10/13/25

A First Look at Julian Jaynes’s Book (1976) “The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind” (Part 17 of 21)

0463 Oh, there is another resonance.

Commitment2c is SVi.  Species impressa2a is SOi.

Commitment2c is a nested form because it2c is the unfolding of judgment2c.

I wonder whether the most nested element in species impressa2a can be depicted as a category-based nested form, just like commitment2c.

Yeah, what if decode2a can be conjured as a nested form?

Well, I already performed a similar operation in points 0395 to 0399.

So, why not?

0464 What would be a normal context3 for decode2a?

May I use the term, “sensation2a“?

Then, sensation3(2a) would tend to be exclusive, as well as actual.

0465 Does that make sense3c?

A sensation3(2a) may be depicted as the hylomorphe, active body [substantiates] sensate soul2a.

To me, it seems that this actuality2a may exclude other actualities, based one’s training2c, that is, commitment2c.

Exclusion characterizes one of the logics of thirdness.

So, there is something like a normal context3 and a potential1 in decode2a, even though decode2a belongs to the category of secondness.

0465 What is the actuality2 for decode2a?

The logic of secondness includes the law of noncontradiction.

One way to express the realm of actuality is a hylomorphe, a relational structure containing two contiguous real elements.  The contiguity is [decode].  The first real element, which would correspond to matter in Aristotle’s hylomorphe, is species impressa intelligibilis2(2c), that is, the universality of sensation2(2c). The second real element, corresponding to form in Aristotle’s hylomorphe, is species impressa2(2a), the impression itself.

Decode2a not only labels the actuality2a, but [decode] also labels the contiguity between the perspective and content level actualities.

“Impression2a” not only labels the actuality2a, but the term represents the form2(2a) within species impressa2a.

“Sensation2a” not only labels the actuality2a, but the term denotes a normal context3(2a) operating on the possibility of an intelligibility to the construction of a perception1(2a).

0466 Here is a picture as how that looks.

0467 What is the potential1 for decode2a?

Well, the species impressa2a is directly situated by the imaginaton1b (otherwise labeled, “the potential of situating content1b“) and virtually situated by the phantasm2b (also labeled, “perception2b“).

0468 The phantasm2b answers the question, “What does this2a mean to me?”2b, while addressing the potential of my imagination1b.  So does perception2b.

Why use different terms for the same element in the interscope?

0469 Does “phantasm2b” go with the bicameral mind?

Does “perception2b” associate to subjective consciousness?

Yeah, it seems so.

Phantasm2b is not subject to introspection.

Perception2b is.

0470 Plus, those arrows must be neuronal fibers connecting the right and left Wernicke regions.

The form2(2a) in the actuality of decode2a, the species impressa2(2a) (a term now twice baked) is substantiated by matter, the universality of species impressa2(2c), projected from the perspective to the content level. 

0471 The potential1 for decode2a anticipates the intelligibility of the current species expressa1(2c) in two ways. Directly, the situation-level phantasm2b will answer to the question, “What does this mean to me?”3b, and virtually, the phantasm2b will be judged by the question, “Does this make sense?”3c.

A phantasm2b virtually situates sensation2a, impression2a and decode2a.

0472 The following figure pertains to hand-speech talk as two independent modes of talking.

The figure also places Wernicke’s region on the right at the bottom and Wernicke’s region on the left at the top.

0473 This portrayal describes the human SVi(SOi) for the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, prior to the first singularity.

0474 It also reminds me of a scenario portrayed in Looking at N.J. Enfield’s Book (2022) “Language vs. Reality“, appearing in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2024, as well as in Part III of Original Sin and the Post Truth Condition(available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

The scene is a team in Europe around 20kyr, hunting deer by driving them over a cliff.  It is three moons since the solstice.  A team member notices a particular type of cloud that signifies the coming of the first autumn cold front.  The first cold front is a big deal during glacial maximum.  The team does not want to be trapped, away from the community, and buried in snow.

0475 I, the team leader (so to speak), can see that my team wants to take the deer that we harvested so far and get out of there.  They tell me to ask the lion-man.  I always take the lion-man with me for moments like this.  Carved from mammoth ivory, the head of the lion adorns the body of a human.  The artifact is small enough to carry, along with my weapons, on team adventures.

Every member of the team watches me look into the face of the lion-man.

The lion-man speaks for himself.  He also speaks because he cannot hand-talk.

0476 We all bet on the intelligibility2c of my perception2b of what lion-may says2a.

Hand-speech talk is marvelous.  The hand-talk component is grounded in icons and indexes, the most natural of natural sign-relations.  The speech-talk component paints with symbols, the most conventional of natural sign-relations.  Hand-speech talk is decoded2a into a species impressa2a. So is the voice of the lion-man..

0477 I hear what the lion-man says.

Then, I look up at my team, knowing that they will follow what lion-man says.

I gesture, [image WRAP][image DEER ASLEEP][circle point to all in team][point to direction of community].

Gather the meat that we have and let’s go home.

10/11/25

A First Look at Julian Jaynes’s Book (1976) “The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind” (Part 18 of 21)

0478 What happens after the hand-component of hand-speech talk dies?

0479 After the first singularity, traditions that relied on hand-talk are lost or are modified to work with speech-alone talk.

Of course, the modification business cannot stand, because hand-talk facilitates implicit abstraction and speech-alone can only pretend to facilitate implicit abstraction.

0480 Pretend?

Since speech-alone talk does not picture or point its referents, the spoken word precedes its referent.  But, since language evolves in the milieu of hand-talk, we innately expect the referent to precede the word, rather than the other way around.

Speech-alone talk gives the impression that it images and indicates referents because word-referent associations exist before each individual is born, whether they are sensible or social constructions.  In doing so, spoken words fulfill our evolved expectations.  We expect the referent to precede the word, rather than the other way around.

0481 Steven Mithen devotes an entire chapter in The Language Puzzle to the issue of finding and learning the meanings of spoken words in our current Lebenswelt.

Guess how infants figure out spoken words.

They already know that words exist.  It is only a matter of figuring out what they are.

Infants recognize one spoken word from another by tracking transition possibilities.

They do so before they start to talk.

0482 How much easier their lives would be if they grew up in a hand-speech talk tradition?

Hmmm, maybe, I should say, “How much more intuitively natural their mental processing would be, if…”

0484 Perhaps, this is one of the reasons why many current psychologists see no need to entertain the four interweaving hypotheses proposed by Julian Jaynes in 1976.  They are focused on investigating the nature of language using sophisticated observations and measurements.  They cannot see how their investigations comport with Jaynes’s formulation of the bicameral mind.  The scientists are doing precisely what the voices in their heads are telling them to do.

I know that sounds goofy.

But, introspection does not seem to be a strong suite when it comes to modern bigilib academic “scientific” disciplines.

0485 Consider modern science in light of the following interaction between Wernicke’s regions, right and left, as delineated through Jaynes’s paradigm.

0486 Commitment2c resides in Wernicke’s region on the right.  A positivist intellect3(2c) (rationes3(2c)) brings the actuality of disciplinary language2(2a) into relation with the possibility of observations and measurements1(2c).  Disciplinary language2(2a) is treated as if its symbolic terms are icons and indexes of {real things [substantiating] phenomena}2(2c).  In the process, Wernicke’s region on the right weighs what is2(2c) on the basis of universality.  The scientist implicitly abstracts a species impressa2(2a) where phenomena speak for themselves2(2c)

…in the language of the scientist’s discipline2(2a).

In other words, observations and measurements1(2c) will be situated as intelligible perceptions2b when they become… um… data for models2b.

0487 Can I say that another way?

Phenomena speak for themselves2(2c) through mathematical and mechanical symbols2(2c) in the normal context of a positivist intellect2(2c) operating on the potential of ‘intelligible observations and measurements1(2c).

0488 That is the SVi.  What is the SOi?

Disciplinary technical terms [decode and go into] a scientific species impressa2(2a) in the normal context of positivist sensation3(2a) (portrayed here as the juxtaposition of “sense” and “action”) operating on the potential of ‘a scientific referent and its symbolic representation’1(2a).

0489 Why turn sensation2a into “sense” and “action” for scientific inquiry as what is happening3a?

Well, that is my impression2(2a) of phenomena speaking for themselves2(2c).

10/10/25

A First Look at Julian Jaynes’s Book (1976) “The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind” (Part 19 of 21)

0490 Julian Jaynes’s book applies to historical and psychological developments in our current Lebenswelt.

The following timeline pertains.

0491 The Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia is clearly present in the archaeological record by 5800 B.C.  According to the hypothesis of the first singularity, the Ubaid is the first stone-age culture to practice speech-alone talk.  However, nearby hand-speech cultures are already changing due to their exposure to the marginally greater wealth and power of the Ubaid.  They are losing the hand-component of their hand-speech talk.  Soon, they will practice speech-alone talk.

The Ubaid shows trends towards labor and social complexity from the very beginning.  These trends are slow at first.  A tripartite temple structure appears in some villages.  Some villages grow while other villages decline and are abandoned.  This supports the idea that explicit abstractions in labor specialization are re-organizing societies from social circles to circles of specialization.

0492 The judgment2c that unfolds into commitment2c incorporates explicit abstractions of prior generations.

0493 Now, let me conduct a thought experiment, concerning a formerly hand-speech talking culture near the Ubaid, that has dropped the hand-component of its hand-speech talk, and is now practicing speech-alone talk.

In generation one, an innovation is made in, say, obtaining copper from the heating of yellow, almost golden, rocks mixed with charcoal in a clay pot.

Generation two improves the process and adds more detailed spoken labels, including terms for the look of the rocks, the character of the charcoal, the degree that the rocks are ground, the proportion of rock and charcoal, and the shape and durability of the clay pot.  The entire process is holistic and the labels assist in consistency. 

Generation three treats the labels as if they picture and point to their referents, and the process turns into a recipe or… a modern anthropologist might say, “a ritual”.  Toying with the ritual allows more productive extraction of copper, but its getting harder to find those almost-golden rocks.  Substitutions must be made.  Emissaries are sent afield to locate more of the correct minerals.

Generation four processes the technical words as if they symbolize essences operating within the ritual.  The recipe-oriented process, done properly, appeases the gods.  If the gods are pleased, then copper alchemically coagulates in the heated clay vessel.

0494 What happens during this span of four generations?

The first generation does not have specialists in copper extraction.  The fourth generation does.  Each generation operates by converting the explicit abstractions of the previous generation into implicit abstractions. The implicit abstractions pour into their labels, as if the labels are their proper containers.  At the end, a new, specialized “social circle” manifests, demanding its place in the current social system.  The “copper refiners” cannot be ignored.  Their sensible and social constructions get incorporated into an expanding syncretic.

0495 All four generations rely on the bicameral mentality.

The bicameral mentality is not deceptive or manipulative, because one’s commitment2c is presumably to the harmony of all social circles.  After the first singularity, that commitment2c  includes labor and social specializations, just as prior to the first singularity.  Even civilizational conflict exhibits the patterns of a bicameral mind, according to Jaynes’s reading of Homer’s Iliad.  Introspection does not occur.  Every spoken word is taken on face value.

0496 Almost forty generations pass from the start of the Ubaid to the beginning of the Sumerian Dynastic.  Today, the Sumerian and Egyptian Dynastic periods are regarded by anthropologists as the earliest civilizations.  The Sumerian Dynastic is composed of city-states.  The Egyptian Dynastic rules a consolidated territory.

0497 Even after the official end of the Sumerian civilization, the bicameral mentality operates.

Ur III is the last empire to practice Sumerian as a spoken language.  Consider the story of the Tower of Babel.  Thingsspeak for themselves, even in a civilization that speaks both Sumerian and Akkadian.  The Bible attests to the land of Shinar speaking “one language” as if it is a civilizational mantra.

Consider Looking at Joseph Farrell’s Book (2020) “The Tower of Babel Moment” (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog in December 2023) for a possible case study.  The one language that the people of Shinar believe in is the language of the Tower of Babel, speaking for itself.

0498 Due to increasing complexity and volatility of ritual practices and statecraft, species impressae2a spontaneously generated by commitment2c become less and less capable of supporting intelligible phantasms2b.

A quest for authorization begins.

Elite traditions appear, formally triggering the operation of the bicameral mind by specialists in prognostication.

As civilizations become more and more difficult to manage, the two-chambered mind is increasingly clogged by explicit abstractions in the guise of implicit abstractions.  However, the bicameral mind is still anchored in a phenotypethat matches Jaynes’s proposed right and left Wernicke regions.

Is that too great a simplification?

Let me bring it down to our modern era.

When I look at all the meters and lab equipment operated by physicists, all the pipets and spectrometers used by biochemists, all the dissection tools used by anatomists, all the surveys collected by sociologists, and so on, I cannot help but think that the data speaks for itself.

Then, a voice in my head says, “Trust the science.”

Where did I hear that before?

0499 For prognostications, traditions that observe and measure certain natural events or intentional procedures allow expert-initiated events to speak for themselves, according to associations between certain features of the events and clues to future outcomes.

Eventually, the associations are recorded as recipes. And, the recipes are attributed to divine intelligences.

0500 Technical terms are later recorded as recipesRecipes are regarded as both universal and intelligible.

Prognostication events2(2c) are decoded (by experts) and rendered into technical terms2(2a) that weave a kind of impression2(2a) for the inquirer to consider.

0501 In short, after the first singularity, the semiotic differences between spoken words and hand-speech words start to burden the holistic operations of the interventional sign-relation embodied in the bicameral mind.  Speech-alone talkpermits explicit abstraction to be regarded by commitment2c as an implicit abstraction.

0502 How long does that last before the bicameral mind breaks down?

This is one question that Jaynes’s research labors to answer.

10/9/25

A First Look at Julian Jaynes’s Book (1976) “The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind” (Part 20 of 21)

0503 This first look at The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, by Julian Jaynes, makes fun of the term, “auditory hallucinations”.

Why?

It turns out that the term applies to SVi(SOi), the dual actualities of the interventional sign relation.

It also turns out to be the embodiment of what evolutionary anthropologist, Steven Mithen, calls “synaesthesia” or “cross-modal sensations” that explain why spoken words exist.

0504 Indeed, a weird divergence comes to the surface in Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) The Language Puzzle(appearing in Razie Mah’s blog in September 2025).

0505 Steven Mithen asks, “Why do spoken words exist?”

His conscious answer is that they are acquired through synaesthesia in regards to things themselves.  In other words, interactions with things themselves somehow trigger stable vocal utterances, or spoken words, through… well… leaky neurons.

Yet, some other intelligence operates beneath the surface of his conscious answer.  His bicameral mind inspires him to admit that he rejects the gestural origin of language outright, because no current research into natural language deals with gestural language. That makes sense, because all civilized people only practice speech-alone talk.

0506 Yet, the inadmissibility of Mithen’s conscious admission triggers a search, by this reader, for clues to an alternate hypothesis, which this examination provides.  After the domestication of fire and after the evolution of voluntary neural control of the vocal tract, vocal utterances are added as adornments to hand-talk.  This habit contributes to the emergence of our own species, Homo sapiens, who practices hand-speech talk from the beginning.

0507 So, Mithen’s synaesthesia is not like… working with neuronal crossover… from encountering things themselves to auditory assignments.

0508 Rather, synaesthesia becomes a cultural practice during night-time communal hand-talk.  Vocal utterances clarify hand-talk word gestures when they are difficult to see in the flickering light of a campfire.  Then, synaesthesia from the Wernicke’s region on the right trains the Wernicke’s area on the left to automatically decode either hand-talk or speech-talk or both.  Hand-speech talk is then practiced night and day.

0509 The habit of synaesthesia does not stop there, because sensory-modal crossover supports the logic of adornment.  A spoken word adorns a hand-talk word-gesture.  Likewise, ochre adorns skin.  Soon, seashells are strung on fiber to adorn ankles and necks.  Each of these adornments speak to the actuality of what they are adorning.

After humans interbreed with Neanderthals, between 65 and 45kyr, humans begin to carve and mold figures in earnest.  These artifacts speak for themselves.  This is synaesthesia at its most robust.  The visual realness of say, the lion-man,crosses over into the auditory realness of what the lion-man has to say.

After the first singularity, Julian Jaynes attributes the large eyes of Mesopotamian temple statuary to synaesthesia.  The large eyes trigger “auditory hallucinations”, where divine commitment2c induces meaning-filled species impressa2a.

0510 Here is a picture.

0511 However, there is a problem.

Our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0512 In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, the intervention sign-relation is honed through natural… or is it cultural?… selection to promote harmony among diverse social circles.  What the lion-may says is always in tune with what needs to be done to stay alive in a hostile world.

In our current Lebenswelt, explicit abstractions from one generation are taken to be implicit abstractions by the next.  So, the way that an explicit abstraction divides the world, say, between experts and the people that are supposed to benefit from expertise, becomes implicit, and then more explicit abstractions are added, then they become implicit, until elite expert “voices” no longer make sense to the ones who are being ordered around.

0513 What is amazing is that, without introspection, elites follow their own bicameral voices with um… “mindless” obedience.

Does any of this seem vaguely familiar?

0514 So, how does one solve the problem of authorization?

This is the topic of Book III of Jaynes’s masterwork.

0515 Many solutions are ingenious.  They tend to use tricks to stimulate interventional sign-vehicles2c (SVi) that yield, through the two-chambered mind, oracular proclamations2a (SOi), that may be regarded as ‘more intelligible that what the questioner can achieve on his or her own’1(2a).

For example, an oracle tells Socrates that he is the wisest philosopher on earth (SOi).  So, Socrates spends the rest of his life trying to show that the oracle is wrong, which turns out to be an effective way to demonstrate that no one is as wise as Socrates (SVi).

0516 Here is a picture of what happens as consciousness slowly arises, during the breakdown of the bicameral mind.

The statement on the left describes the bicameral mind before the first singularity.

The statement on the right describes how civilizations attempt to rescue, maintain and (maybe even) exploit the bicameral mind, as it gets clogged down with explicit abstractions (that are absorbed into the next generation’s implicit abstractions).

0517 Yes, as soon as I start wondering whether my phantasm2b is intelligible, I engage in introspection, and a whole new vocabulary is needed.  These words arrive as explicit abstractions, that attain the qualities of implicit abstraction, then those qualities are formalized into recipes, and then those recipes are considered to be the essence of whatever the thing that we have labeled must be.

What have we labeled this thing?

“Subjective consciousness?”

0518 Remember that Jaynes’s term, “auditory hallucination” serves as a label for SVi(SOi).

10/8/25

A First Look at Julian Jaynes’s Book (1976) “The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind” (Part 21 of 21)

0519 I conclude this first look at Julian Jaynes’s breakthrough masterwork, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, with a brief summary.

I examine the First Mariner Books edition, published in 2000, which offers the advantage of a postscript… er… “afterword”, written in 1990, fourteen years after the first edition.

The afterword does not substitute for the masterwork, even though it neatly distills the complex argument into four propositions.

0520 Here are the four propositions.

0521 This examination commences with these four propositions.

Why do I pursuit of this topic?

In my view, Mithen’s 2024 work, The Language Puzzle, exhibits the hallmarks of both subjective consciousness and bicameral mind.

0522 This examination concludes with modifications on Jaynes’s four propositions.

0523 Each of these modifications have been discussed in full.

These modifications bind together Mithen’s nyet hypothesis, pertaining to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, and Jaynes’s historical hypothesis, pertaining to our current Lebenswelt.

These modifications demonstrate that our current Lebenswelt (items in blue) is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in (items in green).

These modifications propose how the first singularity is a major cause for this difference.

The first singularity stands between the green and the blue items.

0524 Steven Mithen publishes in 2024, almost precisely five decades after Julian Jaynes publishes in 1976.  So much has happened during the past fifty years.  Also, so little has happened, when it comes to developing Jaynes’s four propositions.  How strange it is that Steven Mithen’s bicameral mind may have constructed a foreword to Jaynes’s masterwork, without the author consciously realizing it.

0525 This is precisely the irony that permeates Jaynes’s landmark work.

Who could have known? 

So concludes this first look at Jaynes’s text.

09/30/25

Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 1 of 23)

0001 The full title of the book before me is The Language Puzzle: Piecing Together The Six-Million-Year Story Of How Words Evolved (2024, Basic Books, New York).  Dr. Mithen is a Professor of Early Prehistory at the University of Reading.  He has published before.  More on that later.

The book works on the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle.  Fourteen chapters present the pieces.  The introduction and conclusion stage and arrange them.

0002 This current metaphor is very different than a glorious historical metaphor used in a book published almost three decades earlier.  The Prehistory of The Mind (1996) offers the historical development of the architecture of cathedrals in Europe as a lens for considering cognitive evolution.  The metaphor works well because the nave associates to general intelligence and side chapels associate to specialized mental modules.

0003 From the genetic divergence from chimpanzees to the start of bipedalism, the simple nave of general intelligenceadapts to cognitive challenges.

From the appearance of bipedalism to the domestication of fire, specialized modules are added to general intelligence, but the two do not integrate.  Indeed, both specialized modules and general intelligence are supported by their own, thick, walls.  The metaphor is the Romanesque cathedral.

From the domestication of fire until the first singularity (think, “the potentiation of civilization”), general intelligence integrates with specialized modules, presumably due to talk becoming fully linguistic.  Language becomes the walls, supported by flying buttresses of automatic decoding.   The metaphor is the Gothic cathedral.

0004 Here is a picture.

0005 The metaphor is so wonderful that Razie Mah publishes the e-book, Comments on Steven Mithen’s Book (1996) The Prehistory of The Mind as one of the readers that accompanies the masterwork, The Human Niche, in the series A Course On The Human Niche (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

0006 Mithen’s approach is also echoed in the work of another evolutionary anthropologist, Michael Tomasello, working at the Max Planck Institute in Leipzig, Germany, as discussed in Comments on Michael Tomasello’s Arc of Inquiry (1999-2019) (by Razie Mah, also see blogs for January through March, 2024).

0007 Mithen’s approach is also reflected in another review that belongs to the series, A Course On The Human Niche.  The title is Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big.  In this review, social circles turn out to be very important in hominin evolution.  Mammalian brain size roughly correlates to group size.  So, the larger the hominin brain grows, the larger the group.

Not surprisingly, Mithen’s metaphor indicates the social circle under the most intense selection pressure, irrespective of group size.

0008 What does this imply?

Obviously, group size is not the crucial factor in hominin evolution.

Whatever is increasing hominin brain size is.

0006 To me, it is not surprising that Mithen has not encountered Razie Mah’s review of his 1996 work, even though it is one of the few more-than-surface reflections on The Prehistory of The Mind available.

Perhaps, the same will go for this blog, which will take Mithen’s metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle quite literally. 

09/29/25

Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 2 of 23)

0007 Imagine a jigsaw puzzle.

In a way, a jigsaw puzzle is a purely relational structure.

0008 In order to solve the puzzle, one must dyadically connect each puzzle piece to other pieces.  Sometimes the image on a puzzle piece offers a clue.  Other times, an unusual edge catches the eye.  Either way, one edge of one puzzle piece will fit with one edge of another piece in a way that is intuitively obvious.

0009 A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues) should assist in comprehending the triadic relation diagrammed above.  The triadic normal context of a match3 brings a dyadic actuality2, {one edge [fits] another edge}2, into relation with the monadic potential that ‘the fit will be intuitively obvious’1.

0010 The category-based nested form is not the only triadic relation in play.

In terms of the natural sign-typology of Charles Peirce, the image is an icon. The edge-shape is an index.

0011 An icon is a natural sign-relation, whose sign-object is determined on the basis of similarity, imagery and other characteristics of firstness.  Firstness is a category, corresponding to the monadic realm of possibility.

0012 An index is a natural sign-relation, whose sign-object is determined on the basis of contiguity, cause and effect, action-reaction and other characteristics of secondness.  Secondness is a category, corresponding to the dyadic realm of actuality.  Secondness contains two contiguous real elements.  For nomenclature, the contiguity is placed in brackets.  For example, for Aristotle’s hylomorphe, the two real elements are matter and form.  The contiguity?  I propose to use the word, “substance”.  So, for Aristotle, a thing is matter [substance] form.

0013 So, jigsaw puzzles contain pieces that are icons and indexes.

What about the third type of natural sign?

What about the symbol?

Well, if I follow the pattern for icons and index, the symbol is a sign-relation whose sign-object is determined on the basis of what?… not imagery… not indications… how about the fact that each symbol has to be different from any other symbol.  Of course, nobody thinks about that when they use the word, “symbol”.  Indeed, this attribute sounds positively ridiculous, even though correct.

0014 For example, the moon offers an image of a nearby planetesimal.  The moon points to the sun, because its every changing face is due to sunlight striking its surface.  Then, I ask, “How can the moon be a symbol, if it is the only symbol and there aren’t any other moons?”

To which, I say to myself, “Well, why don’t I go out one night, away from the city, away from the camp, and sit myself down in its pale light and ask it, ‘What on Earth do you symbolize?”

0015 Strangely, this is not what any of our ancestors in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in could ever ask.

Why?

The Homo genus practices hand talk, then adds speech to hand talk, then ends up with speech-alone talk.

Hand talk belongs to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

Hand talk words image or point to their referents.

They serve as images and icons.

So, where is the symbol in hand talk?

09/27/25

Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 3 of 23)

0016 Chapter one introduces the idea that the author will present pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.

In chapter fifteen, the author assembles the pieces.

0017 Chapter two presents a brief rendition of human evolution.

Here is a list, with a few items that Mithen does not mention, stopping before the evolution of the Neanderthal and our own species, Homo sapiens.

0018 Here is one item that Mithen does not mention.  Once bipedalism is an adaptation to mixed forest and savannah, Michael Tomasello’s concept of obligate collaborative foraging becomes relevant.  See Razie Mah’s blog for January through March, 2024.  Specialized cognitive modules may be adaptations to the mental and physiological demands of particularly successful teams.  Over generations, hominins find it easier and easier to learn and perform team tasks.  Plus, their brains increase in size with each successful team.

0019 Chapter three offers a disputation on words and language. A key technical term is “displacement”. “Displacement” acknowledges the reality that the referent is not present when a spoken word is used.  I can say the word, “moon”, without the planetesimal being visible.  But, where does the word, “displacement”, appear in this chapter on words and language?  And, why does it appear in chapter six, concerning iconic and arbitrary words?

0020 Yes, what about the spoken word, “displacement”?

Is “displacement” located, as presence1 in the following category-based nested form?

The triadic normal context of definition3 brings the dyadic actuality of a spoken word or statement2 into relation with the monadic potential of ‘meaning, presence and message’1.  

0021 Of course, in speech-alone talk, “displacement” refers to the reality that the referent is not present when a spoken word is used.  But, is that reality2 the presence1 underlying the term “displacement”?  If the answer is “yes”, then the message must be something like, “Hey, you better figure out whether the displaced referent has… um… the meaning that you think it has.”

0022 The other day, I “loaned” a friend twenty bucks.

Do I think that I’m getting that money back?

0023 That raises the question, “What is the presence1 that characterizes the word, ‘displacement’?”

On one hand, the referent is what is displaced.

On the other hand, what goes into that displacement?

0024 Mithen skirts around these ridiculous issues  After all, displacement is so obvious that it appears in chapter six (On Iconic and Arbitrary Words) and not in chapter three (Words and Language).

09/26/25

Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 4 of 23)

0025 Okay, let me consider what is displaced when I utter the term, “piece in a jigsaw puzzle”.

0025 What is the reality that is not present when the spoken term is used.

Well, look.  A referent is pictured in the red circle.  The red circle indicates a referent.

How intuitively obvious is that?

0026 At the same time, I cannot ignore the dyadic actuality where two real elements, corresponding to the edge of one piece and the edge of another piece, are contiguous, [fits].

0027 Plus, should I neglect that there is a normal context that characterizes what is happening?

0028 To me, not only is the referent displaced by a spoken term, but the entire nested form that relates to the spoken term is not present, or is present only in potential1, in the normal context of definition3.

Can I see the meaning, presence and message in the possibility of ‘an obvious fit’1?

Is this why I am never going to get my “loan” back?

0029 But, what am I really asking?

Perhaps, the question that I raise is, “Is a word like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle?”

I ask, “Can I take Mithen’s ‘language puzzle’ literally?”

In the normal context of definition3, the actuality of a spoken word or term2 emerges from (and situates) the potential that spoken words sensibly fit together and that the fit is so good that it is easy to recognize1.

0030 But, what about the referent?

Yeah, what about the piece of a jigsaw puzzle that is in the red circle?

Well, the referent has three commendable features.  The first is the image (or the fragment of a big picture) that it bears.  The second is that it can join other pieces in an assembly of adjacent pieces.  The third is that the thing that the spoken word would picture or point to, if it could serve as an image or index, is displaced.

0031 It makes me wonder how speech-alone talk could bootstrap itself.

Well, Mithen has a hypothesis.

But, before I get that far, I want to suggest that manual-brachial gestures can be a source for words because they do not fully displace the referent.  Instead, they call the referent to mind through the natural act of picturing and pointing.

In this regard, manual-brachial word-gestures allow a literal appreciation of the metaphorical statement that words are like pieces in a jigsaw puzzle.

0032 Here is a diagram of the corresponding category-based nested form.

The normal context of working in a team3 brings the actuality2 of patterns of iconic and indexal hand-talk2 into relation with the potential of ‘assembling and locking in a big picture’1.

Can I envision the meaning, presence and message1 that underlies each manual-brachial word-gesture2 in the normal context of team-work3?

Working in a team is what is happening3a.  The possibility of ‘something happening’1a corresponds to ‘assembling the pieces, locking them in and visualizing the big picture’1a.

09/25/25

Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 5 of 23)

0033 What about monkeys and apes?

As far as psychological experiments with chimpanzees are concerned, these great apes practice the relationality inherent in the category-based nested form, each on his or her own and not in coordination.

0034 Here is a picture.

0035 For example, a captive chimpanzee may be challenged by a banana, suspended above reach on a string from the ceiling of an enclosure containing several large boxes.  The chimpanzee may figure out that the boxes may be stacked, allowing access to the banana.  The chimpanzee performs whatever it takes to turn the metaphor that a word is like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle into something literal.  But, it cannot um… displace the referent.

0036 Say what?

Here is the deal that becomes plain in chapter four, concerning monkeys and apes.

0037 How crazy is that?

If I use the principle of uniformitarianism, and I work forward from the common ancestor with the chimpanzee (say, 7 Myr), who solves challenges for food, and I work backwards from civilized folk, who will solve a puzzle because it offers a challenge, then do the forward and backward exercises meet in the same… um…. location?   I mean, does the label, “challenge”, remain the same when passing between the starting point and the end point?

0038 If the word, “challenge”, is a piece of a jigsaw, then one edge will eventually connect through other pieces to a specific reward, especially food, and a different edge will eventually connect to a reconceptualization of the specific reward, as something that might be called, “satisfaction”.

0039 What does this imply?

Well, if I take the metaphor that a word is like a piece in a jigsaw puzzle literally, then the content-level actuality2a in the following two-level interscope corresponds to a word, whether gestural (as in sign-language) or spoken (as in speech-alone talk).

0040 Obviously, this is what monkeys and chimpanzees do, with the chimpanzees performing better.  Once the pieces fit into an assembly, then the assemblies fit together, and the food is obtained.  The referent is not displaced.  The challenge is to sensibly construct a solution.

0041 Often enough, biologists stop with this sensible construction and go on to say that the general intelligence of monkeys and apes is adaptive, because it solves problems.  But, the spoken term, “the cognitive capacity of monkeys and apes”, is a label that introduces a perspective-level actuality2c, that does not exist for monkeys or apes.  Monkeys and apes do not realize1c that they have satisfied the conditions whereby the actual solution2b can be displaced by the term, “challenge”2c.

But, the biologist does.