05/31/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 1 of 4)

0829 I have, under examination, two texts that bring the inquirer to the door of a truly postmodern discipline of biosemiotics.

0830 The first book is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer (Switzerland) and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. Series editors are Kalevi Kull, Alexei Sharov, Claude Emmeche and Donald Favareau. These authors and editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the continuing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

0831 The second book before me is Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe, edited by Alexei Sharov and George Mikhailovsky. Each chapter has its own author(s). The book is published in 2024 by Scrivener Press (Beverly, MA) and logs in as volume 1 in Scrivener’s Series on Astrobiology Perspectives on Life in the Universe. Series editors are Martin Scrivener and Phillip Carmical. Chapter authors and book editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the continuing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.

0832 If biosemiotics is postmodern and scientific, what is modern and scientific?

The modern natural sciences (physics, chemistry, in their diverse applications) and the modern social sciences (including sociology, psychology, anthropology and other, various specialties) conduct empirio-schematic inquires, under the auspices of the Positivist’s judgment.

Here is a picture of the fully modern Positivist’s judgment.

0833 The empirio-schematic judgment occupies the slot for what ought to be and is imbued with secondness (the realm of actuality).

In the empirio-schematic judgment, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is,firstness).

0834 In the following points, I re-capitulate the argument in points 0201 through 0226.

0835 Notice that biology is not listed above.

In some ways, biology goes into the same basket as physics and chemistry, in which the noumenon is obvious. The noumenon is so obvious that triumphalist scientists get around Kant’s slogan (occupying the slot for what is) by substituting a successful model in for the noumenon. Then, a successful model (as the new noumenon) [can be objectified as] its phenomena. This is the character of the laboratory sciences in chemistry, physics and biology.

Here is a picture.

0836 The modern social sciences develop in the same century as the laboratory sciences.

One advantage of laboratory science is that a successful model does not completely occlude its noumenon. The social sciences do not have that advantage. Instead, social scientists observe phenomena with the expectation that there must be a noumenon.

Say what?

0837 The modern social sciences pull their noumena out of their asses and then develop an empirio-schematic charade that substantiates their intuition (that is, their guess of what the noumenon must be.

Here is a picture.

0838 The hocus-pocus of modern social science seems tawdry, at first, but then Edmund Husserl formalizes the process of assessing what the noumenon must be.

Husserl’s phenomenology is so well-targeted that contemporary social scientists blame his followers for pulling noumena out of their asses, then go about claiming that their non-phenomenological assessments of what the noumenon must be are far better, because they are guided by observations and models.

0839 Ahem, let me get this straight.

Phenomenologists use a clearly delineated methodology to determine what the noumenon must be, thereby supporting novel empirical inquiry.

Social scientists…

0840 Stop! My academic audience is agitated.

A highly credentialed sociologist yells, “Hey, you have that wrong!”

“Phenomenologists pull what the noumenon must be out of their asses.”

“Modern social scientists allow data and models to speak for themselves.”

05/30/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 2 of 4)

0841 Biosemiotics adheres to the relational structure of the Positivist’s judgment, but with a caveat. Metaphysics is allowed. Um… along with another caveat. Philosophical (Aristotelian) metaphysics is distinct from religious metaphysics.

Biosemiotic metaphysics consists in using Aristotle’s formal and final causes for determining what the noumenon should be.

0842 In contrast, religious metaphysics consists of applying Aristotle’s formal and final causes to real initiating (religious) events.

The positivist intellect must accept philosophical metaphysics in order to investigate semiotic agency₂, in the normal context of an agent₃ operating on the potential of final causality₁. Final causality₁ is necessarily metaphysical.

At the same time, the positivist intellect must not endorse religious metaphysics.

0843 The books listed in points 0830 and 0831 do an admirable job in arriving at a Positivist’s judgment that allows empirio-schematic inquiry and follows the precepts of oft-derided phenomenology. Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay is inherently biosemiotic and allows the inquirer to distinguish what goes into a model from what must be modeled. Sign-vehicles and sign-objects are phenomena that go into a model. Sign-interpretants are what must be modeled.

0843 Here is a picture.

0844 Take a look at the slot for the noumenon.

In their book, Semiotic Agency (2021, see point 830), Sharov and Tonnessen lay the groundwork for this examiner to diagram semiotic agency as the reification of the specifying and exemplar sign relations. That explains the “ST”. In the examination of chapters on non-human agency, the interventional sign comes into play, hence the additional “I”. The complete noumenal overlay should be be labeled “the biosemiotic noumenal overlay”.

0845 The biosemiotic overlay lays over the noumenon of every biological inquiry.

How so?

All biological noumenon are inherently semiotic. Semiosis is what all biological entities have in common.

0846 The laboratory sciences are born when empirio-schematic traditions produce successful models that can replace their respective noumena. Once a model substitutes for its noumenon, Kant’s slogan is negated. Successful models (as noumena) [can be objectified] by their phenomena.

The same goes with biosemiotics.

In this case, the biosemiotic noumenal overlay lays over the noumena of diverse biological systems and entities. It is the one feature they all have in common. Also, the biosemiotic noumenal overlay has a particular advantage. It’s configuration tells the inquirer what goes with phenomena and what needs to be modeled.

0847 Here is a picture.

0848 The STI noumenal consists in three sign-relations: the specifying, the exemplar and the interventional. The first two belong to semiotic agency. The latter does not.

The sign elements are sign-vehicle (SV), sign-object (SO) and sign-interpretant (SI). An SV stands for its SO in regards to their SI.

0849 I ask, “Which of the elements go with phenomena and which are in need of modeling?

The SV and SO go with phenomena. The SI are in need of modeling.

0850 Now, I ask, “How should one label each of the above sign elements?”

That is a little more difficult. If it helps, I know that these sign-elements also belong to three-level interscope.

0851 Here is the specifying sign-relation.

The SV_s is a real initiating (semiotic) event_2a.

The SI_s is self-governance_3b operating on potential courses of action_1b.

The SO_s is information_2b as specified.

0852 Here is the exemplar sign-relation.

The SV_e is information_2b that stands for a goal_2c (SO_e) in the normal context_3c and potential_1c of salience (SI_e).

Oh, that is awkward.

The SO_e is a goal or purpose_2c, and that lines up with the fact that semiotic agency₂ is an actuality₂ whose normal context₃ is agent₃ and potential₁ is ‘final causality’₁.

The SI_e is labeled, “salience”. SI_e includes a perspective-level normal context_3c and potential_1c.

0853 I do not have labels for any of the sign-elements of the interventional sign-relation.

05/29/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 3 of 4)

0854 Maybe, an example will help.

Here is the STI noumenal overlay for the lively incident where a sociologist yells at me in an academic setting about how the noumena of socialists are pure gold and the noumena from phenomenologists are pure crap.”

Oh, I meant to say, “sociologists”.

0855 Now, for those who do not want to scroll back, a sociologist interrupts my line of thought with the following shout out, “”Hey, you have that wrong! Phenomenologists pull what the noumenon must be out of their asses. Modern social scientists allow data and models to speak for themselves.”

The key word is “themselves”.

0856 Razie Mah’s blogs for July through October 2024 examines books covering the post-truth condition. These are gathered in a three-part publication, titled Original Sin and The Post-Truth Condition, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

The word, “themselves”, does not refer to observations and models, per se. Technically, these are spoken. They do not speak. But, those who conduct observations and formulate models do speak. So, “themselves” means “experts”.

0857 Yes, experts₃ are semiotic agents₃. Obviously, one of their ‘final causes’₁ involves ‘protecting academic turf’₁. The normal context of expert₃ brings the actuality of expertise (semiotic agency)₂ into relation with the potential of ‘defending established academic real-estate’₁.

0858 Somehow, in my rambling discourse, I claim that observations, in the modern social sciences, tend to be… shall I say?… biased by the model that occupies the site of the noumenon.

To the napping sociologist, that claim_2a (SV_s) stands for information in the social sciences_2b (SO_s) in regards to modern social science methods_3b operating on the acquisition of data_1b (SI_s).

0859 How is that information_2b(SV_e) salient (SI_e)?

Social science information_2b (SV_e) stands for what the social thing itself must be (SO_e) in regards to the assessments_1cof this long-standing empirio-schematic tradition_3c (SI_e).

0860 Now, the assertion of what the social noumenon must be_2c (SO_e) is contiguous with the real event that causes me to pause my rambling lecture_2c (SV_i). SV_i is a real event. It_2c is an intervention (SV_i) that stands for an expression of intention_2a (SO_i) in regards to the normal context of this academic presentation_3a elevating the possibility that phenomenology may lay claim to the academic turf of modern social scientists_1a (SI_i).

0861 What is sort of creepy about this loop is that the professor’s shout out (SV_i) frames my original statement (SV_s) as something of an accusation. It is as if I was saying, “Modern social scientists select their phenomena (and then conjure the corresponding noumenon).”

Isn’t that uncanny?

0862 Nonetheless, the moral of this incident offers me some labels for a few sign-elements that may come in handy later.

05/28/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 4 of 4)

0863 Now I want to step backwards then forwards.

The current examination looks at two books, described in point 0830 and 0831..

Here is how the examination starts.

These two examinations are available as e-books, by Razie Mah, under the title, Biosemiotics as Noumenon, Parts 1 and 2. Part 1 is subtitled, “Semiotic Agency”. Part 2 is subtitles, “Origins of Life”.

0864 Part 3 concerns nonhuman agency. This examination is completed.

Part 4, concerning human agency, remains.

0865 The reading list for Part 4 starts with a discussion of Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) “New Beginnings”, by Razie Mah. The commentary is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

There is cause for this.

0866 The STI noumenal overlay (Sharov and Tonnessen’s semiotic agency along with the interventional sign-relation) not only explains why phenomenology works, but it also recovers some philosophical riches of the much-derided scholastic era. Modern histories of philosophy during the twentieth century often omit the period from the 500s to the 1400s, corresponding to the birth and development of universities throughout Christendom. Some call the period, “the dark ages”.

It is sort of like the way modern social sciences pooh-pooh phenomenology.

Academic turf must be protected. Who is more important, an expert in modern analytic philosophy or a so-called schoolman who can explicate Saint Thomas Aquinas?

0867 One of those treasures is uncovered by John Deely (1942-2017). Deely is both a Thomist and a semiotician (in the tradition of Charles Peirce). Deely figures out that Charles Peirce (in the 1800s) arrives at the same definition of the sign-relation as Baroque scholastic, John Poinsot (also John of St. Thomas, in the 1600s).

This discovery is discussed in New Beginnings. But, it is not the only surprise.

0868 What is of interest to me, in this examination of biosemiotics, is the fact that the specifying and exemplar sign-relations are embedded in a three-level interscope composed of category-based nested forms, which I call, the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

The reason is obvious. Semiotic agency₂ is a reification of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

0869 So, the trajectory of this examination proceeds by way of the following script.

0870 So, this juncture between non-human agency and human agency ends and the examinations continue.

05/27/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 1 of 4)

0871 The scholastic three-level interscope for how humans think is introduced in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

The conceptual apparatus is developed in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction.

The semiotic tool is productively used in Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (appearing in July 2024 in Razie Mah’s blog).

0872 Here is a diagram.

0873 The three-level interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.

For each level, a triadic normal context₃ brings a dyadic actuality₂ into relation with a monadic possibility of ‘something’₁.

Among levels, perspective_c brings situation_b into relation with content_a. Likewise, thirdness brings secondness into relation with firstness.

0874 Here is how each nested form is articulated.

On the content level, the normal context of what is happening_3a brings the actuality of sensation_2a into relation with the potential of ‘something happening’_1a.

On the situation level, the normal context of what it means to me_3b brings the actuality of perception_2b into relation with the possibility of ‘situating content’_1b.

On the perspective level, the normal context of whether this makes sense_3c brings the actuality of a judgment_2c into relation with the possibility of ‘contextualizing the situation’_1c.

0874 Notice that the actualities are not portrayed as dyads. When they are, the scholastic interscope becomes more… well… beautiful. And, biosemioticians must be careful when a transcendental manifests, like a beautiful painting at the end of a hallway. There is no telling where that hallway leads.

0875 What about biosemiotics?

Elements of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay fit nicely into various slots in the scholastic interscope.

0876 Can I discern a specifying sign-relation?

Here, the initiating (semiotic)_2a is a real event_2a.

Information_2b virtually situates the initiating semiotic_2a, in the same way that a specifying sign-object (SO_s) virtually situates its sign-vehicle (SV_s).

Notice that both SO_s and SV_s belong to the realm of actuality.

0877 A specifying sign-interpretant (SI_s) enables the SV_s to stand for its SO_s.

What is that SI_s?

SI_s consists of the situation-level normal context_3b operating on its possibility_1b.

In this instance, SI_s is the normal context of self-governance_3b operating on potential ‘courses of action’_1b.

0878 I can go further.

I can imagine the exemplar sign-relation.

0879 A perspective-level goal_2c virtually contextualizes situation-level information_2b, in the same way that an exemplar sign-object (SO_e) virtually contextualizes its sign-vehicle (SV_e).

Both SO_e and SV_e belong to the realm of actuality.

0880 An exemplar sign-interpretant (SI_e) enables the SV_e to stand for its SO_e.

What is that SI_e?

This is where the scholastic interscope for how humans think comes in handy.

For semiotic agency, the SI_e is vague. The normal context of salience_3c operates on a potential underlying salience_1c. I suppose the potential_1c is ‘the possibility_1c of contextualizing information_2b‘, if that helps.

For the scholastic interscope, the normal context asking, “Does this make sense?”_3c operates on the possibility of ‘contextualizing the situation’_1c.

0881 To me, this implies that the term, “salience_3c((1c))“, supports an actuality_2c that weighs perception_2b against sensation_2a, while asking what goal_2c might be attempted.

What does that imply?

0882 The scholastic interscope contains the specifying and exemplar sign relations, which figure so prominently in semiotic agency.

05/24/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 2 of 4)

0883 Here is a diagram showing the way that Sharov and Tonnessen bring a three-level interscope into a dyadic actuality suitable for laying over the noumenon of all biological processes.

Empirio-schematic inquiry into biosemiotics may now fruitfully employ this noumenal overlay as the thing that is objectified by biosemiotic phenomena.

0884 But, there is more.

The interventional sign-relation is difficult to fathom, because its sign-vehicle cannot be seen. It must be inferred. In biosemiotics, that inference represents phenomena. It is the goal_2c as a sign-vehicle (SV_i).

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 3 of 4)

0887 The judgment_2c in the above figure contains two contiguous real sign-elements. One is the exemplar sign-object (SO_e) and the other is the interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i). As already discussed, the contiguity is [meaning]. For biosemiotics, the medieval scholastic term, “judgment_2c“, corresponds to {SO_e [meaning] SV_i}_2c.

0888 At the same time, for postmodern scholastics, judgment_2c is a triadic relation.

Indeed, it is the triadic relation that stands at the start of this lengthy examination v(see point 0005).

0889 There are two types of judgment. The one depicted above is contemplative. The other is actionable. Once Peirce’s three categories are assigned, one category to one element, then the judgment becomes actionable. An actionable judgment unfolds into a category-based nested form.

Does “unfolds” sound like [meaning]?

0890 One example should suffice.

The scholastics harbor an ideal for judgment_2c. As far as they are concerned, this judgment_2c is the best. A rational intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the intelligibility of perception (what ought to be, firstness) into relation with the universality of sensation (what is, secondness).

This is a level-headed judgment, for sure. The scholastics are trying to be sensible, even when they face the nonsensical mysteries of life and revelation. No wonder they have such riotous and entertaining debates. In Latin, no less.

0891 Here is a picture of the scholastic’s ideal judgment.

0892 The assignments of the categories are crucial.

Thirdness goes into the normal context₃.

Secondness goes into actuality₂.

Firstness goes into the possibility of ‘something’₁.

0893 Categorical assignments appear in the above figure.

If the assignments are different, then the judgment would unfold into a different category-based nested form.

This is critical, if I rotate the current assignments one notch counterclockwise, then the intelligibility of my perceptionsbecomes the normal context₃, bringing the actuality of my “rational intellect”₂ into relation with the possibility that ‘my sensations are universal’₁. Replace “intelligibility of perceptions₃” with “knowledge₃“, “rational intellect₂” with “don’t contradict me₂“, and “universality of sensations₁” with “universality of what I experience₁“. Then, the unfolded nested form says, “The normal context of my knowledge₃ brings the actuality of ‘don’t contradict me’₂ into relation with the possibility that what I experience is universal₁.”

0894 Doesn’t that sound like expertise?

Rotating the categorical assignments one notch counterclockwise takes the inquirer from the scholastic idea to modern expertise. Experts are knowledgable₃, elevate their own experiences₁ over others, and do not enjoy being contradicted₂.

Scholastics are just trying to be rational intellects₃, bringing the universality of what they sense₂ into relation with the possibility of ‘an intelligent perception’₁.

05/22/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 4 of 4)

0895 So, I have a working definition of [meaning], as a judgment_2c (SO_s) unfolding into a category-based nested form_2c (SV_i).

Also, from point 0862, I have a working definition of [message], as the continuity between an expression of intention (SO_i) and an initiating (semiotic) event (SV_s). Plus, the initiating (semiotic) event_2a (SV_s) is not the same as the event that occurs after judgment_2c unfolds into an action_2c (SV_i).

0896 Here is a picture of the interventional sign, along with its contiguities.

0897 These contiguities turn out to be the connections between semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation.

This is shown clearly in the biosemiotic (or STI) noumenal overlay.

In sum, the scholastic interscope for how humans think assists in appreciating the nature of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

The scholastic interscope contains three boundary-crossing sign relations. Two belong to semiotic agency. One belongs to the interventional sign-relation.

The scholastic interscope also contains three contiguities between sign-relations. These correspond to content-level [message], situation-level [presence] and perspective-level [meaning].

0898 Finally, there is Peirce’s natural sign typology, consisting of icons, indexes and symbols.

An icon is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the qualities of images, pictures, unities, monads and so forth.

An index is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the characteristics of pointing, contact, cause and effect, and other dyads.

A symbol is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the stuff of habit, convention, law, agreement, and so on.

0899 I conclude with a list of the sign-relations that are embedded in the scholastic interscope for how humans think,along with the sign-object and type of natural sign.

0900 This information should prove handy in the upcoming examination of human agency.

05/21/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 1 of 8)

0901 The text before me is chapter seven of Pathways (see point 0831 for book details, pages 137-166).

Examinations of the chapters on non-human agency end up with a suggestion that biosemiotics may include more than semiotic agency. Semiotic agency contains the specifying and exemplar sign-relations. The scholastic interscope for how humans think contains one other sign-relation. The interventional sign-relation is odd, compared to the other two sign-relations.

So is the author’s term, “potential meanings”.

0902 Of course, the terms, “interventional sign-relation” and “potential meanings” are mere labels. They are tags. They are spoken words. They are unlike the manual-brachial word-gestures of fully linguistic hand or hand-speech talk.

For hand talk, in terms of parole, gesture-words picture and point to their referents. They are icons and indexes. So, word-gestures (SV_s) abstract the natural sign-qualities of these types of signs. Icons and indexes picture and point to ‘something that could be present’ (SO_s). Presence (SV_e) can have many meanings, depending on what is going on. Consequently, SO_e is an intuitive abstraction based on what the word-gesture implicitly pictures and points to(langue). I call the process, “implicit abstraction”.

For example, the hand-talk word, [image RAVEN], can denote the color black, as well as particular attitudes.

The hand-talk word, [POINT to corner of eye], can denote the color white, as well as particular attitudes and warnings.

0903 Can the term, “potential meaning” be stated using hand-talk?

No. What is there to picture or point to?

The term is an explicit abstraction.

0904 In speech-alone talk, parole is arbitrarily related to langue.

Since parole comes first, as SV_s, the specified referent (SO_s) comes into being after a word is spoken. After all, SV_sassociates to message and message precedes presence (SO_s). The specified referent (SO_s) associates to information_2b. But, since speech-talk cannot picture or point to anything, that information_2b (SO_s) may end up being explicitly defined.

0905 I say “may”, because sometimes information_2b is obvious. Consider the word, “chair”. Everyone immediately intuits a “chair”, even though chairs do not occur in nature. But, what about the American bureaucratic designation, “chair-person”?

Sit down for a minute and think about it.

How can a person be a chair?

0906 Sharov’s technical term, “potential meaning” has two descriptors made into one character. So, one way to approach the term is to step back and consider the initial claim made in Razie Mah’s e-book, How To Define The Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues). The normal context of definition₃ brings the actuality of a spoken term₂ into relation with the potential of its meaning, presence and message’₁.

0907 Surely, the reader anticipates my next move.

The words that go into the slot for potential₁ are familiar.

Not only do they₁ underlie the actuality of a spoken term₂, they₁ have already been used to label the three intra-level contiguities that occur in the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

0908 Here is a picture.

Since [meaning] is the one contiguity that associates to “meaning”, [presence] and [message] must associate to the qualifier, “potential”

05/20/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 2 of 8)

0909 The introduction (section 7.1) does not disagree.

To me, it seems that the label for the contiguity between SO_s and SV_e could be changed to “potential meaning”. [Presence] is rich with “potential meaning”. So is the moniker, “information_2b“.

0910 At the same time, the introduction (section 7.1) does not agree.

0911 The author claims that “meaning” associates to how an organism interprets a sign.

Surely, that claim coheres to the SI_s. Or, maybe it goes with the SI_e.

0912 Also, the author is interested in writing about resources that are not meaningful, but can be meaningful when an organism happens to discover that they have um… meaning_2c.

Sign-relations are essential for the discovery of signification.

So, the author figures that there are potential meanings (where an entity can become meaningful to a semiotic agent) and potential signs (where an entity can come to the attention of a semiotic agent).

The author offers a table to distinguish proper meanings and signs from potential meanings and signs.

Finally, section 7.1 concludes that organisms can actualize potential meanings (and potential signs) by integrating them into their own goal-directed activities, especially when those activities are phenotypic (hence, adaptive in Umwelts past).

In section 17.2, the author develops the theme of form within a sign-relation.

The argument is theoretical.

0913 So, allow me to return a previous example.

A revision is in order.

0914 One fine morning, an unattended dog wanders the streets of my town, looking for what?… a potential sign? No. It is looking for a message, in the form of a SV_s.

This unfamiliar dog is not an idealist. Or maybe, the dog is an idealist, because the dog is certain that a form is nearby, and that he can sink his teeth into that form. Not so much to chew, as to swallow.

0915 No sign-vehicle sends that interventional sign-object (SO_i) until a sound, emanating from a pile of leaves, sends a message… er… a specifying sign-vehicle (SV_s).

0916 Here is Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay for semiotic agency as a generalization of this canine organismin a semiotic context.

0917 In section 7.3, titled “Semiotic Agency in Biosemiotics”, Sharov references his groundbreaking 2021 work with Tonnessen. The idea that semiotic agency is contained within biosemiotics is broached, but not with the verve of the above figure, which derives from Razie Mah’s examination of Sharov and Tonnessen’s 2021 text.

0916 “Semiotic agency” is no longer a label. It is a technical tool for biosemiotics. The utility of this tool is yet to be determined. However, what this examination finds is significant.

Semiotic agency reifies specifying and exemplar sign-relations. At the same time, semiotic agency draws upon an interscope that parallels the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

So, there are several key phenomena to consider. The first is an initiating semiotic event_2a (SV_s) that parallels sensation_2a. The second is information_2b (SO_s [presence] SV_e) that parallels perception_2b. The third is a goal or aim_2c(SO_e) that parallels judgment_2c.

0917 Does that reduce semiotics to a tool, as noted in section 7.4?

I guess that sign-relations are tools in the same way that a dog’s snout (one side fitted for detection and the other side fitted for biting into the detected thing) is a tool.

I prefer to use the terms, “adaptations” and “phenotypes”.

0918 So, how should biosemioticians conceptualize potential meanings and potential signs (section 7.5)?

Take a look at the preceding figure.

What is in the pile of leaves?

A potential sign?

The sound and, with investigation, odor coming from a pile of leaves_2a (SV_s) stands for an animal_2b (SO_s) in regards to the wandering dog’s detecting_3b something going on in a pile of leaves_1b (SI_s).

0919 What is salient (SI_e) about this hidden animal (SO_s)?

May I also ask, “What is the potential meaning of this hidden animal?”

The dog burrows into the leaf pile for further information_2b. The animal may be wounded_2b.

Well, that means it_2b (SO_s) is not going to fight back_2b (SV_e). So, the dog’s goal module_3c((1c)) (SI_e) says, “Yes, I can put this in my mouth.”_2c (SO_e).

An Archaeology of the Fall

A Horror Story by Razie Mah