05/14/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 14 of 19)

0172 Novotny’s summaries of Suarez and Hurtado suggest a story.  The story goes like this:

Francisco Suarez S.J. figured that he could construct a comprehensive approach to ens rationis (being of reason).  During the previous centuries, ‘beings of reason’ had been used in scholastic discussions of various topics.  Three types of ‘being of reason’ stood out.  These were negation, privation and relation.  Self-contradiction went in there somewhere.

Suarez wrote about the natures, causes and divisions of beings of reason.  (As it turns out, these fit into a model constructed of category-based nested forms.  The model starts with encountered beings2a and ends with judgment2c.  The same model applies to implicit abstraction [a way of thinking] and hand and hand-speech language [ways of talking].  These features belong to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.)

Suarez proposed a thought experiment.  What happens when an act of speech-alone talk becomes the encountered real being2a?  (This thought experiment becomes apparent with the model.  However, it entails a mind-boggling transition.  ‘An act of speech-alone talk’ is not the same as either a real encounter or hand talk.)

0173 Pedro Hurtado S.J. conducted the experiment.  The answer was unexpected.  The perspective-level actuality changed from judgment2c to definition2c.

In Suarez’s set up, judgment2c virtually contextualizes a reckoning2b based on the possibility inherent in realness1b.  Realness exists in the realm of possibility.  It includes both true versus false and true versus deception.  Realness1b is thinking about it2a in the manner of being (existence).

In Hurtado’s execution, proper definition2c virtually contextualizes a reckoning2b based on the potential of fact versus fiction1b.  Facts go with true.  Fiction goes with false.

0174 Novotny takes issue with Hurtado’s claim that he is merely following the steps of Suarez.  How can Hurtado come up with different conclusions?

The answer is plain.  Hurtado placed input that belongs to our current Lebenswelt into a model that coheres with the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Speech-alone talk does not image or point to its referent, as hand talk does.  Explicit abstraction can symbolize one aspect of judgment and place the other aspects under erasure.  Implicit abstraction is holistic.  Explicit abstraction is not.

0175 Tellingly, in this transition from implicit to explicit abstraction, a facet of realness falls into shadow.  The facet is the axis of true versus deception.  In this occultation, the Age of Ideas begins.

0176 Definitions only care about true versus false.  Modernism focuses only on facts.

0177 Daniel Novotny is a detective as well as a philosopher.  He traces the attempt to develop a comprehensive treatment of beings of reason.  There are many clues in the writings of various Baroque scholastics.  Novotny faces the dilemma: Who do I present?

Suarez and Hurtado are obvious selections.  Suarez was a Baroque scholastic of great renown.  Hurtado was his understudy.

0178 But then what?

My analysis relies on Novotny’s genius.  After Suarez (publishing around 1600) and Hurtado (around 1620), Novotny introduces a pair of Franciscans, Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto (between 1628 and 1646).

0179 The manner in which they discuss the status of the question (concerning beings of reason) shows that they, like Hurtado, are investigating explicit abstraction (within a thought experiment set up for implicit abstraction).  Novotny lists three claims:

MBN1: The term ‘being of reason’ is defined as ‘an object of the intellect and nothing else’.

MBN2: There are beings of reason.  Beings of reason are actual.

MBN3: Beings of reason require actual thought.  They are completely mind-dependent.

0180 These claims fit into the interscope for explicit abstraction.  ‘The being of reason2a’ is a decoded statement2a.  ‘Complete mind-dependence’ suggests that the being of reason2a is fiction, not fact1b.

Nevertheless, the fiction1b, emerging from the decoded statement2a, may be regarded as fact1b.  Yet, through reflection, the formal intellect may discern that the being of reason2a is fictional1b.  In doing so, the formal intellect attains truth by properly defining ‘the being of reason’ as fiction. 

0180 Thus, the three claims go with the words colored red in the following figure.

05/13/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 15 of 19)

0182 In Chapter 7; Section A; Part 1, Novotny uses the word “real” for “fact”.  This is curious.  In Hurtado’s (explicitly abstract) model, situational potential is fact versus fiction1b.  In contrast, the situational potential in implicit abstraction is realness1b.

0183 Even more revealing is the terminus of the reflective act2c.

For Hurtado, the reflective act arrives at true, as opposed to false, premises.  This includes the identification of a statement as fiction.  The identification must be regarded as true, even though the statement itself is fiction.

0184 How does this work?

An encountered explicit abstraction2a triggers action by the efficient intellect2b.  I suppose that one could say that the being of reason2a arises from the potential of whatever processes a speech-alone statement1a.  It could be the potential of automatic decoding1a.  Or it could exist as an object2a that necessarily fits the normal context of ‘this must be a proposition’3a.

0185 I suggest that the encountered explicit abstraction2a could also be called “an extrinsic denomination2a”.  Originally, the latter term suggests that all beings of reason2a are somehow pegged to encountered real beings2a.  This accords to that intuition.

0186 However, look at the term closely.  “Extrinsic” means from outside the intellect of the subject.  It could also mean from outside the subject.  “Denomination” means to apply a name or value to this or that.  A spoken proposition2acould fit the bill.

0187 So the idea of extrinsic denomination could shift, from an image where beings of reason are tags on encountered forms2a or acts of reason2a to a picture where beings of reason are decoded versions of propositions that are spoken to me2a.

With that shift, spoken statements2a (one element in the content-level actuality) may trigger the efficient intellect2b to produce a being of reason2a (the other element of the dyad) that is virtually proper (truly defined)2c and appropriate(factually reckoned)2b.  Such objects must already reside in the vocabularies of the efficient2b and formal2c intellects, even though only the occasion of the encountered speech-alone statements2a makes them actual.

0188 This scenario matches Mastri’s and Belluto’s fourth claim:

MBN4: Before they are actual objects of the intellect, beings of reason exist as virtual and potential objects.

Yet, they do not exist as actual or possible real beings.

MBN5: Beings of reason cannot exist in actual reality.

However, they fill a slot in the realm of actuality.  Consequently…

MBN6: Beings of reason are not pure nothingness.

0189 By filling in the empty slot of the dyad of actuality2a, the efficient intellect2b imposes a being of reason2a into the content-level nested form.   This being of reason2a will get classified as fact or fiction1b, depending on the situation3b. However, the default situation is real, so:

0190 MBN7: Beings of reason are thought of in the manner of facts (true and real beings), even though they may be fiction.

This implies that facts are not beings of reason.  Beings of reason are fictional, even though they may be regarded as facts.  Once the formal intellect ascertains that a beingin_reason2a is fiction, then the situation changes, and the efficient intellect may now grasp the being of reason2a as fiction1b.

(Perhaps, this goes with the fact that Cervantes published Don Quixote, the first fictional novel of the Age of Ideas, in Spanish in 1607 AD.)

0191 MBN8: The formal intellect may reflexively (or reflectively) think of ‘beings of reason’ as ‘fictions’.

The formal intellect2c does this through analogy: Beings of reason are to thought as beings are to existence.

MBN9: Beings of reason exist (are beings) in an analogical sense of existence (being).

0192 What does this imply?

Novotny sums it up.  Mastri’s and Belluto’s treatment is more mature than Suarez’s set up.

0193 The question is: Why?

Mastri and Belluto run Suarez’s thought experiment.  They take Hurtado’s perspective, valuing true over false, and arrive at a similar entanglement with fact and fiction.  Yet, Mastri and Belluto re-work Hurtado’s jarring change of perspective and re-establish the importance of the ‘being of reason’:

The beingin_reason is important because it allows the formal intellect to identify it as fiction, thereby arriving at a truth. That truth is not available to fact, which is already true.

0194 In their narrative arc, the being of reason2a is transcribed into a type of decoded statement2a.  The beingin_reason2ais a decoded statement that will be classified as fiction, even though, at first, the efficient intellect2b grasps it as fact.  When the formal intellect2c discerns the decoded statement2a as false, it2c arrives at a truth: This reckoning2b is false2c, so it must situate2b a fiction1b.

The situation changes.  Once the decoded statement2a is labeled a ‘being of reason2a’, the efficient intellect may grasp the decoded statement2a as fiction and truthfully entertain its falsehood.

0195 Mastri’s and Belluto’s perspective2c looks like this:

0196 Amazingly, the Baroque scholastics arrive at a counterpoint to the emerging Age of Ideas.  The Age of Ideastheorizes how facts produce true definitions.  The Baroque scholastics discover how fictions are false, until the moment that the formal intellect recognizes them as false.  Then, that recognition introduces truth.  So, now a beingin_reason may be regarded as fact in a situation conditioned by a truthful acknowledgment of fiction.

As such, Mastri and Belluto (as well as other Baroque scholastics) justify modern literature as written words that are false unless regarded as fiction.  They do so before modern literature is written.  Who could anticipate that?  Is the Age of Ideas also the Age of Fiction?

05/12/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 16 of 19)

0197 What next? 

Novotny considers a rather odd Cistercian who distanced himself from all the schools of the Baroque era.  Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz publishes an essay one year before his death in 1682 AD.  The work is titled Leptatotos, translating as “The Most Subtle”.  This essay contains a discussion on ‘beings of reason’.

The student should read chapter 8 of Novotny’s text.

0198 Caramuel starts with a list of meanings associated with the term.  Or rather, he begins with a pairing of apparent contradictions.

The first pair is active and passive.  Active goes with the efficient intellect2b.  Passive goes with the next pair: real and intentional.  Real is a product of the intellect that pertains to mind-independent beings or states of being.  Intentional goes with the next pair: subjective and objective.  Subjective is a state of the subject, that is, the intellect, which is active and dwells on the real.  Objective goes with the next pair: impossible and possible.  Impossible goes with beings that cannot exist.  Possible goes with the next trio: logic, physics and psychics.

To me, this list weirdly echoes the contrast between fact and fiction.

0199 If I go backwards, I start by acknowledging that the possible is not all encompassing.  I set aside logic (the laws of non-contradiction), physics (the deterministic laws of cause and effect) and psychics (the pursuit of resolving mental contradictions).  I consider the impossible.  The impossible is a contradiction (a dyad) that cannot reduce to its monadic elements through logic, physics or mental gymnastics.

0200 The impossible and the possible then flow into the objective.  The term “objective” indicates an object within the intellect.  It does not reduce to the subjective.  The ‘subjective’ is whatever is going on in the subject.  For moderns, the subject may reduce to neurophysiological dynamics.  But, the object cannot be reduced.  The object belongs to a sign, a non-reducible triadic relation.

0201 The objective and the subjective then flow into the intentional.  The term, “intentional”, contrasts with the term, “real”.

To me, these terms point to the dyad of actuality in the content-level nested form.  “Real” describes the encountered being2a.  A ‘real being’ is being thought of in the manner of being.  “Intentional” describes what is imputed to the real being2a.  The efficient intellect2b projects ‘a being of reason (or a decoded version of a speech-alone statement)2a’ in order to grasp what is happening3a and the potential underlying the encountered being1a.

0202 The intentional and real then flow into the passive.  The term “passive” seems odd, because it corresponds to ‘the machinations of the active efficient intellect’.  Just as a dancer feels that the music moves her, not the other way around, the efficient intellect generates its content-level nested forms in response to an encounter that cannot easily be ignored.  Indeed, sometimes the efficient intellect does so mindlessly.

0203 So what is a ‘being of reason’?

CN1: In its proper sense, a being of reason is objective and impossible.

That means the flow is from passive, into intentional, into objective, then into impossible.  

This makes me consider what is impossible.  Impossible contrasts with possible.  The possible flows into logic, physics and psychics.  These fields apply the logic of non-contradiction to various topics.

So what is impossible defies all methods to resolve contradictions.  The impossible is a contradiction (a bound dyad) that cannot be reduced to its monadic elements through logic, physics or rationalizations.

0204 Caramuel loved to coin new words.  He fashioned the word “incompossible” to label this particular type of contradiction.  An incompossible actuality cannot be reduced to its underlying potentials.

So what does Caramuel say?

CN2: If anything, a being of reason is self-contradictory.  It is the extrinsic or intrinsic union of incompatible things.

0205 How can this happen?  What causes this union?

CC1: Language (talk) is the efficient cause of extrinsically united self-contradictory objects.

CN3: There are no intrinsically united self-contradictory beings of reason.

CN4: There are extrinsically united self-contradictory beings of reason.

CN5: Extrinsically united self-contradictions (beings of reason) are real beings.

0206 What is going on?

0207 Like Hurtado, Mastri and Belluto, Caramuel transforms Suarez’s original Baroque scholastic interscope by introducing a new perspective.  This perspective values unity over division.  This type of perspective could account for a chimera, an imaginary animal stitched together from parts of real animals.  For example, the Greek Chiron is half-man and half-horse.  Hold the pieces close enough together and they will attach to one another.

Caramuel’s perspective shifts the situation.  With Suarez, situational reason relies on the potential of realness.  For Hurtado, and later, Mastri and Belluto, situational reason works with the possibilities inherent in fact versus fiction.  For Caramuel, situational reason deals with the possibility that contradictions can co-exist in the realm of actuality.  This potential defines the impossible.

0208 Two contradicting actualities are linked — through linguistic expression — into a single actuality2a.  The linguistic expression occupies the slot designated for a real encountered being2a.  The linguistic expression is decoded into a living contradiction2a.  The efficient intellect projects this living contradiction2a — a being of reason2a — as the remaining element in the content-level dyad of actuality.  The being of reason2a accounts for the encountered linguistic statement2a.

0209 The efficient intellect2a can only employ this projection2a within a formal intellect2b that values unity over division or structure over chaos.  In modern terms, this formal intellect seeks gestalt.

0210 Here is Caramuel’s argument as an interscope:

0211 Three surprises come to the fore.

First, Caramuel’s model applies to any fully linguistic way of talking.  Two contradictory items may be united only through grammar.  Grammar consists of operations within a symbolic order.  This applies to hand talk, hand-speech talk and speech-alone talk.  Therefore, Caramuel’s model transcends the differences between the Lebenswelt that we evolved in and our current Lebenswelt.

Second, Caramuel’s model applies to modern theories of gestalt and cognitive association.  Humans can discern a white horse in a snowy field.  Humans can imagine a mythical creature that has the torso of a man and the body of the horse.

Third, Caramuel explicitly recovers the part of judgment2c that Suarez ignores and Hurtado Mastri and Belluto do not include.  “It is” is a linguistic statement that expresses a self-contradiction.

0212 Caramuel answers the question originally posed by Suarez: What are the causes, natures and divisions of beings of reason?  He does this by altering the definition of a ‘being of reason’ into something that Suarez would not recognize:

0213 A ‘being of reason’ is an extrinsic, linguistically formulated, self-contradiction that is thought of in the manner of an intrinsic unity.

05/11/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 17 of 19)

0214 Whoa!  Who would have expected that?

0215 The being of reason is still the other element in the dyad of actuality in the content level2a.  As such, it accounts for ‘the original element in the dyad of actuality, the encountered being2a’.

The encountered being2a is a language-event that stimulates the efficient intellect2b to produce this particular type of account2a, in the process of constructing a content-level nested form.

The beingin_reason2a is composed of actualities that contradict.   It emerges within the efficient intellect2b from the potential of intrinsic unity1b.

0216 At this point, I return to Novotny’s summary of Caramuel (Chapter 8; Section B).

0217 What are the causes of ‘beings of reason’?

CC1: Language is the (efficient) cause of extrinsically united, self-contradictory objects (‘beings of reason’).

CC2: If anything, language is the (efficient) cause of the (intellect seeing ‘beings of reason’ as) intrinsic unification.

CC3: If anything, God (efficiently) causes the ‘essence’ of the intrinsic unity (exhibited by beings of reason within the intellect).

CC4: If anything, intrinsically united ‘beings of reason’ have no formal or material causes.  They may have exemplar or final causes.

0218 To me, the depicted model captures all these causes.  The efficient intellect2b decodes a linguistic statement2a, producing a being of reason2a that depicts contradicting actualities as a single (contradiction-filled) actuality2a.  This actuality is then situated by the potential for intrinsic unity1b.  This potential1b underlies the efficient intellect2b within the normal context of situational reason3b.

0219 Notably, Caramuel’s causes call to mind one of Hurtado’s causes:

H2C9: ‘Beings of reason’ can be made through the simple apprehension of unity between incompatible items.

This suggests that the entire process is experienced as simple apprehension.  In modern terms, ‘beings of reason’ are gestalt experiences.

0220 What does this imply?

To Novotny, Caramuel’s perspective tends towards elimination of the term ‘beings of reason’ from the disciplines of ontology (the study of being) and metaphysics (inquiry into being itself).  After all, the very term ‘being of reason’ contains a contradiction.  Therefore, it is not subject to the logic of non-contradiction.  Beings that are not subject to the logic of non-contradiction cannot be actual.

0221 Or can they?

Novotny goes on to say that Caramuel may as well have written this, “Does it make sense to insist that there are non-existing entities that we treat as if they existed?  One would also have to insist that the contrary is true.  Some entities exist that we treat as if they do not exist.”

0222 To me, that recalls the matrix that has appeared more than once in this work.

0223 What Suarez called ‘a being of reason’ fits both entries in the red dashed outline.  It fits hand talk as an unreal being (a being that cannot be pointed to).  It fits speech-alone talk as a real nonbeing (a nonbeing that can be thought of as existing).

0224 How does this work?  Or, how does this not work?

0225 In hand talk, a real encountered being2a stimulates the efficient intellect.  The efficient intellect produces a being of reason2a, a nonreal being.  This beingin_reason2a exists as a being in the person, manifesting itself through fleeting physiological expressions. These expressions can be pictured and pointed to.  But, my projected beingin_reason2a cannot be seen by others.  Thus, the beingin_reason2a is a being that cannot be pointed to.

0226 Then, the reckoning2b that produces the beingin_reason2a is judged2c.  This judgment2c is a nonbeing that can be pointed to2c.

0227 Why is the judgment2c a real nonbeing?

It2c yields a hand talk statement that conveys a contradiction2a.  Two actualities are unified within one actuality.  The single actuality is a contradiction that has no being (existence), but it can be imaged and indicated.  The efficient intellect2b situates the encountered statement2a as an expression of truth2a.  This truth2a is a nonbeing that can be thought of in the manner of being.

0228 This is the nature of implicit abstraction.

0229 In speech-alone talk, a real encountered being2a stimulates the efficient intellect.  The efficient intellect produces a being of reason2a, a real nonbeing.  According to Suarez, this beingin_reason2a is a nonbeing that is thought of in the manner of being (existence).  If it existed, it would exist in the intellect2b.

I can say this only because I can symbolize the intellect using speech-alone words.  Symbols are placeholders in a system of differences.  Therefore, they do not exist by themselves.  They are nonbeings that cannot be thought of in the manner of being.

0230 With that said, I march on.  ‘The reckoning that produces the beingin_reason2a’ is judged according to what ought to be defined2c.  According to Hurtado, the beingin_reason2a is a fiction1b.  This accords with the perspective of true versus false2c.  According to Caramuel, it2a is a gestalt1b uniting two contradicting actualities2a.  This accords with a perspective of unity versus incoherence2c.

0231 Judgment2c supports an unreal being, manifesting as a speech-alone statement, independent of the formal intellect.  That speech-alone statement is encountered as a real being2a, even though it never fully articulates the complete judgment.  I call the process of speaking a judgment: an explicit abstraction2c.

It2c becomes a speech-alone talk statement2a that forces the intellect2b to do this or that.  Is it fact or fiction?  Is it unity or chaos?  The efficient intellect2b situates the encountered statement2a according to a reigning perspective2c.

This is the nature of explicit abstraction.

0232 Implicit abstraction belongs to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in (as well as our current Lebenswelt).  It is intuitively natural.  Explicit abstraction belongs to our current Lebenswelt.  It is often counterintuitive.

Students should read the concluding chapter of Novotny’s book.

05/9/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel” (Part 18 of 19)

0233 If it is baroque, then how does one fix it?

0234 Baroque scholasticism is difficult to access.

Why?

It is written in Latin.

Plus, the format of Aristotle’s inquiry can confuse the reader.  Novotny’s pithy summaries are marvelous aids for understanding.  Also, since Novotny has already surveyed various Baroque scholastics, his intuition serves as a guide.  My comments closely track his text.

0235 In his work, Novotny aimed to display the dramatic shift in opinion concerning beings of reason between 1600 and 1680 AD.  This shift of opinion now raises two postmodern issues.

0236 One concerns the implications of the first singularity.  The adoption of speech-alone talk (and loss of hand talk) opens the door to explicit abstraction.  The history of philosophy may tell the tale of the unfolding of explicit abstraction.  

0237 Two, there is another history.  It is the historical expression of implicit abstraction in our current Lebenswelt.

These are issues to reflect upon.

0238 Through Suarez, scholastic inquiry constructs a model of implicit abstraction.  Through Hurtado, Mastri and Belluto, scholastic inquiry explodes the model by placing explicit abstractions into the slot designated for encountered real beings2a.  Then, with Caramuel, scholastic inquiry changes the perspective, turning the being of reason into both a real nonbeing and an unreal being.  Here is a subject of inquiry that defies the logic of actuality.

0239 But Caramuel does not conclude what I state here:  Actuality is not everything.  Actuality is not all there is.

0240 I say this only because Charles S. Peirce opens a new age of understanding.  There are three categories to existence: firstness, secondness and thirdness.  Firstness is the monadic realm of possibility.  Secondness is the dyadic realm of actuality.  Thirdness is the triadic realm of normal context.

Models of intuitive and explicit abstraction display the trajectory of Novotny’s narrative.  They do so from a truly postmodern stance.  Consequently, they demonstrate the potential of scholasticism in the Age of Triadic Relations.

0241 What comes next begins where Caramuel left off.

0242 What is this gestalt that contains a contradiction?  Where does his alternate definition of the ‘being of reason’ lead?

0243 Caramuel answers the question originally posed by Suarez: What are the causes, natures and divisions of beings of reason?  He does this by altering the definition of a ‘being of reason’ into something that Suarez would not recognize:

A ‘being of reason’ is an extrinsic, linguistically formulated, self-contradiction that is thought of in the manner of an intrinsic unity.

0244 Here is a picture of Caramuel’s novel concepts, once again.

0245 Let me examine the components.

0246 First, what is encountered?

Caramuel’s redefinition applies to hand talk, hand-speech talk and speech-alone talk.  All that is required is a grammatically correct statement that contains a self-contradiction.

What is encountered2a is one element of a dyad in the realm of actuality.  Roughly, this element corresponds to the word ‘effect’ in the phrase ‘cause and effect’.  The senses come into play.  For hand talk and speech-alone talk, the encountered being2a is a statement.

0247 What happens next?

Following Suarez’s model, the efficient intellect then projects a ‘being of reason’ into the slot that would roughly correspond to ‘cause’.  The being of reason2a accounts for what is encountered2a.  It is an object within the subject of the intellect2b.  The efficient intellect2b is able to project ‘an intrinsically unified being of reason2a’ because it emerges from the possibility inherent in unity1b.

0248 This explains how ‘beings of reason’ arise from extrinsic (to the subject, the situated intellect) statements.  This also explains how ‘beings of reason’ are projections of the efficient intellect2b.

05/8/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 19 of 19)

0249 Second, what is the structure of this ‘being of reason’?

0250 Let me start with an example.

My example will be the words “being of reason”2a.

This example belongs to our current Lebenswelt, since both ‘being’ and ‘reason’ are explicit abstractions.  The terms are juxtaposed in a way that violates the laws of non-contradiction.  ‘A being’ is an actuality whose existence cannot be denied.  It is a fact.  ‘Reason’ is the determination of a ratio.  This determination is a second, contradicting actuality.

0251 Why does the juxtaposition entail a contradiction?

A being is one element.  A ratio compares two elements.  What is the other element that ‘a being’ is compared to?  It must be something regarding the manner of being because it is weighed against being.  But, it does not exist in the manner of being.

0252 OK, maybe I can accept that there is a contradiction between two actualities.

What are the two actualities?

The first is being2 (‘what is encountered’).  The second is the determination of a ratio2.

A single actuality contains these two contradicting actualities.  It does so by serving as the terminus for the ratio.

0253 At this point, to me, the intrinsic unity becomes apparent.  The beingin_reason2a is what the encountered being ought to be.

In this case, the encountered being2a is an extrinsic, linguistically formulated, self-contradiction.  The being of reason2abecomes a single, unified nonbeing composed of two actualities: the word “being”, pointing to existence or what is, and the determination of a ratio or reason, pointing to the constellation of what ought to be.  The unification must be a nonbeing because the logic of non-contradiction cannot reduce it to its component actualities.

0254 This suggests that nonbeings resist the logic of non-contradiction.  Yet, beingsin_reason are actual when they occupy the slot designated for secondness in the category-based nested form.

0255 This also suggests that the two component actualities belong to nested forms.  In other words, each of the actualities comes with a normal context and possibilities.

0256 What could these nested forms be?

I figure that the normal context3 for being as what is there2 might be realness3.  Perhaps, it3 is existence3.  The underlying possibility1 is a basis for realness1.   Realness3 brings ‘being (what is)2’ into relation with a potential basis for realness1.

I suppose that the normal context3 for the determination of a ratio2 is rationality3.  The underlying possibility1 is a basis for the ratio1.  So, rationality3 brings ‘the determination of a ratio2’ into relation with a potential basis for the ratio1.

0257 The two nested forms intersect in the realm of actuality, as follows:

0258 Curiously, this intersection reflects all the elements in judgment2c.  Judgment2c belongs to the formal intellect2c. Judgment2c virtually contextualizes the reckoning by the efficient intellect2b.

0259 Judgment2c is a relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’.  The formal intellect virtually designs the normal contexts of the intersection and sets the parameters for the potentials.

0260 For Baroque scholastics, the basis of rationality was captured in the logic of non-contradiction.  This is why the beingin reason2a could not exist, even though it could be regarded in the manner of being.  The basis of realness was existence.  Facts went with existence.  Fiction did not.

0261 The interscope for ‘being of reason’ in Baroque scholasticism ended up looking like this:

0262 To me, this interscope marks the beginning and the end of the Age of Ideas.

The Age of Ideas emphasizes the axis of true versus false, throwing the axis of true versus deception into shadow.  Baroque scholasticism faded from view, along with fictions like beingsin_reason.

On the one hand, once the elevation of one axis and the occlusion of the other axis became ingrained as habit, then modern philosophy and science follows.

On the other hand, modern literature explores the negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions in which Baroque scholasticism sleeps.

0263 Modernism is a world with a fixed perspective.  Actuality is every thing.  Actuality is all there is.  For example, modernism elevates human dispositions.  It occludes human conscience.  Thus, the term “sin”, which coincides with the intersection of human action and thought, follows the same trajectory as “beings of reason”.

0264 Modernism is a world of deception.  Surely, facts may paint a false picture.  Facts depend on one’s fictions.  Indeed, facts will support ‘the current intersection of existence and rationality’ until the moment when deception turns realness into deprivation and negates rationality with its own distorted valuations.

Will we then return to beings of reason as explanations for negation, privation, relation and self-contradiction?  Or will we return to beingsin_reason in order to locate the intrinsic unity between fact and fiction?

0265 There is more to actuality than every thing.  Charles Peirce opens a path to postmodern scholasticism.  Deely and Novotny opened a vista into where we have been.

The student should now proceed to Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Essay (2017) “Izquierdo on Universals” by Razie Mah.

05/7/26

Semiotics and History – Baroque Scholasticism and Early Modernism (Part 1 of 1)

SaH0043 The Baroque scholastics of southern and central Europe live at the same time as the mechanical philosophers of northern and western Europe.  The latter give rise to the Age of Fiction, with Cervantes publishing Don Quixote in the early 1600s.  The former give rise to the Age of Ideas, with the birth of modern science.

Of course, it is not as neat as that.

Consequently, an examination of an article by Novotny serves as a capstone for Razie Mah’s online course on Baroque Scholasticism and as an introduction to an online course in Early Modernism.

Baroque Scholasticism consists of Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel (and appears in Razie Mah’s blog in May, 2026).

The capstone for Baroque Scholasticism and the introduction to …and Early Modernism consists of Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Article (2017) Izquierdo on Universals

Baroque Scholasticism and Early Modernism consist of a review of Eric Santner’s Book (2016) The Weight of All Flesh.

SaH0044 Both are strands in the course: Semiotics and History.

See Razie Mah’s blog for February 3, 2026.

05/7/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Essay (2017) Izquierdo on Universals (Part 1 of 6)

0267 What are universals? Why are they important? 

In the Spring 2017 issue of the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (vol. 91(2) pages 227-249), Daniel Novotny examines Disputation 17 of the Baroque scholastic treatise, The Lighthouse of the Sciences (1659).  The title of Novotny’s article is Sebastian Izquierdo on Universals: A Way Beyond Realism and Nominalism.  These comments intend to demonstrate the postmodern relevance of this work using the category-based nested form.

The student should obtain the article from online.

0268 Oh, back to the starting questions.

Some things are similar to one another.  Universals grow out of this impression.  Various things can share in certain universals, to the exclusion of other things.  In this very brief paper, Daniel Novotny reviews and summarizes the theory of universals proposed by the Spanish Baroque scholastic, Sebastian Izquierdo, SJ (1600-1681 AD).

Izquierdo’s life overlaps with the northern European authors who mark the dawn of the Age of Ideas, including Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Rene Descartes (1596-1650).  His life also overlaps with theorists marking the twilight of the Latin Age, including Francisco Suarexz (1548-1617) and John Poinsot (1589-1644).  Our current age is born at this time.  This is the moment to which we must return in order to come to terms with our era.

0269 Daniel Novotny is not unfamiliar with the Baroque philosophers.  I commented on his full-length book, Ens Rationis: From Suarez to Caramuel, published in 2013.  Novotny’s exposition is so clear that constructing (inevitably messy) category-based nested forms came easy.

My comments wove a story into his presentation, starting with the dichotomy of fact versus fiction and ending with an intimation of postmodern social construction.  This narrative adds value by connecting Baroque scholasticism and our present, postmodern, world.

0270 As for the article under examination, Novotny begins with a caveat.  Baroque philosophy and theology is a complex tapestry, filled with commentary and references.  One can easily get lost in this forest of questions and answers.  Typically, an entire text must be examined in order to configure an author’s opinion, if distinct from all others.  Since such effort is very difficult and time consuming, Novotny limits this publication to a careful examination of Disputation 17 of Izquierdo’s major philosophical work, The Lighthouse of the Sciences.

Disputation 17 presents Izquierdo’s theory of universals.

0271 The table of contents for The Lighthouse of the Sciences is organized in a novel way, portending substantial differences from traditional doctrines and methods.  In Disputation 17, Izquierdo considers three questions.  To me, these questions sound postmodern.

Q1. What are universals?

Q2. Are some universals independent of the intellect?

Q3. If universals are intellect dependent, what is their nature?

0272 To the first question, Izquierdo offers four meanings:

0273 Let me supply an example from Eric Santner’s (2016) book, The Weight of All Flesh. 

0274 During late medieval and early modern times, political theologians proposed that the king had two bodies.  One was mortal.  The other was glorious.

When a king died, his mortal body was quickly buried.  An effigy (representing the king’s glorious body) was manufactured and placed on the throne until the coronation of a new king.  Then, the effigy was buried in a separate funeral.

0275 The glorious body of the king is a universal with four meanings.

0276 The last meaning is particularly twisted.  The universal, in its proper sense, cannot be a particular.  Yet, here is a particular effigy that becomes a symbol of the king’s glorious body.

According to C. S. Peirce, a symbol is a sign based on tradition, convention, law, consensus and so on.  Here, a political and theological consensus connects a sign-object (the king’s glorious body) to a sign-vehicle (an effigy of the deceased king).

0277 In Peirce’s semiotic terminology, the scholastic term “objective concept” portrays the union of a sign-vehicle and sign-object.  The term “objective precision” reflects the operation of a sign-interpretant.

0278 In the terminology of the nested form, “objective concept” belongs to secondness, the realm of actuality.  “Objective precision” belongs thirdness and firstness, the realms of normal context and possibility, respectively.  An objective concept is a mind-dependent being.  Objective precision is a formal act of the intellect.

0279 For example, in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a murderous uncle gains the throne and becomes king (objective concept).  Unfortunately, the ghost of Hamlet’s father (the glorious body of the deceased king) appears, calling Hamlet to reject his uncle’s claims (through objective precision).  Hamlet’s uncle has no nobility.  Therefore, his uncle is not king (and does not have a glorious body, since the glorious body of Hamlet’s father haunts the world).

0280 This dramatic call to judgment may be depicted as a relation between what is and what ought to be.  Indeed, I define the actuality of judgment as this triadic relation.

0281 Here is a diagram.

05/6/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Essay (2017) Izquierdo on Universals (Part 2 of 6)

0282 Judgment is the actuality of a perspective-level nested form.  Unlike the drama of Hamlet, the scholastic objective concept is a judgment within the normal context of reason, rather than paranoia and passion.

0283 The normal context of reason3c brings the actuality of a relation between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’2c into relation with the potential of intellectual understanding1c.

0284 The actuality2c goes with objective concept.  The normal context3c and potential1c compose objective precision.

0285 How do the four meanings figure into this model of the scholastic term “objective concept”.

0286 The first meaning (M1) goes like this: A universal may be with respect to causal operations.

0287 The following depicts the ongoing example.

0288 The other three meanings behave similarly.  Each occupies a slot for judgment.

0289 Now, back to universals.

0290 According to Izquierdo, Aristotle follows two definitions of universal.

D1. A universal can exist in the many.

D2. A universal can be predicated in the many.

0291 To me, D1 goes with what is and D2 goes with what ought to be.

0292 Here is how that fits the ongoing model of judgment2c.

0293 This diagram implies that a third universal exists within the (universal) triadic structure of judgment.  This universal (D0) coincides with the meaning that brings D1 and D2 into relation.

0294 What does this imply?

0295 Universals are important because they participate in judgment2c.  Judgment2c is a primal triadic relation occurring within the normal context of reason3c.  The potential of intellectual understanding1c underlies judgment2c.

0296 Judgment2c is the natural harbor for universals.  In fact, judgment itself is a universal, since all humans share the ability to form judgments that may be diagrammed as a triadic relation.

0297 Aristotle isolated two universals (D1 and D2) and potentiated the discovery of the third (D0).

The third corresponds to the four meanings that Izquierdo assigns to universals.

05/5/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Essay (2017) Izquierdo on Universals (Part 3 of 6)

0298 Now, let me return to the example of the dual-body of the king.

0299 Here is the diagram.

0300 The meaning of a universal (D0, a causal operator, imbues) brings one universal (D1, the mortal body) into relation with another universal (D2, the glorious body of the king). 

0301 The political theory of the dual body of the king, identified by Eric Santner as a precursor to the modern theory of capitalism, brings three universals into a primal triad.  Each king, just like anyone else, is really or physically bound to the universal of the mortal body.  Each king, unlike anyone else, is formally and logically bound to the universal of the royal glorious body.  The glorious body of the king is a universal with respect to political nation states.

0302 The king’s glorious body is unique to each realm.  As such, the appearance of the king’s ghost (glorious body) must be disturbing for whoever sits on the throne (a mortal body claiming to be imbued with the one unique glorious body).

0303 The relation between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’2c is primal.  There is no a priori assignment of each element to a category.  The law of non-contradiction (which applies to actuality) dictates that each element dwells in one and only one category.  There are only three elements.  There are only three categories.

0304 In order for the primal triad to unfold into a nested form, each element must be assigned one unique category.  Typically, relation is assigned the quality of thirdness, becoming the normal context of an unfolding nested form.  ‘What is’ is filled with the quality of secondness, turning into actuality in the subsequent form.  ‘What ought to be’ is endowed with firstness, ending up as the potential of the subsequent unfolding nested form.

0305 However, other permutations are allowed.

0306 The previous figure typically yields the following nested form:  The normal context of imbues3 brings the actuality of the mortal body of the king2 into relation with the potential of a royal glorious body1.

0307 In the case of Hamlet, the ghost of the king takes on the mantle of secondness and the king’s deceased body becomes an exclusive concern (rich in thirdness).  The resulting nested form looks like this: The normal context of the murder of the king (mortal body)3 brings the actuality of the king’s ghost (glorious body)2 into relation with the potential that the king is imbued with a mission calling for retribution1.  The political and theological relation, where the glorious body of the king imbues the mortal body of the king, has been violated.

(Indeed, Shakespeare (1564-1617) and Miguel de cervantes (1547-1616) dates to the time of the Baroque Scholastics (1600-1680)).

0308 Are universals found in reality, independent of the intellect?

0309 Izquierdo lists four positions.  He argues against three and agrees with the fourth.  Novotny provides the details.  The fourth position goes like this:

T4. By nature, a universal is common to individuals only in the intellect.  It has no other lesser than numerical unity (that is, it is indivisible).

0310 I wonder: Does the primal triad of judgment and its elements satisfy this position?

0311 Let me start with the primal triad.

0312 The primal triad is by nature common to all individuals in a community.  All communities are composed of individuals who reason3c, thus actualize judgment2c in the pursuit of understanding1c.

0313 Members within each civilized community share particular primal triads.  Indeed, this is required for members of a community.  Those who cannot formulate particular primal triads (as formal acts of the intellect) are excluded from working together within an organization.  In our current Lebenswelt, many communities are so specialized that those who have not mastered particular elements and operations are excluded.

0048 In civilization, the fourth position (T4) works in two ways.  Objective precision is universal by nature.  Particular objective concepts are common to individuals in community.  Also, particular objective concepts define individuals in community by establishing conditions for belonging.

0314 The primal triad is indivisible.  It cannot be reduced to any one of its components.  In this, it has no lesser than numeric unity.  The entire primal triad must be delineated in the pursuit of explicit intellectual comprehension.

0050 This delineation is possible only in purely symbolic languages, such as speech-alone talk.  This explains my caveat: “in civilization”.  Our current Lebenswelt is potentiated by the purely symbolic qualities of speech-alone talk.

0315 Theoretically, each element of a primal triad can be extracted and labeled.  Practically, such a process fails to capture the intuitive aspects of judgment.

Remember, each element of the primal triad is a universal, steeped in varying qualities of thirdness (context and exclusivity), secondness (actuality and non-contradiction) and firstness (potential and inclusivity).  Only when a judgment becomes a nested form are the categorical assignments fixed.

0316 This brings me to the elements.

Aristotle connects two elements to universals.  These two elements are what is (existents) and what ought to be(predicates).  Izquierdo has these two elements in mind.  At the same time, he searches for how they fit into a bigger picture.

0317 He asks: What is the nature of Aristotle’s universals?

He concludes that universals exist only in the intellect.  This means that universals only exist in an intellectual actuality (or structure).  The primal triad models the intellectual structure of judgment2c.  Only a universal may occupy each slot.

0318 This again poses the question: What is a universal (now, as an element within an intellectual structure, the primal triad)?

0319 In order to discern an answer, I must step back and see the interplay of intellect with other types of cognition in the individual in community.