0064 I ask, “Why do hominins engage in cooperative activities3b?”
0065 Hodder’s book serves as a concrete example.
Hodder labors to share his knowledge and insights.
Hodder anticipates remuneration or acclamation for his efforts.
Hodder competes (labors) to cooperate (share knowledge), because the fruits of cooperation (remuneration and acclamation) increase his chances of reproductive success.
0066 Okay, that may sound reductionist. It is. But, anyone who reads books by social scientists is familiar with this type of nonsense.
0067 As an archaeologist, Hodder is honestly trying to puzzle out a difficulty. How does one explicitly discuss implicit abstraction1b, the potential hiding within entanglement theory3b?
Oh, I know how.
Rely on implicit abstraction to convey the impression that entanglement theory coincides with a human adaptation.
0068 From the prior blog, I know that Hodder’s entanglement theory indirectly describes a human adaptation2b. This adaptation2b exploits a niche1b in the normal context of natural selection3b. The human niche1b is the potential of triadic relations1b.
Triadic relations2a are purely relational beings. They rely on material beings. But, they are not material beings. They are like things, in the sense that they exist in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. They are not mere things, like boulders resting on a valley floor. They are like boulders changing the way that water flows in a river. They are relational beings.
0069 Hodder writes as if things entangle us. He wants to extend the idea to biological evolution. Things create potentials1b that may be exploited by adaptations2b in the normal context of natural selection3b.
But the inverse is also true. Life searches for opportunities to stay alive. Life seeks ways to avoid death. Sometimes, things provide those opportunities. Sometimes, things provide dangers. We know this in our bones. Potential may be opportunity. Potential may be dangerous.
Consequently, entanglement theory should fall into our mind’s lap, like manna from heaven.
0070 These comments add value to Hodder’s work. Here is a way to articulate Hodder’s entanglement theory.
Figure 19
0071 Hodder refines his theory by isolating various dependencies. Human-thing dependence is H2b-T2a. Thing-human dependency, T2a-H2b, is an instance when the content-level normal context3a and potential1a come into play as a projection of implicit awareness1b. Thing2a-thing1b dependency describes the nature of tools.
These dependencies are salient in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
0072 Oh, I almost neglected to mention one more dependency. Human-human dependency.
Now, this dependency is like all the other dependencies. At the same time, H-H dependency is not the same as all the other dependencies. How so? One of the elements of H-H must be a thing. One element changes from a human to a thing. This transformation characterizes explicit abstraction. In this regard, all the other dependencies may be re-enacted with specialized humans as things.
H-H dependency is salient in our current Lebenswelt.
0073 Plus, our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
0074 A terminological shift is appropriate when considering human-human dependency in our current Lebenswelt. Instead of a “thing”, the person becomes an “object”.
Of course, in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, one can never objectify a person within one’s own social circles. What does one image or point to? Hand-speech talk does not allow objectification, that is, explicit abstraction.
0075 Can I wrap my head around this idea?
In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in,linguistic hand-speech talk always referred to things and states of things that could be imaged or pointed to with manual-brachial word gestures. In our current Lebenswelt,almost every spoken word that I know involves an explicit abstraction, where meaning, presence and message are projected into a formant-frequency placeholder (a parole) in a system of differences. How mind boggling.
0076 When we project meaning, presence and message into a spoken word, the intended referent becomes an “object”. A “baker” is someone who makes the dough to make bread. A “ovener” is someone who makes sure that the fire heating an oven is constantly and correctly maintained.
Well, that is the nomenclature that I am going to use.
0077 Now, I can return to the diagrams of H2b-T2a, T2a-H2b and T2b-T2a presented earlier (points 0036-0041).
Emmer wheat is used to make bread. This is an example of human-thing dependency, H2b-T2a, in our current Lebenswelt.
Figure 20
0078 Bread is a product of organized human activities. Because spoken words may be used to label specialized features of the organization2b, explicit abstraction allows various tasks to become specialties, such as baker and ovener2a. This follows the pattern of thing-human dependency, T2a-H2b.
Here is a picture.
Figure 21
0079 The specialties of “baker” and “ovener”, once defined, promulgate feelings of implicit abstraction. These people-things become artifacts that validate our projections of meaning, presence and message into the spoken words. These specialties2a are part of the toolset for producing product1a in the normal context of managing a bakery3a.
Humans are now tools. The question arises, “What makes a good ‘baker’ or ‘ovener’?”
Of course, these human-tools require training2a.
0080 Plus, these specialists2b better do their jobs well1b in the normal context of running a bakery business3b. This criteria fits the style of thing-thing dependence. However, now the things are objectified humans.
0081 Needless to say, Hodder proves a variety of examples in his excellent work.
Some of the examples carry moral overtones.
0082 For example, the making of thread starts during the Neolithic with spinning whorls. These distinctly shaped cylinders twist strands of wool or flax fiber together. They take some skill to use. One must turn the whorl in a particular way in order to produce thread. The thread may not be fine. It is thread nonetheless.
By the medieval period of Europe, “spinsters” use fairly sophisticated pedal-powered spinning wheels, where the rotary motion is powered by a foot pedal and the cylinder-aspect of the whorl is performed by a spinning wheel. Obviously, explicit abstraction plays a role in the technical separation of the spin from the fiber holding aspects of the old-fashioned whorl. Now, finer threads are made.
So, the whorl to spinning-wheel transition belongs to our current Lebenswelt.
0083 What about fire?
The domestication of fire, accomplished hundreds of thousands of years ago, occurs in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in,when hand talk favors implicit abstraction. Note that there are no “fire specialists” apparent in the fossil record for the ensuing millennia. Making fire involves tacit knowledge. Making fire is procedural. Making fire is an embodied experience. Do we have a spoken word to label the making of fire as a cooperative effort?
0084 In contrast, the specialty of running a kiln occurs in our current Lebenswelt. Kilns are used to cook things, such a pottery, at particularly high temperatures. Indeed, in this instance, two specialties are apparent: the one who makes pots out of clay and the one who fires the pottery using a kiln. Expertise is required for both specialties. Explicit abstraction is required for expertise.
0085 Perhaps, the fact that humans can be objectified as things in our current Lebenswelt accounts for Hodder’s moral intonations.
Or, perhaps a feeling of moral indignation arises from his examples, include opium, which starts as a thing, a poppy plant.
0086 In our current Lebenswelt, explicit abstraction allows humans to be objectified.
Objects can be treated as things in Hodder’s H-T, T-H and T-T dependencies.
The result?
H-H dependencies include H-O, O-H and O-O dependencies.
0087 Plus, H-H dependency carries moral implications.
Why?
Dependencies on things is intuitively natural for humans. We adapted into a niche filled with these dependencies.
Dependencies on objects requires explicit abstraction. Once implemented, these dependencies start to feel intuitively natural. Once established, they feel intuitively natural.
But, they are not.
0088 Perhaps, I am starting to appreciate the implications of Hodder’s title: Where are we heading?
Imagine what happens when I replace the term, “things”, with “objects” (that includes humans).
0097 Whatever surrogate for complexity that one uses, an inflection point occurs around 7800 years ago. Once speech-alone talk influences and then replaces hand-speech talk, explicit abstraction adds to implicit abstraction. H-T, T-H, T-T entanglements expand to H-H entanglements (H-O, O-H, O-O). Explicit abstraction is required. But, once humans are objectified, then implicit abstraction kicks back in. One would never know that a distinction defined by spoken wordsbecomes… well… intuitively natural.
Yes, once an objectification is implemented and routinized, then humans become things.
0098 The masterwork, An Archaeology of the Fall, mentions Dr. Ian Hodder as lead investigator at the Catal Hoyuk archaeological site (point 0206).
A mother poses a question, saying (more or less), “Don’t you think that Dr. Hodder would benefit from knowing the hypothesis of the first singularity?“
The son says, “He can figure it out for himself.”
What a reply.
0099 Catal Hoyuk flourishes as a hand-speech talking culture. It belongs to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, right at the cusp, before the start of the Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia.
The site is abandoned as soon as our current Lebenswelt begins.
0100 Surely, the end of Catal Hoyuk can be attributed to climate changes at the start of our current interglacial, in the same way that the formation of a creole-speaking Ubaid culture can be attributed to rising sea levels.
But, climate explanations are not enough. These comments add value to Hodder’s argument. Entanglement theoryundergoes a fundamental change once speech-alone talk enters our world.
Hodder proposes that human-thing entanglements enslave us. They do. However, human-thing entanglements pale in comparison with human-object entanglements. The hypothesis of the first singularity enriches Hodder’s entanglement theory by adding a Peircean relational foundation, then depicting how objects2a may be treated the same as things2a. Objects2a are products of explicit abstraction. Things2a are not.
0101 Slavery begins in our current Lebenswelt with the objectification of humans.
Once Hodder’s entanglement theory encounters the hypothesis of the first singularity, everything we know turns inside out. Hodder attempts to generate an explicit abstraction that, given time, will convey the essence of implicit abstraction. The category-based nested form is instrumental in displaying the relational theatrics that Hodder performs.
0103 Hodder is clever.
Things are content level.
Humans are situation level.
A third level, the perspective level, appears as a complication in points 23 to 31. Here is a wrinkle worth exploring. A good place to start is A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
0104 My thanks go to Dr. Ian Hodder for opening an inquiry that nudges open the door to a new age of understanding. These comments show that the latch is already unlocked.
0105 Where are we heading?
We are moving towards a fourth age of understanding: The Age of Triadic Relations.
0001 Twenty-two thousand years ago, during the maximum of the last ice age, people roamed (along with other large mammals) in a land that bridged modern-day Siberia and Alaska. Glaciers on the eastern (or American) side prevented humans from advancing further. Until they didn’t.
Humans found a way around the blockade. By ten thousand years ago, humans occupy both American continents.
0002 The Siberian-Alaskan landmass displayed one type of ecology (some would call it a frozen wasteland). Yet, Paleolithic people migrating into the Americas adapted to a large variety of ecologies (including the tropics).
0003 How could this be so?
The authors conclude that humans are adapted to niche switching. Humans culturally adapt to novel ecological niches by operating as both generalists and specialists. Humans are behaviorally flexible because they can oscillate between established traditions (which the authors call, “culture”) and problem-solving (which the authors call, “consciousness”). Consequently, humans can “switch” from one niche (such as ice-laden Beringia) to another niche (such as California’s San Joachim Valley).
0004 But, I wonder, “Are not traditions (‘cultures’) specialist oriented? The specializations may not be wildly complicated, but meaningful enough. For example, someone who does well at running with a lance might fit in to the specialty of hunting large game. Someone who is good at identifying mushrooms may fit into the specialty of fungi forager. So, everyone can be a generalist problem-solver, but also work as a specialist too.
“Plus, everyone, whether lance-bearer or mushroom-gatherer, must learn their craft, and must innovate in the face of new challenges.
“So, the human gift of ‘niche-switching’ indicates that humans can find ways to make a living in every ecology. The recent territorial expansion of anatomically modern humans into the Americas serves as an outstanding example.”
0005 Okay, then what is a “niche”?
The authors are modern biologists. When modern biologists hear the word, “niche”, they think “ecological or environmental conditions”. But, there is another technical definition for the word, “niche”, that expands that narrow frame.
0006 What is a “niche”?
The Darwinian paradigm can be diagrammed by following A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).
Here is a picture.
Figure 01
The normal context of natural selection3 brings the actuality of adaptation2 into relation with the potential of ‘something’1, which biologists label “niche“1.
0007 Okay, if the word, “niche” labels the possibility of ‘something’1, then what is this so-called ‘something’?
Now, I turn to A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).
‘Something’ is a content-level actuality2a that is independent of the adapting species.
Consequently, the niche1b is the situation-level potential1b that virtually emerges from (and situates) a content-level actuality2athat is independent of the adapting species.
Figure 02
0008 The most notable feature of this sensible construction is that the content-level actuality2a has no apparent normal context3a or potential1a. In order to understand this actuality2a, one must ascertain its normal context3a and potential1a, which is a very difficult assignment.
Perhaps, this difficulty is why modern biologists say that the actuality2a reflects environmental or ecological conditions. Well, “conditions” also has the advantage of implying a specific material ‘something’ that a species adapts to. Such specificity implies that all niches are proximate.
0009 When the authors use the term, “niche switching”, they are saying that humans are adapted to flourishing in a wide-variety of ecologies and environments.
How do humans accomplish this flourishing?
Well, the generalist within us solves problems. The specialist within us modifies a skill set. Consciousness (or, is it culture?) is adaptive because it draws out an understanding that a content-level actuality3a has a normal-context3a and a potential1a that the person (along with others) can adapt2b to. In other words, the content-level independent actuality2a is meaningful.
Figure 03
0010 There is another advantage of a category-based depiction of Darwinian evolution. It explains the idea of niche construction.
Niche construction occurs when a situation-level adaptation2b alters the content-level actuality2a by introducing a content-level normal context2a and potential1a. To a beaver, a rapidly moving stream surrounded by woods2a has the normal context3a of a place to settle3a and the potential1a of damming the creek to make a home1a. Once this happens, once beavers down enough trees to block the water’s free flow, the independent actuality2a becomes a slow moving creek and glen2a.
Humans are even more sophisticated, since the independent actuality2a becomes meaningful. Our lineage adapts to a niche1b, where the potential of understanding comes from converting an actuality2a into a sign, a mediation, a category-based nested form or some other triadic relation. The sign-relation has three elements: sign-vehicle, sign-object and sign-interpretant. The mediation has three elements: matter, form and mediator. The category-based nested form has three elements: normal context3, actuality2 and potential1. The subscripts refer to the three categories detailed by American philosopher, Charles Peirce: thirdness, secondness and firstness, respectively.
0011 Triadic relations are real (although immaterial) beings (that entangle the material world). Until recently, no biologist imagines that these ephemeral beings could compose an actuality independent of an adapting species2a. Yet, many biologists suggest that the human niche consists of niche construction, or, as with these authors, “niche switching”.
The hypothesis that the ultimate human niche is the potential of triadic relations appears in Razie Mah’s e-book, The Human Niche. The hypothesis is tested in four commentaries.
Comments on Steven Mithen’s Book (1996) The Prehistory of Mind
Comments on Derek Bickerton’s Book (2014) More that Nature Needs
Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big
Comments on Robert Berwick and Noam Chomsky’s Book (2016) Why Only Us?
All are available at smashwords and other e-book venues. They are listed in the series: A Course on the Human Niche.
0012 Here is a diagram of Darwinian evolution for the Homo genus.
0013 Chapter one of Heying and Weinstein’s book is titled “The Human Niche”.
The hypothesis that the ultimate human niche1b is the potential1b of triadic relations2a accounts for the authors’ claim that humans adapt to “switching” among proximate niches. A proximate niche roughly corresponds to an ecology or an environment. The switch entails finding opportunities through understanding. Understanding is the act of adding a normal context3a and potential1a to an independent actuality2a. Understanding is an adaptation2b to the potential1b of triadic relations2a.
0014 Say what?
The ultimate human niche (of the potential of triadic relations) allows humans to rapidly “switch” from one proximate niche (defined as an ecology or an environment) to another.
In Darwin’s paradigm, a niche is the potential that underlies an adaptation. For most species, one finds that a creature’s adaptation solves problems (or finds opportunities) in the so-called “environment of evolutionary adaptation”. By labeling the niche as “the environment of evolutionary adaptation”, modern biologists put on cognitive blinders. “The environment of evolutionary adaptation” implies material beings, not relational beings.
Material conditions goes with proximate niches.
Relational conditions goes with ultimate niches.
The label “environment of evolutionary adaptation” fixes the gaze of modern biologists onto proximate niches.
No modern biologist has come up with a simpler or a more productive hypothesis of an ultimate niche for the Homogenus that the one proposed in Razie Mah’s e-book, The Human Niche.
0015 Once evolutionary biologists (and psychologists) come to terms with the proposition that the ultimate human nicheis the potential of triadic relations (which are purely immaterial beings), they will come face to face with the mystery of human (and all biological) evolution.
0016 Say what?
Mystery of evolution?
At this juncture, I recapitulate a portrait developed in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”. The presence underlying the word, “religion”, corresponds to a particular arrangement of category-based nested forms.
Already, the reader of this blog has encountered the two-level interscope. There is another way to combine two category-based nested forms. The intersection is already applied to evolution in Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome, along with other commentaries in the series, A Course on Evolution and Thomism, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
So, for me, this is familiar territory.
0017 Here is the two-level interscope for Darwinian evolution.
Figure 05
0018 This figure is only half the picture of modern evolutionary biology.
Contemporary biologists are more than mere Darwinists. They call themselves, “NeoDarwinists”. The “Neo-” of NeoDarwinism points to genetics. Each lineage carries DNA, which is foundationally distinct from the actuality that is independent of the adapting species2a. I could say that DNA is foundationally dependent on the actuality2a of the species. But, DNA is not responsible for the adaptations of the species, even when it serves as an internal foundation to the lineage. DNA is responsible for the phenotypes of the species.
In other words, in the normal context of body development3b, the phenotype2b emerges from (and situates) the genome1b. Plus, the situation-level genome1b is the potential1b of the species’ DNA2a. DNA2a is an actuality on the content level.
The following figure is the other half of the picture of modern evolutionary biology.
Figure 06
0019 What about epigenetics?
Ah, epigenetics (as it is currently formulated) has the same character as niche construction. Epigenetics alters the expression of DNA2a by altering its normal context3a and potential1a.
0020 The authors are natural historians, rather than geneticists. Natural selection comes to the fore in their book. Nevertheless they pay tribute to genetics with a concept, called “the omega principle”, where culture is an adaptation and culture evolves to serve our genes (that is, our lineage). This principle is confusing, because it confounds adaptation2band phenotype2b in a world where biology has specialized into natural historians and geneticists.
I ask, “Is there another way to formulate the mysterious omega principle”?
