A First Look at Julian Jaynes’s Book (1976) “The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind” (Part 15 of 21)
0432 Here is a timeline for the Near East, starting with the first singularity.

0433 By the time that archeological evidence for the Ubaid is obvious (say, around 5800 B.C.), surrounding cultures are already dropping the hand-component of their hand-speech talk.
0434 Even though the Ubaid practices speech-alone talk, the bicameral mind persists.
Indeed, the bicameral mind persists through the Sumerian Dynastic, long after writing is invented.
For hundreds of years, cuneiform writing is used to record transactions and inventories. But, no scribe writes that the temple and the palace are competing power sources. Surely, the scribes record events involving competition among factions and powers, but the explicit abstraction of “competition” has yet to be labeled. Despite this, modern academics find it easy to project modern conflicts between state and church onto ancient civilizational structures. Are they missing the mark?
0435 If Julian Jaynes is on target, then people in the Sumerian Dynastic do not think with subjective consciousness. Instead, they do what their “auditory hallucinations” tell them to do.
In sum, people in these early civilizations cultivate a bicameral mentality.
0436 Let me say this again.
The first singularity marks the transition from the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt. The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices hand-talk (or hand-speech talk) and exhibits constrained social complexity. Our current Lebenswelt practices speech-alone talk and exhibits unconstrained social complexity.
The semiotic characteristics of hand-talk and speech-alone talk account for the difference.
0437 Peirce identified three natural sign-relations: icon, index and symbol.
Here is a picture of how each way of talking employs Peirce’s natural sign-relations.

0438 The semiotics of hand-talk allows both sensible and social construction. Hand-talk images and indicates its referents. The referent precedes the manual-brachial word-gesture. Because hand-talk words are distinct, they behave like symbols. Symbols are different from one another. They form a symbolic order that allows symbolic operations, such as grammar. This is how hand-talk becomes fully linguistic.
0439 The semiotics of speech-alone talk appears to allow sensible construction. Spoken words, such as “cat” and “chair” appear to picture and point to their referent. But, they really don’t. Spoken words do not picture or point to anything. So, speech-alone talk ultimately favors social construction, even for familiar terms. Consider “cat-nap” and “chair-person”.
0440 Along with social construction, spoken words can label anything. Labeling is the first step in explicit abstraction. Words are defined on the basis of meaning, presence and message.
0441 Finally, speech-alone talk is fully linguistic because spoken words are already symbols. Each spoken word differs from other spoken words. So, symbolic operations can spontaneously order discourse.
0442 Surely, cultural transitions from hand-speech talk to speech-alone talk preserve continuity with respect to speech-talk, but not with respect to hand-talk. To me, the hypothesis of the first singularity helps explain why there seems to be two paces to language evolution. Linguistic data seem to show very slow evolution of words from long ago(corresponding to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, practicing hand-speech talk) and more rapid word-sound change in recent times (corresponding to our current Lebenswelt, practicing speech-alone talk).
0443 My summary of the impact of the first singularity starts with the following figure.

0444 The first singularity marks the evolutionary transition from the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt. It also denotes the cultural transition from hand-speech talk to speech-alone talk.
0445 Hand and hand-speech talk only permit implicit abstraction. The purely relational structures of the interscope, the interventional sign and the bicameral mind engage implicit abstraction. These triadic relations are holistic. They are not analyzed. They are performed. Consequently, these relational structures facilitate constrained social complexity, where teams may specialize, but individuals do so only modestly. Indeed, hand-speech talk adapts to conduct both sensible and social construction in teams and communities.
0446 Speech-alone talk is experienced as if it is hand-speech talk. But, it is not, because speech-alone words do not image or point to anything.
This is tricky, because spoken words appear to allow implicit abstraction and facilitate explicit abstraction. When the Wernicke’s region on the right adopts a spoken label as if it is a hand-talk word, then the person projects that assumption into the way an utterance is decoded. I suppose that might increase the intelligibility of perception2b in a specialized cultural venue, and if that is so, then speech-alone facilitates unconstrained social complexity. That does not mean harmony among social circles. It means the multiplication of explicit social circles based on specialized disciplinary languages and means of production.
0447 Given that the semiotic properties of hand-talk (and hand-speech talk) and speech-alone talk are radically different and given that the bicameral mind is an adaptation that pumps interventional sign-relations, then one may wonder how the evolved two-chambered mind performs in the milieu of unconstrained social complexity.
This is where the hypotheses of Julian Jaynes applies.