0950 Here is a picture.

0951 Yes, new terminology is proposed.

What is the [message]?

[Inter] is “enters from the Umwelt”.

0952 Something that is outside the micropore’s accreting sludge’s semiotic agency (SO_i) [ inters ] a place where organic molecules_2a (SV_s) stand for what is in a micropore of volcanic glass_2b (SO_s) operating on the potential of content entering into the pore and not leaving_1b (SI_s).

So, the [message] is [inter].

0953 Obviously, “inter” is a new word, technically coining something from outside of the agent that initiates semiotic agency.

The term is a play on “enter” as well as “inter”.  “Inter” derives from the Latin word for “among”, as in the term, “international”.  “Inter” also means to “bury a corpse”.  Here, “inter” alludes to the burial of the sign-object of the interventional sign.  Surely, a burial conveys a message.  That message inters the SO_i.

[Message] can be sort of like being born again.

0954 [Inter] is when the message is born the first time.  [Inter] is like a revelation to an agent that may not exist.  Or, if an agent exists, then [inter] is like a revelation, pure and simple, like the way that I realize that the dead duck is alive.

0955 Here is a picture for the nitrogenous organic molecule entering a micropore on the surface of volcanic glass in an Archean hydrothermal vent.

Organic molecules in the hydrothermal vent (SV_s) stand for accumulation (SO_s) in regards to the self-governance of carbon-based molecules in a micropore operating of possible courses of action (SI_s).

0956 The question arises, “Who is the agent₃?”

Is the “agent₃” the micropore with a hydrothermal vent?

Or, is the agent₃ the sludge accumulating in the micropore?  This agent₃ faces a problem faced by all hoarders.  There is only so much space in a micropore.  So, the micropore stops accumulating.

0957 But, not all micropores give up when sludged out.  Some develop organic subagents that assist in packing the micropore and are capable of latching to the walls of the hydrothermal vent, despite the turbulence.  These subagents then manage to colonize neighboring micropores, pack them over time, then find paths to other micropores.

Does that key into [presence]?

Is information_2b all about accumulation (SO_s) [presence] packing and moving on (SV_e)?

0957 Accumulation and packing_2b (SV_e) stands for colonization of adjacent micropores_2c (SO_e) in regards to packing micropores on the surface of volcanic glass in a hydrothermal vent_3c operating on the potential of these novel molecules that the sludge has inadvertently produced and keeps producing_1c (SI_e).

So, information_2b is more than sustained capture of organic materials floating by in the hydrothermal vent (SO_s).  Information_2b supports the spontaneous production of a suite of molecules that increase the amount that can be packed into a micropore.  Some type of catalyst manifests and this catalyst may leave the micropore and “infect” another micropore.

0958 Here is a picture.

Here, the label, [infold] replaces [inter].  [Infold] is “enters from the Innerwelt”.

Perhaps, the entire community of micropores constitutes the agent₃.

0959 Let me say that again, while focusing on the actualities.

From the outside, organic molecules may pulse into a micropore. That corresponds to [inter]. The same organic molecules tend not to leave, because they bind to the walls of the micropore (through charged interactions and dipoles) or slough out of water solution into the sludge (because water forms hydrogen bonds that exclude many organic molecules).

0960 Particularly configured organic molecules end up getting synthesized as these molecules occasionally covalently bond with one another.  They can form strings, where an organic (hydrophobic) macromolecule has two polar (hydrophilic and glass-loving) ends that can direct molecules entering the micropore to the crystal surface (for electrostatic attraction).  The hydrophobic string can direct molecules towards the organic crud (for getting out of water).

They are like hydrophobic strings with electrostatic glue on either end.

They emerge within sludge [packing tool] accumulation_2b.

0961 If one of these peculiar molecules leaves the micropore, it can “walk” along the glass surface with one end electrostatically holding on to the glass surface and the other coming loose and floating as far as the string allows before coming back to the glass surface.

In this way, one molecule can “walk” to another micropore_2a and catalyze the process of accumulation_2b if it is not already happening.

0962 And, that manifests [meaning] by instigating an interventional sign.

Biphasic macromolecular “walking” along the lining of a hydrothermal vent_2c (SV_i) stands for further settlement of porous space_2a (including micropores already spontaneously accumulating) (SO_i) in regards to the potential of ‘settling novel spaces’_1a in the normal context of a hydrothermal vent_3a (SI_i).

Notice that in the picture, the {SO_i}_2a is the intent expressed by “walking”, rather than further settlement of porous spaces.

0963 Also, I replace [inter], the technical word for [message], with [infold] because the message comes from within the system.  Here, the message, [infold], barely applies.  But, when the normal context_3a belongs to a subagent, then the term definitely applies.

0964 Back in point 0946, the author asks whether there can be potential meaning in a world without meaning (that is, life)?

The answer applies to section 7.6 (Potential Meanings and Complexity of the Non-living World) and 7.7 (Actualization of Potential Meanings by Organisms).

0965 Does the answer also apply to section 7.8 (Potential Signs and Meanings in Human Life)??

Let me go back to that preposterous story about Daisy and the duck.

0966 Here is a picture of how the incident provokes Daisy’s semiotic agency.  The picture is written in the style of a three-level interscope, for the convenience of this examiner.

0967 At the start of the incident, the sudden appearance of an unfamiliar dog pulling out something from a pile of dead leaves_2a (SV_s) stands for a duck in its mouth_2b (SO_s) in regards to Daisy’s self-governance_3b operating on potential courses of action_1b (SI_s).

The encounter with another dog is like a sensation_2a.  Realizing that a duck is in the other’s dog mouth is like a perception_2a.

0968 The duck in the other’s dog mouth_2b (SO_s) [makes present] an opportunity_2b (SV_e).

Daisy’s opportunity_2b (SV_e) stands for the goal of making the duck mine_2c (SO_e) in regards to the normal context of going for it_3c operating on the potential of ‘seizing the moment’_1c (SI_e).

0969 The perspective-level actuality_2c has the character of a judgment.  Daisy’s canine intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the intelligibility of the getting the duck in the other dog’s mouth (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with the universality of Daisy’s sizing up the other dog (what is, firstness).

Say what?

If Daisy’s sizing up the other dog is correct, then she bets that she can get the duck.

0970 Her goal of making that duck her own (SO_e) [means] a fight (SV_i).

0971 [Meaning] connects semiotic agency to an interventional sign-relation.

This is Daisy’s intervention.  I am along as an ally who is capable of throwing rocks.  When the first rock hits solidly, and the other dog looks over at me, I think, “I should have held tighter onto Daisy’s leash.”  Just kidding, I really think, “Wow.  That got his attention.”

Then, I throw the second rock and it misses completely.

0972 Once Daisy positions herself to prevent the other dog from bolting with the prize.  The wandering hound must prepare for a fight.  That means that he must put down the duck.  Then, the third rock lands and its over.

For me, I know that the interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i) has played its course when I pick up Daisy’s leash, still attached to her bodice, and she noses the duck and looks up.

0973 Here is a picture of the interventional sign-relation.

Daisy’s fight_2c (SV_i) stands for her intent at the moment of victory_2a (SO_i) in regards to victory or defeat_3a operating on the potential that the victory affords a message’_1a (SI_i).

0974 The [message] is [infolds] because Daisy and I are now a team.

The intention of Daisy_2c [infold] duck is alive_2a.

1005 On top of that, in chapter seven of Pathways, Alexei Sharov offers another option.

In addition to [meaning], there are potential meanings and potential signs.  Potential meaning goes with [presence].  Potential sign associates to [message].

This is awkward, since the terms, “potential meanings” and “potential signs” take the contiguities out of their brackets (so to speak).

1006 Plus, the exercise of considering “potential meaning” and “potential sign” raises a question concerning how to square the normal-context of agent₃ with the normal context of definition₃.  To me, the agent₃ contextualizes definition₂₍₃₎ as integral to semiotic agency₂.  So, somehow, the nature of spoken words₂₍₂₎ gets imported into semiotic agency₂ as a thing itself (or, should I say, “a noumenal overlay itself”?).

1007 Here is a picture.

The colors are suggestive, but misleading.  [Presence] is wholly contained within the semiotic of semiotic agency.  [Message] spans interventional sign-relation and semiotic agency.  The coloration reminds me that [message] is like passing through a portal to the SV_s.  An interventional sign-object (SO_i) [inters or infolds] the specifying sign-vehicle of semiotic agency (SV_s).

Here is the trick. With [inters], the SO_i enters from the Umwelt.  With [infolds], the SO_i arrives from the Innerwelt.  [Inter] is not wholly contained within the agent.  [Infold] is.

That may be confusing.  And, the above figure exploits that confounding with suggestive, but misleading, coloration.

1008 What I have said concerning how [meaning] may be problematic fits the author’s bold assertion: Knowledge is a language game.

Meaning is like a substance, the contiguity between a manner of matter (the object of an exemplar sign-relation, SO_e) and a manner of form (the vehicle of an specifying sign-relation, SV_s).

Like [message], [meaning] is a portal.  The portal goes from the end terminus of semiotic agency, the goal_2c (SO_e), to the beginning terminus of the interventional sign-relation, the goal in action_2c (SV_i).

1009 At the same time, meaning₁ is a potential that underlies a spoken term₂ in the normal context of definition₃.

1010 So, which is it?

Let the language games begin.

1011 The author relates that a century ago (say, around the 1920s, when the nature of empirical science is debated), linguistic theories of meaning display two fashions.  One academic style concerns how spoken expressions work in terms of symbol manipulation.  The other academic style concerns whether spoken expressions mean what dictionaries say they mean… that is, “semantic content”.

The author makes this accusation in section 8.1, titled, “Do We Ask The Right Kinds of Questions?”

1012 I find this a little funny, along with the author’s note, saying (more or less), “Human adaptive behaviors₃ may be viewed as end-directed activities that construct semiotic agency₂ as a capacity₁ to generate such behavior₃.”

Without the subscripts assigning Peirce’s categories, the note sounds perfectly circular.

With the subscripts, the statement transforms into a category-based nested form responsible for constructing semiotic agency₂ as an actuality₂.

This₂ is semiotic agency₂.

1013 Here is the trick.  “End directed activities” substitutes for “the interventional sign-relation”.

So, the interventional sign-relation [constructs] semiotic agency.

This dyad is a wonderful way to portray the biosemiotic noumenal overlay in speech-alone talk.

1014 Speech-alone talk is different from hand and hand-speech talk.

Hand talk pictures and points to its referents.

1015 In human evolution, hand talk becomes linguistic when manual-brachial icons and indexes become sufficiently distinct from one another as to constitute a system of differences.

Remember dictionaries?  They embody a system of differences.  Each written word differs from all other written words.  Symbols constitute systems of differences.  A finite set of symbols constitutes a symbolic order.  The symbolic order represented by a dictionary is… um… alphabetical.

Once routinized, manual-brachial gestures become symbols, they fall into a system of differences and become linguistic. Then, these linguistic gestural-words support grammar.  Grammar consists in symbolic operations within a finite system of differences.

So, hand talk refers by way of Peirce’s natural signs of icons and indexes (SO_s).  Also, hand talk becomes linguistic when these icons and indexes become more and more symbolic (that is, distinct from one another).  Grammar consists of symbolic operations among hand-talk words.

1016 Hand and hand-speech talk belong to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

Speech-alone talk belongs to our current Lebenswelt.

Speech-alone words cannot picture or point to their referents.

1017 Speech-alone talk simply attaches a label to…. whatever… such as what the term, “end-directed activities” is supposed to mean.  Or, maybe I should say, mean, present and announce.

The spoken term, “end-directed activities” announces, “I am what constructs semiotic agency”. 

The same spoken term presents itself as belonging to the realm of actuality₂.

The same spoken term has a meaning₂ that arises from the potential of ‘the human capacity to generate adaptive behaviors’₁ in the normal context of human adaptation₃.

1018 So, here is the trick.  The term, “end-directed activities”, is just a label.

The interventional sign-relation [constructs] semiotic agency.

1019 Here is a picture.

1020 The interventional sign-relation allows us to imagine that end-directed activities reside “out there”.

But, [meaning] draws the inquirer’s gaze away from the end-directed action (SV_i) back to the goal_2c (SO_e).

And, this is crucial, because the goal_2c resides “in here”, within semiotic agency. 

1021 So, in this language game concerning theories of meaning, I end up with the appearance that “end-directive activities” reside “out there” (as the interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i) expresses an agent’s goal_2c in action) as well as “in here” (as the goal_2c itself (SO_e)).

1022 Dare I continue?

The author calls the SO_e “objective” and the SV_i “objective in parentheses”.

In this terminology, the goal_2c (SO_e) is “objective” and its expression_2c (SV_i) is “objective in parenthesis” because… well… any intervention can go wrong (so, it is better to put the objective in parenthesis).

1023 A rewarding feature of this modern nomenclature is that it allows a clean break between semiotic agency (the Innerwelt aspect) and the interventional sign-relation (the Umwelt and Lebenswelt aspect).

Here is a picture.

For the contiguities, [p] is [presence], [mn] is [meaning] and [mg] is [message].

1024 A clean break makes intellectual labors simpler when [message] is [inter] and more complicated when [message] is [infold].

When I speak to myself, I labor as semiotic agency produces a speech-act that serves as an intervention which activates my… um… semiotic agency.

Is the [message] [inter] or [infold]?

Does it have to be one or the other?

1025 The medieval scholastics come up with terms that are discussed in Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Agency” (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog for October, 2023).  The terms pertain to the levels of the scholastic interscope for how humans think.  The term, “subjective”, labels the content level, where SV_s resides.  The term, “objective”, labels the situation level, where SO_s is located.  The term, “intersubjective” labels the situation level, where SV_e is located.  The term, “suprasubjective”, labels the perspective level, where SO_e is located.

1026 Here is a picture.

1027 This implies that SO_e [meaning] SV_i is, for scholastics, “suprasubjective’ (that is, “subjective from a divine perspective”) and, for modern academics, the locus of both “objective” and “objective in parenthesis”.

In short, the biosemiotic structure of suprasubjectivity contains both objective goal_2c (SO_e) and its (objective) expression in the moment (SV_i).

1027 As if to demonstrate the delicacy of this modern distinction, the author offers the example of spoken language as the arbitrary relation between two systems of differences, parole (speech in act) and langue (speech decoded). 

1028 Can the reader guess how these two systems of differences fit into the above diagram?

Here is what I figure.

1029 The information_2b of semiotic agency is within the agent, even though it_2b concerns what_2a  apparently is located without.

For this reason, I may playfully modify information_2b into -formation_2b (SO_s) [presence] in-_2b (SV_e)

If the goal_2c is to say ‘something’, then SV_i is parole, a speech act.  The parole (SV_i) stands for an intention_2a (SO_i) in regards to what is happening_3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening_1a (SI_i).  Of course, this intention_2a(SO_i) is not the same as the originating goal (SO_e) and that becomes evident when spoken words are instantly decoded by a langue operator_2a (SV_s) as an event akin to sensation_2a.

1030 That brings me (the examiner) back to [meaning] as the contiguity between an objective goal_2c (SO_e) and an (objective) parole (SV_i).

1031 Have I avoided the author’s epistemological trap (section 8.2)?

Does what I am saying (SV_i) seem to support what I think (SO_e)?

At least, to a disinterested observer (SO_i)?

1032 What am I wrestling with?

Here is a picture, relying on a combination of elements from Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay and from the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

1033 I now proceed by way of example.

1034 I say to Daisy, “I guess that we are taking this duck home in order to see whether it lives.”

My expression_2c (SV_i) stands for my intentions in making the statement_2a to Daisy (SO_i) in regards to what is happening_3a operating on the fact that ‘something’ has happened_1a (SI_i).  Daisy got what she wanted.  The other dog did not.  And now, I am Daisy’s master and assigned to make sense of this disaster.  I suppose that is why humans make such good pack-leaders for these domesticated wolves.

1035 I take off my waterproof jacket, toss inside down onto the ground, then place the still-breathing remains on the tarp_2a (SV_s).  The duck is not as heavy as I anticipated.  It is easy to carry home, even with Daisy on the leash and constantly wanting to check on it_2b (SO_s).  The duck is the “form” in “information_2b” (SO_s).  Its presence is contiguous with the… “in- “… of “information_2b” (SV_e).  Yes, I am in it_2c (SO_e) alright.  So, is Daisy and the ornamental duck who is seriously messed up.

1036 Daisy suspects what I am going to do_2c (SO_e) because I did the same for her.

Her suspicions make information_2b pertinent, because it_2b is bound to be salient_3c((1c)) to our goal_2c.  

1037 My written description of Daisy’s suspicions runs right into section 8.3 titled, “The Observer, the Observed, and the Problem of Interpretation”.

Would a biosemiotician say that he (or she) can observe and measure the sign-vehicles and the sign-objects in the following diagram?

1038 Yes, the SV_s and the SO_s become phenomena once the biosemiotic noumenal overlay is regarded as the thing itself.  My particular episode may serve as a case study.  See any article in The Journal on the Care of Injured Ducks.

Daisy is not cognizant that I plan (SV_e) work up a case study to submit for publication.

Publish or perish!

1039 Is this where the author is taking this examiner?

Yes and no.

Yes, there is an epistemic cut between an organism’s observed adaptive response (SV_i) and an observer describing the adaptive response in terms of sign-elements and claiming that an interpretation is plausible (SO_i).  It seems as if what is plausible (SO_e) derives from a sign-object (SO_s) that all biological processes and entities have in common.

No, the epistemologist cries, “Cut!”

1040 Then, members of the audience look around asking, “Who said that?”

The heckler shouts, “I mean… cut between semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation.”

Then, the well-certified members settle back in their chairs and cluck, “Yes, it is epistemic.”

Take a look at “yes” and see that the cut is incorrect.

1041 Epistemic?

Or empirio-schematic?

Where does the epistemic cut go?

Does empirio-schematics care?

1042 We can observe and measure the sign-vehicles and sign-objects in the following figure, once we have the following figure as a diagram of the thing itself.

Then, we can formulate models to account for the sign-interpretants.

1043 On one hand, the inquirer may treat the biosemiotic noumenal overlay as operational, consisting of three sign-relations, which constitute a spiral of semiosis through time.

On the other hand, the inquirer may regard each biosemiotic spiral phenomenologically, that is, as what the noumenon must be.

1044 With this in mind, I may look at one of the real elements that goes with [meaning], SV_i, along with its counterpoint, SV_s.

Parole_2c (SV_i) and langue_2a (SV_s) are worth considering.

Parole_2c (SV_i) is a vocal expression_2c (SV_i) that stands for the expression of an intention_2a (SO_i) in regards to a content-level normal context_3a and potential_1a (SI_i).  Like the actions of an animal, parole (SV_i) is a real event that generates a sign-object (SO_i) that signifies like an icon, a picture that sends a message.

Parole_2c (SV_i) is a real event that belongs to the interventional sign-relation.  It’s counterpart, langue_2a (SV_s) initiates semiotic agency.

1045 Amazingly, over a century ago, Ferdinand de Saussure transforms the discipline of linguistics by proposing that spoken language consists of two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole (SV_i) and langue (SV_s).

Here is one way to consider the proposition.

Parole, SV_i, as an actuality_2c on the perspective level, has a counterpart, langue, SV_s, serving as an actuality_2a on the content level.  SV_i belongs to the interventional sign.  SV_s belongs to semiotic agency.

1046 With that consideration in mind, suprasubjective parole_2c, SV_i, can be observed by a disinterested observer, and subjective langue, SV_s, cannot.  But, does that invalidate the claim that SV_s is phenomena?   No, langue_2a, SV_s, initiates the specifying sign-relation.  That is phenomenal.

Here, I add a caveat.  There is more than one way to portray parole and langue using diagrams of triadic structures.  Just saying….

1047 Nonetheless, in a complementary fashion, I may look at the other real element that goes with [meaning], SO_e, along with its counterpart SO_i.  Goal_2c connects to [meaning].  Expression of intention_2a associates to [message].

1048 This suprasubjective-subjective pair seems even more evolutionarily ancient than parole and langue.  The goal_2c, SO_e, terminates semiotic agency.  An expression of intention_2a or the expression intended_2a, SO_i, satisfies the interventional sign-relation and activates a [message].  The goal_2c (SO_e) belongs to the Innerwelt.  The intended expression_2a (SO_i) belongs to the Umwelt (and for humans, the Lebenswelt).

Indeed, may I suggest that SO_i is what a disinterested observer would objectify if he were not on the subjective level?