0007 Newson and Richerson start their inquiry by asking, “What is it to be human?”

Does a scientific understanding of how our species evolved shed light on the question?

Scientists hope so.  Recently, torrents of new information about human evolution has been coming from geneticists and natural historians, including researchers interested in understanding the adaptive natures of women and children.  What were they up to during the past two million years?

Well, among other things, they were harnessing males to help them survive.  Surely, the family is evolutionarily ancient.  Plus, it complements mother-infant bonding.

0008 The new information does not further the notion of a gene-defined or an environment-based human nature.  For example, neither genes nor environment do good jobs in predicting how children will turn out.  One child may be resilient.  One child may be delicate.  Nevertheless, there are some consistencies.  Children connect to mom and dad.  Children connect to (and compete with) their siblings.  In short, children belong in a family.

0009 What may seem strange to say, at this moment, is that the family (among other things) is a purely relational structure that can be diagrammed using the category-based nested form.  Examples are found in A Primer on The Familyand The First and Second Primers on the Organization Tier, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0010 Imagine that.

Our genus adapts to the opportunities and dangers offered by purely relational structures.

As soon as one imagines the possibility, one recalls a story.  Stories are tools for thinking about what might have happened in our evolutionary history.  Archaeological evidence does not tell a story.  Rather, evidence renders certain stories as plausible and others as implausible.  So, the anthropologist’s task is to fashion a plausible story.  In this book, the gray-colored interludes attempt to present plausible tales.

0011 How can one fashion a plausible story with archeological evidence at hand?

Evidence serves as real, tangible actualities₂ that inquirers can place into the normal context of archaeology₃ and over the potential of ‘something relevant’₁. 

What is relevant?

Well, a plausible story about us fits the bill.

If I follow the method in Razie Mah’s A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form, I arrive at the following.

0012 Well, what about genetics?

Aren’t torrents of information about human evolution coming from genetics as well as natural history?

Okay, allow me to expand the picture.

0013 The normal context of evolution₃ brings the actuality of genetics [and] archaeological evidence₂ into relation with the potential of ‘a story about us (humans)’₁.

What is going on with the “and” in brackets?

Actuality is the realm.  Secondness is the category.  Secondness contains two contiguous real elements.  These two elements are subject to the logics of contradiction and non-contradiction.  This is the logic that we typically think about when we hear the word, “logic”.  If an actuality is logical, the two real elements should agree, or at least, not disagree, and if they do disagree, we should be able to figure out the precise manner in which the disagreement occurs.

Here, the two real elements are genetics and archaeological evidence.  I place the contiguity in brackets.  Here, the contiguity is [and].  [And] is not exactly an evocative contiguity.  But, in earlier days, Richerson frames another term for [and].  The term is “co-evolves”.  Genes and culture coevolve.

0014 The result is two similar hylomorphic structures.  

0015 Both belong to the realm of actuality₂ in the normal context of evolution₃.  Both arise from the potential of ‘stories about us (humans)’₁.

0016 In order to drive home where the evolution₃ of our genus has brought us, the authors relate the story of Jemmy Button, a native of Tierra de Fuego in South America, who was captured (as a child) and brought to England, then grew up in England before returning to his native land (as an adult).  What a tale!  Jemmy grew accustomed to both cultures, implying that each one of us has a tremendous potential for cultural plasticity.

0017 It makes me wonder about the contiguity, [co-evolve].

Clearly, human DNA codes for brains of great plasticity, in addition to function, and this allows culture to inform our brains.  Jemmy Button could function as an Englishman and a native of Tierra de Fuego.  But, he has only one brain.

0018 This implies that I can expand on the previous category-based nested form in the following manner.

Instead of the normal context of evolution₃, I can think in terms of the phenotype of brains (on a content level) that is situated by the adaptability of the same brains (on a situation level).  I imagine two normal contexts.  Body development_3ais the normal context₃ of the content_a level.  Sociality_2b is the normal context₃ for the situation_b level.  So, sociality_3avirtually situates body development_3a.

For actuality, originally culture [co-evolves with] genes.  Now, [co-evolves] corresponds to a relation between the situation and content levels.  On the content level, genes become the dyad: DNA [codes for] brains_2a.  On the situation level, culture becomes a dyad: culture [informs] brains_2b.  Notably, in chapter one, Newson and Richerson describe culture as “shared information”.

For potential, originally the potential is ‘something relevant’₁, which becomes ‘stories about us’₁.  Now, ‘stories about us’₁becomes a content-level ‘function or plasticity’_1a and a situation-level ‘situating content’_1b.  

0019 Here is a two-level interscope.  Interscopes are introduced in A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0020 Now I can ask, “What exactly goes into the slot for potential₁ on the situation_b level?  What is ‘situating content’_1b?”

Towards the end of chapter one, the authors are clear.  Their book intends to tell how our ancestors managed to harness culture_2b.

I wonder, “Aren’t they putting the cart (of culture_2b) in front of the horse (of ‘situating content’_1b)?”

0021 The authors’ focus on actuality₂, rather than potential₁, is typical for modern sciences.

There is an alternative to the two-level interscope for gene-culture co-evolution.  The alternative has the same situation-level nested form, but a different content level.

To start, genes_2a are a content-level actuality_2a, corresponding to DNA [codes for] brains_2a.  Culture [informs] brains_2b is a situation-level actuality_2b that emerges from… um… the potential ‘situating content’_1b.  But, does that situation-level potential_1b virtually emerge from (and situate) the potential of brain function or plasticity_1a?  Or, does it_1b virtually situate another potential, such as the potential of ‘whatever is happening at the time’_1a?

0023 Is there a hidden ingredient to gene-culture co-evolution?

That hidden ingredient is expressed on the content level of the following two-level interscope.

0024 Now, this hidden ingredient must be very important for the “sauce” of the story that Newson and Richerson tells.

It is as if culture informs brains_2b allows the creature to fill in the blanks on the content level.

0025 But, I suppose before our lineage has big brains, then that content level is not culture oriented.  Something much more… um… primal tells the story.

If I go back to a common ancestor between the chimpanzees and our lineage, say seven million years ago, then that obvious actuality_2a involves a behavior common to all mammals.

Chapter two begins with an interlude, a story about mother-infant “culture”.  When the infant drinks its mother’s milk_2a, the mother-infant interaction stimulates hormonal responses_2b.

0026 Here is the hidden ingredient two-level interscope for mother-infant interactions.

0027 If the situation-level normal context is sociality_3b, then the potential of situating content_1b could be called, by psychologists, the possibility of ‘an mother-infant bond’_1b.

0028 Mother-infant bonding_1b situates the physical act of the infant suckling_2a, which is innate for mammals.  So, the content level for the hidden ingredient dovetails into the content level for gene-culture co-evolution.

0029 The normal context of suckling_3a can be viewed as a facet of body development_3a.

The infant’s behavior_2a must be genetic_2a, since an infant is too young to culturally figure out anything.

The innate physical act_1a has a function_1a, so plasticity offers no advantage.

0030 What does this imply?

The secret message of the hidden ingredient of the “gene” side of gene-culture co-evolution is that our brains have the potential to construct the hidden ingredient.  A content level_2a obviously must be going on when content is situated_1b in the normal context of sociality_3b.  So, the potential of function or plasticity_1a corresponds to the (innately gifted) ability of the individual to isolate the potential of ‘whatever is happening at the time’_1a, as well as the normal context_3a and the actuality_2a of the hidden ingredient.

0031 How complicated is that?

There is a huge advantage to Newson and Richerson’s theoretical sleight of hand.  The situation-level actuality_2b arising from mother-infant bonding_1b has the same hylomorphic structure (of two contiguous real elements) as culture [informs] brains_2b.  Indeed, one may say that these two dyads are the polar ends of a continuum of behaviors that rely on pure function (for stimulation) at one end and pure plasticity (for information) on the other.

0032 Finally, the authors complete their picture by claiming that the emotional attachment_1b increases reproductive success_1c.

The problem?

The potential for ‘reproductive success’_1c is necessary, but not sufficient, to explain the actuality of an adaptation_2c.  A niche₁ is required to honestly account for any particular adaptation₂ in the normal context of natural selection₃.  However, the authors are not aware that humans have a niche or that the human niche may have anything to do with the hidden ingredient composing a content-level nested form that does not appear in their theoretical framework.

0033 Here is a picture of the authors’ big picture, applied to the last common ancestor of the chimpanzee and human.

0034 To review.

The situation level of the following diagram addresses “adaptation”.  The content level concerns “phenotype.  This two-level interscope touches base with the authors’ biological expertise.

The above interscope veils a more intuitive content level, where the normal context is what is happening_3a, the actuality is some sort of activity_2a and the potential is that ‘something’ is happening_1a.

Finally, depending on the content level, there are two situation-level actualities_2b available.

The first concerns signals.  The second entails signs.

0035 Is there another way to diagram evolution?

One answer is that adaptation₂ and phenotype₂ are actualities in two nested forms.  Together, they constitute an intersection, defined as an actuality₂ composed of two actualities.

For roads, an intersection is where two roads meet.   It is a single actuality constituted by two actualities.  On top of that, it is full of contradictions, hence the necessity of traffic regulations.

The intersection of adaptation₂ and phenotype₂ is no different.   Each arises from a distinct potential.  That potential situates a content-level actuality.

0036 Here is the natural history side of Neodarwinism.

The normal context of natural selection_3b brings the actuality of adaptation_2b into relation with a niche_1b.  The niche_1b is the potential_1b of an actuality independent of the adapting species_2a. 

Notably, Newson and Richerson are not aware that the actuality independent of the adapting Homo genus_2a is … um… found in Razie Mah’s masterwork, The Human Niche.  To some degree, this ignorance explains the hidden ingredient,discussed earlier.

Here is the genetics side of Neodarwinism.

The normal context of body development_3b brings the actuality of the phenotype_2b into relation with its genotype_1b.  The genotype_1b is the potential_1b of each individual specimen’s DNA_2a.

0037 Now the actualities of adaptation₂ and phenotype₂ constitute a single actuality, which may be labeled “individual”, “species” or “genus”.  Here, the term, “species”, is used.

0038 This relational structure is developed in Razie Mah’s e-books, Speculations on Thomism and Evolution and Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome, along with other works in the series, A Course on Evolution and Thomism.

0039 Intersections are inherently mysterious.

0040 Newson and Richerson are scientists, so their big picture tries to get around the mystery of two actualities constituting a single actuality.  One of the tricks is the hidden ingredient.  Another trick is to replace the content-level hylomorphe, DNA [codes for] body_2a, with a single word, “gene“_2a.

0041 Two novel definitions allow me to further describe their approach.

A “phenotype” is the situation-level potential_1b virtually situating the content-level potential_1a.

An “adaptation” is the perspective-level actuality_2c virtually contextualizing the situation-level actuality_2b.  The situation-level actuality_2b ranges from social interaction [stimulates] hormone response_2b to culture [informs] brain_2b.

0042 Now, the theoretical construct as a three-level interscope looks like the following.

0043 So, an “adaptation” is a perspective-level actuality_2a (arising from the potential of reproductive success_1ccontextualizing an instance, ranging from social interaction [stimulates] hormonal response_2b to culture [informs] brain_2b.  Here, the “adaptation” includes the ways_2c that mother-infant interaction [stimulates] hormones_2b increases reproductive success_1c.

Here, a “phenotype” is emotional attachment_1b virtually emerging from (and situating) an innate_2a function_1a.

0044 Consequently, the terms, “adaptation” and “phenotype” are no longer independent actualities, as noted in the previous blog.  Instead, they are labels for two category-crossing pairs, one for actuality and one for potential.

For “adaptation”, sociality_3b, reproductive success_1c and natural selection_3c are bound.  The perspective-level actuality_2carises from reproductive success_1c, a necessary, but not sufficient cause.  The situation-level actuality_2b is a hylomorphe, ranging from social interactions [stimulate] hormones to culture [informs] brains.

For “phenotype”, body development_3a, genes_2a, function versus plasticity_1a and ‘something’ social_1b are bound.  ‘Something’ social_1b can support social interactions_2b or culture_2b.  The brain and body_3a will innately display either functionality or plasticity or some combination of the two_1a.

0046 Here is the picture for mother-infant bonding, which displays function as the content-level potential.

0047 Chapter two discusses the last common ancestor between humans and chimpanzees.

Newson and Richerson discuss some ways that social interactions may grade into (what scientists might call) culture.

0048 The first concerns vocalizations.  Yes, vocalizations may be social interactions.  Or, they may be the product of social interactions.  A great ape may want to engage in some interactions and avoid other interactions.  These intentions are physically on display when an ape takes the initiative to do something.  Something may include vocalizations, but action is everything.  Actions are signs of intention.

Newson and Richerson mention vocalizations because (somehow) these creatures have to end up speaking, like we do today.  They cannot imagine an alternate pathway, such as the one described in Razie Mah’s e-masterworks, The Human Niche and An Archaeology of the Fall, along with commentaries grouped in the series, Buttressing the Human Niche and Reverberations of the Fall.

0049 The second is group living.  In group living, social interactions abound.

0050 The third consists in compromises that accompany group living: hierarchy and alliances

0051 The fourth is grooming, which sustains alliances and fits well into the hormone-release concept of social interaction.

0052 Here, genes_2a grant an established hormone-triggering system a degree of plasticity_1a.  Hormones_2b are relaxing and promote emotional alliances_1b.

0053 The fifth is culture, which consists in non-genetic inheritance, typically passed from mother to offspring.  Here, culture includes how to interact while grooming, as well as how to look for and acquire food.  The habits satisfy needs.  At the same time, habits [of satisfying] needs_2b reflect the essence of the hylomorphe, culture [informs] brains_2b.  

The “adaptation” concerns paying attention to what others are doing_2c when others are engaged in habitual activities [that satisfy] needs (such as finding food)_2b.  The “phenotype” relies on the potential of neural plasticity_1a in order to support the potential of attributing intention_1b.