Looking at Mikhail Trunin’s Article (2017) “Semiosphere and history” (Part 3 of 8)
0868 Back to the fundament interscope, here is a picture of the content level.

0869 Label1a replaces the signifier1a. The label as potential1a is the efficient cause for the spoken word (parole) as form2af.
0870 Definition1a replaces signified1a, implying explicit abstraction. Definition as potential1a is the final cause for historic thought (langue) as matter2am, because that is the intention behind replacing the signified1a with an explicit abstraction… er definition1a… hmmm… how about referent1a?
Definition should belong to thirdness. But, definition (as thirdness) is deferred in Saussure’s semiology3a because language is scientifically characterized as two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole2a and langue2a. There is no substance, so to speak. Okay, the substance is a completely habitual association. Consequently, the scientist does not know the final cause for why a particular {langue as matter [substantiates] spoken word as form}2a exists.
0871 In contrast, the formal cause is obvious.
Saussure’s semiology3a contextualizes the above dyad2a as a material being2a. The actuality of a spoken (and written) word2af justifies the scholar regarding it2af as a thing2a that is subject to natural inquiry, of which Aristotle’s hylomorphe is the first abstraction. An encountered thing2a consists in two contiguous real elements, matter2am and form2af. The spoken (or written) word2a is situated as an encountered thing2a.
Is there another way to say that?
0872 The spoken word is the encountered form2af that corresponds to a label1a. The matter of langue2am is presumed to emerge from um… the potential (and deferral) of definition1a.
0873 Somehow, that1a must have ‘something’ to do with reference1a.
But, one cannot picture or point to that referent1a unless an artifact1b is constructed to validate the spoken word2af.
0874 On the situation level, the formal cause is also obvious.
The structure (or system) of spoken words3b contextualizes {written words as matter2bm, as they substantiate history as a literary form2bf}2b. Spoken words2af are forms on the content level. They2af become matter2bm on the situation level,as they fit into the sensible (or material) construction of history (as a literary text)2bf.

0875 The efficient cause must be the sensible construction of artifacts1b that will validate the definitions1a underlying the langue2am that Saussure’s semiology associates to historic explicit abstractions, as if to veil the fact that “definition” is the normal context3 for the potential of meaning, presence and message1 for a spoken word2. Yes, definition1a in firstness is definition3 in thirdness deferred.
0876 So where do these artifacts1b, these sensible constructions that validate the forms of the spoken words2af, come from?
0877 Consider a historical event. During the event itself, people may give the ongoing event one name. Later, the historian may assign a different label.
0878 For example, the European War of 1914-1918 is called, during the conflict, The Great War.
One hundred years later, my label is The First Battle Among The Enlightenment Gods, The Tragic War Among Naive Mercantilists (who, on second thought, may have been not so naive).
The written words of the time plus the constructions of the historian certify each composition of thought2am and word2affor use as matter2bm in the substantiation of history in the form of a literary text2bf.
0879 So, why the difference in definition1a and labels1a for the same historical event?
Perhaps, it comes from the perspective-level potential1c.
0880 The perspective-level potential1c should read, the possibility of ‘observations of literary phenonema’1c. But, now that “history2bf” stands in the place of “the literary text2bf“, the transformation is breath-taking.
Every literary text1c is a semiological and structural noumenon, manifesting literary phenomena1c. Now, history2bfstands in the place of the literary text2bf.
0881 If this is the case, the Uspenskij is on target. History is a species of semiotics.
























