0009 Where does “semiotics” enter into the picture?

Of course, the TMS is all about semiotics.

But, what is “semiotics”?

0010 According to Charles S. Peirce, a sign is a triadic relation.  A sign-vehicle stands for a sign-object in regards to a sign-interpretant.

Peirce dies in 1914.

According to Ferdinand de Saussure, a sign is a dyad, composed of a signifier and a signified.

Saussure dies in 1913.

0011 May I now weave the two definitions of sign into Peirce’s category of secondness, the realm of actuality?

0012 According to Peirce, all existence comports with three categories.

0013 Firstness, the monadic realm of possibility, contains only one element.  That element may be simple or complex.

0014 Secondness, the dyadic realm of actuality, contains two contiguous real elements.  

For notation, I place the contiguity in brackets, rendering secondness as the dyad, {one real element [contiguity] other real element}.

Aristotle’s hylomorphe serves as an example. The two real elements are matter and form.  The contiguity is “substance”, yielding the hylomorphe, {matter [substance] form}.

Saussure’s characterization of sign accords to secondness, in so far as both the signifier and the signified are real elements.  The contiguity, however, is missing. Perhaps, the contiguity is “arbitrary relation”.  But, for the moment, I will leave the contiguity as a blank. For now, Saussure’s hylomorphe is the dyad, {signifier [contiguity] signified}.  Here, the signifier is like matter and the signified is like form.

Uh-oh.  What are the technical terms, “parole” and “langue”, doing there?

Also, isn’t parole more like form and langue more like matter?

Hmmm.

Dyadic actualities include the topics that science investigates.

Saussure’s semiology is considered to be scientific (more or less).

0015 Thirdness, the triadic realm of normal contexts, mediations, signs, judgments and so forth, contains three elements, one from each category.

A sign-vehicle stands for a sign-object in regards to a sign-interpretant.

Peirce’s sign relation is paradigmatic, except for one rather unexpected twist.

The sign-interpretant belongs to thirdness.  Both the sign-vehicle and sign-object belong to secondness, the realm of actuality.  So, what is left to associate with firstness?  The only words that are not accounted for are “stands for” and “in regards”.  “Stands for” can be classified as a possibility “in regards” to a sign-interpretant.  So, “stands for” may be an aspect of the sign-interpretant that belongs to firstness.

So, the sign-interpretant belongs to both thirdness and firstness.

0016 If that makes any sense, please take note.

A sign-vehicle (in secondness) stands for a sign-object (in secondness) in regards to a sign-interpretant (in both thirdness and firstness).

Of course, the sign is a triadic relation.

But, can the sign also be depicted as a dyadic actuality?

0017 What I am about to do may be considered a travesty.

The sign-vehicle and the sign-object may be considered real elements.  So, the contiguity must include the sign-interpretant, “in regards to” and “stands for”.  “Stands for” goes with the realm of possibility.  “In regards to” goes with the realm of normal contexts.

0018 May I say that in terms of Peirce’s categories?

Two real elements, the sign-vehicle and the sign-object, belong to secondness.  The sign is a triadic relation.  It brings all three categories into relation.  So, the contiguity – the “substance” – manifests both firstness and thirdness, which I package as [stands for (according to a sign-interpretant)].

0019 Here is a picture of two permutations of secondness.

Oh, there are the terms, “signifier” and “signified”.

0020 Obviously, both diagrammatic representations are incomplete, especially in regards to the contiguity.  Saussure’s contiguity is not labeled.  Peirce’s contiguity looks like a mess.

The real elements may be productively compared.  A sign-vehicle corresponds to a signifier. Both seem to be like matter, in so far as both pour into (?) the sign-relation.  A sign-object goes with the signified.  Both seem to be like form, in that they both manifest the shape (?) of the sign-relation.

0021 But, what about semiotics and history?

The figure on the right originally associates to the term, “semiology”.

Peirce’s sign-relation associates to the term, “semiotics”.

So, is it fair to associate the figure on the right to the term, “semiotics”?

I suppose that it is.

The title of the article testifies to the fairness of the association.

0022 Plus, if both Peirce and Saussure die right at the start of the first battle among the Enlightenment gods, then this pair of confounded associations takes over a century to clarify.

0023 This is a very curious historical muddle.  The transnational subtitle, which is the explicit subject of the article, and the transit from the first to the fourth battles among the Enlightenment gods, which is implicit, coincide.  Actuality is visualized by a pair of dyads in the mold of Aristotle’s hylomorphe, manifesting Peirce’s category of secondness and hybridizing the explicit (labels) and the implicit (relational diagrams).

Explicit transnational transits in space entangle implicit intramodern transits in time.  Implicit transits in timesubstantiate explicit transits in space.

It makes me wonder whether there is an even wider gyre, an upwelling that goes back centuries, that moves within the bowels of the authors’ story.

Is it like some sort of civilizational fart, that just comes out in the end?

0024 While considering the abstract, I drift into an expectation.  This article may touch base with three historical transits, each operating on a different level and each entangling the others.  

Here is a picture.

0025 But, what is “entanglement”?

I wonder.

The authors use the term to point to the meetings of minds from different states within the Union.  “Entanglement” occurs as one mind influences another.  In this way, academics studying aesthetics get tangled up with semiological notions (such a structuralism) and then get caught up with a general theory of culture.

To me, this sequence may work in the following manner.

And, this is confounding.

0026 Aesthetics is already a form, when semiology is introduced as matter.  I could say that aesthetics as formentangles semiotics as matter, since aesthetics already exists when Saussure proposes his breakthrough ideas on the scientific nature of spoken language.  But, the result is notable, because the ‘thing’ that has the matter of semiology and the form of aesthetics has a label: “structuralism”.  

Surely, “structuralism” sounds “scientific and progressive”, as opposed to “formalism” which sounds “traditional and backwards”.

0027 Later, structuralism, as a thing composed of matter and form, entangles another field of inquiry, cultural studies.

Here, a technical difficulty arises, since the discipline of cultural studies is already appropriated by the Marxist dialectic.

0028 Nonetheless, I have arrived at another definition of “entanglement”.

Entanglement mirrors the hylomorphe, as shown in the following diagram.

0029 Aristotle’s hylomorphe describes a thing.  

Does Aristotle’s entanglement do the same?

If so, then a “thing” may manifest as matter that substantiates form or as form that entangles matter.  

0030 To me, it seems that the former leads to a thing, according to classic (or timeless) Greek philosophy.  If the latter leads to a thing, then the originating matter sustains the form and the form entangles matter, until the confounding resolves.  If the resolution favors entanglement, the once-entangled matter substantiates the form.

And, the weird part is this:  One form may relate to two matters, one originating and one entangled.

0031 Finally, in addition to confounding (which is admittedly a little odd), a thing may enter a hylomorphe as matter, as shown in the following diagram.

I say, “Watch out when anyone uses the terms, ‘confounding’ and ‘incorporation’.”

There is no telling what type of flatulence is about to escape.

0032 The article is neatly segmented into eight (8) sections.

I will number sections as I go along.

0033 In the first portion (1), the authors give an overview.  They see four waves of paradigms sweeping over the linguistic academic communities in Russia, starting around the time when Peirce and Saussure pass to their rewards.

0034 Formalist breakthroughs?

The earliest modern academic paradigms approach literature and language from a typological point of view.  The paradigms start in Germany and pass to Poland and Russia.  Aesthetics may be formally regarded as an appreciation of the craft of the author.  So, formalism [substantiates] aesthetics.

0035 This period corresponds to a time when science is a subject of intense philosophical scrutiny.  For example, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) works on phenomenology in Germany.  Jakob Von Uexkull (1864-1944) postulates the concepts of “sign-worlds” called the “Umwelt” for animals and “Lebenswelt” for humans.

0036 Later, Saussure’s Course on Linguistics shocks the field of linguistics by proposing a scientific definition of language.  Spoken language consists of two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole (or speech talk) and langue (what goes on in one’s head in order to decode and encode speech talk).

0037 So, what is a spoken word?

A spoken word is a placeholder in two (arbitrarily related) systems of differences.

Saussure reveals a structure to language.

I can depict that structure as a hylomorphe.

This hylomorphe may then go into academic matter that substantiates a modern discipline of aesthetics or “art appreciation”.

0038 For the hylomorphe depicted above, parole is like matter and langue is like form.  The study of the structure of the spoken word (semiology) serves as matter that substantiates the form of the discipline of aesthetics.

0039 So, what am I suggesting?

Is semiology all that different from formalism?

Both are academic ways of thought.

Or, is “aesthetics” just a spoken word?

0040 The authors mention two Russian scholars working in language studies at this time.  One is Jan Mukarovsky (1891-1975).  The other is Roman Jacobson (1896-1982).  Both start as literature scholars.  Both turn towards structuralism and semiology during the second wave of paradigms.

The timeframe includes the First (1914-1918), Second (1939-1945) and the start of the Third (1945-1989) Battles among the Enlightenment gods.

0041 Here is a picture of the three transits, tailored to this specific timeframe.

0042 The question bears asking, “What moves Soviet academics in literature towards semiology and away from formalist analysis? 

0043 During the first half of the twentieth century, science appears triumphant.  The new government of the Soviet Union advertises itself as a scientific style of governance.  And, Europe does not need to advertise, having fought the First Battle Among The Enlightenment Gods with mechanized infantry, chemical gas warfare, and other technical novelties.  Technology and science embody the Zeitgeist.  Even propaganda acquires its own technology and empirio-schematics.

Saussure is not the only science-minded luminary.  The discipline of quantum mechanics catches the imagination of many.  So does psychoanalysis.  Niels Bohr (1885-1962) runs a physics circle in Copenhagen.  The first celebrity psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) operates out of Vienna.  Carl Jung (1875-1961) applies psychoanalytic concepts to cultural domains.

0044 Russian and Polish formalists are already reacting to the civilizational conditions of the first Battle among the Enlightenment gods.  Science catches the eye of both Mukarovsky and Jakobson.  They move towards integrating semiology into the study of literature.

0045 Or rather, they move towards the use semiology as matter in order to substantiate a modern form of aesthetics.

Unfortunately, as soon as they do so, aesthetics as form gets entangled.

Didn’t I warn about the word, “confounding”?

0046 Yes, there is a hidden problem that does not appear with formalism.

Saussure’s paradigm models speech-alone talk as two contiguous real elements, parole (the speech act) and langue (the associated mental act).  The contiguity is a purely arbitrary relation.

But, what is a purely arbitrary relation?

It is a purely conventional habit.

Culture consists of purely conventional habits.

0047 Suddenly, aesthetics as form [entangles] culture as matter.

Once aesthetics is conceptualized as a scientific form in {semiological matter […] aesthetic form}, the dyadic reality of {aesthetics [entangles] culture} becomes more and more apparent as a noumenon (a thing itself).

0048 The problem?

Well, Marxist dialectics already lays claim to an understanding of culture as the dyadic actuality of {material arrangements [account for] human conditions}.  Plus, the Soviet regime considers that causality to be both foundational and scientific.

Here is a picture of the dilemma.

0049 What does that imply?

Is the dog of Marxist materialism wagging the tail of the academic discipline of aesthetics?

Welcome to the USSR.

Professors in literature in Soviet academies want to become more scientific in order to comport with the socialist program and they entangle cultural studies as matter, and, in doing so, they confront a possibility that the confounding will resolve in favor of the entanglement.

0050 How curious.

The authors tell a story of the adoption of semiology by formalists within the Soviet Empire, where Marxism is the state ideology.  The authors do not mention that their story comports with a very interesting proposition presented in Sign System Studies.

History itself is semiotic.

0051 Nor do the authors consider the nature of science itself.

What the hell is “science”?

At this time, some western philosophers are trying to figure science out.   Others are certain that they know what it is,even though they cannot clearly define what it is.

0052 Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) participates in the debate.  So do the members of the so-called “Vienna Circle” (meeting in the 1920s and 1930s).  Husserl invents “phenomenology”.  The Vienna Circle promotes the doctrine of “logical positivism”.

These are not the only philosophers wrestling with the issue.  In Paris, the French Catholic, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), and (at the same time, in the same city) the Russian Orthodox, Nicolay Berdyayev (1874-1948), struggle to address the question, “What is science?”

0053 Razie Mah writes two reviews on books by these authors.

One is Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy.

The other is Comments on Nicholas Berdyaev’s Book (1939) Spirit and Reality.

Both are available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0054 In section two (2), the authors mention the formalist breakthroughs in the 1910s and the initiation of the Moscow Literary Circle, starting in 1915, right before the Russian Revolution.  End-of-century Germans engage in formal art criticism, which conveys all the clinical qualities of a dissection of a literary text.

Clinical?

Shall we isolate and identify the various rhetorical and linguistic devices used by an author?

0055 Needless to say, at the time, the German chemical industry is unsurpassed in dissolving materials and isolating chemical substances.

So, why not literary things?

0056 Roman Jakobson is the first president of the Moscow Literary Circle (MLC).  The Prague Circle, concentrating on linguistics and literature, starts in 1926.  Jan Mukarovsky is a member.  Of course, the Second World War changes everything, except the categorical nature of science.

0052 So what is science?

Science is the Positivist’s judgment, as noted in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy.

0057 Okay, what is a judgment?

A judgment is a triadic relation containing three elements: relation, what ought to be, and what is.  When each of these elements is assigned to a unique Peircean category, the judgment becomes actionable.

0058 The Positivist’s judgment is a difficult relational structure.  It is a judgment that contains a judgment as what ought to be.

Here is picture.

0059 A positivist intellect (relation, thirdness, M) brings an empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness, N) into relation with the dyad, {the thing itself [cannot be objectified as] its observable and measurable facets} (what is,firstness, O).

0060 Let me dwell on each element (M, N, O).

The positivist intellect (relation, thirdness, M) has a rule.  Metaphysics is not allowed.  Such is the way of science.  Science promotes truncated material and efficient causalities.  “Truncated”?  Yes, “shorn of formal and final causalities”.

0061 Say what?

Consider a thing.

A thing is a hylomorphic actuality.

Material causality operates within the contiguity between matter and form₂.

The Aristotelian mind supplements material causality with formal causality.  The formal cause operates between the normal context₃ and actuality₂.  Formal causes build a category-based nested form.  Formal causation contextualizes material causality.

(In case of confusion, consult A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book vendors).

0062 Here is a picture of how difficult the separation of material causality from formal causation can be for an example in literature studies.

0063 Only the normal context₃ and actuality₂ appear in this figure.  The actuality₂ displays a model, fashioned in the style of Aristotle’s hylomorphe.  The two real elements are language as matter_2m and literary text as form_2f.  The contiguity… the “substance”… consists of technical devices.

Doesn’t that sound scientific?

0064 Imagine how difficult it would be to find the material causality associated with rhetorical devices when the formal cause is neglected.  For example, imagine a publication with an introduction, methods, data, results, and conclusion as its literary devices₂.  Of course, the inquirer can readily guess the genre of this literary work₃.

It’s an opinion piece on the benefits of capitalism or socialism.

(See Razie Mah’s multi-part e-book, Original Sin and the Post-Truth Condition, to appreciate that joke.)

0065 Also, the Aristotelian mind supplements efficient causality with final causality.

Both contribute, in distinct and complementary manners, to understanding the entire nested form.

0066 The triadic normal context of the type of literary work (formal)₃ brings the dyadic actuality (material) of {language (as matter) [literary devices] literary work (as form}₂ into relation with the monadic potential of ‘the author’s style (efficient) and intention (final)’₁.

0067 The efficient cause couples the actuality₂ with its underlying potential₁.

But, the efficient cause makes no sense when divorced from its final cause, because the author’s intent₁ is to construct a particular type of literary work₃.

0068 Without a final cause, sociological reductionists may replace an ‘author’s intent’ with ‘social conditions’.   In doing so, the sociologist assigns the efficient cause to the author’s social conditions and loses harmony among all three elements in the category-based nested form.

Psychological reductions may replace the ‘author’s intent’ with ‘psychological powers and dispositions’, as well as ‘ideological fixations’ (or perhaps, ‘neurochemical imbalances’.)

A communication reductionist may replace the ‘author’s intent’ with ‘a signal-based paradigm of {source [transmission] receiver}’.

0069 In sum, extracting formal and final causationfrom scholarly inquiry into language and literature turns the discipline into a branch of sociology, psychology, communicology, or some other reductionist science.

0070 Of course, academics in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literature reject this option.

Consequently, if investigators of literature are going to take on the mantle of science, they have to sneak in Aristotle’s formal and final causes under the guises of material and efficient causalities.  Their models must include hylomorphes as actualities₂.  Then, an unstated normal context₃ and a potential₁ will accompany that actuality₂.

0071 So, the positivist injunction outlawing Aristotle’s metaphysics must be reconfigured into a refusal to entertain religious mumbo-jumbo.

The positivist intellect (relation, thirdness) of a Professor of Literature must encourage models that (1) are not religious (that is, Christian) and (2) (somehow) allow formal and final causalities.

0072 So far so good, what about the other two elements of the Positivist’s judgment (N and O, see point 0060)?

Let me turn to what ought to be (secondness, N).

0073 The empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness) should belong to thirdness, but it does not.  It is a judgment that is imbued with secondness (the dyadic realm of actuality).  To many scientists, the empirio-schematic judgment is more real than the thing itself.

In the empirio-schematic judgment, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness, N3) brings mechanical and mathematical models (what ought to be, secondness, N2) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is,firstness, N1).

0074 The disciplinary language of aesthetics (relation, thirdness, N3) adopts explicit terminology that implicitly evokes formal and final causalities.  Metaphysics is apparently excluded.  “Metaphysics” characterized as “religious thinking”, is definitely excluded.  In the West, the definition of “metaphysics” has trended from “excluding Aristotle’s formal and final causalities” to “not religious”.

0075 The model (what ought to be, N2) is doubly dipped in actuality.  The model is assigned to secondness in the empirio-schematic judgment.  The empirio-schematic judgment is assigned to secondness in the Positivist’s judgment.  If one poses dyadic models (expressing the relational structure of Peirce’s category of secondness), then the elements in dyadic models may be explicitly formulated, while retaining implicit connotations of formal and final causalities.

0076 How so?

Dyadic actualities entail material and efficient causalities.  These causes may be explicitly abstracted using a disciplinary language.  These causes are required for modeling.

At the same time, a dyadic actuality₂ must be contextualized by a normal context₃ (formal causality) and potentiated by possibilities₁ (efficient and final causalities).  These causes are implicit abstractions that are difficult to explicitly label.  These causes contribute to understanding.

0077 What about observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness, N1)?

The disciplinary languages of literary science (relation, thirdness, N3) discuss observable and measurable facets of the thing itself (what is, firstness, N1), in a critical manner, as to support or undermine a dyadic model as a hypothesis(what ought to be, secondness, N2).

0078 What is (firstness, O) of the Positivist’s judgment is even more curious.

The dyad, {the thing itself [cannot be objectified as] its observable and measurable facets}, appears to belong to secondness, since secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  But, it does not.  It belongs to firstness, the monadic realm of possibility.  Indeed, the noumenon and its phenomena label the same entity from different points of view.

0079 Philosophy considers the noumenon and initially seeks to portray the thing itself as a hylomorphic structure, similar to Aristotle’s dyad {matter [substance] form}.

And that is confusing, because science totally ignores the noumenon.

Science observes and measures phenomena.  Science presumes that… um… there is a noumenon.  Phenomena are the observable and measurable facets of a noumenon.  So, as long as the scientist has observations and measurements… then the noumenon must exist… right?

0080 Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment, unfolded into a category-based nested form.

The subscript, “p”, stands for the Positivist’s judgment.  Plus, the labels M, N and O will no longer be used as guides.

The normal context of the positivist intellect_3p brings the actuality of the empirio-schematic judgment_2p into relation with the potential of the dyad_1p, {the thing itself [cannot be objectified as] its observable and measurable facets}_1p.

0081 Section three (3) discusses the history of the Moscow Linguistic Circle (MLC, starting in 1915).  The participants do not appreciate that they wrestle with the Positivist’s judgment.  But, they do know that the author’s intent cannot be reduced to social conditions (as proposed by sociologists) or conscious or unconscious processes (as proposed by psychologists).  All factions of the MLC agree that a literary text is a noumenon, and not a phenomenon produced by social, personal, or other truncated material and efficient causalities.

In short, the text (the noumenon) cannot be objectified by its observable and measurable facets (its phenomena).

Without the text, literary phenomena do not exist.

0082 What about the empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness)?

By 1929, the disciplinary language of structuralism (relation, thirdness) brings systemically and hierarchically arranged material, formal, efficient and final causes (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations of textual phenomena (what is, firstness).  These causes are not mechanical.  They are organic.

In short, a literary text is like a living thing.  So, the normal context of inquiry₃ focuses on the construction of a system₃.  Or, is that “a systemic construction₃“?  Or, could I say, “system of constructions”₃?

0083 Do not let me forget the not-religious intellect₃.

Here is a picture of the Literary Positivist’s nested form.

0084 The issue of reductionism, once again, cannot be avoided.

The term, “structuralism”, what does it mean?

I recall that the ‘thing’ that has the matter of semiology and the form of aesthetics has a label: “structuralism”.

0085 Obviously, the disciplinary language of “structuralism” satisfies the positivist intellect’s injunction by redefining “metaphysics” as “religious mumbo-jumbo”.

Structuralist models are not truly reductionist because the disciplinary languages of semiology and aesthetics (secretly) incorporate Aristotle’s formal and final causes, through the fact that dyadic models (hylomorphes) are actualities₂ that demand a normal contexts₃ and potentials₁.

0086 In contrast, the sociological, the psychological and the communicational reductionist can propose models (based on truncated material and efficient causalities), where the observable and measurable facets of a thing itself (the literary text) are accounted for by cultural, psychological and communicative arrangements (all materialist, of course).

Sociologists, psychologists and communicational reductionists satisfy the positivist’s injunction according to its original formulation, where “metaphysics” refers to “Aristotle’s formal and final causalities”.

0087 Perhaps, the terminology is not really clear.  Formalism and structuralism are not identical.  Neither are they completely different.

In section three (3), the authors quote Jakobson, writing in 1971, that the term, “structuralism” belongs to modern science in all its manifestations.  The same cannot be said for the term, “formalism”.

0088 What does this imply?

The label, “structuralism”, should apply to the models.  “Formalism”?  Not so much.

Nevertheless, the models (whatever they are called) include formal and final causalities. In sum, they contain a dyadic actuality₂.  Plus, a triadic normal context₃ and monadic potential₁ are along for the ride.

Once again, the subscript “p” stands for the Positivist’s judgment.  The subscript “e” signifies the empirio-schematic judgment.

0089 Let me first consider potential_1p for the Positivist’s judgment.

The noumenon should be the literary text.

The triumphalist scientist proposes to substitute a successful model for the noumenon.

Then, the model substituting for the noumenon [can be objectified by] its phenomena_1p.

0090 Now, I turn to the empirio-schematic judgment_2p for the Literary Positivist.

The terminology is most difficult, because both “formalism” and “structuralism” denote models that are “not religious” (fitting the mandate of “no metaphysics”), yet implicitly evoke formal and final causations.

0091 After all, “structuralism” is “semiology [substantiating] aesthetics”.  So the disciplinary language of structuralism_3e, while sounding “not metaphysical”, contextualizes dyadic relations_2e (and triadic relations disguised as dyadic relations) that are naturally (and for humans, instinctively,) contained in category-based nested forms.

0092 So, how does “structuralism” as part of a disciplinary language_3e operate on the possibility of ‘observations of phenomena within a text’_1e?

Structuralism situates semiology in terms of the aesthetics of systems.  If semiology is the study of spoken language, where “spoken language” consists of two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole and langue, then each habitual association between one parole and one langue (or “sign”) must be situated by a structure or a system.

0093 Consequently, the structure₃ is a normal context₃.  Its potential₁ is ‘the laws of a system’₁.  The actuality₂ is a dyadic structure that takes semiological matter into a form that emerges from (and situates) that potential₁.

A structuralist model_2e (what ought to be, secondness) within an unfolded empirio-schematic judgment_2p manifests all four of Aristotle’s causalities (material, formal, efficient and final).

0094 Yes, that is well and fine, but I still do not have a diagram of what goes into a structuralist model_2e.

That is because there is something about the structuralist model_2e to keep in mind.

0095 If one follows triumphalist scientists, then this model of the text_2e may serve as a substitute for the text itself_1p.  That is, the model of the text_2e (what ought to be, secondness) may re-present the noumenon_1p in the Positivist’s judgment (what is, firstness).

After all, the model_2e, in its empirio-schematic reality_2p, encompasses the phenomena of the literary text_1p.

0096 The following figure color-codes that message.

0097 In section three (3), the authors distinguish two schools of formalism in Russia: The Society for the Study of Poetic Language (in St. Petersburg) and the Moscow Linguistic Circle (MLC, with Jakobson as president).  The two branches aim to adhere to the Positivist’s judgment, with the literary text as the thing itself.

Marxist or Freudian or communication-based reductionist paradigms are discouraged.  Holistic approaches are encouraged.  Formalist and finalist models cannot be fragmented into merely mechanical processes, acting as truncated material and efficient causalities.

0098 Do the terms, “formalist” and “finalist” have anything to do with the most metaphysical of Aristotle’s four causes?

Of course they do.

0099 So, I wonder, “Can one satisfy the positivist’s rule by building models that explicitly use mechanical and efficient terminology while implicitly recruiting formal and final causalities?”

Hmmm.

Did I already answer that question?

0100 Section three (3) reports that Juri Lotman (many years later), in his Lectures on Structural Poetics (appearing in the first issue of Sign Systems Studies, published in 1964), criticizes previous so-called “formal methods” that focused on the matter of language and the form of the literary text.  “Formalists” discern various literary devices in the text.  These devices work in a mechanical fashion and are not “structuralist”, in so far as they do not elucidate interdependent and hierarchical wholes.

0101 As far as I can see, during the first transit (1910s-1930s), academics in linguistics and literature widen their focus of inquiry to include two contemporaneous European trends, logical positivism (the interests of the Vienna Circle) and phenomenology (the return to the “noumenon” proposed by Edmund Husserl).

Within these European trends, a subtle replacement is both encouraged (by the logical positivists) and challenged (by the phenomenologists).  Noumena, which cannot be objectified by their phenomena, are increasingly veiled by successful models, which can be objectified by their phenomena.

0102 But, disagreement mounts.

Logical positivists (or “triumphalist scientists”) want to replace each noumenon with its mechanical or mathematical model.  This gives birth to the academic laboratory sciences.

Phenomenologists rely on a method, devised by Husserl, to figure out what the noumenon must be.  This path supports further observations and measurements of phenomena that objectify what the noumenon must be.  This fuels the social and psychological sciences.

0103 As far as I can see, literature studies and linguistics are more akin to biology (where phenomenology seems more relevant) than chemistry and physics (where triumphalist scientists are hard to dismiss).

But, my opinion does not stand in the way of triumphalist science.

0104 So, let me take a closer look at this structuralist model_2e.

0105 While scientists and intellectuals in the West snip formal and final causalities away from their material and efficient causalities, the linguistic circles in what becomes the Soviet empire unwittingly embrace Aristotle’s trickery.  The structuralist model_2e contextualizes a lower-level category-based nested form.

0106 On the upper line, the empirio-schematic unfolds into a nested form.  The triadic normal context of the language of formalism (where “formal” touches base with Aristotle’s formal and final causalities)_3e brings the dyadic actuality of structuralist models_2e into relation with the monadic potential of ‘observing phenomena in a literary text’_1e.

0107 Then, on the lower line, the structuralist model_2e itself harbors an Aristotle-friendly category-based nested form,as if it_3(2e) belongs to the adjacent lower category.  If the structural model_2e belongs to the perspective level, then the adjacent-lower category-based nested form belongs to the situation level.

This situation-level nested form reads like this: The triadic normal context of a structure (or system)_3(2e) brings the dyadic actuality of {language as matter [substantiates] literary text as form}_2(2e) into relation with the monadic potential of ‘laws within the system’_1(2e).

0108 Does that category-based nested form look like an answer the the question, “What is “structuralism”?

The subscript “2e” designates the higher-level structuralist model_2e.  This subscript will soon change to “c”, standing for a perspective-level of a three-level interscope.

0109 More on that later, because I would like to cast my eyes upon hylomorphes and entanglements and confoundings.  The form in the dyadic actuality at the core of the structuralist model_2e (the form in the actuality_2(2e) within the actuality_2e) entangles matter_2p that engages the normal context_3p and the potential_1p of the Positivist’s judgment.

To this confounding, I attend.

0110 Now back to Peirce and Aristotle and the confounding at hand.

To start, the empirio-schematic judgment_2p is the actuality_2p in the nested form produced when the Positivist’s judgment unfolds.  The empirio-schematic judgment_2p then unfolds into a perspective-level nested form (with subscripts “e”, for now, then “c” for perspective level).

The structuralist model_2e serves as an actuality_2e, within the unfolded empirio-schematic judgment_2e.

Then, the structuralist model_2e virtually contextualizes an actuality_2(2e), consisting of the dyad, {language as matter [substantiates] a literary text as form}_2(2e) (constituting a situation level, the subscript will soon be “2b”).

0111 Do these statements describe the empirio-schematic judgment on the left in the following figure, corresponding to what ought to be (secondness) for the Positivist’s judgment?

0112 According to the triumphalist scientist, models₂ of the literary text as form_2e(2p) should occupy the slot for the noumenon_1p, the literary text itself.   When that happens, then the noumenon-occupying model_1p [can be objectified as] its literary phenomena.

That is one aspect to the substitution.

0113 Another aspect is that the perspective-level model_2e(2p) contextualizes the situation-level literary text as form_2(2e).  This situation-level form_2bf enters into the noumenon_1p, via the model_2e(2p), as anticipated by triumphalist scientists, and entangles matters_2pm salient to a not-religious intellect_3p operating on the potential of the literary text as noumenon_1p [and] its corresponding literary phenomena_1p.

0114 How confounding is that?

When the model_2e(2p) replaces (or overlays) the noumenon_1a, it_2e(2p) does not entangle literary phenomena_1c.  Rather, it_2e(2p) entangles a language_2am of positivist meaning_1a.

It makes me wonder, what matters_2pm are salient to a not-religious intellect_3p operating on the potential of… whatever inspires Kant’s slogan_1p.

Kant’s slogan?

A noumenon cannot be fully objectified as its phenomena.

0115 Okay, if Kant’s slogan is relevant, then I wonder, “What does a noumenon have that its phenomena cannot objectify?”

What words apply?

They cannot be scientific terms.  They must be um… phenomenological labels.

0116 Well, what does any phenomenologist say that any particular noumenon must be?

To start, a noumenon has a meaning that cannot be reduced to its phenomena.

Then, a noumenon has a presence that cannot be fully objectified as its phenomena.

Also, a noumenon may offer a message that cannot be found in the observable and measurable aspects of the thing itself.

0117 As an exercise, replace the term “noumenon” with “the literary text as form”.  Then, ask whether the phenomenological approach is sufficient.

Remember, phenomenology, Russian theory, structuralism and semiology develop in a modernist and science-fixated Zeitgeist during the first half of the twenty-first century.

0118 What does this imply?

If structure or system is the thing where semiology as matter [substantiates] aesthetics as form, and if the structuralist thing pertains to the mother-tongue as matter, and if {the native language as matter [substantiates] a literary text as form}, then an entanglement may occur.

The literary text as form can entangle model-illuminated words as matter, because these words reveal the possibility of aesthetic meaning, presence and message for the literary text as form.

0120 Here is a picture.

0121 I ask, “What does this derivation have to do with the history of the semiotics of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics?”

My answer is freaky.

The members of the Tartu-Moscow School, in their transnational collaborations, embody the derivation rendered in this examination.

0122 How do I know this?

0123 The collaborators are all interested in making academic inquiry into Slavic languages and literature more scientific, in accordance with the “Socialist” title of the USSR, and in accordance to their own expertise as linguists.

This examiner has a model of the scientific enterprise as a Positivist’s judgment, not available to those who lived in the twentieth century.  This model allows me to express their history in terms of later semiotic discoveries in the Peircean tradition.

0124 The examiner does not subtract from the achievements of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics.  Rather, the examination shows how cunning these researchers turn out to be.  They protect their own field of study from reductionists.  They set on finding a path suitable to a not-religious intellect, in accordance with science.

In the process, they unearth concepts that are foundational to Slavic civilization.

They make archaeological discoveries.

0125 The Positivist’s judgment contains two judgments.  The Positivist judgment is a triadic relation that contains the empirio-schematic judgment as one of its elements.  Without the empirio-schematic judgment, the Positivist’s judgment could not function.  So, the empirio-schematic judgment is fundament.  The Positivist’s judgement is derivative.

0126 The confounding leads to a separation of the two judgments.  The empirio-schematic judgment serves as the perspective-level of a fundament three-level interscope.  The Positivist’s judgment serves as the content-level of a derivative three-level interscope.

At the same time, the confounding binds the two interscopes.

0127 Here is a picture.

0128 The semiological and structuralist literary thing entangles an aesthetic (yet not-religious) language of meaning, presence and message.

One form, the literary text, stands in dyadic relation to two matters, one substantiating and one entangled.

0129 The next task of this examiner is to derive the fundament and derivative interscopes.