06/11/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 1 of 5)

1223 The text before me is chapter three of Semiotic Agency (2021, book details on point 830, pages 59-94).

1224 The abstract raises the question of evolution.  The question is addressed earlier in this examination.  Points 0710 through 0752 assert that the actualities of adaptation2b and phenotype2b are not the same.  One does not situate the other.  Instead, their nested forms intersect in such a manner as to constitute a single actuality2.  Adaptation2b and phenotype2b intersect to constitute a living being2.

1225 How shall I proceed?

Semiotic Agency yields the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay by taking an interscope that is similar to the scholastic interscope for how humans think and transubstantiating it from thirdness to secondness.

In thirdness, the scholastic interscope contains the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

1226 Here is a diagram.

In secondness, the elements from these triadic sign-relations fit into a dyad, characteristic of Peirce’s secondness.

1227 The dyad consists of two contiguous real elements, very much in tune with Aristotle’s exemplar, matter [substance] form.

The following depicts a dyad within a dyad.  Each dyad exhibits its own configuration.

For the fundament, the specifying sign, SOs is like matter, SVs is like form, and SIs is [substance].  In a sense, a form of the sign-vehicle calls forth the matter of a sign-object, in the way that say, the form of a traffic stop sign2a (SVs) calls forth the matter of stopping the vehicle2b (SOs). 

For the resonant, the exemplar sign, SVe is like matter, SOe is like form, and SIe is like [substance].  The matter of me following the rules of the road2b (SVe) stands for my successful arrival at my driving destination2c (SOe) in regards to making sense3c operating on the possibility that if everyone obeys the rules of the road then each one of us will get where we are going to1c (SIe).

1228 This dyad within a dyad performs what phenomenology claims to do, that is, identify what the noumenon must be.

The noumenon of what?

Biosemiotics.

Or, should I say, “Biosemiotics as an exercise of the Positivist’s judgment, however compromised the positivist intellect may be.”?

1229 Of course, this is a fantastic claim.  But, this examination of Semiotic Agency (see point 830 for book details) and Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (see point 831 for book details) bears me out.  Sharov, Tonnessen and Mikhailovsky set the stage for a paradigm that not only is phenomenological, but accounts for how phenomenology works.  This examination adds value by presenting the diagrams.

06/10/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 2 of 5)

1230 Now, back to evolution.

May I use the same technique for my examination of evolution?

May I pass from thirdness (M) to secondness (N), then add a twist (O)?

1231 I start with neodarwinism as an intersection (M).  The single actuality2 may be individual2, species2 or genus2.

The intersection consists two triadic relations, even though the single actuality2 um.. belongs to secondness.

Here is a picture.

1232 Yes, adaptation2H is not the same as phenotype2V.

Not only that, each actuality2b belongs to a situation-level nested form.

Here is the two-level interscope for adaptation2H.

1233 In previous examinations, the term, “niche” is a point of contention.  Does the term have a clear technical definition?  Or does “niche” suggest “whatever adaptations are adapting to”?

Surely, a technical definition is implied by the above figure.

A niche1b is the potential1b of an actuality of the adapting species2a.

1234 This introduces another point of contention.

Does the niche have to consist of purely material conditions, whether environmental or ecological?  The answer is no, even though, for almost all species, the niche is the potential of ‘something’ in the environment or the ecology.  The most obvious exception is our own genus, the Homo genus, whose niche is the potential of triadic relations.

Triadic relations are immaterial beings that entangle the material world.  So, a scientist, working under the presumption of the positivist intellect (metaphysics is not allowed), has a difficult time because observations and measurements follow only the entangled material world, rather than the significant observable and measurable facets of the thing itself.

The biosemiotic noumenal overlay changes the game in that respect.  Phenomena consist of sign-vehicles and sign-objects that would be rejected by the modern positivist intellect because they are imbued with formal and final causalities.

1235 As for the potential of triadic relations, consider the e-book, The Human Niche (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

1236 Here is two-level interscope for phenotype2V.

1237 Hmmm, what is going on with the genotype1b?

Like “niche1b“, “genotype1b” labels a potential: the potential1b of DNA2a.  The cellular apparatus for translating DNA into proteins is a complicated arrangement.  Nevertheless, scientists currently have a fairly coherent story for how a DNA world supports a RNA world and a RNA world translates into a protein world.  The phenotype2b manifests in the protein world.  Proteins get cellular processes done.

06/9/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 3 of 5)

1238 Natural historians say, “Consider the adaptation2H.”

Geneticists say, “Consider the phenotype2V.”

The two-level interscopes of adaptation2b and of phenotype2b have one thing in common.

Both express all the elements of the specifying sign-relation

1239 For the natural historian, an actuality independent of the adapting species2a (SVs) stands for an adaptation2b(SOs) in regards to natural selection3b operating on a niche1b (SIs).

For the geneticist, DNA2a (SVs) stands for a phenotype2b (SOs) in regards to body development3b operating on the genotype1b (SIs).

1240 Now, I wonder whether I can repeat the same trick as the one performed at the very start of Semiotic Agency (N).

1241 The above figure expresses two styles of triadic relations, the specifying sign-relation and the two-level interscope.  There are two real elements, the content- and situation-level actualities, and they look like a dyad.  The situation level holds one real element, which I associate to matter (or esse_ce, being [substantiating]).  The content level holds the other real element, which I associate to form (or essence, [substantiated] being}.

1242 Why the associations?

That is how the actualities appear in the above figure.

Content-level form (SVs) stands for situation-level matter (SOs).  This is like the appearance of a shape (SVs) standing for the presence of matter (SOs) in regards to a situation-level normal context3b operating on the possibility of ‘situating content’1b (SIs).  Or, this is like a sensation2a (SVs) standing for a perception2b (SOs) in the normal context of what it2ameans to me3b operating on the potential1b of situating content2a (SIs).

1243 What else do I see?

I see the situation-level normal context3b and its potential1b folding into the contiguity between matter (SOsand form(SVs).

Here is a picture.

Surely, this diagram associates to the S&T noumenal overlay, but separately for adaptation2b and phenotype2b.

1244 Adaptation2b looks like information2b.

1245 Phenotype also looks like information2b.

1246 Both these figures represent incomplete pictures of semiotic agency, because there are no exemplar sign-relations.

Both tell me how incomplete neodarwinism is, as a model for biological systems.

Natural historians may be satisfied with the way that darwinism fits.

Geneticists may be satisfied with the way that the “neo” of neodarwinism fits.

1247 Why don’t most biologists want to talk about “niche” or “genotype”?

Well, the real elements, SVs and SOs, are obvious.

How does one model what needs to be accounted for (the contiguity, SIs) using observations and measurements of the phenomena of the real elements (SVs and SOs)?

Well, natural historians and geneticists are doing research everyday.  They encounter this issue. But, they do not have a complete image of semiotic agency that directs the inquirer.

They do not have an exemplar sign-relation.

06/7/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 4 of 5)

1248 Why is this lack of exemplar sign-relation salient3c((1c))?

Section 3.1 of chapter 3 of Semiotic Agency says that the human individual has three major components: a body (J), cognition (K) and a niche (L).

1249 What does that (J, K, L) tell me?

1250 Take a look at Figure 3.1, which portrays each component in a cut and paste manner.

1251 Surely, the human body (J) corresponds to phenotype2b as the sign object of a specifying relation.

In section 3.2, the author discusses the human body (J) in terms of subagency.

That is fine, because subagency models [body development3b operating on the genotype1a].  Current research in a variety of disciplines related to genetics is relevant.

1252 The niche (L) corresponds to adaptation2b as the sign-object of a specifying sign-relation.

In section 3.4, the author says that the human niche (L) includes the environment (as well as ecology), human artifacts, semiotic factors (such as information and communication) and social conditions.

Yes, but what about triadic relations?

1253 The author goes on to wrestle with different approaches to the term, “niche”.  Each approach tries to model [natural selection3b operating on the potential1b of an actuality independent of the adapting species2a].  But, no approach identifies the one actuality2a that accounts for convergent evolution among all hominin species.

Yes, I am talking about triadic relations.

See The Human Niche, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1254 The author raises the idea of a “cognitive niche”, which brings me to cognition (K).

Section 3.3 discusses human cognition (K) in terms of subagents.

1255 There are mental modules devoted to sensation, perception, memory, integration and action.  They are heterogeneous.  They may be called “cognits” because they knit cogs.  Surely, mental modules and “cognits” are neural… I mean… cognitive adaptations.  Several chapters in Semiotic Agency are devoted to these topics.

Section 3.5 covers periods of human life in terms of age-related phenotype3V (J), adaptation2H (L) and cognition (K).  This section rounds off the idea that the human has three components.

1256 Cognition (K) corresponds to the union of both phenotype2H (J) and adaptation2V (L) when it comes to human agency.

And, that is very curious.

1257 The issue of the salience3c((1c)) of the exemplar sign-relation is not raised.

Why is this issue important to me?

Do I see an opportunity?

1258 I see that a living being is an intersection between adaptation2H and phenotype2V.

I also notice that, when placed into the purely relational structure of semiotic agency, the specifying sign-relation for both adaptation2b and phenotype2b lack exemplar sign-relations.

1259 So, I wonder, does the intersection of neodarwinism provide complementary exemplar sign relations for the specifying sign-relations of natural history and genetics?

06/6/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 5 of 5)

1260 Say what?

Here is the intersection, once again.

1261 Yes, I can make out a configuration that looks like an exemplar sign-relation.

One version of the exemplar relation goes like this.  Information2b (SVe) stands for a goal (SOe) in regards to a normal context asking something like, “Does this make sense?”3c operating on the potential of ‘situating information’1c (SIe).

In the above diagram, information2b (SVe) is adaptation2H.  The goal2c (SOe) is the power to live as an agent.  The [contiguity] (SIe) is an intersection with the phenotype3c operating on the potentials that the phenotype provides1c.

1262 For the -darwinism version of exemplar sign-relation, the two actualities are adaptation2b (SVe) and the power to live as agent2c (SOe).  The contiguity is the normal context of an intersection with one’s phenotype3c, operating on the potentials that the phenotypes provide1c (SIe).

1263 For the neo- version of the exemplar sign-relation, the two actualities are phenotype2b (SVe) and the disposition to live as an agent2c (SOe).  The contiguity is the normal context of an intersection with one’s adaptations3c, operating on the potentials that adaptations provide1c (SIe).

1264 What do these two exemplar sign-relations tell us?

Adaptations express power?

Adaptations allow survival to the extent that the phenotype allows them?

Phenotypes express dispositions?

Phenotypes are expressed as a suite of adaptations whether the agent needs them or not?

No wonder biologists cannot “define” evolution concisely.

1265 Surely, this argument does not please the positivist intellect of the physicists and the chemists.

Biological evolution is a mystery, the intersection of two independent sciences, natural history and genetics.

But, that is not all.  I can delineate an implication for one of the contradictions inherent in biological evolution.

Phenotype is necessary for a -darwinian explanation, where “evolution” operates as an agent.  Phenotypic dispositions are inseparable from individual adaptive powers.

1266 Also, adaptation is necessary for a neo- (or genetic) explanation, where “evolution” operates as an agent.  Adaptive powers are inseparable from species-specific dispositions.

1267 Yes, I am arriving at a contradiction that cannot be resolved into either natural history or genetics.  Both of these discipline’s semiotic agency have the same agent, “evolution”.  But, what is the ‘final causality’?

1268 Here, the logics of firstness come into play.  The logics of firstness are inclusive and allow contradictions.  Evolution as an agent3 brings the actualities of adaptation and phenotype as semiotic agencies2 into relation with ‘a creative potential that evolutionary scientists regard as real’1.  But, it is unreal, because it represents a ‘final causality’ that stands beyond anything than the human can imagine.

After all, humans are evolved living beings.  What are we imaging when we try to picture this ‘final causality’?

1269 Modern evolutionary biologists may attribute the reality of the creative potential underlying evolution as an agent to matter alone, rather than matter [substance] form.

Postmodern biosemioticians may attribute the reality of the creative potential to triadic relations, such as the triadic relations reified into the matter [substance] form of semiotic agency.

1270 What does this imply?

The attribution of the biosemiotician encompasses the attribution of modern evolutionary biology.

The answer approaches the metaphysical in precisely the way that the Aristotle-tolerating positivist intellect currently uses the term, “metaphysics”, for “religious”.

The positivist intellect declares, “Religious empirio-schematic models are not allowed.”

1271 And, this raises a question, “How to define the word “religion?”

This question is the title of one of Razie Mah’s three masterworks.

More on that later.

06/5/25

A Brief Overview of What Razie Mah offers Biosemioticians in 2025 (Part 1 of 3)

1272 Biosemiotics challenges the current scientific vision of human evolution (as of 2025).

Okay, maybe I should correct that.

Razie Mah presents a challenge.  Biosemioticians can board the academic siege-apparatus at their leisure.

Leisure?

In 2010, in the book, Semiotic Animal, John Deely describes the owl of Minerva taking wing in the twilight of the modern Age of Ideas.  He, Thomas Sebeok and (no doubt) biosemiotician Alexei Sharov, know that the Third Age of Understanding comes to a close.

1273 In October 2023, Razie Mah blogs a review, titled Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010), “Semiotic Animal”.  This examination contains the scholastic interscope for how humans think.  The initial version of this interscope is developed in Razie Mah’s e-book, Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings.  The interventional sign-relation comes into view in Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2019) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.

1274 Then, starting in July and running through October 2024, Razie Mah offers a series of examinations in his blog, including Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition”; Joesph Pieper’s book (1974) “Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power”; Vivek Ramaswamy’s book (2021), “Woke, Inc.”; Michelle Stile’s book (2022), “One Idea to Rule Them All”; and N.H. Enfield’s book (2022), “Language vs. Reality”.

These reviews, full of diagrams of the interventional sign relation and detailing its relevance to the current historical moment, are collected in three e-books, Parts 1, 2 and 3, of Original Sin and The Post-Truth Condition.

1275 The owl of Minerva lands in the dawning Age of Triadic Relations.

1276 This brings me to the question of human agency.

Section 3.6 of Semiotic Agency is titled, “Development of Human Agency in Historical Perspective”.

The authors’ story begins with the Neolithic Revolution of the Fertile Crescent, starting around 12,000 years ago, then seamlessly drifts to our own current day.  It reads as if our current Lebenswelt starts with the Neolithic archaeological period.

1277 This story of the development of humanity is not much different from the written myths of the ancient Near East, where humans are um… created… when some differentiated god places special seeds in the soil… or something like that.  These ancient myths are recorded on cuneiform clay tablets, that are preserved by their incineration in royal libraries thousands of years ago.  

Yes, incineration.

The tablets are made of clay.

The capital burns.  Clay fires to brick.  Brick lasts so long that an archaeologist can read the script of a tablet millennia later.

1278 The origin myths of the ancient Near East testify that humans are recent creations, formed from differentiated gods, for the god’s own purposes.  That sounds like our current Lebenswelt to me.  That sounds like the “Development of Human Agency in Historical Perspective”.

Why don’t civilized humans have the agency to see beyond the start of their own civilizations?

1279 Biosemiotics has an answer.  Civilized humans practice a type of semiosis that differs from the type of semiosis that their ancestors practiced.

What am I talking about?

The evolution of talk is not the same as the evolution of language.

1280 Our current Lebenswelt of civilizations practices speech-alone talk.  Speech-alone talk offers the comforts of implicit abstraction (characteristic of icons and indexes) and facilitates the unexpectedly profitable rewards (and the unanticipated costs) of explicit abstraction.  Speech-alone talk can attach a label to anything.  In short, anything can become a sign-vehicle (SVs), just by speaking the label.

1281 So, what does a spoken word mean?  Is the nature of its presence merely a label?  What message does that send?  The answers to all these questions are explicit abstractions.  Spoken words facilitate explicit abstractions based on the purely symbolic-sign qualities of symbols.

1282 The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices hand-talk (for the Homo genus) and hand-speech talk (for the species Homo sapiens).  Hand talk permits implicit abstraction.

What do I mean by “implicit abstraction”?

The diagrams in my examination of Alexei Sharov’s and Morten Tonnessen’s book, Semiotic Agency, depict purely relational structures that hominins adapted to over the course of millions of years.  The idea is mind boggling to the modern.  However, implicit abstraction accounts for modern trends, such as the appearance and success of phenomenology in a civilization prospering on empirio-schematic inquiry.

1283 One of the first items of value for the biosemiotician are works that are contained in the series, A Course on Implicit and Explicit Abstraction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1284 The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices only implicit abstraction.Our current Lebenswelt also practices explicit abstraction.

06/4/25

A Brief Overview of What Razie Mah offers Biosemioticians in 2025 (Part 2 of 3)

1285 Biosemiotics challenges the current scientific vision of human evolution (as of 2025).

Okay, maybe I should correct that.

Razie Mah presents a challenge that biosemioticians should explore.

Human evolution comes with a twist.

1286 The transition between the Lebenswelt that we evolved in and our current Lebenswelt starts with the Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia, nominally, 7800 years ago.  That makes the current year, 7825 U0′ (Ubaid Zero Prime).  The year is merely a formality.  Perhaps, astrologers will have something to say about the year when the Ubaid settles as the world’s first speech-alone talking culture.

At its inception, the Ubaid is the only speech-alone talking culture on Earth.  All other cultures practice hand-speech talk.  The power of speech-alone talk makes the Ubaid disposed to unconstrained social complexity.

1287 The Ubaid archaeological period is followed by the Uruk (starting around 1800 U0′).  The Uruk archaeological period is followed by the Sumerian Dynastic (2800 U0′).  The Egyptian Dynastic starts at the same time, showing precocious development after exposure to speech-alone talk from the the original source in southern Mesopotamia.

1288 As the first singularity spreads, nearby hand-speech talking cultures drop the hand-component of their hand-speech talk in favor of speech-alone talk.  Why?  Speech-alone talk is the practice of wealthier and more powerful neighboring cultures (starting with the Ubaid). Speech-alone talk permits explicit abstraction.  Explicit abstractionfacilitates specialization.  As soon as explicit abstraction is practiced, trends towards labor and social specializationmanifest.

Wealth and power.

What is not to like?

1289 The potentiation of unconstrained social complexity shows up in various guises in the written origin myths of the ancient Near East.  Of course, one well-known myth comes from an oral tradition that lasted for thousands of years, before being committed to writing.  Yes, I am talking about the biblical stories of Adam and Eve.

Notice that the talking serpent does not have hands.  It could not have performed hand talk.  It is an exemplar of speech-alone talk.

1290 What does the speaking serpent accomplish?

It demonstrates the nature of speech-alone talk.

Surely, the serpent enjoyed the game… until the boss showed up.  Once Adam and Eve leave the garden, trends towards unconstrained social complexity follow.  The social circles of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in cannot withstand the onslaught of labor and social specialization.  Brother turns against brother.

1291 Of course, a drama is the best way to tell the tale of the first singularity, that is, the beginning of our humanity… er… current Lebenswelt.

Consider Razie Mah’s fiction, An Archaeology of the Fall.

1292 Nominally, the year of this examination is 7825 U0′ (Ubaid Zero Prime).

And, postmoderns are beginning to realize the power of spoken words to create reality.

That is the nature of our current Lebenswelt.

1293 Here is a list of Razie Mah’s masterworks.

06/3/25

A Brief Overview of What Razie Mah offers Biosemioticians in 2025 (Part 3 of 3)

1294 Biosemiotics is born out of the tradition of phenomenology.

Biosemiotics explains of how phenomenology works in light of modern biology.

In Semiotic Agency (7821 U0′), Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen effectively propose the first step of a biosemiotic noumenal overlay.  Alexei Sharov and George Mikhailovsky complete the overlay in 7824 with Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe.

The biosemiotic noumenal overlay consists in semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation.

1295 The examination of these works has proceeded in Razie Mah’s blogs since the start of January, 2025.  The examination is not exhaustive.  But, it has been revealing.  These blogs will be collected into four books, titled Biosemiotics as Noumenon (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

Of course, Razie Mah has been writing and blogging on semiotic topics for over a decade.  The blog may be found at Razie Mah’s website.  E-articles and e-books for sale are available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  These works are placed in series for convenience.  A full table of contents for e-works and the blog should be available by the end of the year.

Meanwhile, a few suggestions for further research follow.

1296 For the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, the following should be of interest.

1297 For the twist in human evolution, the following applies.

1297 For our current Lebenswelt, there are many threads to follow.

1299 All these works pertain to chapter three of Semiotic Agency, titled “Human Agency”.

They show what biosemiotics can do.

1300 My thanks to Alexei Sharov, Morten Tonnessen and George Mikhailovsky, as well as the many contributors to Pathways, for interesting material to examine.  As noted elsewhere, all the material in these examinations, as well as in Biosemiotics as Noumenon, are available to these authors and contributors to use in their efforts to build biosemiotics as a specialization… or… maybe I should say… a “noumenalization” of what all biological processes have in common.

05/31/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 1 of 4)

0829 I have, under examination, two texts that bring the inquirer to the door of a truly postmodern discipline of biosemiotics. 

0830 The first book is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen.  The book is published in 2021 by Springer (Switzerland) and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics.  Series editors are Kalevi Kull, Alexei Sharov, Claude Emmeche and Donald Favareau.  These authors and editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the continuing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

0831 The second book before me is Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe, edited by Alexei Sharov and George Mikhailovsky.  Each chapter has its own author(s).  The book is published in 2024 by Scrivener Press (Beverly, MA) and logs in as volume 1 in Scrivener’s Series on Astrobiology Perspectives on Life in the Universe.  Series editors are Martin Scrivener and Phillip Carmical.  Chapter authors and book editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the continuing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

0832 If biosemiotics is postmodern and scientific, what is modern and scientific?

The modern natural sciences (physics, chemistry, in their diverse applications) and the modern social sciences (including sociology, psychology, anthropology and other, various specialties) conduct empirio-schematic inquires, under the auspices of the Positivist’s judgment.

Here is a picture of the fully modern Positivist’s judgment.

0833 The empirio-schematic judgment occupies the slot for what ought to be and is imbued with secondness (the realm of actuality).

In the empirio-schematic judgment, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is,firstness).

0834 In the following points, I re-capitulate the argument in points 0201 through 0226.

0835 Notice that biology is not listed above.

In some ways, biology goes into the same basket as physics and chemistry, in which the noumenon is obvious.  The noumenon is so obvious that triumphalist scientists get around Kant’s slogan (occupying the slot for what is) by substituting a successful model in for the noumenon.  Then, a successful model (as the new noumenon) [can be objectified as] its phenomena.  This is the character of the laboratory sciences in chemistry, physics and biology.

Here is a picture.

0836 The modern social sciences develop in the same century as the laboratory sciences.

One advantage of laboratory science is that a successful model does not completely occlude its noumenon.  The social sciences do not have that advantage.  Instead, social scientists observe phenomena with the expectation that there must be a noumenon.

Say what?

0837 The modern social sciences pull their noumena out of their asses and then develop an empirio-schematic charade that substantiates their intuition (that is, their guess of what the noumenon must be.

Here is a picture.

0838 The hocus-pocus of modern social science seems tawdry, at first, but then Edmund Husserl formalizes the process of assessing what the noumenon must be.

Husserl’s phenomenology is so well-targeted that contemporary social scientists blame his followers for pulling noumena out of their asses, then go about claiming that their non-phenomenological assessments of what the noumenon must be are far better, because they are guided by observations and models.

0839 Ahem, let me get this straight.

Phenomenologists use a clearly delineated methodology to determine what the noumenon must be, thereby supporting novel empirical inquiry.

Social scientists…

0840 Stop!  My academic audience is agitated.

A highly credentialed sociologist yells, “Hey, you have that wrong!”

“Phenomenologists pull what the noumenon must be out of their asses.”

“Modern social scientists allow data and models to speak for themselves.”

05/30/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 2 of 4)

0841 Biosemiotics adheres to the relational structure of the Positivist’s judgment, but with a caveat.  Metaphysics is allowed.  Um… along with another caveat.  Philosophical (Aristotelian) metaphysics is distinct from religious metaphysics.

Biosemiotic metaphysics consists in using Aristotle’s formal and final causes for determining what the noumenon should be.

0842 In contrast, religious metaphysics consists of applying Aristotle’s formal and final causes to real initiating (religious) events.

The positivist intellect must accept philosophical metaphysics in order to investigate semiotic agency2, in the normal context of an agent3 operating on the potential of final causality1.  Final causality1 is necessarily metaphysical.

At the same time, the positivist intellect must not endorse religious metaphysics.

0843 The books listed in points 0830 and 0831 do an admirable job in arriving at a Positivist’s judgment that allows empirio-schematic inquiry and follows the precepts of oft-derided phenomenology.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay is inherently biosemiotic and allows the inquirer to distinguish what goes into a model from what must be modeled.  Sign-vehicles and sign-objects are phenomena that go into a model.  Sign-interpretants are what must be modeled.

0843 Here is a picture.

0844 Take a look at the slot for the noumenon.

In their book, Semiotic Agency (2021, see point 830), Sharov and Tonnessen lay the groundwork for this examiner to diagram semiotic agency as the reification of the specifying and exemplar sign relations.  That explains the “ST”.  In the examination of chapters on non-human agency, the interventional sign comes into play, hence the additional “I”. The complete noumenal overlay should be be labeled “the biosemiotic noumenal overlay”.

0845 The biosemiotic overlay lays over the noumenon of every biological inquiry.

How so?

All biological noumenon are inherently semiotic.  Semiosis is what all biological entities have in common.

0846 The laboratory sciences are born when empirio-schematic traditions produce successful models that can replace their respective noumena.  Once a model substitutes for its noumenon, Kant’s slogan is negated.  Successful models (as noumena) [can be objectified] by their phenomena.

The same goes with biosemiotics.

In this case, the biosemiotic noumenal overlay lays over the noumena of diverse biological systems and entities.  It is the one feature they all have in common.  Also, the biosemiotic noumenal overlay has a particular advantage.  It’s configuration tells the inquirer what goes with phenomena and what needs to be modeled.

0847 Here is a picture.

0848 The STI noumenal consists in three sign-relations: the specifying, the exemplar and the interventional.  The first two belong to semiotic agency.  The latter does not.

The sign elements are sign-vehicle (SV), sign-object (SO) and sign-interpretant (SI).  An SV stands for its SO in regards to their SI.

0849 I ask, “Which of the elements go with phenomena and which are in need of modeling?

The SV and SO go with phenomena.  The SI are in need of modeling.

0850 Now, I ask, “How should one label each of the above sign elements?”

That is a little more difficult.  If it helps, I know that these sign-elements also belong to three-level interscope.

0851 Here is the specifying sign-relation.

The SVs is a real initiating (semiotic) event2a.

The SIs is self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b.

The SOs is information2b as specified.

0852 Here is the exemplar sign-relation.

The SVe is information2b that stands for a goal2c (SOe) in the normal context3c and potential1c of salience (SIe).

Oh, that is awkward.

The SOe is a goal or purpose2c, and that lines up with the fact that semiotic agency2 is an actuality2 whose normal context3 is agent3 and potential1 is ‘final causality’1.

The SIe is labeled, “salience”.  SIe includes a perspective-level normal context3c and potential1c.

0853 I do not have labels for any of the sign-elements of the interventional sign-relation.