05/30/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 2 of 4)

0841 Biosemiotics adheres to the relational structure of the Positivist’s judgment, but with a caveat.  Metaphysics is allowed.  Um… along with another caveat.  Philosophical (Aristotelian) metaphysics is distinct from religious metaphysics.

Biosemiotic metaphysics consists in using Aristotle’s formal and final causes for determining what the noumenon should be.

0842 In contrast, religious metaphysics consists of applying Aristotle’s formal and final causes to real initiating (religious) events.

The positivist intellect must accept philosophical metaphysics in order to investigate semiotic agency2, in the normal context of an agent3 operating on the potential of final causality1.  Final causality1 is necessarily metaphysical.

At the same time, the positivist intellect must not endorse religious metaphysics.

0843 The books listed in points 0830 and 0831 do an admirable job in arriving at a Positivist’s judgment that allows empirio-schematic inquiry and follows the precepts of oft-derided phenomenology.  Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay is inherently biosemiotic and allows the inquirer to distinguish what goes into a model from what must be modeled.  Sign-vehicles and sign-objects are phenomena that go into a model.  Sign-interpretants are what must be modeled.

0843 Here is a picture.

0844 Take a look at the slot for the noumenon.

In their book, Semiotic Agency (2021, see point 830), Sharov and Tonnessen lay the groundwork for this examiner to diagram semiotic agency as the reification of the specifying and exemplar sign relations.  That explains the “ST”.  In the examination of chapters on non-human agency, the interventional sign comes into play, hence the additional “I”. The complete noumenal overlay should be be labeled “the biosemiotic noumenal overlay”.

0845 The biosemiotic overlay lays over the noumenon of every biological inquiry.

How so?

All biological noumenon are inherently semiotic.  Semiosis is what all biological entities have in common.

0846 The laboratory sciences are born when empirio-schematic traditions produce successful models that can replace their respective noumena.  Once a model substitutes for its noumenon, Kant’s slogan is negated.  Successful models (as noumena) [can be objectified] by their phenomena.

The same goes with biosemiotics.

In this case, the biosemiotic noumenal overlay lays over the noumena of diverse biological systems and entities.  It is the one feature they all have in common.  Also, the biosemiotic noumenal overlay has a particular advantage.  It’s configuration tells the inquirer what goes with phenomena and what needs to be modeled.

0847 Here is a picture.

0848 The STI noumenal consists in three sign-relations: the specifying, the exemplar and the interventional.  The first two belong to semiotic agency.  The latter does not.

The sign elements are sign-vehicle (SV), sign-object (SO) and sign-interpretant (SI).  An SV stands for its SO in regards to their SI.

0849 I ask, “Which of the elements go with phenomena and which are in need of modeling?

The SV and SO go with phenomena.  The SI are in need of modeling.

0850 Now, I ask, “How should one label each of the above sign elements?”

That is a little more difficult.  If it helps, I know that these sign-elements also belong to three-level interscope.

0851 Here is the specifying sign-relation.

The SVs is a real initiating (semiotic) event2a.

The SIs is self-governance3b operating on potential courses of action1b.

The SOs is information2b as specified.

0852 Here is the exemplar sign-relation.

The SVe is information2b that stands for a goal2c (SOe) in the normal context3c and potential1c of salience (SIe).

Oh, that is awkward.

The SOe is a goal or purpose2c, and that lines up with the fact that semiotic agency2 is an actuality2 whose normal context3 is agent3 and potential1 is ‘final causality’1.

The SIe is labeled, “salience”.  SIe includes a perspective-level normal context3c and potential1c.

0853 I do not have labels for any of the sign-elements of the interventional sign-relation.

05/29/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 3 of 4)

0854 Maybe, an example will help.

Here is the STI noumenal overlay for the lively incident where a sociologist yells at me in an academic setting about how the noumena of socialists are pure gold and the noumena from phenomenologists are pure crap.”

Oh, I meant to say, “sociologists”.

0855  Now, for those who do not want to scroll back, a sociologist interrupts my line of thought with the following shout out, “”Hey, you have that wrong!  Phenomenologists pull what the noumenon must be out of their asses.  Modern social scientists allow data and models to speak for themselves.”

The key word is “themselves”.

0856 Razie Mah’s blogs for July through October 2024 examines books covering the post-truth condition.  These are gathered in a three-part publication, titled Original Sin and The Post-Truth Condition, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

The word, “themselves”, does not refer to observations and models, per se.  Technically, these are spoken.  They do not speak.  But, those who conduct observations and formulate models do speak.  So, “themselves” means “experts”.

0857 Yes, experts3 are semiotic agents3.  Obviously, one of their ‘final causes’1 involves ‘protecting academic turf’1.  The normal context of expert3 brings the actuality of expertise (semiotic agency)2 into relation with the potential of ‘defending established academic real-estate’1.

0858 Somehow, in my rambling discourse, I claim that observations, in the modern social sciences, tend to be… shall I say?… biased by the model that occupies the site of the noumenon. 

To the napping sociologist, that claim2a (SVs) stands for information in the social sciences2b (SOs) in regards to modern social science methods3b operating on the acquisition of data1b (SIs).

0859 How is that information2b (SVe) salient (SIe)?

Social science information2b (SVe) stands for what the social thing itself must be (SOe) in regards to the assessments1cof this long-standing empirio-schematic tradition3c (SIe).

0860 Now, the assertion of what the social noumenon must be2c (SOe) is contiguous with the real event that causes me to pause my rambling lecture2c (SVi).  SVi is a real event.  It2c is an intervention (SVi) that stands for an expression of intention2a (SOi) in regards to the normal context of this academic presentation3a elevating the possibility that phenomenology may lay claim to the academic turf of modern social scientists1a (SIi).

0861 What is sort of creepy about this loop is that the professor’s shout out (SVi) frames my original statement (SVs) as something of an accusation.  It is as if I was saying, “Modern social scientists select their phenomena (and then conjure the corresponding noumenon).”

Isn’t that uncanny?

0862 Nonetheless, the moral of this incident offers me some labels for a few sign-elements that may come in handy later.

05/28/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 4 of 4)

0863 Now I want to step backwards then forwards.

The current examination looks at two books, described in point 0830 and 0831..

Here is how the examination starts.

These two examinations are available as e-books, by Razie Mah, under the title, Biosemiotics as Noumenon, Parts 1 and 2.  Part 1 is subtitled, “Semiotic Agency”.  Part 2 is subtitles, “Origins of Life”.

0864 Part 3 concerns nonhuman agency.  This examination is completed.

Part 4, concerning human agency, remains.

0865 The reading list for Part 4 starts with a discussion of Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) “New Beginnings”, by Razie Mah.  The commentary is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

There is cause for this.

0866 The STI noumenal overlay (Sharov and Tonnessen’s semiotic agency along with the interventional sign-relation) not only explains why phenomenology works, but it also recovers some philosophical riches of the much-derided scholastic era.  Modern histories of philosophy during the twentieth century often omit the period from the 500s to the 1400s, corresponding to the birth and development of universities throughout Christendom.  Some call the period, “the dark ages”.

It is sort of like the way modern social sciences pooh-pooh phenomenology.

Academic turf must be protected.  Who is more important, an expert in modern analytic philosophy or a so-called schoolman who can explicate Saint Thomas Aquinas?

0867 One of those treasures is uncovered by John Deely (1942-2017).  Deely is both a Thomist and a semiotician (in the tradition of Charles Peirce).  Deely figures out that Charles Peirce (in the 1800s) arrives at the same definition of the sign-relation as Baroque scholastic, John Poinsot (also John of St. Thomas, in the 1600s).

This discovery is discussed in New Beginnings.  But, it is not the only surprise.

0868 What is of interest to me, in this examination of biosemiotics, is the fact that the specifying and exemplar sign-relations are embedded in a three-level interscope composed of category-based nested forms, which I call, the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

The reason is obvious.  Semiotic agency2 is a reification of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

0869 So, the trajectory of this examination proceeds by way of the following script.

0870 So, this juncture between non-human agency and human agency ends and the examinations continue.

05/27/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 1 of 4)

0871 The scholastic three-level interscope for how humans think is introduced in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

The conceptual apparatus is developed in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction.

The semiotic tool is productively used in Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (appearing in July 2024 in Razie Mah’s blog).

0872 Here is a diagram.

0873 The three-level interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.

For each level, a triadic normal context3 brings a dyadic actuality2 into relation with a monadic possibility of ‘something’1.

Among levels, perspectivec brings situationb into relation with contenta.  Likewise, thirdness brings secondness into relation with firstness.

0874 Here is how each nested form is articulated.

On the content level, the normal context of what is happening3a brings the actuality of sensation2a into relation with the potential of ‘something happening’1a.

On the situation level, the normal context of what it means to me3b brings the actuality of perception2b into relation with the possibility of ‘situating content’1b.

On the perspective level, the normal context of whether this makes sense3c brings the actuality of a judgment2c into relation with the possibility of ‘contextualizing the situation’1c.

0874 Notice that the actualities are not portrayed as dyads.  When they are, the scholastic interscope becomes more… well… beautiful.  And, biosemioticians must be careful when a transcendental manifests, like a beautiful painting at the end of a hallway. There is no telling where that hallway leads.

0875 What about biosemiotics?

Elements of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay fit nicely into various slots in the scholastic interscope.

0876 Can I discern a specifying sign-relation?

Here, the initiating (semiotic)2a is a real event2a.

Information2b virtually situates the initiating semiotic2a, in the same way that a specifying sign-object (SOs) virtually situates its sign-vehicle (SVs).

Notice that both SOs and SVs belong to the realm of actuality.

0877 A specifying sign-interpretant (SIs) enables the SVs to stand for its SOs.

What is that SIs?

SIs consists of the situation-level normal context3b operating on its possibility1b.

In this instance, SIs is the normal context of self-governance3b operating on potential ‘courses of action’1b.

0878 I can go further.

I can imagine the exemplar sign-relation.

0879 A perspective-level goal2c virtually contextualizes situation-level information2b, in the same way that an exemplar sign-object (SOe) virtually contextualizes its sign-vehicle (SVe).

Both SOe and SVe belong to the realm of actuality.

0880 An exemplar sign-interpretant (SIe) enables the SVe to stand for its SOe.

What is that SIe?

This is where the scholastic interscope for how humans think comes in handy.

For semiotic agency, the SIe is vague.  The normal context of salience3c operates on a potential underlying salience1c.  I suppose the potential1c is ‘the possibility1c of contextualizing information2b‘, if that helps.

For the scholastic interscope, the normal context asking, “Does this make sense?”3c operates on the possibility of ‘contextualizing the situation’1c.

0881 To me, this implies that the term, “salience3c((1c))“, supports an actuality2c that weighs perception2b against sensation2a, while asking what goal2c might be attempted.

What does that imply?

0882 The scholastic interscope contains the specifying and exemplar sign relations, which figure so prominently in semiotic agency.

05/24/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 2 of 4)

0883 Here is a diagram showing the way that Sharov and Tonnessen bring a three-level interscope into a dyadic actuality suitable for laying over the noumenon of all biological processes.

Empirio-schematic inquiry into biosemiotics may now fruitfully employ this noumenal overlay as the thing that is objectified by biosemiotic phenomena.

0884 But, there is more. 

The interventional sign-relation is difficult to fathom, because its sign-vehicle cannot be seen.  It must be inferred.  In biosemiotics, that inference represents phenomena.  It is the goal2c as a sign-vehicle (SVi).

More on that in short order.

0885 Here is a picture of the interventional sign-relation within the scholastic interscope.

Before discussing the strangeness of the perspective-level sign-vehicle2c (SVi), I want to dwell on our (human) familiarity of the content-level.

What is more routine than asking the question, “What happening?”, as if this is a normal context3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening’1a?

The question asks for content, and the answer comes by way of sensation2a (SOi).  For animals, sensations do not come packaged with loads of information.  For humans, they do.  A simple statement, like “Where did you put your token?”, which is really a question, gets rapidly decoded into the content-level {SOi}2a.

Yes, the SOi is a real element.  The SVs is a real element.  The contiguity between the two is [message].

That token (SVs) is a ticket to ride (SOs).

0886 The familiar character of the content-level SOi and SIi hides the unfamiliar nature of the perspective-level SVi.

What is going on with judgment2c {SVi}2c?

05/23/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 3 of 4)

0887 The judgment2c in the above figure contains two contiguous real sign-elements.  One is the exemplar sign-object (SOe) and the other is the interventional sign-vehicle (SVi).  As already discussed, the contiguity is [meaning].  For biosemiotics, the medieval scholastic term, “judgment2c“, corresponds to {SOe [meaning] SVi}2c.

0888 At the same time, for postmodern scholastics, judgment2c is a triadic relation.

Indeed, it is the triadic relation that stands at the start of this lengthy examination v(see point 0005).

0889 There are two types of judgment.  The one depicted above is contemplative.  The other is actionable.  Once Peirce’s three categories are assigned, one category to one element, then the judgment becomes actionable.  An actionable judgment unfolds into a category-based nested form.

Does “unfolds” sound like [meaning]?

0890 One example should suffice.

The scholastics harbor an ideal for judgment2c.  As far as they are concerned, this judgment2c is the best.  A rational intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the intelligibility of perception (what ought to be, firstness) into relation with the universality of sensation (what is, secondness).

This is a level-headed judgment, for sure.  The scholastics are trying to be sensible, even when they face the nonsensical mysteries of life and revelation.  No wonder they have such riotous and entertaining debates.  In Latin, no less.

0891 Here is a picture of the scholastic’s ideal judgment.

0892 The assignments of the categories are crucial.

Thirdness goes into the normal context3.

Secondness goes into actuality2.

Firstness goes into the possibility of ‘something’1.

0893 Categorical assignments appear in the above figure.

If the assignments are different, then the judgment would unfold into a different category-based nested form.

This is critical, if I rotate the current assignments one notch counterclockwise, then the intelligibility of my perceptionsbecomes the normal context3, bringing the actuality of my “rational intellect”2 into relation with the possibility that ‘my sensations are universal’1.  Replace “intelligibility of perceptions3” with “knowledge3“, “rational intellect2” with “don’t contradict me2“, and “universality of sensations1” with “universality of what I experience1“. Then, the unfolded nested form says, “The normal context of my knowledge3 brings the actuality of ‘don’t contradict me’2 into relation with the possibility that what I experience is universal1.”

0894 Doesn’t that sound like expertise?

Rotating the categorical assignments one notch counterclockwise takes the inquirer from the scholastic idea to modern expertise.  Experts are knowledgable3, elevate their own experiences1 over others, and do not enjoy being contradicted2.

Scholastics are just trying to be rational intellects3, bringing the universality of what they sense2 into relation with the possibility of ‘an intelligent perception’1.

05/22/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 4 of 4)

0895 So, I have a working definition of [meaning], as a judgment2c (SOs) unfolding into a category-based nested form2c (SVi).

Also, from point 0862, I have a working definition of [message], as the continuity between an expression of intention (SOi) and an initiating (semiotic) event (SVs).  Plus, the initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs) is not the same as the event that occurs after judgment2c unfolds into an action2c (SVi).

0896 Here is a picture of the interventional sign, along with its contiguities.

0897 These contiguities turn out to be the connections between semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation.

This is shown clearly in the biosemiotic (or STI) noumenal overlay.

In sum, the scholastic interscope for how humans think assists in appreciating the nature of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

The scholastic interscope contains three boundary-crossing sign relations.  Two belong to semiotic agency.  One belongs to the interventional sign-relation.

The scholastic interscope also contains three contiguities between sign-relations.  These correspond to content-level [message], situation-level [presence] and perspective-level [meaning].

0898 Finally, there is Peirce’s natural sign typology, consisting of icons, indexes and symbols.

An icon is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the qualities of images, pictures, unities, monads and so forth.

An index is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the characteristics of pointing, contact, cause and effect, and other dyads.

A symbol is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the stuff of habit, convention, law, agreement, and so on.

0899 I conclude with a list of the sign-relations that are embedded in the scholastic interscope for how humans think,along with the sign-object and type of natural sign.

0900 This information should prove handy in the upcoming examination of human agency.

05/21/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 1 of 8)

0901 The text before me is chapter seven of Pathways (see point 0831 for book details, pages 137-166).

Examinations of the chapters on non-human agency end up with a suggestion that biosemiotics may include more than semiotic agency.  Semiotic agency contains the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.  The scholastic interscope for how humans think contains one other sign-relation.  The interventional sign-relation is odd, compared to the other two sign-relations.

So is the author’s term, “potential meanings”.

0902 Of course, the terms, “interventional sign-relation” and “potential meanings” are mere labels.  They are tags.  They are spoken words.  They are unlike the manual-brachial word-gestures of fully linguistic hand or hand-speech talk.

For hand talk, in terms of parole, gesture-words picture and point to their referents.  They are icons and indexes.  So, word-gestures (SVs) abstract the natural sign-qualities of these types of signs.  Icons and indexes picture and point to ‘something that could be present’ (SOs).  Presence (SVe) can have many meanings, depending on what is going on.  Consequently, SOe is an intuitive abstraction based on what the word-gesture implicitly pictures and points to(langue).  I call the process, “implicit abstraction”.

For example, the hand-talk word, [image RAVEN], can denote the color black, as well as particular attitudes.

The hand-talk word, [POINT to corner of eye], can denote the color white, as well as particular attitudes and warnings.

0903 Can the term, “potential meaning” be stated using hand-talk?

No.  What is there to picture or point to?

The term is an explicit abstraction.

0904 In speech-alone talk, parole is arbitrarily related to langue.

Since parole comes first, as SVs, the specified referent (SOs) comes into being after a word is spoken.  After all, SVsassociates to message and message precedes presence (SOs).  The specified referent (SOs) associates to information2b.  But, since speech-talk cannot picture or point to anything, that information2b (SOs) may end up being explicitly defined.

0905 I say “may”, because sometimes information2b is obvious.  Consider the word, “chair”.  Everyone immediately intuits a “chair”, even though chairs do not occur in nature.  But, what about the American bureaucratic designation, “chair-person”? 

Sit down for a minute and think about it.

How can a person be a chair?

0906 Sharov’s technical term, “potential meaning” has two descriptors made into one character.  So, one way to approach the term is to step back and consider the initial claim made in Razie Mah’s e-book, How To Define The Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  The normal context of definition3 brings the actuality of a spoken term2 into relation with the potential of its meaning, presence and message’1.

0907 Surely, the reader anticipates my next move.

The words that go into the slot for potential1 are familiar.

Not only do they1 underlie the actuality of a spoken term2, they1 have already been used to label the three intra-level contiguities that occur in the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

0908 Here is a picture.

Since [meaning] is the one contiguity that associates to “meaning”, [presence] and [message] must associate to the qualifier, “potential”

05/20/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 2 of 8)

0909 The introduction (section 7.1) does not disagree.

To me, it seems that the label for the contiguity between SOs and SVe could be changed to “potential meaning”. [Presence] is rich with “potential meaning”.  So is the moniker, “information2b“.

0910 At the same time, the introduction (section 7.1) does not agree.

0911 The author claims that “meaning” associates to how an organism interprets a sign.

Surely, that claim coheres to the SIs.  Or, maybe it goes with the SIe.

0912 Also, the author is interested in writing about resources that are not meaningful, but can be meaningful when an organism happens to discover that they have um… meaning2c.

Sign-relations are essential for the discovery of signification.

So, the author figures that there are potential meanings (where an entity can become meaningful to a semiotic agent) and potential signs (where an entity can come to the attention of a semiotic agent).

The author offers a table to distinguish proper meanings and signs from potential meanings and signs.

Finally, section 7.1 concludes that organisms can actualize potential meanings (and potential signs) by integrating them into their own goal-directed activities, especially when those activities are phenotypic (hence, adaptive in Umwelts past).

In section 17.2, the author develops the theme of form within a sign-relation.

The argument is theoretical.

0913 So, allow me to return a previous example.

A revision is in order.

0914 One fine morning, an unattended dog wanders the streets of my town, looking for what?… a potential sign?  No.  It is looking for a message, in the form of a SVs.

This unfamiliar dog is not an idealist.  Or maybe, the dog is an idealist, because the dog is certain that a form is nearby, and that he can sink his teeth into that form.  Not so much to chew, as to swallow.

0915 No sign-vehicle sends that interventional sign-object (SOi) until a sound, emanating from a pile of leaves, sends a message… er… a specifying sign-vehicle (SVs).

0916 Here is Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay for semiotic agency as a generalization of this canine organismin a semiotic context.

0917 In section 7.3, titled “Semiotic Agency in Biosemiotics”, Sharov references his groundbreaking 2021 work with Tonnessen.  The idea that semiotic agency is contained within biosemiotics is broached, but not with the verve of the above figure, which derives from Razie Mah’s examination of Sharov and Tonnessen’s 2021 text.

0916 “Semiotic agency” is no longer a label.  It is a technical tool for biosemiotics.  The utility of this tool is yet to be determined.  However, what this examination finds is significant.

Semiotic agency reifies specifying and exemplar sign-relations.  At the same time, semiotic agency draws upon an interscope that parallels the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

So, there are several key phenomena to consider.  The first is an initiating semiotic event2a (SVs) that parallels sensation2a.  The second is information2b (SOs [presence] SVe) that parallels perception2b.  The third is a goal or aim2c(SOe) that parallels judgment2c.

0917 Does that reduce semiotics to a tool, as noted in section 7.4?

I guess that sign-relations are tools in the same way that a dog’s snout (one side fitted for detection and the other side fitted for biting into the detected thing) is a tool.

I prefer to use the terms, “adaptations” and “phenotypes”.

0918 So, how should biosemioticians conceptualize potential meanings and potential signs (section 7.5)?

Take a look at the preceding figure.

What is in the pile of leaves?

A potential sign?

The sound and, with investigation, odor coming from a pile of leaves2a (SVs) stands for an animal2b (SOs) in regards to the wandering dog’s detecting3b something going on in a pile of leaves1b (SIs). 

0919 What is salient (SIe) about this hidden animal (SOs)?

May I also ask, “What is the potential meaning of this hidden animal?”

The dog burrows into the leaf pile for further information2b.  The animal may be wounded2b.

Well, that means it2b (SOs) is not going to fight back2b (SVe).  So, the dog’s goal module3c((1c)) (SIe) says, “Yes, I can put this in my mouth.”2c (SOe).

05/19/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 3 of 8)

0920 I am still in section 7.5, what do I know so far?

Meaning as the contiguity between SOe and  SVi lies just outside the purview of semiotic agency, as depicted in the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

Potential meaning lies within the contiguity between SOs and SVe, corresponding to situation level information2b.  Potential meaning dwells within [presence].

0921 Here is a picture of semiotic agency, once again, with [presence] shortened to [p].

0922 Can I say that again?

All biological processes have the biosemiotic noumenal overlay in common.  Semiotic agency belongs to the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.  Semiotic agency contains a contiguity, that I label presence, which throws the reader back to the proposition that presence underlies the definition of a spoken word and now, “potential meaning” is a spoken term that fits into semiotic agency as a characteristic of [presence].

0923 Here is a diagram.

0924 One remarkable feature of this diagram is that presence is technically characterized as a contiguity within semiotic agency.  And, presence1 underlies the spoken term, “potential meaning” in the normal context of definition3.  On top of that, the nested form for definition does not compare to the nested form for agent.  Instead, the normal context of agent3 brings semiotic agency2 (somehow containing a reification of the nested form of definition for a spoken word) into relation with the possibility of a ‘final causality’1.

In sum, the agent3 defines its world within semiotic agency2 according to its ongoing ‘final causalities’1.

0925 At the same time, the agent3 theoretically defines2(3) “potential meaning”2(2) according to the fact that [presence] is intrinsic to semiotic agency”2(1) (as the contiguity within information2b).

That sounds like a formal causality to me.  Formal causality brings harmony between the normal context3 and its actuality2.

0926 So, potential meaning belongs to [presence] in so far as information2b can change [salience] (SIe) in unexpected ways, resulting in impediments or empedoclements.

0927 Here is a picture.