0029 From this association alone, I would expect that each way of talking would represent the world in its own unique way.  The way of hand talk represents the world through implicit abstraction.  The way of speech-alone talk represents the world through explicit abstraction.

0030 In the following steps, I use Suarez’s definition of ‘beings of reason’ to construct a model for implicit abstraction.

0031 Step 1: Start with an encounter

Being^itself₂ belongs to the realm of actuality.  Actuality belongs to Peirce’s category of secondness.  The category of secondness always contains two elements.  The paradigmatic example of secondness is cause and effect.  Both elements belong to actuality.  The two elements are contiguous.  One element accounts for the other.

When I encounter a being^itself, I encounter an effect, not a cause.  Animals, for example, respond to effects, rather than causes.  The effect is being^itself (what exists).  The animal wonders:  What do I do in response to this effect?  Do I approach, flee, or safely ignore it?

0032 Animals do not comprehend that what exists is one element in the dyad of actuality.

0033 So, I start with being^itself (what is encountered).  The figure is mostly empty.  One slot has an entry.  The slot belongs to actuality.

0034 Step 2: Project what accounts for what is encountered.

Humans, in contrast to animals, somehow understand that there is a cause. The human may wonder: How do I situate this effect in order to see what causes it?

Here, I use the word “cause” in the widest sense.  Cause accounts for the encountered being.  I encounter being^itself₂.  Being^encountered₂ is accounted for by another being_2. 

0035 So how does a being^{that-accounts}₂ enter into the picture?

It enters as the other element in the dyad of actuality.  Now, I have two elements in a single entry.  This entry corresponds to actuality.

0036 When a dog comes across something quizzical, it may look at its owner.

What is the dog up to?

The dog looks for a clue.  The human has something that the dog does not.  The encountered being₂ is mind-independent.  The accounting being₂ is mind-dependent.  The accounting being₂ is a nonbeing.  No one can demonstrate its existence.  It cannot be imaged or pointed to.

Yet, the human implicitly presumes its presence.  The human thinks of this nonbeing in the manner of being.  The dog watches for the human’s reaction to this nonbeing.  The human’s reaction sets the context for how the dog will respond.

0037 Step 3: A content-level nested form comes into view

Adding the second element to the dyad of actuality entails the construction of a category-based nested form.  The nested form is an abstraction because it draws itself out from the encountered being₂.  This occurs in the human intellect.

The nested form looks like this:

0038 The normal context of what is happening?₃ brings the dyadic actuality of {being in reason [accounts for] an encountered being}₂ in regards to the potential of ‘something happening’₁.

0039 I now return to Novotny’s text (Chapter 3; Section A).  Metaphysics is the study of being.  It entails the study of nonbeing.  The ‘being of reason’ is a type of nonbeing.  It is a nonbeing regarded in the manner of being.

So why is metaphysics interested in studying ‘beings of reason’?

Suarez lists four suggestions:

SM1: ‘Beings of reason’ are studied in order to facilitate the understanding of real beings.

SM2: This study is useful in various ways.

SM3: This study investigates their nature, causes, division and attributes.

SM4: Real beings are ontologically and epistemologically prior to ‘beings of reason’.

0040 These motivations point to various features of the nested form in the previous figure.

0041 At the same time, the suggestions illuminate the nested form.

Am I correct in asserting the following?

The only real being that appears in this picture is the encountered being_2a.

0042 Obviously not, the human intellect is also a real being.

So, what do I mean by the word “real”?

If by “real”, I mean to be regarded in the manner of being, then I may consider a being^in_reason to be real, even though it is a nonbeing.  So, a being^in_reason is a real nonbeing.  It is a nonbeing thought of in the manner of being.  In the same way, being regarded in the manner of being is real being.

0043 To me, this suggests that the world “real” requires a mind.  An intellect decides whether something is real (to be thought in the manner of being) or unreal (to not be thought in the manner of being).  Indeed, an intellect situates the entire content-level nested form.

0044 So, the human intellect_2b is a real being that situates the being^in_reason_2a.

So, let me reconsider Suarez’s four motivations with the other real being in mind.  Let me substitute the word “intellect” for “real beings” and rework the phrasing.

SM1: ‘Beings of reason’ are studied in order to facilitate understanding of the intellect (and encountered beings).

SM2: The study of beings^{in reason} is useful in various ways.

SM3: This study investigates their nature, causes, divisions and attributes.

SM4: The intellect and the encountered being are epistemologically and ontologically prior to ‘beings of reason’.

0045 This rewrite of Suarez’s suggestions enlarges my perspective.

There are two real beings in play: the encountered being_2a and the intellect that situates the being^in_reason_2a.  The study of beings^in_reason is useful to understand both the real beings that we encounter_2a and the human intellect_2a.  That understanding, which includes the nature, causes, divisions and attributes of beings^in_reason, puts both the situation-level intellect_2b and the content-level actualities_2a into perspective.

What does that imply?

There must be one more actuality.  It is located on the perspective level.

0046 The mental process may be explicitly labeled, “implicit abstraction”.

I can now sketch the relational drama.

0047 First, a human encounters a real being_2a.  This being^encountered_2a must be thought of in the manner of being.  It is real.  It is actual.

0048 But, since actuality is dyadic, there must be another actuality_2a, accounting for the actuality of the encountered being_2a.  The human experiences this as a gap.  During this content-level emptiness, the human is unaware of a normal context or its underlying possibilities.

Why does the human experience this in this way?

If the tendency to experience this gap is innate, then humans evolved into a very odd niche.  In that niche, a disposition to recognize the dyadic character of the category of secondness increased reproductive success.  How strange is that?

0049 Second, a situation-level intellect projects a being of reason_2a (a nonbeing regarded in the manner of being) into the empty slot of the content-level dyad.  When this is done, a content-level nested forms gels.  The normal context_3a is what is happening_3a.  The underlying potential_1a is something that could happen_1a.

What does this imply?

A feature of the intellect_2b is the efficient cause of the being of reason_2a.  I will call this the efficient intellect.

0050 As soon as the being^in_reason is in place, other causes become apparent.  A formal cause (referring to the normal context), a material cause (concerning the encountered being_2a) and a final cause (imagining the possibilities inherent in the appearance of the encountered being_1a) come into view.  These complete the content-level nested form.

0051 Third, another aspect of the intellect constructs a judgment_2c, contextualizing the operation of the efficient intellect.  If the encountered being_2a corresponds to ‘what it is’, and if the being^in_reason_2a corresponds to ‘what it ought to be’, and if the efficient intellect grasps a comparison between the two, then implicit abstraction ends up as a formal relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’.  This formal relation is a judgment that contextualizes the situation.

Thus, a perspective-level formal judgment_2c establishes the basis_1b on which the efficient intellect_2b operates.

0052 The barebones storyline for implicit abstraction looks like this:

0053 Next, I would like to consider Suarez’s claims about beings of reason, as ably discussed by Novotny (Chapter 4; Sections A and B).

0054 SC1: Beings^in_reason_2a have no formal_3a, material_{2a and 1a} and final_1a causes in the strict sense, but they have these causes in some sense.

These causes engage as soon as the being of reason_2a enters into the emptiness of the other element of the dyad of actuality.  Consequently, they operate when a being^in_reason is present.  Yet, they cannot account for a being^in_reasonbecause, technically, a being in reason is a nonbeing.  It simply does not exist.  Yet, apparent formal, material and final causes contribute to the impression that it does.

0055 SC2: Beings^in_reason_2a have no efficient cause in the strict sense.  However, they have an efficient cause in some sense.

SC3: The human intellect is the only efficient cause of ‘beings of reason’.

This fits the dynamic of an efficient intellect reaching into the empty space of the second element in the dyad of actuality and molding a being of reason.

0056 SC4: Extrinsic denominations are necessary but insufficient conditions for beings of reason.

What is an “extrinsic denomination”?  Is it an encountered being_2a?  An encountered being_2a is a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient condition for the formation of a being of reason_2a.

An extrinsic denomination_2a… er… encountered being_2a (?) plays a crucial role of creating an emptiness in the realm of actuality_2a.  It does this simply by occupying one of the elements of the content-level dyad.  The other element appears, almost magically, by an alignment of actualities₂ in the perspective_c and situation_b levels. The content-level emptiness of the other element of the dyad of actuality_2a is thus filled.

0057 Another way to say this is:

SC5: Beings of reason are caused by an act of the intellect that conceives of something that has no being in the manner of being.

0058 The being^in_reason_2a is a nonbeing.  It does not exist, even though it belongs to the realm of actuality.  The efficient intellect_2b is able to think of a being^in_reason_2a as if it exists because the formal intellect_2c provides a facilitating perspective.  A perspective-level judgment_2c virtually (across categories) brings a situation-level efficient intellect_2b into relation with a nonbeing that can be thought of in the manner of being_2a.  The being of reason_2a is a nonbeing that has the potential of being grasped (by the efficient intellect) as a being_2a.

0059 This corresponds to Suarez’s sixth and last thesis concerning the causes of beings of reason:

SC6: Beings of reason are caused by a reflexive act of the intellect.

0060 Today, the word “reflex” means “a stimulated act performed without awareness”.  Yet, to my mind, the word also suggests a bending, a re- (again) flex (turning), similar to a reflection.  The efficient intellect acts like a reflex.  But, it does so under the oversight of a reflection, a second turning.  A reflective second turning_2c virtually brings the reflex_2binto relation with the potential inherent in the being^in_reason_2a.

0061 Next, I would like to consider Suarez’s claims about the nature of beings of reason, as ably condensed by Novotny (Chapter 3; Sections B and C).  I will demonstrate that this model of implicit abstraction applies to Suarez’s claims.

0062 Before I continue, however, let me show the bare-bones schema once again.

0063 Novotny lists Suarez’s nine claims about the nature of beings of reason.

SN1: ‘A being of reason’ is what cannot be actualized in reality.

What does this mean?

A being^in_reason cannot exist by itself.

0064 SN2: Not every being of reason is self-contradictory.

Why does Suarez mention this?

Consider the question that Suarez thought he was addressing:  How do you explain negations, privations, self-contradictions and relations?

After all, they are nonexistent.  They cannot exist by themselves.  Yet, they can be real.  One can think of them in the manner of being.

0065 Indeed, the model shows that the question that Suarez was addressing was more extensive and twisted than he imagined.  Negations, privations, self-contradictions and relations are beings of reason_2a.  However, according to the model, they occur in conjunction with encountered beings_2a.

0066 Here is an example.  I dig with a shovel.  The soil that I move goes with being^encountered.  The hole_2a goes with nonbeing.  When I say, “Watch your step.  Don’t fall into the hole that I just dug.” I speak of the hole as if it were a being.  But, it is not a being^itself.  It is a privation of soil.

If you fall into the hole, the hole itself does you no harm.  It is the soil that you collide with that injures.  The soil that you would hit in a fall corresponds to an encountered being_2a.

0067 Anyone who has come across disturbed soil and has reflected on the types of injury produced by such encountershas a perspective on the danger of holes.  That person reflexively grasps the danger of this nonbeing.  It is as dangerous as any being that one might run into.

0068 A hole is a privation.  A configuration of soil generates this being of reason.  Privations are nonbeings that can be imagined as beings, but cannot exist in reality.  

The self-contradiction is also a being of reason.  A good example is a large human rat.

0069 If I encountered a large human rat, I would be surprised, since large human rats do not exist.  Yet, if I encountered something large, like a raccoon, scurrying inside a dumpster, I could mistake it as both a rat and a human.  In this way, self-contradictions may exist as beings of reason.

SN3: Every being is either a real being or being of reason, but no being is both.

0070 The raccoon (neither human nor rat, but easily mistaken for both) is a being^itself_2a.

The human rat is a being^in_reason_2a.

This suggests the following conclusion.  Since self-contradictions, negations and privations are always beings of reason, they can never exist as beings^themselves.

This lesson is plainly portrayed in the content-level actuality in the bare-bones schema for implicit abstraction.  The first element of the content-level of actuality is a real being.  A second element must be present, according to the nature of secondness.  This second element somehow accounts for the actuality of the encountered real being.

0071 At this point, I have a general idea of why schoolmen postulated beings of reason in their various inquiries.  After all, when looking at beings, there are all sorts of reversals, losses, confounding things and dependencies.  These are grasped as negations, privations, self-contradictions and relations.

What does it mean for one of these nonbeings to fill the emptiness of the second element of the content-level actuality?  It becomes a being^{in reason}.  It is taken to be real, even though it does not exist.

SN4: Beings of reason are – in the analogical sense of the word “are”.

SN7: A being of reason is regarded as a being, even though it has no being in itself.

0072 The efficient intellect_2b is a real being.  It ascribes being (existence) to the being^in_reason_2a.  “Object” is another word for being^in_reason.  The efficient intellect_2b grasps an object_2a.  It makes the object part of its subjective — reflexive — reckoning.

The object_2a goes with the content-level nested form.  The efficient intellect_2b belongs to the situation-level nested form.  The content-level normal context_3a is what is happening_3a.  The situation-level normal context_3b is situational reason_3b.

0073 SN6: A being^in_reason_2a has only objective being in the intellect_2b.

SN5: Three different relations to reason are indicated by the expression ‘being of reason’.  These are (1) effective, (2) subjective and (3) objective.

This is a minimum, since the bare-bones schema offers one more. (4) A perspective-level actuality_2c draws into relation the ‘what it is’ of the encountered being_2a and the ‘what it ought to be’ of the being^{in reason}_2a.  Since the intellect, the seat of reason, is involved, Suarez predicted that this relation would generate a comparison.

SN9:  Beings of reason and real beings are related by an analogy of proportionality.

0074 Finally, Suarez suggests why ‘beings of reason’ are necessary.

SN8a: ‘Beings of reason’ are necessary to know nonbeing.

Nonbeing is more than nothing.  According to the bare-bones schema, the being^{in reason}_2a is an actual object that the efficient intellect grasps.

0075 SN3b: ‘Beings of reason’ are needed to know things relatively in comparison to other things.

This reminds me of the perspective-level nested form.  The actuality that puts the efficient intellect into perspective_2c is a judgment that weighs ‘what it is’ against ‘what it ought to be’_2c.  This judgment_2c grounds reckoning_2b.  It addresses the question: On what basis would the efficient intellect_2b grasp a real nonbeing_2a in response to encountering a real being_2a?

0076 SN3c: ‘Beings of reason’ are required to explain the capacity of our intellect to think of self-contradictory beings (as well as negations, privations and relations).

0077 This matches the situation-level nested form.  The efficient intellect reckons_2b.  Once a real being is encountered, the efficient intellect reckons that there must be a second element to the dyad in the content-level actuality.  This must be an innate reckoning, because the efficient intellect does exactly what needs to be done.  It_2b projects an object_2a — a being^in_reason_2a — into the emptiness of the second element in the realm of actuality_2a.

The projected being^in_reason is thought of in the manner of being (existence).  This is why humans regard negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions as real, even though they cannot be seen, heard, touched, tasted or smelled.

0078 So far, so good.  The bare-bones schema coheres to Suarez’s nine claims about the nature of ‘beings of reason’.  The only drawback is:  Suarez actually made eleven claims.  There are two more to go.

0079 I did not mention these two because Novotny insightfully does not list them in chapter 3.  Why?  Novotny argues that they are not consistent with the other nine.  So, he lists them in chapter 4 — on the division of beings of reason.

0080 Before I go there, I want to shine the flashlight of the category-based nested form in another direction.

My thesis is that Suarez’s comprehensive treatment of beings of reason coheres to a model of implicit abstraction.  I also propose that implicit abstraction corresponds to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Implicit abstraction evolves in the milieu of hand talk.

In this section, I want to develop the latter claim.

0081 I intend to adapt this bare bones schema to hand talk.  The adaptation provides greater insight into the model and its application to Novotny’s story about ens rationis.

So here goes.

0082 When our hominin ancestors talked, they used linguistic manual-brachial word-gestures.  These word-gestures were referential.  They were natural signs.  They imaged and indicated their referents.

0083 What does this imply?

In hand talk, the words “real” and “being” cannot exist.  What is there to image?  What is there to point to?

The sensibility that goes with the word “real” changes.  From my standpoint, as a person who uses only speech-alone talk, I need to imagine what “real” would denote in the world of hand talk.

So, here is my compromise: “Real” labels that which may be imaged or pointed to instead of that which is regarded in the manner of being.  The term “being” goes with existence.

0084 In order to clarify, consider Suarez’s construction of ‘beings of reason’.  He uses Latin, a tongue in speech-alone talk.  His words belong to our current Lebenswelt.  He uses the word “real” in a particular manner.  It means to regard in the manner of being (existence).

The following matrix applies to speech-alone talk.  The two real elements stand out. The two unreal elements do not stand out.  Of the latter, one is not ruled out.  The ‘unreal being’ is an existent that must be regarded as if it does not exist.  The other is ruled out as impossible.  The ‘unreal nonbeing’ is a nothing.  It is like a whisper in an empty room.

0085 How should this matrix be adjusted for the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

There was no word for “real” in the world of hand talk (before Homo sapiens) and hand-speech talk (from the appearance of Homo sapiens to the first singularity).  Why?  How can anyone picture or point to “real”.  The term “real” is an explicit abstraction.

0086 So how do I apply the term to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

My suggestion goes like this: “Real” is what can be conveyed through word-gestures.  Since word-gestures image and indicate, what they picture and point to can be matched to our current term “real”.  The real is whatever can be imaged or indicated.  This results in the following matrix of real and being.

0087 Now, the two elements that stand out belong to being (existence).  The two elements that are hidden are nonbeing(nonexistent).  Of these, one is less hidden than the other.

To me, real nonbeing and unreal being have similar sensibilities.  As soon as I think that an ‘unreal being’ is possible, then I imagine that there must be a way to point to it.  The way to point to it may be nonsensical, but what is the alternative?  The way to point to a being that cannot be pointed to is by treating it as if it were a nonbeing that can be pointed to.

0088 In other words, in hand-speech talk, unreal being and real nonbeing may be two sides to a single coin.

During the Upper Paleolithic, people were not rich, but they did carry a few items of value with them.  Some of these were carvings of animals or people.  What were these images pointing to?  Obviously, the carvings imaged beings.  But, just as obviously, the imaged beings were no longer present.  Similarly, what is no longer present could be imaged and pointed to in hand and hand-speech talk.  Perhaps, the image was of a real being, that became a unreal being, but is now a real nonbeing.

0089 So maybe, the matrix should look like this:

0090 To me, this looks like a nested configuration, rather than two sides of the same coin.  The being that can be pointed to goes with content.  The being that cannot be pointed to goes with situation.  Then, the nonbeing that can be pointed to goes with perspective.

This produces the following variation of the bare-bones schema:

0091 The nonbeing that can be imaged and pointed to_2c may enter into the slot designated 2a (real being).  In doing so, an implicit abstraction becomes an encountered being_2a.

0092 How can this happen?

The nonbeing_2c can be pictured or indicated through hand talk.  The nonbeing could be a self-contradiction, negation, privation or relation.  It can be depicted through a grammatically correct but nonsensical proposition.  After all, the statement, “A hole is where the ground is no longer there.” does not make much sense.  Thus, the relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’ may become a gestural utterance that fills the slot designated for a real being_2a.

This conclusion parallels the ideas in A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction.  The student may want to take a look at this work.

0093 Shall I tell the fable of the big rat?

0094 Before the first singularity, our Paleolithic ancestors lived in bands that occasionally congregated into tribes.  A lot was accomplished in the apparent chaos of tribal song-fests.  It was during such a gathering that Running Goat was given new parents.  He was a strapping youth, but he needed guidance.  His father died during the winter.  His mother was given to his uncle.  But, Running Goat was not going to live under his uncle’s tent.  His uncle was not much of a hunter.  Dashing Bleeter was.

0095 The tribal elders made him the son of a renowned hunter in a different band.  The hunter and his wife gladly accepted this, not so much because it would increase their status, but because they had no children of their own. Running Goat was not the first child they adopted.

0096 In the band, a girl was coming of age.  Her name was Smiling Water.

One day, she was coming back to her tent with a gourd of water.  Running Goat was nearby, working on his bow and arrows.  He and his pal had just been out trying the tool.  It needed some adjustments.  When saw her, he elbowed his friend.  Watch this.

0097 “Wait!” he gestured to Smiling Water.  “Rat I See Into tent Run.”

Pool of Joy lowered her gourd and put it on the ground.  By tradition, she could not speak to a warrior.  So, even though he was not yet a warrior, she treated him as one, gesturing, “(Points to tent) Please Rat Chase.”

0098 Leaping Cloven Hoof rushed into the tent, as if chasing a rat.  Once in the tent, however, he stopped in his tracks.  What did he see?  The mother of Smiling Water crouched in a corner of the tent, fixing a pelt coat.  She looked up, unhappy at the interruption and knowing that Running Goat was up to no good.

She threw her boot at him.  His face flushed.  Oh, was he in trouble.  He ducked out of the tent.

But, Happy Liquid was outside the ten, ready to see a dead rat, killed by her newfound hero.

Running Goat gestured, “(Points to Smiling Water) (points to inside tent) Mother!”

0099 Then he took off.  His friend dropped the construction project and ran after him.

Waters of Smiles picked up the gourd and went into her tent.

0100 She asked her mom, “Rat Running Goat See?”

Her mother looked at her quizzically, then grinned, gesturing “Me Rat Big.”

Smiling Waters suddenly understood.  From then on, even after she was married to Running Goat, she called her mom: Big Rat.

0101 What is an implicit abstraction?

An implicit abstraction is a nonbeing that can be imaged or pointed to using hand or hand-speech talk.  The nonbeing is a relation between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’. It is imaged or pointed to through a grammatically correct nonsensical statement.

0102 Here is a diagram of the judgment in the fable.

Note how the entire judgment is captured in two word gestures: Big Rat.

0103 As far as triadic relations go, judgment is unusual.  Any of its three elements may be assigned to the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness.  In this case, the relation belongs to secondness (the realm of actuality), ‘what is’ goes with thirdness (the realm of normal context) and ‘what ought to be’ associates to firstness (the realm of possibility).

0104 The resulting nested form is constructed on the basis of the categories.  The example goes like this:

The normal context of the Big Rat (mom)₃ brings the actuality challenging RG’s attempts to impress SW₂ into relation with the possibilities inherent in RG’s desire to capture the love and attention of SW₁.

0105 This raises the question, “Is this category-based nested form indivisible?”

0106 Novotny lists Suarez’s last two claims about the nature of ‘beings of reason’ in the chapter on division.

The student should read Chapter 5 of Novotny’s book.

0107 Suarez struggled to show the relevance of the traditional formulation.  He arrived at two conclusions:

SD1: ‘Beings of reason’ have three exclusive and sufficient species: negation, privation and relation.

SD2: Self-contradictory ‘beings of reason’ may define a fourth category, or they may belong to negation.

Put another way, negations, privations and relations are always ‘beings of reason’.  Self-contradictions may or may not be inherent.

0108 In order to appreciate these divisions, consider the triad that constitutes judgment on the perspective level.  The four traditional items fit into the structure of judgment as ‘what ought to be’.

0109 The element, what it ought to be, typically goes with firstness.  The logic of firstness is inclusive.  It allows contradictions.  Traditional formulas for ‘beings of reason’ are full of contradictions.  After all, they are beings that cannot possibly exist by themselves.

How can a negation exist without the reversal of a real being?  Yet, these non-existents may be regarded in the manner of being.  They may take on a life of their own.

0110 How does this happen?

A relation (in thirdness) becomes the basis on which ‘what it ought to be’ takes on the character of secondness.  ‘What is’, the encountered being, takes on the character of firstness.  For example, negation_2a arises from a reversal of the potential of the encountered being_2a.  ‘The reversed encountered being’ goes with ‘effect’.  Negation is projected as a ‘cause’.

0111 Implicit abstraction expresses the whole judgment in the slot designated 2a (real being).  Hand and hand-speech talk image and point to an action that may be attributed to a judgment.  The result may be a grammatically correct, yet nonsensical, statement.  The action… um…the statement_2a is what_2a the judgment_2c stands for.  But, the judgment cannot be pictured or indicated in hand talk.

Explicit abstraction places an element of judgment in the slot designated 2a (real being).  Why is this so?  Spoken words are symbols.  Symbols are placeholders in a system of differences.  So the whole judgment becomes an order composed of particular elements.  Each element may (or may not) get a label.

0112 Suarez’s claims imbue the element of ‘what it ought to be’ with secondness (the realm of actuality).  Negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions may now be examined as if they were real beings.  At the same time, the real being falls into the background, without a label.  The real being becomes an element that is hidden by Suarez’s definition of a ‘being of reason’.

Suarez’s explicit abstraction may now enter the slot designated 2a (real being), without regard to the other elements.

0113 Consider the previous two figures along with the tenth statement on the nature of ‘beings of reason’.

SN10: Negations and privations may be in things (as real negations or privations) or in beings of reason (as negations or privations that are spoken about as if they are real).

0114 Surely, this statement re-enacts the above categorical flip between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’.  When a negation is regarded as a real privation in a thing, it goes with firstness, the realm of possibility.  Why?  The real being (secondness) has a potential for reversal (firstness).  When the negation is regarded in the manner of being, it goes with secondness, the realm of actuallity.  It becomes actual.  Meanwhile, the encountered being enters into the category of firstness. 

0115 Suarez’s statement on the nature of beings^in_reason explicitly abstracts one feature of the three elements of judgment.  The scholastics before Suarez noticed a pattern.  If negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions entered into someone’s discourse, then the schoolman ended up discussing nonbeings the manner of being.  No one was sure why this was the case.

0116 The observation itself goes into the record as the eleventh and last claim listed by Novotny.  Suarez claims:

SN11: Humans think in both the ‘manner of being’ and ‘the manner of nonbeing’.

After all, one could not define the ‘being of reason’ unless one imagined a being in the manner of a nonbeing.  Ironically, this is precisely what occurred when Suarez transubstantiated (changed Peircean categories) the encountered real being (what it is) from the category of secondness into firstness.

A being thought of in the manner of a nonbeing may manifest itself it many ways.  It may be an existent that one must declare cannot possibly exist.  It may be a being existing in pure potential.  It may be a being that somehow causes an action to happen.  Then, the action exists, and the being that causes it must be regarded in the manner of a nonbeing.

0117 Say what?

Technically, a being belonging to the category of firstness (possibility) within a particular thirdness (normal context)can also be a being that one assumes (as if it is a nonbeing, such as an idea) and then ignores (because one has to deal with secondness, the realm of actuality). 

Is that confusing, or what?

It is especially confusing since we evolved to confound the iconic and indexal linguistic act_2a with thinking in the manner of being (existence).  Hand talk is experienced as real being_2a.  By extension, so is speech-alone talk.  What Suarez calls a ‘being of reason’ is experienced_2b as a nonreal being_2a, a being that cannot be pictuerd and pointed to (and therefore cannot be regarded as existing by itself).

0118 This experience_2b is triggered by the presence of talk_2a.  The efficient intellect_2b asks the question: What accounts for a linguistic act_2a (in the slot designated for real encountered beings)?

Is a linguistic act_2a the same as an encountered being_2a?

Or is it an encounter_2a regarded_2b in the manner of being_2a?

If that is not confusing enough, consider this: What Suarez defines as ‘a being of reason’ (a nonbeing thought of in the manner of a being) corresponds to a judgment_2c.  Judgment_2c is a nonbeing that cannot be imaged or pointed to (hence, hand talked about).  But, the action produced by a judgment can be pictured and indicated.

Oh my.  An action that can be imaged and indicated may go into the slot for an encountered being_2a.

But, the being that cannot be pointed to_2a is not the judgment_2c that is somehow objectified by the action_2a, it_2a is um… a being^{of reason}_2a.

0119 The following matrix hybridizes hand talk and Suarez’s speech-alone talk concepts.

0120 No wonder Daniel Novotny starts to question Suarez’s approach in the chapter of the division of ‘beings of reason’.  The terms “being”, “existence”, “nonbeing”, “image” and “indication” are intertwined in the strangest fashion.  To me, Suarez has intuitively constructed a model of implicit abstraction in a philosophical tradition devoted to explicit abstraction.

On one hand, implicit abstraction belongs to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  It also belongs to our current Lebenswelt.

On the other hand, explicit abstraction belongs only to our current Lebenswelt.

0121 Here is the bare-bones schema for implicit abstraction:

Here is the skeletal model for Suarez’ motivation to study ‘beings of reason’:

0122 Implicit abstraction operates when a judgment is imaged or pointed to in hand or hand-speech talk.  Icons and indexes are holistic.  They are indivisible.  Consequently, their referent is the entire judgment.

0123 The nested form model of Suarez’s motivations diagrams an explicit process.  The process starts with an encountered being_2a.  The efficient intellect reckons a being^in_reason_2a. The formal intellect arrives at ‘a judgment that the efficient intellect has generated something that cannot exist as a mind-independent being.  Oops, I meant to say: a nonbeing thought of in the manner of being.

Various scholastics (before Suarez) offered this explicit abstraction in order to explain observations.  Suarez aims to construct a comprehensive treatment of these ‘beings of reason’.  He formulates a thought experiment.  The thought experiment imbues beings^in_reason with secondness.  But, in doing so, the schoolman enters unknown territory.  Suarez is about to place this explicit abstraction into the slot designated for an encountered being_2a.

0124 Here is another example.

0125 Around the time that Suarez was working on his thought experiment, Galileo was tinkering with his less ambitious and more playful scientific experiments.  Some of these were driven by technology.  The ability to make glass lens and the ability to understand how lenses worked bootstrapped one another.  Galileo made a telescope, also called a spyglass, that proved valuable to merchants waiting for ships to arrive.

0126 Why?

The prices of goods changed as soon as a ship arrived.  There was an advantage to lock in a low price when the ship had not arrived and its arrival was uncertain.  After the ship arrived, ‘the certainty of delivery’ increased prices.

A spyglass and a high tower made for advantage.  They eliminated privation (lack of certainty).

0127 Here is the story in a nutshell:

0128 Before the spyglass, no one knew whether the Athena would arrive with its shipment of olive oil from Corinth.  This was a privation.  A person could pay now for a jug of olive oil later, once the ship came in.  Privation went with risk.  If I were confident, my privation would not deter me from making my bid (paying a low price).  If I were less confident, it would.

0129 In this regard, privation is like negation.  It is like blindness.  I cannot see the future.  I cannot make a confident reckoning_2b because the arrival of the ship exists as situational potential_2b.  I do not know_3b whether it is real_1b until the arrival itself_2a.  Until its arrival, I am full of contradictions.  Do I make a bid?  Or do I wait for expensive certainty?

0130 With these two situations in mind, consider the difference between the real and the unreal.  Which being^{in reason}_2awould be labeled “real” and which “unreal”?  I will answer my own question, “Of course, the delivery would be labeled real because I spied the Athena on the horizon.”

0131 Meanwhile, a different me walks through the downtown exchange.  I do not possess a spyglass or a high tower.  The owner of the Athena asks me whether I want to buy 5 amphora of olive oil on his ship.  He promises it will come in soon.  He offers a great price, but I am not sure.  I heard rumors… Surely, my privation is a nonbeing that I regard in the manner of being.  Why?  The risk is palpable.

0132 I could write out the advantages of buying now.  I could write out the disadvantages.  These would be explicit abstractions that I could use when I go home and tell my wife that I had been to the exchange.

She says, “I told you not to go there.  You always lose money.  How am I going to run this house with you losing money like that.  By the way, we are out of olive oil.”

0133 I sit on a stool as she storms out of the kitchen.

The maid, who was listening, quietly approaches, whispering “Sir, it is none of my business, but I have a friend with a spyglass, and he says the Athena is on the horizon.”

0134 Now, I go back to Suarez.

0135 The terms of “privation”, “negation”, “self-contradiction” and “relation” are explicit abstractions.  They are not like implicit abstractions.

The same goes for the term: beings^{in reason}. 

In hand talk and hand-speech talk, beings of reason_2a would be beings that one cannot image or point to (therefore, cannot talk about)_2a.

In speech-alone talk, ‘beings of reason_2a” are nonbeings thought of in the manner of being_2a.

My uncertainty in the example is a being of reason_2a in both senses.

0136 In hand talk, I could never put my being of reason into the slot designated for the encountered being_2a.  I could never dissociate my being of reason (what it ought to be) from its relation to an encountered being (it is).

In speech-alone talk, I can dissect my own judgment_2c.  In fact, this is precisely where Suarez’s thought experiment leads:  What happens when I place an explicit abstraction into the slot designated for the encountered being_2a?

0137 What happens when my uncertainty enters the slot for a real being_2a?

Students should read chapter 6 of Novotny’s book.

0138 Francisco Suarez, S.J., is born in 1548 AD and died in 1617.  He starts teaching at Salamanca College in 1570.  He moves on to other universities.  Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, S.J., is a young colleague of Suarez at Salamanca College.  He considers beings of reason in two efforts, once in 1615 and again in 1624.  The first version of Disputation 19 is five thousand words long.  The second version is thirteen thousand words long.

0139 Hurtado starts by confirming Suarez’s divisions:

H1D1: Beings of reason fall into privations, negations and relations.

0140 He then contends:

H1N4: There are beings of reason.

H1N2: A ‘being of reason’ is what has merely objective being in the intellect.

H1N1: Extrinsic denomination is necessary, but not sufficient, for something to be a being of reason.

0141 Hurtado steps right into Suarez’s thought experiment.  Or should I say, “madness”?  He places an explicit abstraction, the ‘being of reason’ defined as ‘a nonbeing thought of in the manner of being’, right into the slot designated for a real being_2a.  The technical term for this placement is “extrinsic denomination”.

0142 Then, before I can scream, “No!  This is a booby trap,” Hurtado’s efficient intellect_2b has grasped this apparently real being_2a and generated the second element in the dyad of actuality_2a:

H1N3: A ‘being of reason’ is a false proposition thought of in the manner of being true.

H1N5: ‘Beings of reason’ are completely dependent on actual mental acts.

0143 Here is a model for the actual mental act:

H1C1: ‘Beings of reason’ are constituted by false mental acts.

0144 So, this model must be situated by the possibility of falsehood.

0145 The situation must be put into perspective.

H1N6: Some beings of reason can be actualized in reality.

0146 A good example is the being^{in reason}_2a of my feeling that the Athena will arrive with its cargo intact.

H1C2: Beings^{in reason}_2a are made of false statements.  The false statements may be necessary or contingent.

0147 Hmmm.  The potential of falsehood_1b is taking a life of its own.

0148 Self-contradictions make certain the possibility of falsehood_1b.

H1N8: True judgments about self-contradictory beings must presuppose that they are composed of false statements.

H1N7 and 9: Self-contradictory beings are not ‘beings of reason’.  They are pure nothingness.  No, that is not it.  They are fictitious beings.

0149 This provides nuance to the previous interscope.

0150 Falsehood_1b is a way to deny realness_1b.  Another way to deny realness_1b is labeled “fiction”.  This logic implies that truth is a way to affirm realness_1b.  Another way to affirm realness_1b has a label, as well.  It is called “fact”.

0151 According to Hurtado, facts are not beings^in_reason. They are beings because they affirm the referent that they correspond to.  Fictions are a peculiar sort of real being, because they pretend to affirm the referent that they correspond to.  Thus, the whole discussion comes to a judgment.  This judgment values true over false.

0152 This judgment has some notable features.

Previously, whatever went into the slot for encountered being_2a became ‘what it is’.  Suarez did not mention this connection.  He assumed it.  Now, the explicitly abstracted term, “facts”, designates ‘what is’.  Thus, Hurtado concludes that facts are not ‘beings of reason’.

0153 The being^{in reason}_2a remains ‘what it ought to be’.  Since judgment presents it solely within the metric of true versus false, the ‘being of reason’ becomes false.

0154 The entire relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’ remains the occasion for an implicit abstraction.  However, this abstraction entails a valuation of the quality of a speech-alone statement.

For Hurtado’s first version of Disputation 19, the axis of true versus false brings the ‘what is’ of fact into relation withthe ‘what ought not to be’ of fiction.

0155 To me, that fits the word “definition”.