprasubjective and the subjective (very similar to language and also very similar to the idea that both my Innerwelt and my Umwelt are Outerwelt to my nervous system)’1?

How about Daisy’s mind?

Or the duck’s?

1051 Here is a picture of the semiotic three-level interscope, with descriptive dyads for the perspective and content-level actualities displayed.

The colors indicate complementary pairs.

To me, these pairs look like human adaptations into the niche of triadic relations.  The human niche includes the potentials of interscopes and sign-relations.  The pairs link dyadic actualities on the perspective level and the content level of a three-level interscope.  These actualities contain contiguities that bridge the interventional sign-relation and semiotic agency.

1051 If [message] goes with “mind” and if [meaning] goes with the contiguity between two real elements, a goal2c and its expression as a real event2c, I may ask, “Are ‘meaning’ and ‘mind’ brought forth by a… gasp… brain?”

What about “language”?

Or, are mind and meaning organic to the reality that the three-level interscope also contains three sign-relations and the fact that the interventional sign-relation bridges to semiotic agency through the contiguities of [meaning] and [message]?

These are good questions.

1052 Sometimes, it is good to conclude an examination with a few of good questions.

My thanks to the author of this chapter, fully titled, “The Constructivist Approach to Meanings in the Universe”. 

04/1/25

Looking at Hongbing Yu’s Chapter (2024) “…Danger Modeling…” (Part 7 of 7)

0819 In the interventional sign-relation, the agent3 and final causality1 are exposed in the same way that a helium balloon, suddenly rising above a carnival crowd, says, “Someone just let go of their balloon (SOe).” 

Semiotic agency reaches a terminus (SOe).  That terminus is contiguous with an interventional sign-vehicle (SVi).  The contiguity is [meaning, mn].  The balloon rises from a perspective-level actuality2c (SVi) into the mundane atmosphere of a content-level actuality2a (SOi) in the normal context of say, what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a (SIi).

The rising balloon2a sends a message [mg] that says, “Now that I’ve caught your attention3a((1a)), I will serve as the next real initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs).”

0820 Here is a picture.

0821 The interventional sign relation occupies the existential dimension.

The existential dimension seems so much more dangerous than the other two.

0822 The representative and interpretive dimensions belong to semiotic agency.

0823 I suppose I may say that – if I must choose the second most dangerous dimension – the interpretative dimensioncomes next.

Why?

If I have poor information2b (SVe) and have an unworthy goal (SOe), then {SOe [meaning] (SVi)}2c may yield an intervention that misses the mark.

I suppose I am trying to say, “If the interpretative dimension is wayward, then the existential dimension becomes more dangerous.”

0824 Section 17.5 concludes the article by dwelling on the three dimensions and their roles in modeling danger.

0825 However, the existential dimension contains a hidden and disturbing discovery.  The existential dimension is outside of semiotic agency.  The existential dimension contains the interventional sign-relation.  The existential dimension may reveal the agent3 and the final causality1 that make semiotic agency2 an actuality2.

0826 Here is a picture of how semiotic agency (containing the representative and interpretive dimensions) entangles the interventional sign-relation (constituting the existential dimension).

0827 I thank the author for this wonderful chapter, fully titled “The Peculiar Case of Danger Modeling: Meaning-Generation in Three Dimensions”, marking the conclusion of Part III of Pathways, titled “Meanings in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.

This chapter marks the end of this examination of the biosemiotics of nonhuman agency and opens a portal to an examination of human agency.

0828 Biosemiotics is more than semiotic agency.  Biosemiotics includes the interventional sign-relation.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay, more creative and productive than any noumenal overlay that biology has seen so far, now entangles an existential dimension.

02/29/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (2014) “A Natural History of Human Thinking” (Part 1 of 22)

0187 In the preface, the author notes that this book is a prequel to The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (1999, Harvard University Press).  The question is the same.  What makes humans unique?  The answer is the same.  Humans think differently than great apes, their closest biological kin.

In 1999, researchers in evolutionary anthropology could say, “Only humans think of other humans as intentional agents.  Plus, my cat and my dog are intentional operators, as well, say nothing of the weather.”

Okay, I added the second sentence for dramatic effect.

Unfortunately, research conducted after 1999 introduces a problem.  It turns out that great apes recognize intentionality in others.

Uh oh.

0188 This book is the third marker in Tomasello’s intellectual journey.  I start following his trek with Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (1999) “The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition” (appearing in Razie Mah’s January 2024 blog).  The second marker that I examine may be found in Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (2008) “Origins of Human Communication” (appearing later in the same blog for the same month).

0189 In the publication before me, A Natural History of Human Thinking (2014, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts), Tomasello explicitly abstracts three cognitive processes in order to distinguish humans from apes.  The processes are cognitive representation, inference and self-monitoring.  He then proposes that all three components were transformed in two key steps during hominin evolution.  He labels his claims, “the shared-intentionality hypothesis”.

0190 Does this follow the trajectory set by previous works?

Here is a theme that appears in the second marker, pre-emptively modified with the above propositions in mind.

0191 This modified picture allows me to offer slogans for movements zero and one.

For zero, the slogan is “I work for food.”

For one, the slogan is “We work for food.”

01/31/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (1999) “The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition” (Part 1 of 12)

0001 In 1999 AD, Michael Tomasello, then co-director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, publishes the work before me (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts).

To me, this work marks the start of the author’s twenty year journey, culminating in a theory of human ontogeny, published in 2019.  The word, “ontogeny”, refers to human development and associates to the human phenotype.

0002 What interests me in Tomasello’s journey?

As noted in Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), “phenotype” and “adaptation” are not the same.  Instead, these labels apply to distinct actualities that coalesce into a single actuality.  One may call that single actuality, an individual, a species or a genus.  One may also call that single actuality, “a mystery”.

I am interested in the natural history side of the mystery of human evolution.  However, the genetic (or ontogenetic) side cannot be ignored.  Plus, natural history cannot be reduced to genetics, or visa versa

0003 Chapter one of Tomasello’s book is titled, “A Puzzle and a Hypothesis”.

Of course, a puzzle is not a mystery.  A puzzle can be resolved.  A mystery cannot.

The puzzle starts with genetics.  Geneticists have examined the DNA of chimpanzees, bonobos and humans and predict that the last common ancestor lives 6 or 7 Myr (six or seven million years ago).

In contrast, physical anthropologists (natural historians) propose the fossil record noted in the following figure.  With terminological sleight of hand, they refer to human ancestors as “hominins”, even though the old term for any bipedal primate (ape or human) is “hominid”. 

0004 Hmmm. Does the puzzle concern time?

According to genetics, the last common ancestor (LCA) between chimpanzees and humans lives 7 Myr (millions of years ago).  But, little significant shows up in the fossil record until 4 Myr.  Our lineage obviously evolves feet first.  As it turns out, starting around 5 Myr, the extent of tropical vegetation in Africa decreases due to desiccation.  Bipedality is an adaptation to mixed forest and savannah.

0005 The fossil record provides other clues, especially stone tools.

The first stone tools are Oldowan.  Oldowan stones tools are constructed on site.  They are used to scrape meat off of bone and to crack long bones (that are full of fatty marrow).

Acheulean stone tools appear later in the archeological record.  Acheulean stone tools are made beforehand and carried with some intention in mind.  They have the appearance of a giant tooth.  Notably, Acheulean stone tool technology remains unchanged for over a million years.  Innovations in stone-tools follow the domestication of fire.

0006 Surely, these two tables are puzzling.  In the first, the fossil record pertains to changes in hominin phenotypes.  In the second, the fossil record pertains to hominin adaptations, but these adaptations are not phenotypic. They are artifacts.  Are these adaptive artifacts cultural?  Are they behavioral?  I wonder, “Do the words, ‘culture’ and ‘behavior’, capture the matter and the form of these artifacts?”  It is as if an adaptation recognizes matter and generates form.

0007 What is the nature of the adaptation that maintains (and occasionally changes) artifacts, as if these artifacts are phenotypes?

Tomasello suggests that an adaptation is a novel form of social cognition.  Our lineage adapts to a new way of thinking about one another, eventually allowing sociogenesis, new styles of learning and cultural evolution.

0008 Tomasello proposes that there is one adaptation that potentiates subsequent adaptations.

Razie Mah proposes that there is one ultimate niche for our lineage.  The hypothesis is presented in the e-book, The Human Niche (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

0009 Do Tomasello (in 1999) and Mah (in 2018) propose that our lineage is defined by the same adaptation… er… niche?

What is the difference between an adaptation and a niche?

To these questions, I next attend.

01/18/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (1999) “The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition” (Part 12 of 12)

0072 Chapter five is titled, “Linguistic Construction and Event Cognition”.  The perspective-level linguistic communication2c participates in ongoing events2a.

Tomasello claims that joint attention is the key adaptation from which subsequent adaptations proceed.  Surely, the three-level interscope depicted above does not contradict this claim.

After all, the evolution of joint attention should precede the evolution of linguistic communication.

0073 However, there is a disjunction, because great apes show few (if any) tendencies that may be characterized by joint attention.  Even the occasional monkey hunt by chimpanzees is best characterized by several individuals deciding to pursue the same thing at the same time.  The monkey-prey is the focus of attention, but the attention is disjointed, not really coordinated.

So, there must be a period before the evolution of joint attention, where individual intentionality reigns, even when group action takes place.

0074 So, when are these eras happening?

Tomasello wants to place the evolution of joint attention before the time of Homo heidelbergensis, who appears in the fossil record between 800 and 400kyr (thousands of years ago).

To me, this makes sense only so far as this.

Homo heidelbergensis leaves traces of cultural behavior in the archeological record.

To me, such traces indicate that these hominins are in the subsequent build-on era.

So, Tomasello’s timeline may require clarification.

0075 Okay, now that I am nitpicking, I must ask, “Is there a problem with making joint attention2a the foundation of an evolutionary theory?”

Allow me to return to Tomasello’s vision.

0076 According to Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), adaptation2 and phenotype2 belong to two independent scientific disciplines: natural history and genetics.  Since both belong to situation-level nested forms that rely on different potentials, one cannot situate or contextualize the other.  However, this is precisely what occurs in Tomasello’s vision.

Of course, Tomasello’s vision remains a breakthrough in the framework of modern science.  At least, the phenotype does not correspond to the adaptation.  Instead, the phenotype2c puts culture2b into perspective.  Then, culture2b virtually situates the adaptation of joint attention2a.

Yes, to repeat, the phenotype2c does not directly situate the adaptation2a.  Tomasello’s vision leads upwards from joint attention2a to human culture2b and then to human cognitive development2c. Cognitive development2c puts culture2b into perspective, just as culture2b virtually situates joint attention2a.

Tomasello’s vision is truly remarkable.

0077 And, it is difficult to achieve.

This book is the start of a twenty year journey.

0078 As noted in points 0055 through 0058, the last few chapters cover the cultural (situation) and ontogenetic (perspective) levels of Tomasello’s vision.  As far as I can see, these chapters labor to show how human ontogeny2c (the scientific study of human development) virtually contextualizes human culture2b (a somewhat vaguely defined term that refers to all situations where joint attention2a pertains).  In the process, Tomasello must also explain how human culture2b, especially spoken language and symbolic representation, virtually emerges from and situates joint attention2a.

How ambitious is that?

0079 Here a picture of the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality (the vertical column in secondness in Tomasello’s vision, portrayed as a nested form).

The normal context of the behavior of newborns and infants2c virtually brings the actuality of spoken language and symbolic representation2b into the potential of a foundational adaptation2a.

0080 Yes, this is very ambitious, and the final three chapters of this book strain to meet the challenge.  They should be read with this in mind.  The last three chapters are well composed.  Tomasello is an excellent writer.  He is very organized.  But, his exposition is like lifting a two-hundred pound octopus out of the water.  As soon as one arm is lifted, a different one slides back into the murk.

0081 Plus, there is the lingering issue of natural history.

Here is a picture with Tomasello’s guesses.

Tomasello makes two associations that make no sense at all, when considering joint attention2b as an adaptation to sociogenesis1b in the normal context of natural selection3b.  Sociogenesis1b is the human niche1b.  The human niche1b is the potential1b of triadic relations2a.  Consequently, the adaptation of joint attention2a should be marked in the archaeological record with the appearance of the Homo genus, around 1.8Myr (millions of years ago).

0082 With that in mind, I close this examination of the first step in Tomasello’s journey, scientifically exploring who we are.  The next step is a book that expands and clarifies this first step.  It is published nine years later.

01/17/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (2008) “Origins of Human Communication” (Part 1 of 12)

0083 In 2008 AD, Michael Tomasello, then co-director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, publishes the work before me (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts).

This book is the second marker in Tomasello’s intellectual journey.  I start following his journey with Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (1999) “The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition” (appearing in Razie Mah’s January 2024 blog).  That is the first marker.

0084 The second marker starts as an academic presentation in 2006.  His Jean Nicod Lectures, in Paris, concerns his work on great ape gestural communication, human infant gestural communication and human children’s language development.  These lectures attempt to construct one coherent account of the evolution of hominin communication.

Oh, that terminology.  Where Tomasello inscribes, “human”, I say, “hominin”.

0085 From my examination at the first marker, I already have a guess about Tomasello’s vision.

Here is a picture.

0086 Note that the titles of the levels have changed.

Also note that human ontogeny2c or models of child development currently built by psychologists2c, associates to phenotypes and genetics.  Joint attention2a or models in evolutionary psychology concerning hominin cognition2a,associates to adaptations and natural history.

0087 Tomasello uses the word, “origins”, in his title.  Does this suppose that human communication may be regarded as a phenotypic trait or as an adaptation?  Or maybe, the conjunction is “and”.

In the above figure, I get the idea that the phenotype virtually contextualizes the adaptation.  But, that is not really the case.  The phenotype2b virtually situates a species’ or individual’s DNA2a.

Here is a diagram.

0088 Not surprisingly, this diagram in genetics has the same two-level relational structure as Darwin’s paradigm for natural history.

0089 What does this imply?

A mystery stands at the heart of evolutionary biology.

The adaptation is not the same as the phenotype.

Yet, together, they constitute a single actuality, which may be labeled a genus, a species or an individual.

Two category-based nested forms intersect in the realm of actuality.  It is like two streets that meet.  The intersection is constituted by both streets.  As far as traffic goes, intersections are sites of dangerous contradictions.  Traffic from one street should not collide with traffic from the other street.  I suppose that the intersection of adaptation and phenotypecarries irreconcilable contradictions as well.

0090 Perhaps, Tomasello’s vision may be resolved by considering both joint attention2a and human ontogeny2c as adaptations, even though the latter is technically, phenotypic.

I suggest this because selection is the normal context for all three levels in Tomasello’s vision.  Since natural selection goes with adaptation, the vision is one of natural history.

0091 That implies that the potentials for all three levels are like niches.

Human ontogeny2c is an adaptation that emerges from and situates the potential of human culture2b, where human culture2b is like an actuality independent of the adapting species of individuals undergoing development3c.

Human culture2b is like an adaptation that emerges from and situates the potential of joint attention2a, where joint attention2a is like an actuality independent of the adapting ways of doing things3b.

Joint attention2a is like an adaptation that emerges from and situates sociogenesis1a, where sociogenesis1a is the potential of… what?… I have run out of actualities independent of the adapting species.

0092 Here is where the foundational Tomasello-Mah synthesis enters the picture.

Ah, so here is a problem.

Tomasello’s vision of the origins of human communication conceals the actuality underlying sociogenesis1a, the potential1a giving rise to joint attention2a.  The human niche is the potential of triadic relations.

0093 What about the subscripts in the preceding paragraph?

They belong to Tomasello’s vision.

0094 This subscript business can be confusing.

To me, the concealment in Tomasello’s vision is not necessarily a drawback.  Rather, it presents an opportunity to re-articulate Tomasello’s arc of inquiry using the category-based nested form and other triadic relations.

0095 In the prior series of blogs, examining a book published in 1999, I introduced an interscope for the way humans think that derives from work by medieval schoolmen, the so-called “scholastics” of the Latin Age.

Here is a picture of the scholastic version of how humans think, packaged as a three level interscope.

01/2/24

Avoiding Babylon and the Quest for the Grail of the Unholy  (Part 1 of 1)

0001 The actual title of this blog is Looking at Avoiding Babylon’s 2023 Year in Review Podcast.

0002 One avenue to the podcast is https://spiritustv.com@avoidingbabylon.

At the moment of this writing, these comedic, yet earnest, podcasters are also on youtube and rumble.

0003 The current title employs an Arthurian legend riff, because, if anything, the four interlocutors in this video elaborate a sign-relation specifying what Pope Francis, seemingly simultaneously pope and poseur, means to each one.  The appropriate Tarot card is the Hierophant.  So, that is what I will label this confluence of fallible human and political position.

0004 In general, the sign is a triadic relation where a sign-vehicle stands for a sign-object in regards to a sign-interpretant.

Here is a picture.

0005 In a specifying sign, a content-based sign-vehicle (SVs) stands for a situation-based sign object (SOs) in regards to the question of what it means to me, operating on the potential of ongoing content (SIs).

The actions of the Hierophant play a prominent role in the year-end review.  These actions serve as a specifying sign-vehicle (SVs) that stands for the reviewers drinking from a chalice of unholiness (SOs) in regards to what the news events of 2023 mean to traditional Catholics (SIs). 

0006 Here is a picture.

0006 Now, the members of the discussion do not quest for the grail of the unholy.  Rather, they suffer it.  The elixir that they reluctantly imbibe is a distillate of the rotted fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, vaporized and condensed by nefarious operators similar to those fingered in Charles Theodore Murr’s book (2022) Murder in the 33rd Degree.

0007 Razie Mah offers two snapshots of this distillate.

One is Looking at Sam Smith and Kim Petras’s Music Video (2022) “Unholy”, presented in Razie Mah’s blog on February 11, 2023, several days after the Grammy awards.

Two is Looking at Carlo Vigano’s Speech (2021) “How the Revolution of Vatican II Serves the New World Order”,presented during July 2022, in the same blog.

This is what the talents at Avoiding Babylon taste.

0008 So, what is this distillate?

Well, the answer is obvious.

The distillate is the liquid in the grail of the unholy.

Surely, the elixir is spiritual.  But, it is not the blood of Christ.  Its mash is stamped from the modern grapes of alienation and resentment.

0009 At this moment, pause, and take a glance at the title of this blog.  The title proposes a quest, not for the distillate, but for the grail of the unholy.  The grail is the vessel, the cup, the chalice of what is unholy.

0010 Spoken words are so slippery.

Perhaps, the following articulation is more suitable.

I propose a quest for the doctrine of original sin.

0011 The doctrine of original sin is the vessel of the unholy, purchased by Christ in the transaction of all time, bringing good out of the fall of Adam and Eve.

0012 But, has not Augustine’s doctrine of original sin been disproven by modern science?

This is a very good question.

To witness one Christian author caught in the tentacles of this “has not”, consider Looking at Andrew Ter Ern Loke’s Book (2022) “The Origin of Humanity and Evolution”, appearing in Razie Mah’s blog between November 30 and 1, 2023.

0013 I propose that Avoiding Babylon pose this question to their audience, in an open forum, along with the following queries. (1) Is Augustine’s doctrine of original sin still valid after modern science demonstrates that there is no genetic bottleneck, as would be expected if Adam and Eve are parents of all humans? (2) Does Augustine’s diagnosis of concupiscence still apply? (3) What about other diagnoses, such as the Protestant’s doctrine of total depravity?  Do they still apply? Finally, (4) are there any alternate formulations of original sin proposed after Augustine but before the modern Age of Ideas?

0014 I suspect that the answers will be: (1) No.  (2) Yes.  (3) Yes, look no further than the demos-racket party members and their rino consorts beholden to the glow-baloney-ists. (4) Yes, Thomas Aquinas proposes that original sin is the deprivation of original justice.

0015 In a subsequent open forum, I propose that the audience of Avoiding Babylon riddle this question.  Does Aquinas’s proposal that original sin is the deprivation of original justice apply to human evolution?

In other words, is there a twist in human evolution?

Is human evolution shaken, not stirred?

Has the living world of humanity changed?

Is the German word, “Lebenswelt”, appropriate?

What if our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

0016 Why stop there?

Can the Lebenswelt that we evolved in correspond to an era of original justice?

Can our current Lebenswelt correspond to an era of original sin?

0017 Of course, with questions like these, an open forum may descend into chaos.  To date, no one seems willing to connect the dots, except for Razie Mah.  That give this literary figure a certain daring.  He even proposes a label for the transition from the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt.

The label is “the first singularity”.

Yes, there is an archaeology of the fall.

0018 If Aquinas’s concept of original justice applies to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, then how are we to envision this… um… Edenic existence?

Perhaps, inquirers may consider the lives of newborns, infants, toddlers and young children.

These innocent creatures did not evolve to grow up in civilization, did they?

0019 Two recent blogs by Razie Mah assist in opening the modern mind to the possibility that we evolved to be what children expect us to be, which is nothing like what we adults actually are in today’s unconstrained social complexity.

One is Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”, appearing from October 30 to 2, 2023.  John Deely (1942-2017 AD) is the only postmodern semiotician buried in the cemetery adjacent to Saint Vincent’s College in Latrobe, Pennsylvania.  His last student, Brian Kemple, runs the Lyceum website and is worthy of an interview.  So are the contributors to his online journal, Reality.

Two is a series of examinations of the works of Michael Tomasello, recently retired Co-Director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany (and may be living near Duke University in North Carolina).  These will appear from March 31 to January 4, 2024 (and will be wrapped into an e-book titled, Comments on Michael Tomasello’s Arc of Inquiry (1999-2019), soon to be available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

0020 So, the question is, “Are these little tykes expecting us to be, who we evolved to be? And, if so, then why do we seem to fail to live up to their expectations, say nothing of our own expectations for ourselves?”

I suspect that Dr. Tomasello might want to take a swing at that hardball question.

0021 Imagine the implications of associating Aquinas’s original justice to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0022 As for our current Lebenswelt of original sin, the prior specifying sign says that Pope Francis, as a premier news maker of 2023 (SVs), stands for traditional Catholics being forced to drink elixir from the grail of the unholy (SOs) in regards to the question of what it means to believers, who are concerned about ongoing events (SIs).

0023 Of course, scientists like to call these news items, “memes”, easily transmitted virus-like units of cultural information.  Today, memes are everywhere.  They are incessantly broadcast.  So if the Hierophant employs memes, then what is the nature of memes?

Here, Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria, to Bach and Back”, appearing in Razie Mah’s blog in December 2023, offers a notion that memes, bits of gossip, pithy justifications of concupiscence, demoralizing proclamations, and label-attaching accusations involve the specifying sign (as already noted) as well as the interventional sign.

0024 The interventional sign?

The interventional sign is like a mirror of the specifying sign.

In a specifying sign-relation, the content-based sign-vehicle (SVs) is picked up by the senses as a mind-independent being.  The situation-based sign-object (SOs) is mind-dependent.

In an interventional sign-relation, the content-based sign-object (SOs) is available to the senses as an apparently mind-independent being, which is totally backwards from the specifying sign.  The perspective-based sign-vehicle (SVi) is mind-dependent.

0025 For the interventional sign-relation, a perspective-based idea in the mind of someone (or something) (SVi) stands for what the participants sense (SOi) in regards to the content-based question, what is happening, drawing upon the possibility that ‘something’ is happening (SIi).

0026 Here is a picture for the meme at hand.

0027 Note that the sign-object of the interventional sign (SOi) is contiguous with the sign-vehicle of the specifying sign(SVs).

However, the interventional sign-relation is much more difficult to assess than the specifying sign-relation. 

0028 The lesson is on display in Avoiding Babylon’s podcast of the year 2023 in review.

The Hierophant offers an elixir that tastes like poison to traditional Catholics and the interlocutors ask what is happening.  They cannot figure out the potential of ‘something’ happening’ because they cannot ideate, much less imagine, that the current Hierophant is an object (SOi), called into being by an alien intelligence guiding what is happening and the potential of ‘something’ happening (SIi) in the process of implementing an alien idea, plan or judgment (SVi).

0029 Now, substitute the word, “unholy”, for “alien”.

An unholy idea (SVi) stands for this Hierophant making the news (SOi) in regards to the question of what is happening arising from the potential of ‘something’ happening (SIi).

0030 No, this does not sound like concupiscence.

This sounds like something far more deranged.

0031 Has the Yaltaboath of Modernism found its Voice?

Does the Modern Yaltaboath seek to destroy the chalice of the unholy, which has been disproven, then disregarded, but still retains its power to contain the elixir of whatever idea, plan or judgment that our unconstrained minds can conceive?

Will Avoiding Babylon conduct a quest for original sin?

Will they seek to discover the cup of the unholy capable of containing the juices of Modernism?

12/23/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 1 of 20)

0001 Let me start with an admission.  In this particular examination, I am not myself.  I am someone who I am not.  I own a dog named, “Daisy”.

The book before me is by Daniel C. Dennett and is titled, “From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds”.  The book is published by W.W. Norton (New York, London).  The book wrestles with issues both philosophical and scientific.  How does our world come to be?  How do we come to be?

Who are we?  We are people with minds.  Minds intelligently design artifacts using tools of production and tools of the intellect.  The first tools are handy.  The second are… well… not exactly the same as “handy”.

0002 The hand grasps a tool then uses it to manipulate things.  The word, “prehensile” applies.  Our hands are full of prehensions.  We are aware of the heft and feel of material instruments.

The mind grasps an intellectual tool with its… um… brain.  Is there such a word as “comprehensile”?  How about the term, “comprehension”?  Once we become competent using an intellectual tool, we comprehend.  We become familiar with its heft and feel.

0003 The hand is unlike the appendages of other mammals.

For example, cats and dogs only have feet.  The cat uses its front feet as “paws”, in a manner similar to the way humans use their hands.  Not really, because the cat’s paws cannot hold anything.  The cat cannot pick up a tool.  May I say that the cat’s front paws are part of the feline toolkit?  Evolution builds tools right into the cat’s body.  Most mammals are fashioned this way.  Tools are part of their bodies.

0004 The mind serves as a metaphorical appendage, because it grasps ‘something’, and in doing so, may manipulate it.  The dog, whose practical toolkit includes feet and a formidable mouth, has an advantage over the cat, in this respect.  The dog’s mind grasps ‘something’ and, in doing so, manipulates humans into serving as the leader of its pack.

To me, the dog is testimony to the inhospitality of wolf “culture”, in general, and the inadequacy of wolf “leadership”, in particular.  Wolf pack-leaders often behave like aristocrats, always expecting deferential treatment.  They are often filled with paranoia and treachery.  Yet, their followers know that they need a leader.  Otherwise, there is no pack.  Without the pack, there is only death.

0005 Surely, a reasonable human would serve as a more hospitable leader, especially since humans know how to get food in surprising ways.  Humans give dogs food.  Until, of course, starvation fills the land.