Monthly Archives: December 2023

12/12/23

What Is A Meme? (C of G, Part 11 of 20)

0101 With a single chomp of her mighty mouth, along with some head thrashing, Daisy can put an end to the neighbor’s cat.  I suppose that I restrain her from what her species expressa2b calls her to do, because I have her on a leash.  The leash puts Daisy’s species expressa2b into perspective.

0102 Does this imply that there is another sign?  Does this sign connect the situation and perspective levels?

Daisy’s fear and loathing of the cat2b (SVe) stands for her being restrained by the leash and thereby confounded2c (SOe) in regards to the question, “Does this makes sense?”3c, contextualizing the possibility of putting the situation into perspective1c (SIe).

The subscript, “e”, stands for “exemplar”.

Here is a picture.

0103 The exemplar sign-vehicle (SVe) coincides with the specifying sign-object (SOs).

Correspondingly, the exemplar sign-object (SOe) puts the specifying sign-object (SOs) into perspective.  This perspective includes both Daisy and myself, along with the catnip, the cat and my trash-toting neighbor.

0104 Plus, there is a question about nomenclature.

For scholastics, the specifying sign starts with subjective content and ends with objective situation.  The exemplar signstarts with an intersubjective situation and ends with a suprasubjective perspective.  So, the situation-level actuality is “objective” (SOs) for the former and “intersubjective” (SVe) for the latter.

For moderns, only two terms are employed, “subjective” and “objective””.  Scholastic terms shift when stepping from the specifying sign to the exemplar sign.  For moderns, “subjective” opinions often address the question, “What does it mean to me?”3b, while “objective” facts raise the question, “Does this make sense?”3c.

This terminological shift is discussed in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2023, Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”.

0105 The exemplar sign object2c (SOe) makes sense3b because it may be true, or believable, or commonly accepted, or logical with respect to an affordance.  What is that affordance?  May I call it, “intelligibility”?  Oh, that could bring a smile to the face of a philosopher and a grimace to the face of a scientist.

0106 Let me return to the scholastic manifest image for the example of Daisy, my dog, who I knowingly place into proximity to the neighbor’s miserable feline, soon after the neighbor lady takes out her trash.  Is there a problem with planting catnip in the verge near where we regularly stroll?  Surely, the neighbor’s husband, who is rarely at home to tend the verge, does not mind.  Plus, the cat clearly loves the mint.

Here is a picture.

0107 The exemplar sign-object (SOe) contains a judgment.

Recall, a judgment is a relation between what is and what ought to be.

0108 In order to arrive at my judgment2c, I first look at the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality.

To me, Daisy’s confoundedness2c serves as a virtual normal context that brings the actuality of unnerved Daisy2b into relation with the possibilities inherent in her tail tucked between her legs2a.

I next transfer the virtual nested form into the triadic structure of judgment.

Daisy’s confoundedness (relation, thirdness) brings her tucked tail as an universal being (what is, secondness) into relation to Daisy’s fear and loathing as an intelligible being (what is, firstness).

0109 Yes, whatever is going on in Daisy’s mind2c contributes to my judgment2c, even though it (whatever “it” is) cannot be articulated.

0110 For Daisy, a relation that I am not privy to2c virtually brings fear and loathing2b into relation with that catnip-addled feline2a.

0111 The triadic structure of judgment fits neatly into the sign-object of the exemplar sign as well as the perspective-level actuality2c of the scholastic’s three-level interscope.

12/11/23

What Is A Meme? (D of G, Part 12 of 20)

0112 Here is a scholastic picture of the way humans think.

0113 What is the nature of the Latin term, “species intelligibilis“?

Typically, this actuality2c attempts to bring the ‘what is’ of a species impressa2a into relation with the ‘what ought to be’ of a species expressa2b.

There is another way to describe the perspective-level judgment.  A relation2c brings together the universal aspects of the species impressa2a (what is) and the intelligible aspects of the species expressa2b (what ought to be).  As such, the elements belonging to the perspective-level actuality2c are not exactly the same as the situationb and contenta level actualities2.  They must be qualified as elements of judgment.  The scholastics accomplish this task by adding the word, “intelligibilis”.

Here is a picture.

0114 Daisy cannot ask the question, “Does this makes sense?”3b.

Consequently, Daisy cannot contextualize the potential1c of her species expressa2b by formulating a species expressa intelligibilis2c.

Or, maybe she can.

I guess one does not have to speak the question3c in order to ask it.

0115 What is her conviction2c?

Is her phantasm2b effectively true, believable, commonly accepted, and logical with respect to an affordance1b?

What is that affordance1b?

I can only guess.

And then, there is the issue of the leash2c.

0116 Since I am able to put my species expressa2b into perspective2c, I can imagine what Daisy’s judgment might be2c.   I may not be correct.  But, I know that Daisy is fully capable of dispatching that cat, because, by my reckoning, she has already performed such duty on at least one other cat, a half-dozen squirrels, and a dozen rats.

On top of that, if Daisy suddenly throttles that indoor cat, whose only excursions into the wild lead directly to the catnip patch, then the cat’s owner would have to deal with me, her neighbor, whom she has studiously ignored for long enough.

0117 Hmmm.  I guess I should not have said that.

There is something about my species intelligibilis2c best be left unspoken.

How so?

My little addendum enters the reader’s slot for species impressa2a and, in the process, provides a clue to what is happening3a, as well as the potential of ‘something happening’1a.

0118 I know what you are thinking.

What sort of freak would create a situation where his dog kills the neighbor’s cat in order to gain her attention?

12/9/23

What Is A Meme? (E of G, Part 13 of 20)

0119 I have another label for what you are thinking.

You are thinking a meme.

According to Dennett, a meme is a unit of culture, bearing semantic information, offering ‘something’ that makes a difference and surviving through reproduction, such as gossip.

News of Daisy killing the neighbor’s cat is a meme.

0120 I snatch the cat’s corpse from Daisy’s mouth, after distracting her with one of her favorite treats.  I intend to bring the deceased to the neighbor lady.  I am sure that she will tell every person she knows about the incident, if she knows anyone.  She seems like a sailor’s widow, waiting for her husband to return.  But, she does not do what every woman whose man works the seas should be doing, going to church to pray for his safety.

I plan to carry the cat’s body in a bag and knock on her door.

When she answers, I aim to say, “I took the leash off Daisy this morning and she went right after your cat.  Your cat is dead.  I am sorry.  If you want, I will buy you a new cat.”

But first, I ought to address another question.

0121 How did Daisy manifest her judgment2c with such vigor?

I think that the leash says it all.

Removing the leash2c produced a species impressa2a in Daisy, which specified a species expressa2b, which inspired a canine species intelligibilis2c, which stood for an action, which took the cat completely by surprise and generated a new species impressa2a in me, as I came to realize the potential of ‘something’ happening1a underlying the normal context ofwhat is happening3a.

0122 What am I saying?

Am I saying that Daisy’s judgment2c produces a sign-relation that appears inside out, because the sign-vehicle is hidden within Daisy’s mind and the sign-object is what Daisy does, for me to witness?

0123 Yes, I call this inside-out sign-relation an “interventional sign”.

Here is a picture.

12/8/23

What Is A Meme? (F of G, Part 14 of 20)

0124 A meme involves an interventional sign-relation, whose sign-vehicle3c (SVi) fills in the slot for species impressa2a(SOi) while providing clues to a relevant content-level normal context3a and potential1a (SIi).

A meme also involves a specifying sign-relation, where a content-level species impressa2a (SVs) specifies a species expressa2b (SOs) within a situation-level normal context3b and potential1b (SIs).

0125 Here is a general picture of the specifying sign.

0126 Obviously, the interventional sign-object occupies the same content-level actuality2a as the specifying sign-vehicle.

The adaptiveness of the subsequent specifying sign weighs (takes into account) the initial bias (perhaps, affordance) provided by the interventional sign’s interpretant.

0127 In chapter nine, Dennett considers spoken words as paradigms of memes.

What about the gesture-words of hand talk… er… “sign language”?

Surely, these are even more paradigmatic because the gesture-word images and points to its referent.

0128 What if language evolves in the milieu of hand talk?

Here is a scenario to think about.

A warm rain falls all afternoon on my mixed forest location in eastern Africa, around a million years ago.  My Homo erectus comrades can’t do much, so they huddle under trees and nap.  The next day, the clouds have not given way, and I can smell something and I know what that something is.  Mushrooms are sprouting!

0129 How do I know this?

A mental module has evolved, over the course of generations, specifically devoted this opportunity, the smell and the taste and the weather conditions are all encoded, because those of my ancestors who responded to the mushroom-related opportunity reproduced more successfully that those who did not.

Plus, I don’t have a leash.

0130 However, I need to recruit others.  I need volunteers willing to work for food and share the riches with others.  In time, others will return the favor.  So, I initiate an interventional sign-relation.

0131 By Dennett’s account, my hand talk words constitute “a meme,” a unit of culture, containing semantic information, a difference that makes a difference, and a piece of know-what worth having.

0132 By a scholastic’s account, my hand talk words constitute the sign-object of an interventional sign-relation (SOi).

I don’t know whether medieval schoolmen successfully formalize the causality inherent in the interventional sign as a relational being.  According to Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, Latin-writing scholars formalize the specifying and the exemplar sign-causalities.  The discovery of the interventional sign, which has all the characteristics of Dennett’s notion of “an inversion of reason”, appears in Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”.  Both commentaries are available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0133 Whatever the accounting, my intervention sign initiates a specifying sign, leading to a wonderful mushroom harvest and contributing to our team (and our band’s) reproductive success.

0134  What is this “inversion of reason” business?

The interventional sign-relation inverts the commonplace notion that the sign-vehicle is visible (and thus, a subject) and the sign-object is mental (and thus, an object).

The specifying sign-relation reverts the inversion back into the commonplace notion.

0135 Both sign-relations intimate an affordance.

In this instance, the two affordances speak with one voice, saying, “Our team can gather many more mushrooms than a single individual.  We can gather enough to feed all the other potential (but not, at this weather moment, actualized) teams in the band.  Plus, we can dry and hide the rest.  Time is short.  Get to work!”

0136 Notably, this affordance cannot be articulated using hand talk.

How can one picture or point to “team”, “potential” or “affordance”?

Nonetheless, the affordance includes the potentials within the purely relational structure of the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

Clearly, each member of the team conjures the same relational structure, even though each individual possesses a different brain.

Only one more step is required to answer the question, “What is a meme?”

12/7/23

What Is A Meme? (G of G, Part 15 of 20)

0137 From the previous blogs, I know that the meme is bound to the species impressa2a.

In the species impressa2a, the sign-object of the interventional sign (SOi) weds the sign-vehicle of the specifying sign(SVs).

The question arises, “How are the two united?”

0138 Aristotle’s hylomorphe meets the definition of Peirce’s category of secondness.  The category of secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  My nomenclature puts the contiguity into brackets: one real element [contiguity] other real element.

0139 The two real elements are subject to the law of noncontradiction.

Plus, the contiguity is not a real element, even though it seems to be.

Ironically, I intend to use the word, “substance”, to label the contiguity.  The word has a long pedigree.  After being used for philosophical discourse for thousands of years, the word does not have much use in our current modern Age of Ideas.  Some people call table salt, “a substance”.  Some moderns call addiction to cocaine, “substance abuse”.  So, my technical postmodern adoption of the term, “substance”, as the contiguity between matter and form, marks a turning point, the dawn of a new age of understanding.

More or less.

The hylomorphe stands at the beginning of the Greek Age of philosophy.

0140 Here is a picture of Aristotle’s hylomorphe.

0141 For this application, the meme is a species impressa2a manifesting the following hylomorphic structure.

0142 Dennett devotes several chapters to memes, including chapter ten (“The Meme’s Eye Point of View”) and eleven (“What Wrong with Memes?  Objections and Replies”).

0143 This picture of the meme satisfies Dennett’s concept of the meme.

How so?

Memes are units of cultural information.  Memes allow competence without comprehension.  At the same time, memes play a role in comprehension.  

0144 Of course, this picture also challenges Dennett’s notion of the meme.

How so?

The meme is a hylomorphe constructed with sign-elements of two sign-relations.

This brings me back to competence, as opposed to comprehension.

Competence merely requires both signs to function.

Comprehension depends on how apparent the interventional sign is.  How well does the interventional sign-action2a(SOi), which like inversion of what we imagine a sign-object to be, convey what is happening3a and the potential of ‘something happening’1a (SIi)?

After all, comprehension implies that a person registers what is happening3a and the potential of ‘something’ happening1a(SIi), while decoding an ongoing event2a (SOi).

0145 This raises a related issue, asking “What is the proper metaphor for memes?”

According to Dennett (following Richard Dawkins, who originally promotes the idea that memes are phenomena subject to scientific inquiry), memes are like viruses.  Each meme pursues own reproductive fitness.  So, a cultural unit may have traits that exist simply because they are advantageous to its replication.  Yet, the host must matter, because the host carries the meme, just like host carries a virus.

This makes me wonder.

Are viruses the most appropriate analogy for memes?

Or are synapses?

Virus do not form connections.  Synapses do.  The meme as hylomorphe connects the sign-object of an interventional sign(SOi) with the sign-vehicle of a specifying sign (SVs).

0146 A Darwinian paradigm where memes are like viruses leads to different predictions than one where memes are like synapses.

Take a glance at the following figure where a meme is a hylomorphe and ask, “Does this figure look more like one neuron [cultivating] a synapse to another neuron or a virus [infecting] a host?“

Okay, that was a rhetorical question.

0147 If memes are hylomorphic entities, then other characteristics of memes become obvious.  Memes offer competence without comprehension.  Memes are informational beings.  They survive because they encourage the evolution of neural networks.  Plus, they offer affordances.  Neurons make their living by trafficking in information. Information consists in opportunities to form relevant synapses and to cost-cut synapses that are no longer busy.

Here is a picture of Dennett’s characteristics of memes.

0148 The three characteristics of memes highlight the fragility of modern theories that account for cultural phenomenawith poorly-defined labels, such as “beliefs” or “ideas”.  Modern social theorists cannot account for why beliefs or ideas arise in the first place and how they are replicated among individuals.  Meme theorists can.

0149 So, what do social scientists say in response?

Do I hear laughter echoing down the hallways of the College of Social Science?

Or is it it the Colleges of Social Sciences?

0150 In chapter eleven, Dennett defends the meme research project against detractors, who tend to be modern social scientists. Some of these professionals employ the paradigm of natural history to explain human adaptations.  Some of them ignore human evolution altogether.

0151 Once again, here is the Darwinian paradigm, beloved by natural historians.

In the normal context of natural selection3b, an adaptation2b emerges from (and situates) a niche1b, which is the potential1b of an actuality independent of the adapting species2a.   The biologist considers an adaptation2b, as a situation-level actuality, with the goal of first, identifying the actuality independent of the adapting species2a and second, delineating the specific potential that is either exploited or avoided1b.

0152 Now, replace the natural-historical terms with versions that derive from Dennett’s meme project.

In the normal context of cultural selection3b, an explanation for a meme2b emerges from (and situates) an affordance1b,which manifests the potential1b of the hylomorphic structure of the species impressa2a, as pictured above.

0153 What does this imply?

The social scientist should consider the meme as an adaptation2b, as a situation-level actuality, with the goal of first, identifying the content-level actuality2a where a sign-object of the interventional sign-relation substantiates the sign-vehicle of a specifying sign-relation2a and second, delineating the specific affordance that is either exploited or avoided1b.

0156 Clearly, the modern anthropologist faces a more complicated and confusing task than the natural historian, because the meme2a is embedded in the scholastic interscope depicting the way humans think.

12/6/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 16 of 20)

0157 Now that I have arrived at a technical definition of the term, “meme”, within the framework of postmodern scholasticism, I may examine chapter nine of Dennett’s book (“The Role of Words in Cultural Evolution”) and chapter twelve (“The Origins of Language”).

0158 Dennett’s argument goes like this.

Words are a key ingredients to culture, because they belong to language.  Spoken words make excellent examples of memes.  Spoken words are like viruses.

But, I wonder, what about hand-talk words?

0159 Apparently, the idea that language evolves in the milieu of hand talk does not cross Dennett’s mind.  Indeed, many evolutionary biologists treat culture, in general, and language, in particular, as the actuality independent of the adapting species2a, rather than an adaptation2b.  Why?  They are convinced that humans have no ultimate niche, only a blend of proximate niches, all of which offer material or instrumental advantages or challenges.

0160 Au contraire.

According to the masterwork, The Human Niche (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), our lineage adapts to an ultimate niche1b, the potential1b of triadic relations2a, as well as diverse proximate niches, including various Pliocene and Pleistocene ecologies and environments.

Practical language2b is an adaptation to team activities and contributes to the expansion of the hominin neocortex between 2000kyr (thousands of years ago) and 800kyr.  Hand talk evolves from pantomime to rudimentary (team-specific) grammars.

General language2b is an adaptation that evolves within the milieu of hand talk, after the domestication of fire, around 800kyr (800 thousand years ago).  Hand talk evolves from rudimentary team-specific languages to fully grammatical general languages.

Here is a picture of the latter step.

0161 What is language in the milieu of hand talk?

Hand-talk consists of manual-brachial gestures.  Manual-brachial gestures work (that is, have the character of memes) because they picture or point to their referents.  In terms of semiotics, manual-brachial gestures are icons and indexes.

When these are routinized, symbolic processing starts to occur, enhancing the distinctiveness of each gesture, and turning each into a word-gesture in a system of differences.  The modern linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913 AD) defines “spoken language” as two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole (speech) and langue (mental action).  A finite system of differences (for Saussure) is a symbolic order (for Peirce).  Grammar consists of operations within a symbolic order.

In hand talk, the relation between parole and langue is motivated by the natural sign characteristics of hand-talk words.  Manual-brachial gestures are icons and indexes. Gestures image and indicate their referents.  At the same time, hand talk also routinizes gestures into words.  Words operate as symbols.  They form a symbolic order.  A symbolic order allows grammar.  Grammar makes hand talk linguistic.

0162 Our ancestors never imagine that their gesture-words are icons, indexes or symbols.

Nevertheless, they become better and better at hand talk.

0163 How do manual-brachial word gestures fit the definition of meme?

A perspective-level actuality2c may be a conviction that cannot be explicitly expressed using iconic and indexal signs.  After all, how can a hand-talk word point to or picture a species impressa2a, a species expressa2b or a species intelligibilis2c?

Nevertheless, the conviction2c is real.  Plus, if the hypothesis proposed in The Human Niche is credible, and if the scholastic interscope for how humans think describes what it claims to describe, then conviction2c is an adaptation.

So, how do our ancestors express their convictions2c?

They express their convictions through hand-talk expressions2a (SOi) in the normal context of what is happening3a and with the potential of ‘something’ happening1a (SIi).

Then, the hand-talk words2a are linguistically decoded into an icon or index (SVs).

0167 Here is a picture of hand-talk as a meme.

0168 Before general language, the practical hand-talk languages of each team activity are distinct and only occur within the normal context of each team activity.  Many of the characteristics that we associate with spoken words remind me of how hand-talk languages adapt to the crucible of team activities.  

During the team activity, conviction2c judges whether the ongoing content-level normal context of what is happening3asupports the ongoing situation-level normal context of what this means to me3b.  This conviction2c (SVi) substantiates hand-talk words (SOi) that either maintain the situation-level potential1b in the face of content-level potentials1a or not.

0169 For example, we don’t gather mushrooms at locations where lions are known to prowl.  Plus, when a lion is nearby, everyone wants to get back to the band.  There are hand-talk words that convey these tidbits of semantic information.  We expect that our words refer to things and states of things.  We expect our words to be honest.  We insist that certain words are used appropriately.  We expect words to contribute to our awareness of the ongoing situation.  We expect words to convey, sometimes with comic zeal, what is happening and what it means to me.

0170 So, is there a problem with this scenario?

Have you noticed that no one talks with their hands anymore?

According to the masterwork, An Archaeology of the Fall (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), around 7800 years ago, the only culture on Earth practicing speech-alone talk is the Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia.  All other Epipaleolithic, Mesolithic and Neolithic cultures practice hand-speech talk.

0171 Why?

For one, speech is added to hand talk at the start of our species, before 200kyr.  Our human ancestors practice a dual mode of talking, hand-speech talk, for over 190 thousand years. Then, the first singularity occurs.  

For two, the first singularity starts with the Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia.  Today, all civilizations practice speech-alone talk.  In fact, every civilization throughout history practices speech-alone talk, raising the question, asking, “Did the adoption of speech-alone talk potentiate civilization?”

For three, the answer is yes.

0172 Here is a picture of speech-alone talk as a meme.

The difference between hand-talk words and speech-alone words may seem subtle.  Nevertheless, the difference is substantial.

0173 Hand-talk and hand-speech talk facilitate constrained social complexity.

Speech-alone talk potentiates unconstrained social complexity.

12/5/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 17 of 20)

0174 When Dennett says that words are great examples of memes, he considers only spoken words.  He does not suspect that language (that is, grammar) evolves in the milieu of hand talk.  He knows that, today, all civilizations practice speech-alone talk.  Plus, his reading audience is civilized.

Consequently, Dennett’s claim that words play a role in cultural evolution carries an ironic overtone.  His assertion is much larger that he supposes.  In southern Mesopotamia, speech-alone is first realized by the Ubaid culture.

(This is discussed in The First Singularity and Its Fairy Tale Trace, as well as An Archaeology of the Fall, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.)

Outside of southern Mesopotamia, early civilizations are potentiated by the adoption of speech-alone talk.  After exposure to a speech-alone talking culture, hand-speech talking cultures drop the hand-component of their hand-speech talk. Mimesis is key.  Speech-alone talks spreads from a single site to the entire world.

0175 The different semiotic qualities of hand talk and speech-alone talk play a key role in human evolution. Human evolution comes with a twist.  I label that twist, “the first singularity”.

The first singularity illustrates Dennett’s key point.  Speech-alone talk offers affordances that hand-talk lacks.  The consequences are obvious.  Cultures practicing speech-alone talk exhibit greater wealth and power than cultures practicing hand-speech talk.

Yes, the advantages are obvious.

The dangers are hidden.

0176 I wonder.

Is one of the main tasks of postmodern philosophers, such as Dennett, to reveal the dangers inherent to speech-alone talk?  Or, is their main task to conceal them?

Indeed, Dennett’s postmodern philosophical approach distracts me from the manifest image of the scholastic interscope of how humans think and substitutes a scientific image of memes replicating and being selected through cultural evolution.

This is very similar to how I got the dead cat out of Daisy’s mouth, by offering one of her favorite treats as a substitute.

0177 Has the author come to a judgment2c?

0178 The species impressa intelligibilis2c, the universal aspect a content-level species impressa2a, corresponds to what is2c.

According to Dennett, the meme is a basic unit of culture, a word-like being, carrying semantic information, and offering ‘something’ that makes a difference.  The meme is the source of behavioral phenomena observed and measured by social scientists, who then build models, using the specialized languages of psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics and so on.

0179 The species expressa intelligibilis2c, the intelligible aspect of a situation-level species expressa2b, corresponds to what ought to be.

The meme offers models neglected by social scientists.  The meme offers models couched in the disciplinary language of the biological sciences.  Can a meme be accounted for by way of a Darwinian model of descent with modification, in the normal context of cultural selection?  Yes, a meme is a replicator that survives only because it replicates.  Therefore, the differential replication of memes offers a scientific image for cultural evolution.

0180 The relation between what is and what ought to be passes from biological evolution (“Bacteria”) to the pinnacle of human creative engineering (“Bach”) and back to cultural evolution (“and Back”).

0146 Here is a picture.

0181 If this judgment serves as a sign-vehicle for an interventional sign, then the resulting sign-object is a scientific account of the evolution of human brains (SOi).

Part III of Dennett’s book is titled, “Turning Our Minds Inside Out”.

Inside is the noumenon, the thing itself, the human mind.

Outside is a scientific model of a brain, the observable and measurable conjurer of the thing itself.

Or do I have that backwards?

Does the mind conjure the brain?

Or does the brain conjure the mind?

0182 Here is a picture of Dennett’s work as a meme.

12/5/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 18 of 20)

0183 If human culture is to be modeled as the replicative success of memes, then what would empirio-schematic researchentail?

Well, if the term, “meme”, labels a cultural adaptation2b, in the normal context of cultural selection3b operating on various affordances1b, then the actuality independent of the adapting species2a must relate to the scholastic interscope of how humans think2a.

Indeed, I may highlight one particular element in the scholastic interscope2a, the species impressa2a, as the premier feature of the actuality independent of the adapting species2a.

0184 But, didn’t I offer the above content-level actuality2a as a technical definition for the term, “meme”?

So, how can the term, “meme”, also stand for a situationb-level actuality2 in the normal context of cultural selection3b?

If that is not confusing enough, consider that the content-level actuality2a also belongs to the manifest image (which is described by all three actualities of the scholastic interscope).

Plus, we are conscious of a manifest image, not its scientific image.

0185 Consciousness is the user-illusion of competition among neurons for active synapses3b.  Synaptic networks form and are maintained in response to memes.  The qualia that we feel are most likely memes, sign-objects of interventional signs substantiating sign-vehicles of specifying signs.

Consequently, another term for [substance] is [implicit abstraction].  The sign-objects of interventional signs (SOi) are like matter.  The sign-vehicles of specifying signs (SVs) are like form.

So, a meme may be denoted as SOi [implicit abstraction] SVs.

0186 Another word for [substance] might be, “projection”.

In projection, the situation-level potential1b projects continuity into the content-level contiguity.

For example, there is no motion in cinema.  There is only a rapid sequence of images cast upon a screen.  The user illusion projects (or implicitly abstracts) smooth motion in time.  This is only possible if the situation allows it.

Similarly, there is no sweetness to the fact that the neighbor’s cat is dead.  There is only a corpse in the refrigerator and Daisy’s querying gaze, asking, “When are you going to give the dead cat back to me?”

So, the term, “meme”, also labels a neural network2b, in the normal context of neural selection3b operating on the potential of creating and destroying synapses1b, in the process of situating a species impressa2a.

But, once again, didn’t I offer the above content-level actuality2a as a technical definition for the term, “meme”?

Yes, but neural networks are clearly implicated, since they constitute the adaptation2b, and the adaptation is um… what?… a meme?

0187 If that is not enough, the designs of the most intelligent human designer cannot be compared to the adaptivity that arises from a variation of Darwinian natural selection operating on units of culture, in all their varieties.  Why?  There is always a cultural… er… cognitive space that even the most neurotic and attentive-to-detail engineer cannot plan for.  

Consequently, cultural selection3b yields memes that survive and flourish on their own and some of these memes are so strange and resilient that they appear miraculous, even to the positivist intellect.  Therefore, they must be ruled out as “not scientific”.

0188 Here is one confounded empirio-schematic judgment characterizing this discussion.

Here is another.

12/4/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 19 of 20)

0189 In Dennett’s version of the evolution of our minds, consciousness and user-end illusion coincide.  There is no example greater than the musical memes concocted by Johann Sebastian Bach.

Tunes are memes.

0190 Words are memes.

When it comes to spoken words, sometimes the less said, the better.  Fewer words allow the user to engage neurons with less forward guidance.  Clues to the content-level normal context3a and potential1a are not present to guide the evolution of an adaptive perception2b.

So, when I go to the neighbor, to present the dead cat, and to confess Daisy’s guilt, I only say, “I took Daisy off her leash this morning and she got away and killed your cat.  Here it is.  If you want me to bury it, then I will.  If you want me to buy you a new cat, I will.”

0191 Then she starts to cry and says, “It’s not my cat.  It’s my mother’s.”

Her mother died around five years ago.

The man who I thought was her husband?  That is her brother.  Her brother and her lived with mother until her death.  Mother would not let her children go.  She would not let anything go.  She was a maven of the world and her concerns were with the world.  She was an activist who took her children to demonstrations in order to signal that she, above all, cared for the children.  Her last request to her daughter?  Take care of the cat.

0192 My neighbor continued her tale.

The old house was too full of mother’s memes… er… memories of her mother.  So, she and her brother agreed to sell the old house and to move somewhere new.  They bought the house next door to mine.

Soon, her brother realizes that this is his opportunity to construct a life of his own.  That is why he comes by with less and less frequency.  The verge is overgrown.  Her brother is engaged to be married.  He has made a down-payment on a house in a different neighborhood.

0193 No, that is not her cat.  It is her mother’s.  I can go and bury it.  She does not want another.

After a pause, I say, “This Sunday, do you mind coming to church with me?  Service is at nine o’clock.  I can come by at eight-thirty.”

0194 The words that I speak are memes, units of culture, pieces of semantic information, offering something that makes a difference, a novel affordance, a clue to what is happening3a and a new sense that something can happen1a.  The reason that these memes are present, at this moment, is not because the words want to replicate, but because I want the words to bear a meaning, a presence and a message.

0195 Just as a biologist reflects upon an adaptation2b, according to a normal context3b and potential1b, in order to become aware of the actuality independent of the adapting species2a, my neighbor will reflect on the phantasm2b that adapts to this moment and provides an illusion3b of consciousness1b.  The entire scholastic interscope2a comes alive.  What is happening3a?  What does it mean to me3b?  Does this make sense3c?

12/4/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 20 of 20)

0196 Razie Mah offers three masterworks on human evolution.

The Human Niche concerns the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

An Archaeology of the Fall dramatizes the first singularity, the transition from the Lebenswelt that we evolved in to our current Lebenswelt.

How To Define The Word “Religion” concerns our current Lebenswelt.

These works sustain this examination of Dennett’s book.

0197 In these blogs, the term, “meme”, is technically defined using the scholastic interscope for how humans think.  This interscope is also in play in Razie Mah’s blog for October 2023, Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal”.  A “meme” corresponds to a species impressa2a with a hylomorphic structure whereby the sign-object of an interventional sign substantiates a sign-vehicle for a specificative sign.

0198 According to Dennett, a spoken word is a good example of a meme.

Notably, our current Lebenswelt must face the question, asking, “What is the nature of spoken words?”

Why?

Spoken words facilitate explicit abstraction, while hand-talk words allow only implicit abstraction.  We innately expect that spoken words image and point to their referents.  But, they do not.  Symbols are natural signs whose sign-objects are defined by convention, habit, law, tradition and so on.  Yet, no hand-talk language has words that can picture or indicate these terms.  “Convention”, “habit”, “law” and “tradition” label explicit abstractions that cannot be articulated using hand talk.  They may exist, but cannot be named, while using hand talk.

0199 Recall that actualities2 are encountered.

Such actualities2 are understood by ascertaining an appropriate normal context3 and potential1.

0200 How To Define The Word “Religion” applies these lessons to a familiar and contentious term.  This examination of Dennett’s book applies these lessons to the word, “meme”.

Here is a picture.

0201 The message?  The meme exemplifies cultural evolution.

The presence?  The meme embodies neural selection.

The meaning?  A scientific image of the word, “meme”, should overlay what is going on in my mind, that is, the manifest image.  My consciousness is an user-end illusion produced by the message and the presence of cultural and neural selection.

0202 My thanks to the author.  This well-documented work conveys that impression that inquiry into memes may account for the evolution of the human mind.  Whether this impression is productive or unproductive depends on how one defines the word, “meme”.