Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2024) “Theistic Evolution” (Part 21 of 21)

0824 Even though the bill is paid, and the public curtain closes on this examination of Tabaczek’s book, the flavors of the dessert still linger.

The associations in chapter seven suggest a retrogression into the house of evolutionary creation.

At the same time, the associations intimate a moment when the author can go direct into the house of theistic evolution.

0825 How so?

Can a scientist observe and measure the actuality2 within a category-based nested form?


What about the normal context3 and potential1?

No, the scientist can only observe and measure phenomena associated with a category-based nested form.  Phenomena go with the actuality2.  The noumenon associates to the normal context3 and potential1.

0826 Well, if that is the case, and if the Kantian slogan of the noumenon applies (that is, the noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena), then the normal context3 and potential1 [cannot be objectified by] the actuality2.

But, this is what human constantly do.  Humans understand actuality2 in terms of its2 normal context3 and potential1.  So humans intuitively sense that the normal context3 and potential1 can be objectified by the corresponding actuality2.

0827 Indeed, the fact that the four causes work together to elucidate a category-based nested form constitutes one reason why Aristotle’s four causes are superior to attributions to the four elements (earth, water, fire and air).

Aristotle’s four causes are built into human nature.

0827 So, let me re-imagine the dessert, even as I digest it.

To start, a theologyagent (B1) realizes that Aquinas’s use of primary, secondary and instrumental causation in evolutionary creation can be formulated in terms of a category-based nested form.

Next, the agent of theology (B1) begins to appreciate the reason why Aristotle’s four causes are so appealing.  The four causes work together to elucidate all three elements of a category-based nested form.  The category-based nested form is the first step in understanding.

Yes, the category-based nested form is a purely relational structure that is independent of the human mind.

But, it seems that the category-based nested form is embedded in the human body and brain.

0828 A question appears in the sciencemirror (C2), asking, “Is our capacity to intuitively construct category-based nested forms adaptive?  Is the human niche the potential of category-based nested forms, in particular, and triadic relations, in general?”

0829 An answer is already prepared for the slot for scienceagent (A3).

Razie Mah’s e-book, The Human Niche, is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

The claim?

The human niche is the potential of triadic relations.

0830 This is what theistic evolution can produce that evolutionary creation cannot.

In order to taste what Tabaczek’s meal (B1) does to the mirrorscience (C2) consider two of Razie Mah’s blogs (A3), both of which claim that current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us how humans evolved to recognize the noumenon, the thing itself, through implicit abstraction.

Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us where we came from.

Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us what we evolved to be.

Current modern evolutionary theory cannot tell us what went wrong.

0831 Here is a picture of one Greimas square for the optics of Tabaczek’s mirror.

0832 Oh, the two blogs?

Looking at Mark S. Smith’s Book (2019) “The Genesis of Good and Evil”, appears in Razie Mah’s blog from Jan 13 through 31, 2022. 

Looking at Carol Hill’s Article (2021) “Original Sin with Respect to Science”, appears from February 7 through 25, 2022.

With that said, I thank Dr. Mariusz Tabaczek O.P. for this wonderful banquet for thought.

But, my work is not done. I now retreat to Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) in order to examine chapter eight.


Looking at Mariusz Tabaczek’s Book (2021) “Divine Action and Emergence” (Part 22 of 22)

0331 My sudden turn to semiotics does not occur in Tabaczek’s text.

Such is the examiner’s prerogative.

At this point, I stand at the threshold of section 1.3.4, almost precisely in the middle of the book.

My commentary on this book is significant.

Shall I review?

I represent the Positivist’s judgment as a content-level category-based form and discuss how it might be situated (points 0155 to 0184).

I suggest how reductionists can game emergent phenomena.  Plus, I follow Tabaczek back to the four causes (points 0185 to 0239).

I present a specific example of an emergent phenomenon, building on the prior example of a hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell.  Then, I return to Deacon’s general formula for emergence (points 240 to 0276).

Finally, I examine Tabaczek’s “philosophical history of panentheism” up to the section on Hegel (points 0277 to 0330).

0332 These are notable achievements.

But, my commentary is not more significant than Tabaczek’s text.

At this point, it is if I look through Tabaczek’s text and see something moving, something that catches my eye.  It is not for me to say whether it is an illusion or a registration.  It is enough for me to articulate what I see.

0333 At this point, I draw the veil on Razie Mah’s blog for April and May of 2024 and enter the enclosure of Comments on Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024), available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  Comments will cover the rest of Part Two of Divine Action and Emergence.  June 2024 will look at the start of Tabaczek’s next book, Theistic Evolution and Comments will complete the examination.

My thanks to Mariusz Tabaczek for his intellectual quest.

0334 But, that is not to say that I abandon Tabaczek’s text.

No, my slide into sign-relations is part of the examiner’s response.

This occurs in Comments.

There is good reason to wonder whether the response is proportionate.

I let the reader decide.


What Is A Meme? (C of G, Part 11 of 20)

0101 With a single chomp of her mighty mouth, along with some head thrashing, Daisy can put an end to the neighbor’s cat.  I suppose that I restrain her from what her species expressa2b calls her to do, because I have her on a leash.  The leash puts Daisy’s species expressa2b into perspective.

0102 Does this imply that there is another sign?  Does this sign connect the situation and perspective levels?

Daisy’s fear and loathing of the cat2b (SVe) stands for her being restrained by the leash and thereby confounded2c (SOe) in regards to the question, “Does this makes sense?”3ccontextualizing the possibility of putting the situation into perspective1c (SIe).

The subscript, “e”, stands for “exemplar”.

Here is a picture.

0103 The exemplar sign-vehicle (SVe) coincides with the specifying sign-object (SOs).

Correspondingly, the exemplar sign-object (SOe) puts the specifying sign-object (SOs) into perspective.  This perspective includes both Daisy and myself, along with the catnip, the cat and my trash-toting neighbor.

0104 Plus, there is a question about nomenclature.

For scholastics, the specifying sign starts with subjective content and ends with objective situation.  The exemplar signstarts with an intersubjective situation and ends with a suprasubjective perspective.  So, the situation-level actuality is “objective” (SOs) for the former and “intersubjective” (SVe) for the latter.

For moderns, only two terms are employed, “subjective” and “objective””.  Scholastic terms shift when stepping from the specifying sign to the exemplar sign.  For moderns, “subjective” opinions often address the question, “What does it mean to me?”3b, while “objective” facts raise the question, “Does this make sense?”3c.

This terminological shift is discussed in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2023, Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”.

0105 The exemplar sign object2c (SOe) makes sense3b because it may be true, or believable, or commonly accepted, or logical with respect to an affordance.  What is that affordance?  May I call it, “intelligibility”?  Oh, that could bring a smile to the face of a philosopher and a grimace to the face of a scientist.

0106 Let me return to the scholastic manifest image for the example of Daisy, my dog, who I knowingly place into proximity to the neighbor’s miserable feline, soon after the neighbor lady takes out her trash.  Is there a problem with planting catnip in the verge near where we regularly stroll?  Surely, the neighbor’s husband, who is rarely at home to tend the verge, does not mind.  Plus, the cat clearly loves the mint.

Here is a picture.

0107 The exemplar sign-object (SOe) contains a judgment.

Recall, a judgment is a relation between what is and what ought to be.

0108 In order to arrive at my judgment2c, I first look at the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality.

To me, Daisy’s confoundedness2c serves as a virtual normal context that brings the actuality of unnerved Daisy2b into relation with the possibilities inherent in her tail tucked between her legs2a.

I next transfer the virtual nested form into the triadic structure of judgment.

Daisy’s confoundedness (relation, thirdness) brings her tucked tail as an universal being (what is, secondness) into relation to Daisy’s fear and loathing as an intelligible being (what is, firstness).

0109 Yes, whatever is going on in Daisy’s mind2c contributes to my judgment2c, even though it (whatever “it” is) cannot be articulated.

0110 For Daisy, a relation that I am not privy to2c virtually brings fear and loathing2b into relation with that catnip-addled feline2a.

0111 The triadic structure of judgment fits neatly into the sign-object of the exemplar sign as well as the perspective-level actuality2c of the scholastic’s three-level interscope.


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 1 of 18)

0028 This is the second blog in a series.

 Looking at Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “Intersection” appears in Razie Mah’s blog from May 15 through 18, 2023.  In that brief examination (points 0001-0027), a technical category-based definition of the term, “intersection” is shown to mesh with the theme of Kemple’s book, whose full title is The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter, Boston/Berlin).

To me, that is fascinating.

0029 In this series of blogs, I examine Kemple’s appendices.

Yes, he has more than one appendix.

Plus, there are subdivisions.

0030 Appendix 1.1 is titled, “Presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence”.  My associations will draw upon A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, as well as A Primer on Natural Signs, Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, and Comments on Newell Sasha’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.  These primers and comments touch base with Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion”, which is available, along with the other mentioned e-works, at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0031 The title of Appendix 1.1 contains two technical terms.

“Presentative forms” is a term coined by Jacques Maritain and literally means a form that is substantiated by its presentation, rather than by matter.  The hylomorphe is presentation [substantiates] form, rather than matter [substantiates] form.

“The grounding of transcendence” is a phrase used by Martin Heidegger.  It conveys what the presentative form accomplishes.  The presentative form accomplishes more than matter-substantiated form, because it leads to (grounds) another form, which is located at a higher categorical level (transcendence).

Figure 01

0032 Surely, this implies that presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence coincide in a particular way.  The “matter” of the presentative form associates to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”

Is this is a general feature of presentative forms?

Well, the claim is a good working hypothesis.


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 2 of 18)

0033 So why are presentative forms and the grounding of transcendence important?

It seems that they govern the ways in which the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness appear.  The process is not straightforward.  After all, if one category associates with what is expressed and the adjacent higher category goes with what is experienced (with the caveat that thirdness in what is presented wraps around to firstness in form), then each presentative form expresses two categories.

Oh yeah, that makes sense.

0034 But, it does not make sense.

Kemple quotes from Peirce’s 1903 essay, “Sundry Logical Conceptions”, concerning the modes of appearance for the categories of experience.  In the following table, nine presentative forms are listed.  Vertical columns correspond to the category of experience for the presentative form.  The rows correspond to expression according to category.

Figure 02

The columns denote forms and the rows denote appearance (presentation).

0035 For example, consider the form of firstness (first column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to an idea of secondness.  Here, I depict it as ‘something’  in the realm of actuality.  An idea pertains to ‘something’ actual.

Here is another example from the above table.  The form of secondness (second column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to the fact of relations.  To me, these relations are hylomorphic, consisting of two contiguous real elements, characterizing Peirce’s category of secondness.  A thing is a fact of (hylomorphic) relation.

One more example will help.  The form of thirdness (third column) and the appearing category of secondness (second row) corresponds to signs of secondness. Actions are signs of secondness.  So are modes of conduct.

0036 Each element in the above table embodies a form in one category and an appearance in another category.  So, two categories are involved for each item in the table.  Plus, the matrix is exhaustive.

Figure 03

0037 What about the idea that transcendence is grounded in crossing categories?

My head swims.  But, it’s not Kemple’s fault.  It is the idea that the presentative form has a hylomorphic structure and that the element that corresponds to “matter” belongs to one category and the element that corresponds to “form” belongs to the adjacent higher category.

This idea is not apparent in Peirce’s table, pictured above.

Kemple continues…

0038 Going down the first column, forms in firstness may be labeled as “ideas”.  So, the element in the first row and the first column, is an idea of possibility (or, ‘something’ in the realm of possibility).  Likewise, ‘something’ in the realm of actuality corresponds to the idea of secondness.  ‘Something’ in the realm of normal context goes with the idea of thirdness.

Going down the second column, forms in secondness may be labeled as “facts”.  So, qualia are facts of firstness.  Relations in the style of hylomorphes are facts of secondness.  Signs and other triadic relations are facts of thirdness.

Going down the third column, forms in thirdness may be labeled as “signs”.  Feelings, such as awareness of a thing of beauty, are signs of firstness.  Actions, such as modes of conduct, are signs of secondness.    Thoughts are signs of thirdness.

0039 Still, I have a problem.

Even though each element in the above table references two categories.  The rows and columns do not highlight the hypothesis about transcendence developed in the previous blog, where the “matter” of a presentative form belongs to the adjacent lower category of its corresponding “form”.

Is there a ghost of a chance that Heidegger’s ground of transcendence haunts Perice’s table of presentative forms.

Figure 04

0040 Perhaps, I can conjure its specter by coloring a sequence of presentative forms, following the proposed hypothesis.

For each transition, from idea to fact, from fact to sign, and from sign to idea, there is a corresponding transition from firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.  

The result is a seqence of novel presentative forms that are composed of elements of the table.  The lower category presentative form for both appearance (row) and form (column) serves as “matter”… er, I mean “presence”… and the higher-category presentative form in both appearance (row) and category (column) serves as “form”.   

0041 In the following diagram, sequences appear in color.

Figure 05

0042 The hylomorphic structure, lower-category presence [substantiates] higher-category form, embodies transcendence, defined as moving from one category to the adjacent higher category in both form and appearance.  So, ways to imagine the coincidence of presentative forms and grounds of transcendence track the colors in the table above


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 3 of 18)

0043 Okay, allow me to explore the most obvious diagonal.

Figure 06

0044 Consider ‘something’ in the realm of possibility [substantiates] the form of a hylomorphic relation.  According to the hypothesis on grounding transcendence, the novel presentative form is ‘something’ possible [substantiates] a thing.   An idea in firstness causes (or is contiguous with) the facts of a cause-and-effect relation.  Element (column 1, row 1) substantiates element (column 2, row 2).

Figure 07

0045 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Moglichkeit (translated into English as “possibility”)?

Yes, Moglichkeit applies when ‘something’ in the realm of possibility serves as grounds for a cause-and-effect fact.

‘Something’ presents itself as a thing.

Okay, that sounds plausible.

0046 Let me consider the next novel presentative form.

Consider hylomorphic relations [substantiate] thoughts.  A fact of secondness grounds a sign of thirdness.   The thing is like matter.  The thought is like form.  Element (column 2, row 2) substantiates element (column 3, row 3).

Figure 08

Facts of secondness [substantiate] signs of thirdness.  Things [substantiate] thoughts.

0047 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Ausweisen (previously rendered as “account” and now translated by Kemple into “pointing out”)? 

A thing has significance.

Okay, here are two successes in a row.  But, the trend is making me nervous.

The form of the first movement, presents itself as a fact and that presentation substantiates a sign in the realm of thirdness,corresponding to a thought.

I am afraid that this trend will end up as a tortuous run-on sentence.

0048 One more step.

Consider thoughts [substantiate] ‘something’ in the realm of possibility.  A sign of thirdness grounds an idea of firstness.   Thoughts are like matter.  ‘Something’ in the realm of possibility is like form.

Figure 09

0049 Does this capture Heidegger’s use of the German term, Boden (previously translated as “basis” and now translated by Kemple as “surroundedness”)?

Is the originating ‘something’ in the realm of possibility subsumed into a form that is substantiated by a thought?

Okay, I am not nervous anymore.

I am perplexed, yet intrigued.

0050 Of course, the questionable character of the following hypothesis cannot be doubted.

Otherwise, I could present the following claims as fiat accompli.

First, presentative forms in the table in Appendix 1.1 are hylomorphes, where the column conveys experience (form) and the row represents appearance (presentative).

Second, presentative forms may contribute to a novel presentative form, corresponding to Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence.

Third, tabular presentative forms that cross adjacent categories constitute a grounding of transcendence.  This is a hypothesis.

In other words, the grounding of transcendence follows diagonals within Kemple’s table of presentative forms.

0051 What transitions do Moglichkeit, Ausweisen and Boden correspond to?

How about passages from idea to fact, fact to sign, and sign to idea?

Another option is firstness to secondness, secondness to thirdness and thirdness to firstness.

One more option is that both passages are implicated.

0052 In section 6.3.1, Kemple notes that Peirce’s categories and Heidegger’s groundings do not map onto one another perfectly.  Peirce’s categories pertain to semiosis.  Heidegger’s labels are contained within a framework of ontic-ontological transcendent grounds that are specific to human beings.

0053 So far, my associations to Kemple’s appendix 1.1 yields a hypothesis and a challenge.

The hypothesis is that Maritain’s presentative forms and Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence coincide with the construction of novel presenative forms, composed of presentative forms.   A tabular element in one categorysubstantiates the tabular element in the adjacent higher category, for both columns and rows, with a wrap-around at thirdness.

The result is three sequences of three transitions, depicted in colors in the above table.

0054 If this result is plausible, the elements in the table are not only presentative forms, but they are also elements in a novel hylomorphic structure: presentative (column A, row B) [substantiates] form (column A+1, row B+1).

Heidegger’s terms seem to jive with these novel presentative forms.

0055 Is that confusing?  If so, then I wonder.

Does Moglichkeit (possibility) start with the column of idea or with the row of firstness?


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 4 of 18)

0056 I repeat.  Here is a table that colors in the hypothesis of the coincidence between a sequence of novel presentative forms and grounding of transcendence, with one diagonal strand colored in bold.

Figure 10

0057 First, I associate two contiguous elements, ‘something’ in the realm of possibility (presentative) and hylomorphic relations or things (form) to Heidegger’s term, Moglichkeit.  ‘Something’ (presentation, idea in firstness) substantiates a thing (form, fact in secondness).

Kemple elaborates in section 6.3.1.  Heidegger identifies the dimensions of Moglichkeit (possibility) as Shiften (translated as establishing, finding, causing, as well as inducing) and Weltenwurf (translated as projection of world).

0058 What do these dimensions suggest?

Following the argument of the previous blog, the presentation of Moglichkeit rests primarily in firstness, rather than the idea of firstness and the form of Moglichkeit rests in secondness, rather that the fact of hylomorphic relations.

That would associate Moglichkeit with a contiguity between firstness and secondness, more or less mirroring the relation between contenta and situationb-level actualities2 for a two-level interscope.

0059 If this association to Moglichkeit is plausible, then the presentation of Ausweisen rests primarily in secondness (the row), rather than the fact of secondness (the column), and the form of Ausweisen touches base with thirdness (the row), instead of signs of thirdness (the column).  Maybe, I should say, essentially with thirdness, and accidentally with signs of thirdness.

How to translate the term, Ausweisen?  Kemple recommends the term, “pointing out”, while other translators choose the term, “account”.  “Pointing out” distinguishes an object from its surroundings.  An object is “laid out in consciousness”.

Finally, Boden (surroundedness) connects thirdness (the row) with firstness (the row) in the same manner as Moglichkeitand Ausweisen.  The presentation belongs to row 3 and column N.  The form belongs to row 1 and column N+1, unless N+1 equals four, then the column returns to idea (the form of firstness).

Here is the summary for the ongoing diagonal.

Figure 11

0060 Does Moglichkeit, Ausweisen and Boden associate to pairs of elements in a sign relation?

Here is a guess.

Figure 12

0061 For Moglichkeit, the sign-vehicle (SV) associates to novel presentation in firstness (row) and the sign-object (SO) associates to novel form in secondness (row).  The columns shift as well.

For Ausweisen, the SO associates to novel presentation in secondness (row) and the SI associates to novel form in thirdness (row).  The columns shift as well.

For Boden, the sign-interpretant (SI) associates to novel presentation in thirdness (row) and a corresponding nacent SV associates to novel form in firstness (row).  The columns shift as well.  The nascent SV may sustain the next Moglichkeit.

0062 Here is a picture of how sign-elements key into the tabular presentative forms along one diagonal.

Figure 13

Each novel presentative form expresses the tabular presentative form (row M, column N) [contiguity based on the two manifesting sign elements] the tabular presentative form (row M+1, column N+1), with wrap-around from thirdness to firstness.

0063 Here is a picture of the flow of Heidegger’s terms and how they might associate to the elements of Peirce’s sign-relation for this particular diagonal.

Figure 14

0064  In general, Moglichkeit moves diagonally from the first to the second row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from firstness to secondness.  A sign-vehicle makes a sign-object possible.

Ausweisen moves diagonally from the second to the third row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from secondness to thirdness.  A sign-object points to the facet of a sign-interpretant in thirdness.

Boden wraps around diagonally from the third to the first row and associates to a hylomorphic structure crossing from thirdness to firstness.  The facet of the sign-interpretant in thirdness joins with the facet of the sign-interpretant in firstness.

0065 So far, I suggest that Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence corresponds to novel presentative forms.

Plus, these novel presenatitive forms further correspond to elements in a sign relation.

In the previous figure, couplings of sign-elements label the contiguity between the two tabular presentative forms that contribute to the novel presentative form.

0066 If these associations make sense, then I may claim the following.

Heidegger’s grounds of transcendence may be technically written as a novel presentation [substantiates] form.  Plus, the novel presentation belongs to one category (foremost in appearance (row) and secondarily in experience (column)) and the novel form belongs to the adjacent higher category (for both row and column, with wrap around).

A sequence of dyads may be depicted by focusing on diagonals in a table of appearances versus forms.  A table of presentative forms contains nine ” presentative forms” (or better, “tabular presentative forms”) according to the current normative use of the term, and supports three sequences of “novel presentative forms”.  Each sequence associates to Heidegger’s three terms describing the grounds of transcendence.

0067 Finally, the contiguity between novel presentation and novel form along one particular diagonal juxtaposes two elements within a sign relation.


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 5 of 18)

0068 So far, I have considered one diagonal in a table of presentative forms.

Here is a different diagonal.

Figure 15

0069 I arrive at the following associations.

Figure 16

0070 These associations touch base with the following story about how Sam got a new job.

Sam recently graduated from IIT with a degree in accounting.  He lost his job at a tax-assistance company because of the impact of inexpensive computer software programs designed for tax returns.  He hears from one his professors that there may be a job at a small accounting software company on Halstead.  So, he calls, and they tell him to come by.  When?  How about tomorrow at 11?  Oh, by the way, could you e-mail us your resume?

The next day, Sam gets off the bus in front of a chicken-baking restaurant.  Where is the company?  Oh, there, on the second floor.  How to get there?  The only other door is in the back of the restaurant.  Plus, there are outside stairs. 

0071 Obviously, Sam has to enter the restaurant.  They are broiling chicken for lunch.  It smells just like grandma’s house (presentation of qualia as a fact).  Gramma had a saying, “Don’t judge a book by its cover.”  (form signifying mode of conduct).  So, Sammy asks one of the cooks. The broiler points to the stairs halfway down the restaurant.

At the foot of the stairs, Sammy remembers what gramma counseled (presentation of an action or mode of conduct), and tells himself, “Remember why you are here.”  (form as an idea of a normal context).  Up the stairs he goes.  He recounts to himself the parts of his resume having to do with understanding accounting programs.  By the time he stands at the door, the only door, at the top of the stairs, Sam already asks his Grandma to be a guardian angel looking over him (presentation of a normal context).  The chicken restaurant is the cover.  The software company is the book (form is a fact of qualia).

0072 In terms of Peirce’s formulation of the sign-relation, the smell of chicken (sign-vehicle) stands for Sam’s grandmother (sign-object) in regards to Grandma advising Sam and her advice applying to the current situation (sign-interpretant).

In terms of Heidegger’s three features in the grounding of transcendence, Moglichkeit (possibility) is the presentation of the smell of broiling chicken substantiating the form of a slogan, “Don’t judge a book by its cover”, Ausweisen (pointing-out) is the presentation of asking for directions, going to and going up the stairs substantiating the formation of a normal context that literally manifests the slogan, and Boden (surroundedness) presents a manifestation of the slogan as the door at the top of the stairs.

0073 Both Peirce’s sign-relation and Heidegger’s three components grounding transcendence play into the table of presentative forms, each in a different manner.  If Peirce’s and Heidegger’s approaches pertain to a single reality, then I may say that the single reality contains the nine presentative forms in the table.


Looking at Appendix 1.1 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 6 of 18)

0074 One diagonal remains.

Figure 17

Here are the suggested associations.

Figure 18

0075 Sam knocks on the door.  He hears a shuffling and the door opens just a bit, “Are you Sam Johnson?”

“Yes”. Sam has a feeling that this book is going to be more interesting than the cover (presentation of feelings as a sign).

The door opens wide and Sam is beckoned to enter by two nerdy fellows.  Both wear glasses.  Both are around the same age as Sam.  The room is full of computers and books and… everything one would expect from a start-up software company.  The big room is obviously once the living room of the family who once owned the restaurant below.

The pale one says, “Hi, I am Mel Kandusky.  This is Isaac Viruda.”

Isaac is of Indian descent.  Not Native American, but southcentral Asian.

Sam says, “Are you any relation to Professor Kandusky, at IIT?”

Mel says, “I’m his son.”

0076 Sam realizes that he is already written into the book (form as the idea of actuality).

Mel continues, “Have a seat.  Isaac and I went over the resume that you sent.  We have some issues.”  Mel looks at Isaac.  Isaac smiles, then tries to look serious.

“We think that you may be too earnest for this software startup.”

“What do you mean?”, Sam says, “Your dad told me to apply!” (presentation of the idea of the actuality.  The question and comment serves to define the sign-object by raising the fact that this interview is a sign that Professor Kandusky had told Sam about the job).

Isaac starts smiling again.

“Well, we don’t come to work before 11 and we leave right after the restaurant closes at 6.  So, we are not working eight hours a day.  Plus, we rotate the morning help desk daily, so whoever gets the job will be on call from 7 to 11 while at home for around… “, Mel pretends to count the number of people in the room, “… two days per week.  So, we were thinking that may not meet your high standard of earnestness (presentation of the sign of Professor Kandusky’s intrinsic recommendation as fact).”

0077 Sam laughs, and is about to say… when an old woman walks out from the hallway into the former living room.  She is obviously a Kandusky.

“Oh, I hope that I’m not interrupting.  I’m just passing through.  Oh, you are the new…?”

Mel does the introductions, “Sam, this is my grandmother.  She owns the restaurant on the first floor.  Gramma, this is Sam, he’s going to work with us.”

Mrs. Kandusky says, “Nice to meet you.  If you ever want some chicken or fixins, just come downstairs.” (possible sign-vehicle, presentation of feeling as a thing of beauty)

She then proceeds to the door and down the stairs.

0078 So, that is the story of how Sam got a new job.

In terms of Peirce’s formulation of the sign-relation, the feeling that a book is opening (sign-vehicle) stands for the goofy interview (sign-object) in regards to Professor Kandusky’s invitation to Sam to join a family enterprise (sign-interpretant).

In terms of Heidegger’s three features in the grounding of transcendence, Moglichkeit (possibility) is the presentation a feeling inspired by Sam’s grandmother substantiating the idea that the book is actualAusweisen (pointing-out) is the presentation of the book of Sam’s resume substantiating the fact that the interview itself is a sign of the Professor’s intention to hire Sam, and Boden (surroundedness) re-presents this sign as an invitation to join the Professor’s family-based team.

0079 Both Peirce’s sign-relation and Heidegger’s grounding of transcendence play into the table of presentative forms,each in a different manner.  If Peirce’s and Heidegger’s approaches pertain to a single reality, then I may say that the single reality contains the nine presentative forms in the table.


Looking at Appendix 1.2 in Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) “The Intersection” (Part 7 of 18)

0080 This is the third blog in a series. 

The first blog, posted from May 15 through 18, 2023 at www.raziemah.com, performed a cursory examination of Brian Kemple’s Book (2019) The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue (Walter de Gruyter, Boston/Berlin).  The book is volume twenty in the Semiotics, Communication and Cognition series, edited by Paul Cobley and Kalevi Kull.

The second blog precedes this blog, depending on how one defines, “proceeds”, and covers appendix 1.1.

At present, I have appendix 1.2 of Kemple’s book before me.  

0081 Peirce’s vision of a complex sign-relation contains one sign-vehicle, two sign-objects and three sign-interpretants.  Altogether, there are six elements.

Figure 19

0082 Kemple presents five different possible configurations of semiosic structure.  He calls this sequence, “the semiotic ladder”.  Here is a table of the five rungs.

Figure 20

Clearly, the semiotic ladder offers a variation of Peirce’s vision of the complex sign-relation.

0083 I ask, “How would I translate the semiotic ladder into category-based nested forms?”

Peirce’s formulation of a complex sign-relation starts with a single sign-vehicle.  The immediate sign-vehicle triggers an immediate sign-object and immediate sign-interpretant.  Then, a dynamical sign-object and dynamical sign-interpretant follow.  Then, if the sign-vehicle repeats and the dynamical interpretant becomes a habit, that habit is a final interpretant.

0084 In contrast, a three-level interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.  Each of three levels (contenta, situationb and perspectivec) contains a nested form with three elements (potential1, actuality2 and normal context3).  There are nine elements altogether.

So, is there a way to mesh a paradigm with six elements with one with nine?

0085 Well, yes and no.

Yes, category-based nested formulations of signs are developed in several of Razie Mah’s e-works, including Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings and Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.

No, the formulations do not quite match Peirce’s paradigm.

0086 Nevertheless, an attempt to explain Peirce’s paradigm in terms of the three-level interscope may prove insightful, even though it may not be fully satisfying.

To this I attend, using the example of a landslide.