06/14/25

Looking at Lorenzo Magnani’s Chapter (2024) “Anchors of Meaning” (Part 5 of 7)

1193 Now, this is where a dramatic and a literary choice needs to be made.  Do I depict what happens next as another round of semiotic agency or do I say, “Go ahead and act out your interventional sign, because that is the way that nature rolls.”?

Maybe, I can ask Daisy.

1194 Here is a picture of what I am talking about.

1195 What about rhetoric?

The spoken word, “cognition”, would say, “Go another round.”

The spoken words, “innate response”, would say, “Finish the job.”

1196 The biosemiotician has more than one way to depict the interventional sign-relation.

1197 The dyadic actuality of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay is good for empirio-schematic research.

If I ask, “What gives rise to phenomena and what needs to be modeled?”, then the answers are fairly obvious.

The spider on thigh and who intends what? gives rise to phenomena.

[What is happening and the potential of something happening] needs to be modeled.

1198 Frege’s triangle offers another way to engage in biosemiotic inquiry.  This triangle portrays reified sign-relations, just like the biosemiotic noumenal overlay, but in a geometric, spiral of triangles.  The architecture is like a winding staircase with three steps per whirl.

1199 What if a hominin in the social circle of a team is a semiotic agent?

There is still a conceptc, such as the contiguity between traditional use of iconic and indexal hand-talk words as a manner to convey information (SOe) and the manual-brachial gestures, [image SPIDER][point to THIGH][facial expression of DISTRESS] (SVi).

1200 Surely, the goal2c of the signer is to issue a warning.

The hand-talk statement2c (SVi) stands for a warning2a (SOi) in regards to a normal context that is similar to what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a (SIi).

1201 Next there is a contiguity between SOi (as matter) and SVs (as form).  Frege’s label, [symbola], corresponds to the [substance] of the dyadic actuality on the content level.

When the signer makes the hand-talk statement, all the members of the team can see it.  But, the signer offers an additional clue.  The signer is looking at one particular team member.  And, this team member has a spider on his thigh.

At the time of the statement, everyone on the team engages in an ongoing activity.  Say, shaking ripened fruit from a tree.  So, the warning is not exactly in line with the task at hand.

1202 Nevertheless, each member of the team is a symbol (a sign whose object is based on convention) simply because each member is different from any other member of a team.  The team is the system of a system of differences or the order of a symbolic order.  The team is the convention, so to speak.

So, the comment comes from an elder who is more aware that spiders can appear during this particular collaborative activity.  Perhaps, I can say that the elder stands for someone who is aware of the safety of others.  But, there is no hand-talk gesture word that images or points to the explicit abstraction of “safety”.

1203 Nevertheless, the protolinguistic hand-talk of hominins living between the start of bipedality and the domestication of fire (3.5-0.8Myr) has hidden symbolic operations working beneath the obvious iconic and indexal manual-brachial word-gestures.  The manner in which a spider is pantomimed in [image SPIDER] varies, but only one particular gesture becomes habitual, that is, conventional.  The way that the signer has eye contact with the signee when he signs [image SPIDER] then [point to thigh] has all the hallmarks of grammar.  It is a symbolic operation.  Finally, [facial expression of DISTRESS] may be on its way to being stylized, but at the moment, forget convention!

The goal2c is to warn.

06/13/25

Looking at Lorenzo Magnani’s Chapter (2024) “Anchors of Meaning” (Part 6 of 7)

1204 In section 18.4, titled “Anchors of Meaning: External Semiotic Representation and the Disembodiment of the Mind”, explores the interventional sign-relation, without knowing what the interventional sign-relation is.  

Instead, the author frames a discussion in terms of current research into cognitive niches.

An external representation (such as a word-gesture in hand talk) can be accessed and modified in different cognitive niches (such as different teams within a band of Homo erectus) because the hand-talk word is anchored as an icon or index of a referent.

In this way, hominins extend their “minds” into the Umwelt and turn it into a Lebenswelt of hand-talk words.

1205 The author labels the use of hand talk words by teams in obligative collaborative foraging, “abduction manipulation”.

The label is as funny as it is true.

If [symbola] images [conceptc], then every interventional sign-relation asks, “Guess what I’m thinking?”

That question is pure abduction manipulation.

1206 For an example, in Figure 18.3, the author offers a diagrammatic representation that calls to mind Aristotle’s demonstration of how the geometry of triangles may be intuitively abstracted.

Even the slaves of ancient Greece can follow the diagram.

Compare that to the following presentation of Frege’s triangle.

The two triangles are not so different.  Both manipulate abduction.

1207 The last half of section 18.4 discusses the disembodiment of the mind.

Semiotic agency (purple lines) embodies the mind.

The interventional sign-relation (orange line) is like a mind, disembodied.

Along those lines, there are some late moderns who assert that our current Lebenswelt is a simulation.

I wonder, “Are they communing with the orange line?”

1208 Speaking of communing with orange lions, the author offers a work of Paleolithic art dating to around thirty-thousand years ago.  It is orange.  But, that is not the salient feature.  It’s shape is half-man (bottom portion) and half-lion (top portion).

1209 I wonder, what is the story behind the lion-man Paleolithic artifact?

The Upper Paleolithic of Europe begins after humans evolved (around 200,000 years ago).  The continuity between 200,000 years ago and 30,000 years ago is strong, but advances in tool-use, resilience to different ecologies, and creativity in spiritual awareness are remarkable.  Spiritual awareness?   It’s just another term for “disembodied mind”.  That lion-man, carved from ivory and stained orange from years of resting in soil, embodies a “disembodied mind”.

1210 That means that the lion-man is an agent, capable of semiotic agency, and its owner is an agent, capable of semiotic agency. 

So, what is the owner up to?

1211 Well, I need to go back more than 170,000 years before the 30,000 year old artifact to explain.

After the domestication of fire, starting 800,000 years ago, hand-talk, once confined to the social circle of teams, becomes an activity in its own right, as cooking becomes more communal (one fire, one cookout per band) and shooting the breeze after a nice meal becomes routine.  Hand-talk adapts and becomes linguistic.

Linguistic hand-talk offers an opportunity not available to proto-linguistic hand-talk.  One can make grammatically correct counter-intuitive statements.  Even though every gesture-word is sensible, because it pictures or points to its referent, when combined to make a grammatically correct statement, a new type of mental construction (or “cognitive space”) becomes possible. 

See the chapter of meaning in How to Define the Word “Religion”, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1212 The figure of lion-man precisely captures the counter-intuitive nature of nonsensical hand-talk statements.  The lion part pictures a lion.  The human part pictures a human.  Each part is perfectly referential.  But, the artifact makes no sense at all.

1213 Soon after the the domestication of fire, the Neanderthals and Denisovans speciate as hominins practicing fully linguistic hand-talk.  They are not the only hominins that thrive on the fact that the cognitive spaces opened by fully linguistic hand talk are good at organizing all social circles, including very large social circles such as the community (150), the mega-band (500) and the tribe (1500).

These larger social circles cannot gather for long, because large meetings are opportunities for disease.  So, they develop cultural practices that are useful for rapid recognition and social synchronization.  One of these practices is singing.  Singing is a powerful semiotic tool for both recognition and synchronization.  Sexual selection for better singing follows.  The vocal tract comes under voluntary neural control.

1214. Then, a little over 200,000 years ago, the voice is added to hand talk (as an adornment) with the speciation of Homo sapiens.  Hand-speech talk is born, along with the semiotics of adornment.  The Paleolithic period that followsslowly discovers what adornment can do.  And, equally slowly, the speech aspect of hand-speech talk takes on a life of its own.

Around 50,000 years ago, humans migrate into ice-age Europe.  They occasionally breed with Neanderthals.  How can this happen?  Humans are still predominately practicing hand talk.  Their speech is an adornment.

By 30,000 years ago, humans have not bred with Neanderthals for thousands of years, even though many carry Neanderthal genes.  Why?  Perhaps, the occasional presence of the hand-talking Neanderthals inspire the humans to speak more, to cultivate their vocal adornments by exploring the semiotic capacity of speech in the milieu of hand talk.  The Neanderthals cannot speak.  They can try to imitate what the humans are doing.  But, their vocal tracts are not under the same degree of voluntary control.

Hmmm.  Extinction looms.

See Comments on David Reich’s Book (2018) Who We Are and How We Got Here, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1215 The Upper Paleolithic lion-man is fashioned as an artifact, an agent, with a mind.  Obviously, a piece of ivory does not have a mind, so the modern scientist must call what the lion-man exhibits, “a disembodied mind”.

06/12/25

Looking at Lorenzo Magnani’s Chapter (2024) “Anchors of Meaning” (Part 7 of 7)

1216 This lion-man ivory is valuable.

Why?

1217 He is an agent, with a disembodied mind.

The other agent, the human, practices hand-speech talk, and occasionally is faced with moments when consultation may be advisable.  The community faces difficulties.  What are we to do?

Let the community-leader ask the lion-man.

1218 The Neanderthal cannot do this, because Neanderthals only practice hand-talk.

The humans practice hand-speech talk.  The ivory figure cannot hand talk.  So, the lion-man must speak.

1219 At this point, I enter the terrain of a precocious book, proposing that modern consciousness rises from the ashes of the breakdown of whatever is going on when the Paleolithic community-leader is speaking to lion-man, or rather, hearing the disembodied voice of lion-man.  The book is The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind(1976), by Princeton psychologist and psychohistorian, Julian Jaynes (1920-1997).

1220 The lion-man speaks in an interventional sign-relation.

Here is a picture.

Today, lion-man would be an app on an i-phone.

1221 This example brings this examiner through section 18.5 (“Material Anchors for Conceptual Blends”) and into section 18.6 (“Conclusion”).

1222 I rest my pen.

My thanks to the author, Lorenzo Magnani, and his team at the Computational Philosophy Laboratory.  May they find a way to portray the semiotics of a world that does not compute, otherwise labeled, the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

06/11/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 1 of 5)

1223 The text before me is chapter three of Semiotic Agency (2021, book details on point 830, pages 59-94).

1224 The abstract raises the question of evolution.  The question is addressed earlier in this examination.  Points 0710 through 0752 assert that the actualities of adaptation2b and phenotype2b are not the same.  One does not situate the other.  Instead, their nested forms intersect in such a manner as to constitute a single actuality2.  Adaptation2b and phenotype2b intersect to constitute a living being2.

1225 How shall I proceed?

Semiotic Agency yields the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay by taking an interscope that is similar to the scholastic interscope for how humans think and transubstantiating it from thirdness to secondness.

In thirdness, the scholastic interscope contains the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

1226 Here is a diagram.

In secondness, the elements from these triadic sign-relations fit into a dyad, characteristic of Peirce’s secondness.

1227 The dyad consists of two contiguous real elements, very much in tune with Aristotle’s exemplar, matter [substance] form.

The following depicts a dyad within a dyad.  Each dyad exhibits its own configuration.

For the fundament, the specifying sign, SOs is like matter, SVs is like form, and SIs is [substance].  In a sense, a form of the sign-vehicle calls forth the matter of a sign-object, in the way that say, the form of a traffic stop sign2a (SVs) calls forth the matter of stopping the vehicle2b (SOs). 

For the resonant, the exemplar sign, SVe is like matter, SOe is like form, and SIe is like [substance].  The matter of me following the rules of the road2b (SVe) stands for my successful arrival at my driving destination2c (SOe) in regards to making sense3c operating on the possibility that if everyone obeys the rules of the road then each one of us will get where we are going to1c (SIe).

1228 This dyad within a dyad performs what phenomenology claims to do, that is, identify what the noumenon must be.

The noumenon of what?

Biosemiotics.

Or, should I say, “Biosemiotics as an exercise of the Positivist’s judgment, however compromised the positivist intellect may be.”?

1229 Of course, this is a fantastic claim.  But, this examination of Semiotic Agency (see point 830 for book details) and Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (see point 831 for book details) bears me out.  Sharov, Tonnessen and Mikhailovsky set the stage for a paradigm that not only is phenomenological, but accounts for how phenomenology works.  This examination adds value by presenting the diagrams.

06/10/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 2 of 5)

1230 Now, back to evolution.

May I use the same technique for my examination of evolution?

May I pass from thirdness (M) to secondness (N), then add a twist (O)?

1231 I start with neodarwinism as an intersection (M).  The single actuality2 may be individual2, species2 or genus2.

The intersection consists two triadic relations, even though the single actuality2 um.. belongs to secondness.

Here is a picture.

1232 Yes, adaptation2H is not the same as phenotype2V.

Not only that, each actuality2b belongs to a situation-level nested form.

Here is the two-level interscope for adaptation2H.

1233 In previous examinations, the term, “niche” is a point of contention.  Does the term have a clear technical definition?  Or does “niche” suggest “whatever adaptations are adapting to”?

Surely, a technical definition is implied by the above figure.

A niche1b is the potential1b of an actuality of the adapting species2a.

1234 This introduces another point of contention.

Does the niche have to consist of purely material conditions, whether environmental or ecological?  The answer is no, even though, for almost all species, the niche is the potential of ‘something’ in the environment or the ecology.  The most obvious exception is our own genus, the Homo genus, whose niche is the potential of triadic relations.

Triadic relations are immaterial beings that entangle the material world.  So, a scientist, working under the presumption of the positivist intellect (metaphysics is not allowed), has a difficult time because observations and measurements follow only the entangled material world, rather than the significant observable and measurable facets of the thing itself.

The biosemiotic noumenal overlay changes the game in that respect.  Phenomena consist of sign-vehicles and sign-objects that would be rejected by the modern positivist intellect because they are imbued with formal and final causalities.

1235 As for the potential of triadic relations, consider the e-book, The Human Niche (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

1236 Here is two-level interscope for phenotype2V.

1237 Hmmm, what is going on with the genotype1b?

Like “niche1b“, “genotype1b” labels a potential: the potential1b of DNA2a.  The cellular apparatus for translating DNA into proteins is a complicated arrangement.  Nevertheless, scientists currently have a fairly coherent story for how a DNA world supports a RNA world and a RNA world translates into a protein world.  The phenotype2b manifests in the protein world.  Proteins get cellular processes done.

06/9/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 3 of 5)

1238 Natural historians say, “Consider the adaptation2H.”

Geneticists say, “Consider the phenotype2V.”

The two-level interscopes of adaptation2b and of phenotype2b have one thing in common.

Both express all the elements of the specifying sign-relation

1239 For the natural historian, an actuality independent of the adapting species2a (SVs) stands for an adaptation2b(SOs) in regards to natural selection3b operating on a niche1b (SIs).

For the geneticist, DNA2a (SVs) stands for a phenotype2b (SOs) in regards to body development3b operating on the genotype1b (SIs).

1240 Now, I wonder whether I can repeat the same trick as the one performed at the very start of Semiotic Agency (N).

1241 The above figure expresses two styles of triadic relations, the specifying sign-relation and the two-level interscope.  There are two real elements, the content- and situation-level actualities, and they look like a dyad.  The situation level holds one real element, which I associate to matter (or esse_ce, being [substantiating]).  The content level holds the other real element, which I associate to form (or essence, [substantiated] being}.

1242 Why the associations?

That is how the actualities appear in the above figure.

Content-level form (SVs) stands for situation-level matter (SOs).  This is like the appearance of a shape (SVs) standing for the presence of matter (SOs) in regards to a situation-level normal context3b operating on the possibility of ‘situating content’1b (SIs).  Or, this is like a sensation2a (SVs) standing for a perception2b (SOs) in the normal context of what it2ameans to me3b operating on the potential1b of situating content2a (SIs).

1243 What else do I see?

I see the situation-level normal context3b and its potential1b folding into the contiguity between matter (SOsand form(SVs).

Here is a picture.

Surely, this diagram associates to the S&T noumenal overlay, but separately for adaptation2b and phenotype2b.

1244 Adaptation2b looks like information2b.

1245 Phenotype also looks like information2b.

1246 Both these figures represent incomplete pictures of semiotic agency, because there are no exemplar sign-relations.

Both tell me how incomplete neodarwinism is, as a model for biological systems.

Natural historians may be satisfied with the way that darwinism fits.

Geneticists may be satisfied with the way that the “neo” of neodarwinism fits.

1247 Why don’t most biologists want to talk about “niche” or “genotype”?

Well, the real elements, SVs and SOs, are obvious.

How does one model what needs to be accounted for (the contiguity, SIs) using observations and measurements of the phenomena of the real elements (SVs and SOs)?

Well, natural historians and geneticists are doing research everyday.  They encounter this issue. But, they do not have a complete image of semiotic agency that directs the inquirer.

They do not have an exemplar sign-relation.

06/7/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 4 of 5)

1248 Why is this lack of exemplar sign-relation salient3c((1c))?

Section 3.1 of chapter 3 of Semiotic Agency says that the human individual has three major components: a body (J), cognition (K) and a niche (L).

1249 What does that (J, K, L) tell me?

1250 Take a look at Figure 3.1, which portrays each component in a cut and paste manner.

1251 Surely, the human body (J) corresponds to phenotype2b as the sign object of a specifying relation.

In section 3.2, the author discusses the human body (J) in terms of subagency.

That is fine, because subagency models [body development3b operating on the genotype1a].  Current research in a variety of disciplines related to genetics is relevant.

1252 The niche (L) corresponds to adaptation2b as the sign-object of a specifying sign-relation.

In section 3.4, the author says that the human niche (L) includes the environment (as well as ecology), human artifacts, semiotic factors (such as information and communication) and social conditions.

Yes, but what about triadic relations?

1253 The author goes on to wrestle with different approaches to the term, “niche”.  Each approach tries to model [natural selection3b operating on the potential1b of an actuality independent of the adapting species2a].  But, no approach identifies the one actuality2a that accounts for convergent evolution among all hominin species.

Yes, I am talking about triadic relations.

See The Human Niche, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1254 The author raises the idea of a “cognitive niche”, which brings me to cognition (K).

Section 3.3 discusses human cognition (K) in terms of subagents.

1255 There are mental modules devoted to sensation, perception, memory, integration and action.  They are heterogeneous.  They may be called “cognits” because they knit cogs.  Surely, mental modules and “cognits” are neural… I mean… cognitive adaptations.  Several chapters in Semiotic Agency are devoted to these topics.

Section 3.5 covers periods of human life in terms of age-related phenotype3V (J), adaptation2H (L) and cognition (K).  This section rounds off the idea that the human has three components.

1256 Cognition (K) corresponds to the union of both phenotype2H (J) and adaptation2V (L) when it comes to human agency.

And, that is very curious.

1257 The issue of the salience3c((1c)) of the exemplar sign-relation is not raised.

Why is this issue important to me?

Do I see an opportunity?

1258 I see that a living being is an intersection between adaptation2H and phenotype2V.

I also notice that, when placed into the purely relational structure of semiotic agency, the specifying sign-relation for both adaptation2b and phenotype2b lack exemplar sign-relations.

1259 So, I wonder, does the intersection of neodarwinism provide complementary exemplar sign relations for the specifying sign-relations of natural history and genetics?

06/6/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen’s Chapter (2021) “Human Agency” (Part 5 of 5)

1260 Say what?

Here is the intersection, once again.

1261 Yes, I can make out a configuration that looks like an exemplar sign-relation.

One version of the exemplar relation goes like this.  Information2b (SVe) stands for a goal (SOe) in regards to a normal context asking something like, “Does this make sense?”3c operating on the potential of ‘situating information’1c (SIe).

In the above diagram, information2b (SVe) is adaptation2H.  The goal2c (SOe) is the power to live as an agent.  The [contiguity] (SIe) is an intersection with the phenotype3c operating on the potentials that the phenotype provides1c.

1262 For the -darwinism version of exemplar sign-relation, the two actualities are adaptation2b (SVe) and the power to live as agent2c (SOe).  The contiguity is the normal context of an intersection with one’s phenotype3c, operating on the potentials that the phenotypes provide1c (SIe).

1263 For the neo- version of the exemplar sign-relation, the two actualities are phenotype2b (SVe) and the disposition to live as an agent2c (SOe).  The contiguity is the normal context of an intersection with one’s adaptations3c, operating on the potentials that adaptations provide1c (SIe).

1264 What do these two exemplar sign-relations tell us?

Adaptations express power?

Adaptations allow survival to the extent that the phenotype allows them?

Phenotypes express dispositions?

Phenotypes are expressed as a suite of adaptations whether the agent needs them or not?

No wonder biologists cannot “define” evolution concisely.

1265 Surely, this argument does not please the positivist intellect of the physicists and the chemists.

Biological evolution is a mystery, the intersection of two independent sciences, natural history and genetics.

But, that is not all.  I can delineate an implication for one of the contradictions inherent in biological evolution.

Phenotype is necessary for a -darwinian explanation, where “evolution” operates as an agent.  Phenotypic dispositions are inseparable from individual adaptive powers.

1266 Also, adaptation is necessary for a neo- (or genetic) explanation, where “evolution” operates as an agent.  Adaptive powers are inseparable from species-specific dispositions.

1267 Yes, I am arriving at a contradiction that cannot be resolved into either natural history or genetics.  Both of these discipline’s semiotic agency have the same agent, “evolution”.  But, what is the ‘final causality’?

1268 Here, the logics of firstness come into play.  The logics of firstness are inclusive and allow contradictions.  Evolution as an agent3 brings the actualities of adaptation and phenotype as semiotic agencies2 into relation with ‘a creative potential that evolutionary scientists regard as real’1.  But, it is unreal, because it represents a ‘final causality’ that stands beyond anything than the human can imagine.

After all, humans are evolved living beings.  What are we imaging when we try to picture this ‘final causality’?

1269 Modern evolutionary biologists may attribute the reality of the creative potential underlying evolution as an agent to matter alone, rather than matter [substance] form.

Postmodern biosemioticians may attribute the reality of the creative potential to triadic relations, such as the triadic relations reified into the matter [substance] form of semiotic agency.

1270 What does this imply?

The attribution of the biosemiotician encompasses the attribution of modern evolutionary biology.

The answer approaches the metaphysical in precisely the way that the Aristotle-tolerating positivist intellect currently uses the term, “metaphysics”, for “religious”.

The positivist intellect declares, “Religious empirio-schematic models are not allowed.”

1271 And, this raises a question, “How to define the word “religion?”

This question is the title of one of Razie Mah’s three masterworks.

More on that later.

06/5/25

A Brief Overview of What Razie Mah offers Biosemioticians in 2025 (Part 1 of 3)

1272 Biosemiotics challenges the current scientific vision of human evolution (as of 2025).

Okay, maybe I should correct that.

Razie Mah presents a challenge.  Biosemioticians can board the academic siege-apparatus at their leisure.

Leisure?

In 2010, in the book, Semiotic Animal, John Deely describes the owl of Minerva taking wing in the twilight of the modern Age of Ideas.  He, Thomas Sebeok and (no doubt) biosemiotician Alexei Sharov, know that the Third Age of Understanding comes to a close.

1273 In October 2023, Razie Mah blogs a review, titled Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010), “Semiotic Animal”.  This examination contains the scholastic interscope for how humans think.  The initial version of this interscope is developed in Razie Mah’s e-book, Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings.  The interventional sign-relation comes into view in Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2019) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.

1274 Then, starting in July and running through October 2024, Razie Mah offers a series of examinations in his blog, including Looking at Steve Fuller’s Book (2020) “A Player’s Guide to the Post-Truth Condition”; Joesph Pieper’s book (1974) “Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power”; Vivek Ramaswamy’s book (2021), “Woke, Inc.”; Michelle Stile’s book (2022), “One Idea to Rule Them All”; and N.H. Enfield’s book (2022), “Language vs. Reality”.

These reviews, full of diagrams of the interventional sign relation and detailing its relevance to the current historical moment, are collected in three e-books, Parts 1, 2 and 3, of Original Sin and The Post-Truth Condition.

1275 The owl of Minerva lands in the dawning Age of Triadic Relations.

1276 This brings me to the question of human agency.

Section 3.6 of Semiotic Agency is titled, “Development of Human Agency in Historical Perspective”.

The authors’ story begins with the Neolithic Revolution of the Fertile Crescent, starting around 12,000 years ago, then seamlessly drifts to our own current day.  It reads as if our current Lebenswelt starts with the Neolithic archaeological period.

1277 This story of the development of humanity is not much different from the written myths of the ancient Near East, where humans are um… created… when some differentiated god places special seeds in the soil… or something like that.  These ancient myths are recorded on cuneiform clay tablets, that are preserved by their incineration in royal libraries thousands of years ago.  

Yes, incineration.

The tablets are made of clay.

The capital burns.  Clay fires to brick.  Brick lasts so long that an archaeologist can read the script of a tablet millennia later.

1278 The origin myths of the ancient Near East testify that humans are recent creations, formed from differentiated gods, for the god’s own purposes.  That sounds like our current Lebenswelt to me.  That sounds like the “Development of Human Agency in Historical Perspective”.

Why don’t civilized humans have the agency to see beyond the start of their own civilizations?

1279 Biosemiotics has an answer.  Civilized humans practice a type of semiosis that differs from the type of semiosis that their ancestors practiced.

What am I talking about?

The evolution of talk is not the same as the evolution of language.

1280 Our current Lebenswelt of civilizations practices speech-alone talk.  Speech-alone talk offers the comforts of implicit abstraction (characteristic of icons and indexes) and facilitates the unexpectedly profitable rewards (and the unanticipated costs) of explicit abstraction.  Speech-alone talk can attach a label to anything.  In short, anything can become a sign-vehicle (SVs), just by speaking the label.

1281 So, what does a spoken word mean?  Is the nature of its presence merely a label?  What message does that send?  The answers to all these questions are explicit abstractions.  Spoken words facilitate explicit abstractions based on the purely symbolic-sign qualities of symbols.

1282 The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices hand-talk (for the Homo genus) and hand-speech talk (for the species Homo sapiens).  Hand talk permits implicit abstraction.

What do I mean by “implicit abstraction”?

The diagrams in my examination of Alexei Sharov’s and Morten Tonnessen’s book, Semiotic Agency, depict purely relational structures that hominins adapted to over the course of millions of years.  The idea is mind boggling to the modern.  However, implicit abstraction accounts for modern trends, such as the appearance and success of phenomenology in a civilization prospering on empirio-schematic inquiry.

1283 One of the first items of value for the biosemiotician are works that are contained in the series, A Course on Implicit and Explicit Abstraction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1284 The Lebenswelt that we evolved in practices only implicit abstraction.Our current Lebenswelt also practices explicit abstraction.

06/4/25

A Brief Overview of What Razie Mah offers Biosemioticians in 2025 (Part 2 of 3)

1285 Biosemiotics challenges the current scientific vision of human evolution (as of 2025).

Okay, maybe I should correct that.

Razie Mah presents a challenge that biosemioticians should explore.

Human evolution comes with a twist.

1286 The transition between the Lebenswelt that we evolved in and our current Lebenswelt starts with the Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia, nominally, 7800 years ago.  That makes the current year, 7825 U0′ (Ubaid Zero Prime).  The year is merely a formality.  Perhaps, astrologers will have something to say about the year when the Ubaid settles as the world’s first speech-alone talking culture.

At its inception, the Ubaid is the only speech-alone talking culture on Earth.  All other cultures practice hand-speech talk.  The power of speech-alone talk makes the Ubaid disposed to unconstrained social complexity.

1287 The Ubaid archaeological period is followed by the Uruk (starting around 1800 U0′).  The Uruk archaeological period is followed by the Sumerian Dynastic (2800 U0′).  The Egyptian Dynastic starts at the same time, showing precocious development after exposure to speech-alone talk from the the original source in southern Mesopotamia.

1288 As the first singularity spreads, nearby hand-speech talking cultures drop the hand-component of their hand-speech talk in favor of speech-alone talk.  Why?  Speech-alone talk is the practice of wealthier and more powerful neighboring cultures (starting with the Ubaid). Speech-alone talk permits explicit abstraction.  Explicit abstractionfacilitates specialization.  As soon as explicit abstraction is practiced, trends towards labor and social specializationmanifest.

Wealth and power.

What is not to like?

1289 The potentiation of unconstrained social complexity shows up in various guises in the written origin myths of the ancient Near East.  Of course, one well-known myth comes from an oral tradition that lasted for thousands of years, before being committed to writing.  Yes, I am talking about the biblical stories of Adam and Eve.

Notice that the talking serpent does not have hands.  It could not have performed hand talk.  It is an exemplar of speech-alone talk.

1290 What does the speaking serpent accomplish?

It demonstrates the nature of speech-alone talk.

Surely, the serpent enjoyed the game… until the boss showed up.  Once Adam and Eve leave the garden, trends towards unconstrained social complexity follow.  The social circles of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in cannot withstand the onslaught of labor and social specialization.  Brother turns against brother.

1291 Of course, a drama is the best way to tell the tale of the first singularity, that is, the beginning of our humanity… er… current Lebenswelt.

Consider Razie Mah’s fiction, An Archaeology of the Fall.

1292 Nominally, the year of this examination is 7825 U0′ (Ubaid Zero Prime).

And, postmoderns are beginning to realize the power of spoken words to create reality.

That is the nature of our current Lebenswelt.

1293 Here is a list of Razie Mah’s masterworks.