0208 Chapters 4 and 5 of Basak’s text discuss the generation of the major and minor gods that comprise the divine council, the Anunnaki.

I would like to start with the actuality₂ of Enlil’s separation of the sky and the earth from the point of view of Lotman’s thing.

0209 Here is a picture of Lotman’s empirio-schematic virtually contextualizing a nested form of Enlil’s creation story.

Uh oh, does this figure imply that Lotman’s thing is now operating on the perspective level?

Does that mean that an unfolded empirio-schematic judgment occupies the perspective level?

Oh my.

0210 As mentioned earlier (and completely missed by Basak), the actualities of An₂ and Ki₂ are further differentiated in the creation of the other members of the divine council, resulting in a surprisingly rich actuality₂ composed of two contiguous real category-based nested forms.

Remember that the green separation consists of Enlil’s domain, which is not a real element, but a substance.  The [air] is the contiguity between the heavens and the earth.

0211 The categorical qualities within heavenly and earthly nested forms are colored by the fact that the nested forms are real elements within a divine actuality_2b.

0212 The thirdness of An₃ and Ki₃ is reified into two complementary normal contexts₃.  They do not align with one another.  They do not exclude one another.

0213 The secondness of Utu₂, Nanna₂, Ninhursag₂ and Ereshlugal₂ is as solid as the sun, moon, mountains and underworld.

0214 Finally, the gods of Enki₁ and Inanna₁ associate to the realm of possibility, as if those possibilities are actual.

Surely, these are speculative observations.

Nevertheless, these are the ones that I want to explore, using Basak’s text for mythological accounts.

0215 I start with Enki₁.  Part III of chapter 6 recounts the congratulatory celebration following the creation of humans as the resolution of the Igigi’s labor stoppage in the Eridu Genesis.

Yes, the gods throw a party.  Enki₁ and Ninmah₂ (Ninhursag₂) are both in attendance.  Enki₁ is the one who comes up with the idea of creating humans in order to solve the divine labor dispute.  Ninmah₂ is crucial to fashioning the human out of clay from Enki’s domain, the Abzu.

Already, the impression is made that Enki₁ belongs to the realm of possibility (the category of firstness) and Ninmah₂ belongs to the realm of actuality (the category of secondness).

0216 After drinking jugs of beer, the two gods engage in a contest about who can create the most useless humans.

0217 Ninmah₂ goes first.  She creates six messed up humans.  One has weak hands.  Another is blind.  A third has broken feet.  A fourth is incontinent.  A fifth is barren.  A sixth is sexless.  This comports with what one expects for a goddess imbued with secondness (in regards to Ki₃) within Enlil₃‘s secondness.

Enki₁‘s retort addresses the question, “How can each disfigured or dysfunctional person be a productive member of society?”  He assigns different specializations to each.  In doing so, he₁ offers a divine precedent for inclusion and for balancing apparent contradictions (between a person’s functionality and that person’s job).

0218 Enki₁ goes next.  He fashions a creature that looks like the following.

It cannot sit.  It cannot stand.  It cannot walk.  It cannot eat bread or drink beer.  It cannot speak or listen.  What can this flawed, helpless being do?  It cannot do anything.  Ninmah₂, the so-called “mother goddess”, is flummoxed.   She₂ curses Enki₁ for his folly.

0219 Chapter 5 discusses the goddess Inanna₁ (in Sumerian) and Ishtar₁ (in Akkadian).  She is queen of the heaven and earth, but mostly the earth, since her interests include love and war.

Yes, she reigns over the contradictory domains of love, beauty, sexuality and fertility as well as war, conflict, political power and intrigue.

To me, that sounds like the category of firstness.  The logics of firstness are inclusive.  Firstness allows contradictions.

0220 The following story associates to the forty-day retrograde of the planet Venus.

0221 Inanna₁ desires power (one wonders why) even from Kur, the underworld, the domain of her elder sister, the goddess Ereslugal₂.  She₁ decides to go herself₁.  Inanna₁ adorns herself before her descent, but she is forced to surrender a piece of her regalia at each of the seven gates.  By the time she gets to Ereshlugal₂‘s throne-room, she is naked and powerless to defend herself.

Uh-oh.

0222 Ereshlugal₂ calls the Anunnaki, once the celestial divine council (in the Sumerian sign-world), now a court ruling over the fate of the deceased (in the Akkadian sign-world).  Their decision is brutal.  Inanna₁ is killed and her corpse is hung on a hook.

Is this what happens when potential₁ enters the underworld of actuality₂ in order to obtain power?

Is this what happens when the planet Venus enters into combustion (conjunction) with the sun?

0223 As one might expect for a goddess imbued with potential₁ (in the normal context of Ki₃) as well as actuality₂ (in the normal context of Enlil₃), after three days, Inanna’s servant Ninsubar₁, and Enki₁, find a way to rescue her₁.  A deal₂ is struck, Inanna₁ may leave the underworld alive if she₁ provides a substitute for… you know… that hook.

0224 Upon her return, she₁ finds a substitute right away.  A shepherd king sits on her empty throne.  Out come the demons to drag the presumptuous fellow down to serve as Inanna₁‘s substitute on a meat-hook in hell.

0225 While these two instances do not grant certainty to the assignment of Enki₁ and Inanna₁ to the realm of possibility for An₃ and Ki₃ respectively, within Enlil₃‘s differentiated actuality₂, they do lend credence to the intelligence of the guess.

Isn’t that the most that we can expect in a world perfused with sign-relations?