1193 Now, this is where a dramatic and a literary choice needs to be made.  Do I depict what happens next as another round of semiotic agency or do I say, “Go ahead and act out your interventional sign, because that is the way that nature rolls.”?

Maybe, I can ask Daisy.

1194 Here is a picture of what I am talking about.

1195 What about rhetoric?

The spoken word, “cognition”, would say, “Go another round.”

The spoken words, “innate response”, would say, “Finish the job.”

1196 The biosemiotician has more than one way to depict the interventional sign-relation.

1197 The dyadic actuality of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay is good for empirio-schematic research.

If I ask, “What gives rise to phenomena and what needs to be modeled?”, then the answers are fairly obvious.

The spider on thigh and who intends what? gives rise to phenomena.

[What is happening and the potential of something happening] needs to be modeled.

1198 Frege’s triangle offers another way to engage in biosemiotic inquiry.  This triangle portrays reified sign-relations, just like the biosemiotic noumenal overlay, but in a geometric, spiral of triangles.  The architecture is like a winding staircase with three steps per whirl.

1199 What if a hominin in the social circle of a team is a semiotic agent?

There is still a concept^c, such as the contiguity between traditional use of iconic and indexal hand-talk words as a manner to convey information (SO_e) and the manual-brachial gestures, [image SPIDER][point to THIGH][facial expression of DISTRESS] (SV_i).

1200 Surely, the goal_2c of the signer is to issue a warning.

The hand-talk statement_2c (SV_i) stands for a warning_2a (SO_i) in regards to a normal context that is similar to what is happening_3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening_1a (SI_i).

1201 Next there is a contiguity between SO_i (as matter) and SV_s (as form).  Frege’s label, [symbol^a], corresponds to the [substance] of the dyadic actuality on the content level.

When the signer makes the hand-talk statement, all the members of the team can see it.  But, the signer offers an additional clue.  The signer is looking at one particular team member.  And, this team member has a spider on his thigh.

At the time of the statement, everyone on the team engages in an ongoing activity.  Say, shaking ripened fruit from a tree.  So, the warning is not exactly in line with the task at hand.

1202 Nevertheless, each member of the team is a symbol (a sign whose object is based on convention) simply because each member is different from any other member of a team.  The team is the system of a system of differences or the order of a symbolic order.  The team is the convention, so to speak.

So, the comment comes from an elder who is more aware that spiders can appear during this particular collaborative activity.  Perhaps, I can say that the elder stands for someone who is aware of the safety of others.  But, there is no hand-talk gesture word that images or points to the explicit abstraction of “safety”.

1203 Nevertheless, the protolinguistic hand-talk of hominins living between the start of bipedality and the domestication of fire (3.5-0.8Myr) has hidden symbolic operations working beneath the obvious iconic and indexal manual-brachial word-gestures.  The manner in which a spider is pantomimed in [image SPIDER] varies, but only one particular gesture becomes habitual, that is, conventional.  The way that the signer has eye contact with the signee when he signs [image SPIDER] then [point to thigh] has all the hallmarks of grammar.  It is a symbolic operation.  Finally, [facial expression of DISTRESS] may be on its way to being stylized, but at the moment, forget convention!

The goal_2c is to warn.

1204 In section 18.4, titled “Anchors of Meaning: External Semiotic Representation and the Disembodiment of the Mind”, explores the interventional sign-relation, without knowing what the interventional sign-relation is.  

Instead, the author frames a discussion in terms of current research into cognitive niches.

An external representation (such as a word-gesture in hand talk) can be accessed and modified in different cognitive niches (such as different teams within a band of Homo erectus) because the hand-talk word is anchored as an icon or index of a referent.

In this way, hominins extend their “minds” into the Umwelt and turn it into a Lebenswelt of hand-talk words.

1205 The author labels the use of hand talk words by teams in obligative collaborative foraging, “abduction manipulation”.

The label is as funny as it is true.

If [symbol^a] images [concept^c], then every interventional sign-relation asks, “Guess what I’m thinking?”

That question is pure abduction manipulation.

1206 For an example, in Figure 18.3, the author offers a diagrammatic representation that calls to mind Aristotle’s demonstration of how the geometry of triangles may be intuitively abstracted.

Even the slaves of ancient Greece can follow the diagram.

Compare that to the following presentation of Frege’s triangle.

The two triangles are not so different.  Both manipulate abduction.

1207 The last half of section 18.4 discusses the disembodiment of the mind.

Semiotic agency (purple lines) embodies the mind.

The interventional sign-relation (orange line) is like a mind, disembodied.

Along those lines, there are some late moderns who assert that our current Lebenswelt is a simulation.

I wonder, “Are they communing with the orange line?”

1208 Speaking of communing with orange lions, the author offers a work of Paleolithic art dating to around thirty-thousand years ago.  It is orange.  But, that is not the salient feature.  It’s shape is half-man (bottom portion) and half-lion (top portion).

1209 I wonder, what is the story behind the lion-man Paleolithic artifact?

The Upper Paleolithic of Europe begins after humans evolved (around 200,000 years ago).  The continuity between 200,000 years ago and 30,000 years ago is strong, but advances in tool-use, resilience to different ecologies, and creativity in spiritual awareness are remarkable.  Spiritual awareness?   It’s just another term for “disembodied mind”.  That lion-man, carved from ivory and stained orange from years of resting in soil, embodies a “disembodied mind”.

1210 That means that the lion-man is an agent, capable of semiotic agency, and its owner is an agent, capable of semiotic agency. 

So, what is the owner up to?

1211 Well, I need to go back more than 170,000 years before the 30,000 year old artifact to explain.

After the domestication of fire, starting 800,000 years ago, hand-talk, once confined to the social circle of teams, becomes an activity in its own right, as cooking becomes more communal (one fire, one cookout per band) and shooting the breeze after a nice meal becomes routine.  Hand-talk adapts and becomes linguistic.

Linguistic hand-talk offers an opportunity not available to proto-linguistic hand-talk.  One can make grammatically correct counter-intuitive statements.  Even though every gesture-word is sensible, because it pictures or points to its referent, when combined to make a grammatically correct statement, a new type of mental construction (or “cognitive space”) becomes possible. 

See the chapter of meaning in How to Define the Word “Religion”, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1212 The figure of lion-man precisely captures the counter-intuitive nature of nonsensical hand-talk statements.  The lion part pictures a lion.  The human part pictures a human.  Each part is perfectly referential.  But, the artifact makes no sense at all.

1213 Soon after the the domestication of fire, the Neanderthals and Denisovans speciate as hominins practicing fully linguistic hand-talk.  They are not the only hominins that thrive on the fact that the cognitive spaces opened by fully linguistic hand talk are good at organizing all social circles, including very large social circles such as the community (150), the mega-band (500) and the tribe (1500).

These larger social circles cannot gather for long, because large meetings are opportunities for disease.  So, they develop cultural practices that are useful for rapid recognition and social synchronization.  One of these practices is singing.  Singing is a powerful semiotic tool for both recognition and synchronization.  Sexual selection for better singing follows.  The vocal tract comes under voluntary neural control.

1214. Then, a little over 200,000 years ago, the voice is added to hand talk (as an adornment) with the speciation of Homo sapiens.  Hand-speech talk is born, along with the semiotics of adornment.  The Paleolithic period that followsslowly discovers what adornment can do.  And, equally slowly, the speech aspect of hand-speech talk takes on a life of its own.

Around 50,000 years ago, humans migrate into ice-age Europe.  They occasionally breed with Neanderthals.  How can this happen?  Humans are still predominately practicing hand talk.  Their speech is an adornment.

By 30,000 years ago, humans have not bred with Neanderthals for thousands of years, even though many carry Neanderthal genes.  Why?  Perhaps, the occasional presence of the hand-talking Neanderthals inspire the humans to speak more, to cultivate their vocal adornments by exploring the semiotic capacity of speech in the milieu of hand talk.  The Neanderthals cannot speak.  They can try to imitate what the humans are doing.  But, their vocal tracts are not under the same degree of voluntary control.

Hmmm.  Extinction looms.

See Comments on David Reich’s Book (2018) Who We Are and How We Got Here, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1215 The Upper Paleolithic lion-man is fashioned as an artifact, an agent, with a mind.  Obviously, a piece of ivory does not have a mind, so the modern scientist must call what the lion-man exhibits, “a disembodied mind”.

1230 Now, back to evolution.

May I use the same technique for my examination of evolution?

May I pass from thirdness (M) to secondness (N), then add a twist (O)?

1231 I start with neodarwinism as an intersection (M).  The single actuality₂ may be individual₂, species₂ or genus₂.

The intersection consists two triadic relations, even though the single actuality₂ um.. belongs to secondness.

Here is a picture.

1232 Yes, adaptation_2H is not the same as phenotype_2V.

Not only that, each actuality_2b belongs to a situation-level nested form.

Here is the two-level interscope for adaptation_2H.

1233 In previous examinations, the term, “niche” is a point of contention.  Does the term have a clear technical definition?  Or does “niche” suggest “whatever adaptations are adapting to”?

Surely, a technical definition is implied by the above figure.

A niche_1b is the potential_1b of an actuality of the adapting species_2a.

1234 This introduces another point of contention.

Does the niche have to consist of purely material conditions, whether environmental or ecological?  The answer is no, even though, for almost all species, the niche is the potential of ‘something’ in the environment or the ecology.  The most obvious exception is our own genus, the Homo genus, whose niche is the potential of triadic relations.

Triadic relations are immaterial beings that entangle the material world.  So, a scientist, working under the presumption of the positivist intellect (metaphysics is not allowed), has a difficult time because observations and measurements follow only the entangled material world, rather than the significant observable and measurable facets of the thing itself.

The biosemiotic noumenal overlay changes the game in that respect.  Phenomena consist of sign-vehicles and sign-objects that would be rejected by the modern positivist intellect because they are imbued with formal and final causalities.

1235 As for the potential of triadic relations, consider the e-book, The Human Niche (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

1236 Here is two-level interscope for phenotype_2V.

1237 Hmmm, what is going on with the genotype_1b?

Like “niche_1b“, “genotype_1b” labels a potential: the potential_1b of DNA_2a.  The cellular apparatus for translating DNA into proteins is a complicated arrangement.  Nevertheless, scientists currently have a fairly coherent story for how a DNA world supports a RNA world and a RNA world translates into a protein world.  The phenotype_2b manifests in the protein world.  Proteins get cellular processes done.

1238 Natural historians say, “Consider the adaptation_2H.”

Geneticists say, “Consider the phenotype_2V.”

The two-level interscopes of adaptation_2b and of phenotype_2b have one thing in common.

Both express all the elements of the specifying sign-relation. 

1239 For the natural historian, an actuality independent of the adapting species_2a (SV_s) stands for an adaptation_2b(SO_s) in regards to natural selection_3b operating on a niche_1b (SI_s).

For the geneticist, DNA_2a (SV_s) stands for a phenotype_2b (SO_s) in regards to body development_3b operating on the genotype_1b (SI_s).

1240 Now, I wonder whether I can repeat the same trick as the one performed at the very start of Semiotic Agency (N).

1241 The above figure expresses two styles of triadic relations, the specifying sign-relation and the two-level interscope.  There are two real elements, the content- and situation-level actualities, and they look like a dyad.  The situation level holds one real element, which I associate to matter (or esse_ce, being [substantiating]).  The content level holds the other real element, which I associate to form (or essence, [substantiated] being}.

1242 Why the associations?

That is how the actualities appear in the above figure.

Content-level form (SV_s) stands for situation-level matter (SO_s).  This is like the appearance of a shape (SV_s) standing for the presence of matter (SO_s) in regards to a situation-level normal context_3b operating on the possibility of ‘situating content’_1b (SI_s).  Or, this is like a sensation_2a (SV_s) standing for a perception_2b (SO_s) in the normal context of what it_2ameans to me_3b operating on the potential_1b of situating content_2a (SI_s).

1243 What else do I see?

I see the situation-level normal context_3b and its potential_1b folding into the contiguity between matter (SO_s) and form(SV_s).

Here is a picture.

Surely, this diagram associates to the S&T noumenal overlay, but separately for adaptation_2b and phenotype_2b.

1244 Adaptation_2b looks like information_2b.

1245 Phenotype also looks like information_2b.

1246 Both these figures represent incomplete pictures of semiotic agency, because there are no exemplar sign-relations.

Both tell me how incomplete neodarwinism is, as a model for biological systems.

Natural historians may be satisfied with the way that darwinism fits.

Geneticists may be satisfied with the way that the “neo” of neodarwinism fits.

1247 Why don’t most biologists want to talk about “niche” or “genotype”?

Well, the real elements, SV_s and SO_s, are obvious.

How does one model what needs to be accounted for (the contiguity, SI_s) using observations and measurements of the phenomena of the real elements (SV_s and SO_s)?

Well, natural historians and geneticists are doing research everyday.  They encounter this issue. But, they do not have a complete image of semiotic agency that directs the inquirer.

They do not have an exemplar sign-relation.

1248 Why is this lack of exemplar sign-relation salient_3c((1c))?

Section 3.1 of chapter 3 of Semiotic Agency says that the human individual has three major components: a body (J), cognition (K) and a niche (L).

1249 What does that (J, K, L) tell me?

1250 Take a look at Figure 3.1, which portrays each component in a cut and paste manner.

1251 Surely, the human body (J) corresponds to phenotype_2b as the sign object of a specifying relation.

In section 3.2, the author discusses the human body (J) in terms of subagency.

That is fine, because subagency models [body development_3b operating on the genotype_1a].  Current research in a variety of disciplines related to genetics is relevant.

1252 The niche (L) corresponds to adaptation_2b as the sign-object of a specifying sign-relation.

In section 3.4, the author says that the human niche (L) includes the environment (as well as ecology), human artifacts, semiotic factors (such as information and communication) and social conditions.

Yes, but what about triadic relations?

1253 The author goes on to wrestle with different approaches to the term, “niche”.  Each approach tries to model [natural selection_3b operating on the potential_1b of an actuality independent of the adapting species_2a].  But, no approach identifies the one actuality_2a that accounts for convergent evolution among all hominin species.

Yes, I am talking about triadic relations.

See The Human Niche, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1254 The author raises the idea of a “cognitive niche”, which brings me to cognition (K).

Section 3.3 discusses human cognition (K) in terms of subagents.

1255 There are mental modules devoted to sensation, perception, memory, integration and action.  They are heterogeneous.  They may be called “cognits” because they knit cogs.  Surely, mental modules and “cognits” are neural… I mean… cognitive adaptations.  Several chapters in Semiotic Agency are devoted to these topics.

Section 3.5 covers periods of human life in terms of age-related phenotype_3V (J), adaptation_2H (L) and cognition (K).  This section rounds off the idea that the human has three components.

1256 Cognition (K) corresponds to the union of both phenotype_2H (J) and adaptation_2V (L) when it comes to human agency.

And, that is very curious.

1257 The issue of the salience_3c((1c)) of the exemplar sign-relation is not raised.

Why is this issue important to me?

Do I see an opportunity?

1258 I see that a living being is an intersection between adaptation_2H and phenotype_2V.

I also notice that, when placed into the purely relational structure of semiotic agency, the specifying sign-relation for both adaptation_2b and phenotype_2b lack exemplar sign-relations.

1259 So, I wonder, does the intersection of neodarwinism provide complementary exemplar sign relations for the specifying sign-relations of natural history and genetics?

0909 The introduction (section 7.1) does not disagree.

To me, it seems that the label for the contiguity between SO_s and SV_e could be changed to “potential meaning”. [Presence] is rich with “potential meaning”.  So is the moniker, “information_2b“.

0910 At the same time, the introduction (section 7.1) does not agree.

0911 The author claims that “meaning” associates to how an organism interprets a sign.

Surely, that claim coheres to the SI_s.  Or, maybe it goes with the SI_e.

0912 Also, the author is interested in writing about resources that are not meaningful, but can be meaningful when an organism happens to discover that they have um… meaning_2c.

Sign-relations are essential for the discovery of signification.

So, the author figures that there are potential meanings (where an entity can become meaningful to a semiotic agent) and potential signs (where an entity can come to the attention of a semiotic agent).

The author offers a table to distinguish proper meanings and signs from potential meanings and signs.

Finally, section 7.1 concludes that organisms can actualize potential meanings (and potential signs) by integrating them into their own goal-directed activities, especially when those activities are phenotypic (hence, adaptive in Umwelts past).

In section 17.2, the author develops the theme of form within a sign-relation.

The argument is theoretical.

0913 So, allow me to return a previous example.

A revision is in order.

0914 One fine morning, an unattended dog wanders the streets of my town, looking for what?… a potential sign?  No.  It is looking for a message, in the form of a SV_s.

This unfamiliar dog is not an idealist.  Or maybe, the dog is an idealist, because the dog is certain that a form is nearby, and that he can sink his teeth into that form.  Not so much to chew, as to swallow.

0915 No sign-vehicle sends that interventional sign-object (SO_i) until a sound, emanating from a pile of leaves, sends a message… er… a specifying sign-vehicle (SV_s).

0916 Here is Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay for semiotic agency as a generalization of this canine organismin a semiotic context.

0917 In section 7.3, titled “Semiotic Agency in Biosemiotics”, Sharov references his groundbreaking 2021 work with Tonnessen.  The idea that semiotic agency is contained within biosemiotics is broached, but not with the verve of the above figure, which derives from Razie Mah’s examination of Sharov and Tonnessen’s 2021 text.

0916 “Semiotic agency” is no longer a label.  It is a technical tool for biosemiotics.  The utility of this tool is yet to be determined.  However, what this examination finds is significant.

Semiotic agency reifies specifying and exemplar sign-relations.  At the same time, semiotic agency draws upon an interscope that parallels the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

So, there are several key phenomena to consider.  The first is an initiating semiotic event_2a (SV_s) that parallels sensation_2a.  The second is information_2b (SO_s [presence] SV_e) that parallels perception_2b.  The third is a goal or aim_2c(SO_e) that parallels judgment_2c.

0917 Does that reduce semiotics to a tool, as noted in section 7.4?

I guess that sign-relations are tools in the same way that a dog’s snout (one side fitted for detection and the other side fitted for biting into the detected thing) is a tool.

I prefer to use the terms, “adaptations” and “phenotypes”.

0918 So, how should biosemioticians conceptualize potential meanings and potential signs (section 7.5)?

Take a look at the preceding figure.

What is in the pile of leaves?

A potential sign?

The sound and, with investigation, odor coming from a pile of leaves_2a (SV_s) stands for an animal_2b (SO_s) in regards to the wandering dog’s detecting_3b something going on in a pile of leaves_1b (SI_s). 

0919 What is salient (SI_e) about this hidden animal (SO_s)?

May I also ask, “What is the potential meaning of this hidden animal?”

The dog burrows into the leaf pile for further information_2b.  The animal may be wounded_2b.

Well, that means it_2b (SO_s) is not going to fight back_2b (SV_e).  So, the dog’s goal module_3c((1c)) (SI_e) says, “Yes, I can put this in my mouth.”_2c (SO_e).

0920 I am still in section 7.5, what do I know so far?

Meaning as the contiguity between SO_e and  SV_i lies just outside the purview of semiotic agency, as depicted in the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

Potential meaning lies within the contiguity between SO_s and SV_e, corresponding to situation level information_2b.  Potential meaning dwells within [presence].

0921 Here is a picture of semiotic agency, once again, with [presence] shortened to [p].

0922 Can I say that again?

All biological processes have the biosemiotic noumenal overlay in common.  Semiotic agency belongs to the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.  Semiotic agency contains a contiguity, that I label presence, which throws the reader back to the proposition that presence underlies the definition of a spoken word and now, “potential meaning” is a spoken term that fits into semiotic agency as a characteristic of [presence].

0923 Here is a diagram.

0924 One remarkable feature of this diagram is that presence is technically characterized as a contiguity within semiotic agency.  And, presence₁ underlies the spoken term, “potential meaning” in the normal context of definition₃.  On top of that, the nested form for definition does not compare to the nested form for agent.  Instead, the normal context of agent₃ brings semiotic agency₂ (somehow containing a reification of the nested form of definition for a spoken word) into relation with the possibility of a ‘final causality’₁.

In sum, the agent₃ defines its world within semiotic agency₂ according to its ongoing ‘final causalities’₁.

0925 At the same time, the agent₃ theoretically defines₂₍₃₎ “potential meaning”₂₍₂₎ according to the fact that [presence] is intrinsic to semiotic agency”₂₍₁₎ (as the contiguity within information_2b).

That sounds like a formal causality to me.  Formal causality brings harmony between the normal context₃ and its actuality₂.

0926 So, potential meaning belongs to [presence] in so far as information_2b can change [salience] (SI_e) in unexpected ways, resulting in impediments or empedoclements.

0927 Here is a picture.

0928 At this point, I must keep in mind that there are two other potentials₁ (besides presence₁) that underlie any spoken term₂ in the normal context of definition₃.  These are not embodied in semiotic agency.  In fact these potentials bridge semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation on the perspective and content levels.

0929 Bridges?

Suspension bridges?

Yes, [meaning] and [message] are contiguities suspended within the perspective-level actuality_2c of goal_2c and the content-level actuality of real initiating (semiotic) event_2a, respectively.

One contiguity spans from semiotic agency to the interventional sign-relation.  One contiguity spans in the reverse direction.

0930 In section 17.5, the author notes that the label of “potential meaning” may also be applied to hypothetical things that have not been observed before.  Well, let’s forget the qualifier, “hypothetical”, and put in the word, “encountered” for “observed”.  “Potential meaning” may be applied to things that we (semiotic agents) have not encountered before.

0931 Daisy knows ducks.  She participated in duck hunts on the farm before she broke her leg and ended up as my pet.  They were going to shoot her, to put her out of her pain, but I paid the vet bills and took her in.  It is funny how things work out that way.

So, when we come upon the unfamiliar dog, standing in a pile of leaves, with that huge ornamental duck in its mouth, I think “That poor ornamental duck.” and Daisy leaps forward and I fail to hold the leash (SV_i).  Now, the crisis begins.  Daisy’s goal_2c is obvious, that duck is hers and she [means] to take it (SV_i).

0932 I grab some rocks from a nearby planter and rush to follow along.  I don’t know whether Daisy knows that I will fight on her side.  But, I figure that, if this fight goes from uncertainty to calamity, I can at least use the rocks as ammunition to protect myself.  Oh, forget that, I am fighting for Daisy’s cause.

0933 The dog can’t defend himself and hold the duck at the same time.  He cannot make up his mind as Daisy makes a quick pass, nipping his front leg on her way.  In the process, he exposes his flank and I throw my first rock, which hits with a resounding thud.  The unfamiliar dog looks over at me.  What the…?  He drops the duck because he expects to engage Daisy.  Daisy parks in front of him in the fierce dog sort of way.  The prize lies between them.  Then, my third rock hits (my second missed completely) and the wayward dog thinks better of it.

0934 The whole incident takes less than two minutes.  The defeated dog trots off, looking back to make sure that we are not following.  I walk over to Daisy, who appears to be guarding the dead duck.

0935 I pick up the leash and Daisy noses the duck, then looks at me, like she is saying something.

0936 This is a good example for why semiotic agency is full of adaptations.

All species adapt to interventional signs within their Umwelt.

Some of these interventional signs are completely unsettling.

They start with {SO_e [meaning] SV_i}_2c.

0937 Here is a diagram of what happened.

0938 For the interventional sign-relation, Daisy breaking loose_2c (SV_i) stands for her expression of intent_2a (SO_i) in regards to the content-level normal context of a dog challenge_3a operating on the potential of ‘one or the other getting the duck’_1a (SI_i).

0939 This opens me to wondering whether the message in {SO_i [message] SV_s}_2a also carries a potential sign.

Does the unfamiliar dog dropping the duck and running off signify Daisy’s intent_2a (SO_i)?

That answer must be yes.

Daisy seems to be perfectly calm and I am unquestionably unnerved.

0940 Did she get what she wanted?

She presses her nose on the duck once again, then looks up at me.

At that moment, I get the message.

The duck is still alive!

0941 Potential meaning resides in [presence].  Potential signs reside in [message].

Does that seem rational?

0942 Here is a picture.

0943 In section 7.6, the author asks whether there can be potential meaning in a world without meaning (that is, life)?

0944 Now, if you (the reader) think that my last story about Daisy is implausible, then approach my answer as if it is a movie.  Movies only work when one suspends disbelief.  Movies are full of implausible moments.  But, the more unlikely feature is that we (humans) imagine that the illusion of moving pictures is real.  What other species watches television and responds as if the moving images convey realness?

My answer concludes at point 0964.

0945 Of course, there are physical processes that have emergent properties.  This topic of inquiry is examined in Parts 1 and 2 of Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  This commentary addresses three books Emergence (2019), Divine Action and Emergence(2021), and Theistic Evolution (2024).  This commentary is echoed in points 0288 through 0300.  These points lead into an examination of chapter 5 of Semiotic Agency (titled “Origins of Life”) and chapter 9 of Pathways (titled “Chemical Origins of Life”).

0946 If I adjust the intensity of the colors, then I can depict a world before meaning.

0947 Since biosemiotics and life are co-extensive (by definition), a non-living anti-entropic emergent being (such as a waterspout or an oil droplet in water) has no “proper semiotics”.  The purely relational structure of biosemiotics dwells in the realm of possibility.

Even stranger, neither [presence] nor [message], the harbors of potential meaning and potential sign, respectively, are real elements.  They are contiguities between real elements.

0948 Here is a picture, highlighting how these contiguities stand between real elements in a single actuality₂.  They are like [substance].

At last, I can say, “Without [message], there is no sign to manifest [presence].  Without [presence], there is no [meaning].”

Without content, there is no situation.  Without situation, there is no perspective.

0949 So, the question arises, “Can there be content without perspective?”

The answer is yes and no.

The answer is yes by way of example.

The answer is no, because without meaning, how can there be a message?

How about that example?

Imagine a molecular amino acid floating along a conduit in a hydrothermal vent.  It hits a rock and clings to that rock due to electrostatics.  Then, it finds its way into a micropore, which is completely lined with organic chemicals with similar properties.  They electrostatically cling to the surface of the micropore.  Plus, there is a little circulation.  Occasional pulses bring organic material in, but (since the organic molecules cling to the crystalline walls and to one another) no organic chemicals go out.

0950 Here is a picture.

0951 Yes, new terminology is proposed.

What is the [message]?

[Inter] is “enters from the Umwelt”.

0952 Something that is outside the micropore’s accreting sludge’s semiotic agency (SO_i) [ inters ] a place where organic molecules_2a (SV_s) stand for what is in a micropore of volcanic glass_2b (SO_s) operating on the potential of content entering into the pore and not leaving_1b (SI_s).

So, the [message] is [inter].

0953 Obviously, “inter” is a new word, technically coining something from outside of the agent that initiates semiotic agency.

The term is a play on “enter” as well as “inter”.  “Inter” derives from the Latin word for “among”, as in the term, “international”.  “Inter” also means to “bury a corpse”.  Here, “inter” alludes to the burial of the sign-object of the interventional sign.  Surely, a burial conveys a message.  That message inters the SO_i.

[Message] can be sort of like being born again.

0954 [Inter] is when the message is born the first time.  [Inter] is like a revelation to an agent that may not exist.  Or, if an agent exists, then [inter] is like a revelation, pure and simple, like the way that I realize that the dead duck is alive.

0955 Here is a picture for the nitrogenous organic molecule entering a micropore on the surface of volcanic glass in an Archean hydrothermal vent.

Organic molecules in the hydrothermal vent (SV_s) stand for accumulation (SO_s) in regards to the self-governance of carbon-based molecules in a micropore operating of possible courses of action (SI_s).

0956 The question arises, “Who is the agent₃?”

Is the “agent₃” the micropore with a hydrothermal vent?

Or, is the agent₃ the sludge accumulating in the micropore?  This agent₃ faces a problem faced by all hoarders.  There is only so much space in a micropore.  So, the micropore stops accumulating.

0957 But, not all micropores give up when sludged out.  Some develop organic subagents that assist in packing the micropore and are capable of latching to the walls of the hydrothermal vent, despite the turbulence.  These subagents then manage to colonize neighboring micropores, pack them over time, then find paths to other micropores.

Does that key into [presence]?

Is information_2b all about accumulation (SO_s) [presence] packing and moving on (SV_e)?

0957 Accumulation and packing_2b (SV_e) stands for colonization of adjacent micropores_2c (SO_e) in regards to packing micropores on the surface of volcanic glass in a hydrothermal vent_3c operating on the potential of these novel molecules that the sludge has inadvertently produced and keeps producing_1c (SI_e).

So, information_2b is more than sustained capture of organic materials floating by in the hydrothermal vent (SO_s).  Information_2b supports the spontaneous production of a suite of molecules that increase the amount that can be packed into a micropore.  Some type of catalyst manifests and this catalyst may leave the micropore and “infect” another micropore.

0958 Here is a picture.

Here, the label, [infold] replaces [inter].  [Infold] is “enters from the Innerwelt”.

Perhaps, the entire community of micropores constitutes the agent₃.