05/29/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 1 of 19)

0003 The following 2016 essay comments on a recent book on baroque scholasticism by Daniel Novotny, a Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Bohemia in the Czech Republic. The title of the work is Ens rationis from Suarez to Caramuel: A Study in the Scholasticism of the Baroque Era (Fordham University, 2013).

These comments and Novotny’s book may be used as an independent home school or college course of study. Student instructions are colored in burgundy.

Please have this book at hand for the full story.

0003 This commentary is not a close reading. Rather, it is a curious association of postmodern and semiotic diagramsto Novotny’s writing. These models come from Razie Mah’s foundational works, including How to Define the Word “Religion” as well as An Archaeology of the Fall.

I regard Novotny’s work as both insightful and prophetic. By “insightful”, I mean seeing through the highly nuanced Latin text in order to grasp the core. He plainly condenses each nuanced argument into one or two sentences. By ‘prophetic’, I mean that he quests for truth. In chapter 9, paragraph 3, Novotny admits that his initial aim was to show that, even today, Baroque scholastic culture could produce philosophical illumination.

As the following comments will show, he is on target, but not in the way he expected.

0004 Why consider baroque scholasticism?

John Deely (1942-2017 AD) writes the first postmodern survey of the history of philosophy, from the ancient Greeks to the 21st. His book is entitled, Four Ages of Understanding (2001, University of Toronto Press).

0005 Deely locates Baroque scholasticism (1600 to 1680 AD) at the start of the Age of Ideas and the end of the Latin Age. He focuses on this time – right around the promulgation of the Peace of Westphalia (1648 AD) – as paradigmatic. Two figures stand out.

0006 In France, Rene Descartes (1596-1650) wrestles with the philosophical implications of the new mechanical philosophy. Note, the word “philosophy” appears twice. On one had, philosophy trends to modernism and postmodernism. On the other hand, philosophy spawns science.

0007 In Spain, John Poinsot (1589-1644) arrives at the definition of a sign. A sign is a triadic relation. The relation was classified as ‘a being of reason’ (ens rationis) by Suarez, the first philosopher covered by Novotny. Almost 300 years after Francisco Suarez ,(1548-1617) the sign as a triadic relation is independently discovered by Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce marks a new turning. He is the first philosopher of the upcoming Age of Semiotics.

0008 Both John Deely and Daniel Novotny seek to understand the critical juncture where the Latin Age gave way to our current Age of Ideas.

The origin of the Age of Ideas is wrapped in modern mythology. Descartes is lionized. Poinsot is ignored. The Age of Ideas reigns in the shining castles of modern universities. To me, state-supported multiversities look like palaces. Mechanical philosophy is taught to some. Analytic philosophy is taught to others. Propaganda and technique covers the rest.

Outside the palaces of big government (il)liberalism lays a moat of resentment, filled with materialistic philosophies, political theologies and television. Even further away, the forgotten remnants of the Latin Age slowly convert an apparently dead civilization into a living soil. For centuries, moderns were warned about going into the dark forest of scholasticism.

Yet, that is where John Deely and Daniel Novotny wander.

0009 A crucial difference arises between Deely and Novotny. Deely has Peirce’s definition of the sign to guide him. He has a lantern. Novotny does not have the advantage of a postmodern source of light. Novotny only has his own intuition.

John Kronen, of the University of St. Thomas, captures Novotny’s lack of an illuminated path in his review, writing, “If one agrees with Aristotle that opposites are treated in the same science (e.g. medicine treats both health and sickness) … then one should agree that metaphysics (the study of being) ought to study nonbeing”.

Indeed, Novotny bravely says, “OK, I will look into this nonbeing stuff. I will go into the dark forest of scholasticism and see what happens.”

0010 From these labors, he comes up with the insights and the prophecy that I place before you.

Here, the student should read chapters 1 and 2 of Novotny’s work.

0011 What about this nonbeing stuff?

During the Latin Age, the term “beings of reason” appears in various scholastic discussions. In 1597 AD, the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez writes the first comprehensive treatment on the topic (Chapter 9:Paragraph 1). This marks the start of Baroque scholasticism (Chapter 1: Sections A-D).

At this point, the student should read Novotny’s treatment of Suarez’s Disputation 54 (chapters 3, 4 and 5).

0012 Why are ‘beings of reason’ needed?

Suarez proposes three reasons (Chapter 3: Section C: Point 3). These are distilled by Novotny into claim SN8:

Beings of reason are needed (1) to know nonbeing, (2) to know things comparatively and (3) to explain why humans can think of self-contradictory beings.

Over the previous centuries of inquiry in Aristotle’s tradition, schoolmen routinely use the term “beings of reason” on three occasions. These occasions suggest reasons for inquiring into the nature of the term. They are (1) negations, (2) privations and (3) relations. Self-contradictions (4) are also implicated.

So, at the beginning, Suarez asks: What is the ontological status of the term ‘beings of reason’?

0013 Now, let me turn to my own methods.

What do I have that makes my comments more than a curiosity?

Just as Deely holds the lantern of Peirce’s semiotics, I hold the flashlight of the category-based nested form. You can be the judge of the power of this source of illumination.

Please note the prerequisites at point 0003.

Here is the category-based nested form in a nutshell:

0014 The nested form is depicted as follows:

normal context₃( actuality₂( possibility or potential of something₁))

The numerical subscripts denote Peirce’s categories. The parentheses denote precission.

This depiction breaks down into four statements:

Actuality₂ emerges from the possibility of something₁.

Actuality₂ situates the potential of something₁.

A normal context₃ contextualizes actuality₂(something₁).A normal context₃ brings actuality₂ into relation with the possibilities inherent in something₁.

05/28/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 2 of 19)

0015 Now, let me re-examine Suarez’ three reasons for investigating ‘beings of reason’.

0016 (1) ‘Beings of reason’ are needed to know nonbeing.

If nonbeing is ‘not existent’, then why call it a “being”? Being goes with existence. How can being assist in knowing nonbeing?

0012 (2) The answer to that is by comparison. A nonexistent can be known by comparison to being. What does not existcan be compared to what actually exists.

Today, this would be called “a thought experiment”. The thought experiment builds on a comparison. Being^in_reason is to thought (comparatively) as being^itself is to existence.

The question is: How is this comparison accomplished?

The answer is: A nonbeing can be regarded in the manner of being.

0017 (3) The ‘being of reason’ explains why humans can think of self-contradictions.

Reason goes with thought. Thought is ‘the world of reason’. Being is ‘what exists’. Existence is ‘the world of actuality’. So let me substitute these terms into the above equation and come up with an alternate way to express it.

‘This nonbeing (called “being of reason”) belongs to the world of reason’ (comparatively) as ‘being (what exists) belongs to the world of actuality’.

0018 To me, this sounds like an example of how humans think in self-contradictions. What I call “being” does not exist. It is a nonbeing. Yet, I can think of it as if it is actual, even though it does not exist.

What does this suggest?

One can explain why humans can think of self-contradictions by explaining the causes, natures and division of ‘beings of reason’.

0019 In discussing these three reasons for studying ‘beings of reason’, I present Suarez’s definition of a being^in_reason. A ‘being of reason’ is a nonbeing thought in the manner of being. It is a thought experiment. It is held, in thought, as a contradiction. This is the case for all thought experiments.

05/27/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel” (Part 3 of 19)

0020 How do thought experiments work?

Typically, when reason is applied to the world of actuality, then the inquirer strives to eliminate contradictions. This is the modern way. This is the way of actuality. As soon as one poses, in reason, a scenario that does not exist (or a nonbeing) and could be regarded in the manner of actuality (or existence, being), then the logic changes from eliminating contradictions to excluding whatever makes the scenario less real.

0021 In this way, a thought experiment can find a truth within fiction.

0022 Suarez sets up what moderns call “a thought experiment”.

Allow me to go through the specifics of this thought experiment.

To start, Suarez attaches a novel normal context to the word “being”. He defines ‘a being of reason’ or being^in_reason. This being^in_reason is a nonbeing. It cannot exist. It is not a being^itself.

But, what does the word “existence” indicate?

It indicates actuality, the realm of actuality that corresponds to Peirce’s secondness.

0023 Suarez uses language to project a nonbeing into the realm of actuality. This being^in_reason is inherently a contradiction. So, reason cannot be used to eliminate contradictions. Reason must be used to explore the scenario.

0024 What is the prime motivation for doing this?

Suarez’s thought experiment allows inquiry into nonbeing. But, this is not an ordinary nonbeing, it is a nonbeing regarded in the manner of being. It does not simply not exist. It is thought of as if it does exist (as a being^itself), even though it does not.

0025 I can put this into a category-based nested form in the following manner. Reason₃ is the normal context. Being^in_reason₂ is the actuality. Knowing this particular character of nonbeing₁ is the inherent possibility.

0026 How relevant is this nonbeing stuff?

Needless to say, I personally think that there are more reasons for asking about beings^in_reason than nonbeing, comparison, and holding contradictions in thought.

One motivation concerns — what I call — implicit and explicit abstraction. The idea comes from An Archaeology of the Fall.

In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, our genus and our species practiced hand talk. Hand talk favors implicit (or intuitive) abstraction.

In contrast, in our current Lebenswelt, speech-alone talk permits explicit (or symbolic) abstraction.

0027 In order to get a picture of the difference between hand talk and our current way of talking, speech-alone talk, consider the following associations:

0028 I ask, “Which row goes with hand talk? Which row goes with speech-alone talk?”

Let me give you a hint.

In hand talk (and in its more developed hybrid, hand-speech talk), words consist of what could be imaged or pointed to. Manual-brachial word gestures are ideal for picturing and indicating things and states of things.

In speech-alone talk, word-sounds do not image or point to anything. Spoken words are placeholders in two arbitrarily related systems of differences. A word-sound is a placeholder linked, by convention, to a place-holding word-mental act. One symbol links to another. One symbolic order evokes the other.

05/26/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 4 of 19)

0029 From this association alone, I would expect that each way of talking would represent the world in its own unique way. The way of hand talk represents the world through implicit abstraction. The way of speech-alone talk represents the world through explicit abstraction.

0030 In the following steps, I use Suarez’s definition of ‘beings of reason’ to construct a model for implicit abstraction.

0031 Step 1: Start with an encounter

Being^itself₂ belongs to the realm of actuality. Actuality belongs to Peirce’s category of secondness. The category of secondness always contains two elements. The paradigmatic example of secondness is cause and effect. Both elements belong to actuality. The two elements are contiguous. One element accounts for the other.

When I encounter a being^itself, I encounter an effect, not a cause. Animals, for example, respond to effects, rather than causes. The effect is being^itself (what exists). The animal wonders: What do I do in response to this effect? Do I approach, flee, or safely ignore it?

0032 Animals do not comprehend that what exists is one element in the dyad of actuality.

0033 So, I start with being^itself (what is encountered). The figure is mostly empty. One slot has an entry. The slot belongs to actuality.

0034 Step 2: Project what accounts for what is encountered.

Humans, in contrast to animals, somehow understand that there is a cause. The human may wonder: How do I situate this effect in order to see what causes it?

Here, I use the word “cause” in the widest sense. Cause accounts for the encountered being. I encounter being^itself₂. Being^encountered₂ is accounted for by another being_2.

0035 So how does a being^{that-accounts}₂ enter into the picture?

It enters as the other element in the dyad of actuality. Now, I have two elements in a single entry. This entry corresponds to actuality.

0036 When a dog comes across something quizzical, it may look at its owner.

What is the dog up to?

The dog looks for a clue. The human has something that the dog does not. The encountered being₂ is mind-independent. The accounting being₂ is mind-dependent. The accounting being₂ is a nonbeing. No one can demonstrate its existence. It cannot be imaged or pointed to.

Yet, the human implicitly presumes its presence. The human thinks of this nonbeing in the manner of being. The dog watches for the human’s reaction to this nonbeing. The human’s reaction sets the context for how the dog will respond.

0037 Step 3: A content-level nested form comes into view

Adding the second element to the dyad of actuality entails the construction of a category-based nested form. The nested form is an abstraction because it draws itself out from the encountered being₂. This occurs in the human intellect.

The nested form looks like this:

0038 The normal context of what is happening?₃ brings the dyadic actuality of {being in reason [accounts for] an encountered being}₂ in regards to the potential of ‘something happening’₁.

05/25/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 5 of 19)

0039 I now return to Novotny’s text (Chapter 3; Section A). Metaphysics is the study of being. It entails the study of nonbeing. The ‘being of reason’ is a type of nonbeing. It is a nonbeing regarded in the manner of being.

So why is metaphysics interested in studying ‘beings of reason’?

Suarez lists four suggestions:

SM1: ‘Beings of reason’ are studied in order to facilitate the understanding of real beings.

SM2: This study is useful in various ways.

SM3: This study investigates their nature, causes, division and attributes.

SM4: Real beings are ontologically and epistemologically prior to ‘beings of reason’.

0040 These motivations point to various features of the nested form in the previous figure.

0041 At the same time, the suggestions illuminate the nested form.

Am I correct in asserting the following?

The only real being that appears in this picture is the encountered being_2a.

0042 Obviously not, the human intellect is also a real being.

So, what do I mean by the word “real”?

If by “real”, I mean to be regarded in the manner of being, then I may consider a being^in_reason to be real, even though it is a nonbeing. So, a being^in_reason is a real nonbeing. It is a nonbeing thought of in the manner of being. In the same way, being regarded in the manner of being is real being.

0043 To me, this suggests that the world “real” requires a mind. An intellect decides whether something is real (to be thought in the manner of being) or unreal (to not be thought in the manner of being). Indeed, an intellect situates the entire content-level nested form.

0044 So, the human intellect_2b is a real being that situates the being^in_reason_2a.

So, let me reconsider Suarez’s four motivations with the other real being in mind. Let me substitute the word “intellect” for “real beings” and rework the phrasing.

SM1: ‘Beings of reason’ are studied in order to facilitate understanding of the intellect (and encountered beings).

SM2: The study of beings^{in reason}is useful in various ways.

SM3: This study investigates their nature, causes, divisions and attributes.

SM4: The intellect and the encountered being are epistemologically and ontologically prior to ‘beings of reason’.

0045 This rewrite of Suarez’s suggestions enlarges my perspective.

There are two real beings in play: the encountered being_2a and the intellect that situates the being^in_reason_2a. The study of beings^in_reason is useful to understand both the real beings that we encounter_2a and the human intellect_2a. That understanding, which includes the nature, causes, divisions and attributes of beings^in_reason, puts both the situation-level intellect_2b and the content-level actualities_2a into perspective.

What does that imply?

There must be one more actuality. It is located on the perspective level.

05/23/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 6 of 19)

0046 The mental process may be explicitly labeled, “implicit abstraction”.

I can now sketch the relational drama.

0047 First, a human encounters a real being_2a. This being^encountered_2a must be thought of in the manner of being. It is real. It is actual.

0048 But, since actuality is dyadic, there must be another actuality_2a, accounting for the actuality of the encountered being_2a. The human experiences this as a gap. During this content-level emptiness, the human is unaware of a normal context or its underlying possibilities.

Why does the human experience this in this way?

If the tendency to experience this gap is innate, then humans evolved into a very odd niche. In that niche, a disposition to recognize the dyadic character of the category of secondness increased reproductive success. How strange is that?

0049 Second, a situation-level intellect projects a being of reason_2a (a nonbeing regarded in the manner of being) into the empty slot of the content-level dyad. When this is done, a content-level nested forms gels. The normal context_3a is what is happening_3a. The underlying potential_1a is something that could happen_1a.

What does this imply?

A feature of the intellect_2b is the efficient cause of the being of reason_2a. I will call this the efficient intellect.

0050 As soon as the being^in_reason is in place, other causes become apparent. A formal cause (referring to the normal context), a material cause (concerning the encountered being_2a) and a final cause (imagining the possibilities inherent in the appearance of the encountered being_1a) come into view. These complete the content-level nested form.

0051 Third, another aspect of the intellect constructs a judgment_2c, contextualizing the operation of the efficient intellect. If the encountered being_2a corresponds to ‘what it is’, and if the being^in_reason_2a corresponds to ‘what it ought to be’, and if the efficient intellect grasps a comparison between the two, then implicit abstraction ends up as a formal relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’. This formal relation is a judgment that contextualizes the situation.

Thus, a perspective-level formal judgment_2c establishes the basis_1b on which the efficient intellect_2b operates.

0052 The barebones storyline for implicit abstraction looks like this:

0053 Next, I would like to consider Suarez’s claims about beings of reason, as ably discussed by Novotny (Chapter 4; Sections A and B).

0054 SC1: Beings^in_reason_2a have no formal_3a, material_{2a and 1a} and final_1a causes in the strict sense, but they have these causes in some sense.

These causes engage as soon as the being of reason_2a enters into the emptiness of the other element of the dyad of actuality. Consequently, they operate when a being^in_reason is present. Yet, they cannot account for a being^in_reasonbecause, technically, a being in reason is a nonbeing. It simply does not exist. Yet, apparent formal, material and final causes contribute to the impression that it does.

0055 SC2: Beings^in_reason_2a have no efficient cause in the strict sense. However, they have an efficient cause in some sense.

SC3: The human intellect is the only efficient cause of ‘beings of reason’.

This fits the dynamic of an efficient intellect reaching into the empty space of the second element in the dyad of actuality and molding a being of reason.

0056 SC4: Extrinsic denominations are necessary but insufficient conditions for beings of reason.

What is an “extrinsic denomination”? Is it an encountered being_2a? An encountered being_2a is a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient condition for the formation of a being of reason_2a.

An extrinsic denomination_2a… er… encountered being_2a (?) plays a crucial role of creating an emptiness in the realm of actuality_2a. It does this simply by occupying one of the elements of the content-level dyad. The other element appears, almost magically, by an alignment of actualities₂ in the perspective_c and situation_b levels. The content-level emptiness of the other element of the dyad of actuality_2a is thus filled.

0057 Another way to say this is:

SC5: Beings of reason are caused by an act of the intellect that conceives of something that has no being in the manner of being.

0058 The being^in_reason_2a is a nonbeing. It does not exist, even though it belongs to the realm of actuality. The efficient intellect_2b is able to think of a being^in_reason_2a as if it exists because the formal intellect_2c provides a facilitating perspective. A perspective-level judgment_2c virtually (across categories) brings a situation-level efficient intellect_2b into relation with a nonbeing that can be thought of in the manner of being_2a. The being of reason_2a is a nonbeing that has the potential of being grasped (by the efficient intellect) as a being_2a.

0059 This corresponds to Suarez’s sixth and last thesis concerning the causes of beings of reason:

SC6: Beings of reason are caused by a reflexive act of the intellect.

0060 Today, the word “reflex” means “a stimulated act performed without awareness”. Yet, to my mind, the word also suggests a bending, a re- (again) flex (turning), similar to a reflection. The efficient intellect acts like a reflex. But, it does so under the oversight of a reflection, a second turning. A reflective second turning_2c virtually brings the reflex_2binto relation with the potential inherent in the being^in_reason_2a.

0061 Next, I would like to consider Suarez’s claims about the nature of beings of reason, as ably condensed by Novotny (Chapter 3; Sections B and C). I will demonstrate that this model of implicit abstraction applies to Suarez’s claims.

05/22/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel” (Part 7 of 19)

0062 Before I continue, however, let me show the bare-bones schema once again.

0063 Novotny lists Suarez’s nine claims about the nature of beings of reason.

SN1: ‘A being of reason’ is what cannot be actualized in reality.

What does this mean?

A being^in_reason cannot exist by itself.

0064 SN2: Not every being of reason is self-contradictory.

Why does Suarez mention this?

Consider the question that Suarez thought he was addressing: How do you explain negations, privations, self-contradictions and relations?

After all, they are nonexistent. They cannot exist by themselves. Yet, they can be real. One can think of them in the manner of being.

0065 Indeed, the model shows that the question that Suarez was addressing was more extensive and twisted than he imagined. Negations, privations, self-contradictions and relations are beings of reason_2a. However, according to the model, they occur in conjunction with encountered beings_2a.

0066 Here is an example. I dig with a shovel. The soil that I move goes with being^encountered. The hole_2a goes with nonbeing. When I say, “Watch your step. Don’t fall into the hole that I just dug.” I speak of the hole as if it were a being. But, it is not a being^itself. It is a privation of soil.

If you fall into the hole, the hole itself does you no harm. It is the soil that you collide with that injures. The soil that you would hit in a fall corresponds to an encountered being_2a.

0067 Anyone who has come across disturbed soil and has reflected on the types of injury produced by such encountershas a perspective on the danger of holes. That person reflexively grasps the danger of this nonbeing. It is as dangerous as any being that one might run into.

0068 A hole is a privation. A configuration of soil generates this being of reason. Privations are nonbeings that can be imagined as beings, but cannot exist in reality.

The self-contradiction is also a being of reason. A good example is a large human rat.

0069 If I encountered a large human rat, I would be surprised, since large human rats do not exist. Yet, if I encountered something large, like a raccoon, scurrying inside a dumpster, I could mistake it as both a rat and a human. In this way, self-contradictions may exist as beings of reason.

SN3: Every being is either a real being or being of reason, but no being is both.

0070 The raccoon (neither human nor rat, but easily mistaken for both) is a being^itself_2a.

The human rat is a being^in_reason_2a.

This suggests the following conclusion. Since self-contradictions, negations and privations are always beings of reason, they can never exist as beings^themselves.

This lesson is plainly portrayed in the content-level actuality in the bare-bones schema for implicit abstraction. The first element of the content-level of actuality is a real being. A second element must be present, according to the nature of secondness. This second element somehow accounts for the actuality of the encountered real being.

0071 At this point, I have a general idea of why schoolmen postulated beings of reason in their various inquiries. After all, when looking at beings, there are all sorts of reversals, losses, confounding things and dependencies. These are grasped as negations, privations, self-contradictions and relations.

What does it mean for one of these nonbeings to fill the emptiness of the second element of the content-level actuality? It becomes a being^{in reason}. It is taken to be real, even though it does not exist.

SN4: Beings of reason are – in the analogical sense of the word “are”.

SN7: A being of reason is regarded as a being, even though it has no being in itself.

0072 The efficient intellect_2b is a real being. It ascribes being (existence) to the being^in_reason_2a. “Object” is another word for being^in_reason. The efficient intellect_2b grasps an object_2a. It makes the object part of its subjective — reflexive — reckoning.

The object_2a goes with the content-level nested form. The efficient intellect_2b belongs to the situation-level nested form. The content-level normal context_3a is what is happening_3a. The situation-level normal context_3b is situational reason_3b.

0073 SN6: A being^in_reason_2a has only objective being in the intellect_2b.

SN5: Three different relations to reason are indicated by the expression ‘being of reason’. These are (1) effective, (2) subjective and (3) objective.

This is a minimum, since the bare-bones schema offers one more. (4) A perspective-level actuality_2c draws into relation the ‘what it is’ of the encountered being_2a and the ‘what it ought to be’ of the being^{in reason}_2a. Since the intellect, the seat of reason, is involved, Suarez predicted that this relation would generate a comparison.

SN9: Beings of reason and real beings are related by an analogy of proportionality.

0074 Finally, Suarez suggests why ‘beings of reason’ are necessary.

SN8a: ‘Beings of reason’ are necessary to know nonbeing.

Nonbeing is more than nothing. According to the bare-bones schema, the being^{in reason}_2a is an actual object that the efficient intellect grasps.

0075 SN3b: ‘Beings of reason’ are needed to know things relatively in comparison to other things.

This reminds me of the perspective-level nested form. The actuality that puts the efficient intellect into perspective_2c is a judgment that weighs ‘what it is’ against ‘what it ought to be’_2c. This judgment_2c grounds reckoning_2b. It addresses the question: On what basis would the efficient intellect_2b grasp a real nonbeing_2a in response to encountering a real being_2a?

0076 SN3c: ‘Beings of reason’ are required to explain the capacity of our intellect to think of self-contradictory beings (as well as negations, privations and relations).

0077 This matches the situation-level nested form. The efficient intellect reckons_2b. Once a real being is encountered, the efficient intellect reckons that there must be a second element to the dyad in the content-level actuality. This must be an innate reckoning, because the efficient intellect does exactly what needs to be done. It_2b projects an object_2a — a being^in_reason_2a — into the emptiness of the second element in the realm of actuality_2a.

The projected being^in_reason is thought of in the manner of being (existence). This is why humans regard negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions as real, even though they cannot be seen, heard, touched, tasted or smelled.

05/21/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 8 of 19)

0078 So far, so good. The bare-bones schema coheres to Suarez’s nine claims about the nature of ‘beings of reason’. The only drawback is: Suarez actually made eleven claims. There are two more to go.

0079 I did not mention these two because Novotny insightfully does not list them in chapter 3. Why? Novotny argues that they are not consistent with the other nine. So, he lists them in chapter 4 — on the division of beings of reason.

0080 Before I go there, I want to shine the flashlight of the category-based nested form in another direction.

My thesis is that Suarez’s comprehensive treatment of beings of reason coheres to a model of implicit abstraction. I also propose that implicit abstraction corresponds to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. Implicit abstraction evolves in the milieu of hand talk.

In this section, I want to develop the latter claim.

0081 I intend to adapt this bare bones schema to hand talk. The adaptation provides greater insight into the model and its application to Novotny’s story about ens rationis.

So here goes.

0082 When our hominin ancestors talked, they used linguistic manual-brachial word-gestures. These word-gestures were referential. They were natural signs. They imaged and indicated their referents.

0083 What does this imply?

In hand talk, the words “real” and “being” cannot exist. What is there to image? What is there to point to?

The sensibility that goes with the word “real” changes. From my standpoint, as a person who uses only speech-alone talk, I need to imagine what “real” would denote in the world of hand talk.

So, here is my compromise: “Real” labels that which may be imaged or pointed to instead of that which is regarded in the manner of being. The term “being” goes with existence.

0084 In order to clarify, consider Suarez’s construction of ‘beings of reason’. He uses Latin, a tongue in speech-alone talk. His words belong to our current Lebenswelt. He uses the word “real” in a particular manner. It means to regard in the manner of being (existence).

The following matrix applies to speech-alone talk. The two real elements stand out. The two unreal elements do not stand out. Of the latter, one is not ruled out. The ‘unreal being’ is an existent that must be regarded as if it does not exist. The other is ruled out as impossible. The ‘unreal nonbeing’ is a nothing. It is like a whisper in an empty room.

0085 How should this matrix be adjusted for the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

There was no word for “real” in the world of hand talk (before Homo sapiens) and hand-speech talk (from the appearance of Homo sapiens to the first singularity). Why? How can anyone picture or point to “real”. The term “real” is an explicit abstraction.

0086 So how do I apply the term to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

My suggestion goes like this: “Real” is what can be conveyed through word-gestures. Since word-gestures image and indicate, what they picture and point to can be matched to our current term “real”. The real is whatever can be imaged or indicated. This results in the following matrix of real and being.

0087 Now, the two elements that stand out belong to being (existence). The two elements that are hidden are nonbeing(nonexistent). Of these, one is less hidden than the other.

To me, real nonbeing and unreal being have similar sensibilities. As soon as I think that an ‘unreal being’ is possible, then I imagine that there must be a way to point to it. The way to point to it may be nonsensical, but what is the alternative? The way to point to a being that cannot be pointed to is by treating it as if it were a nonbeing that can be pointed to.

0088 In other words, in hand-speech talk, unreal being and real nonbeing may be two sides to a single coin.

During the Upper Paleolithic, people were not rich, but they did carry a few items of value with them. Some of these were carvings of animals or people. What were these images pointing to? Obviously, the carvings imaged beings. But, just as obviously, the imaged beings were no longer present. Similarly, what is no longer present could be imaged and pointed to in hand and hand-speech talk. Perhaps, the image was of a real being, that became a unreal being, but is now a real nonbeing.

0089 So maybe, the matrix should look like this:

0090 To me, this looks like a nested configuration, rather than two sides of the same coin. The being that can be pointed to goes with content. The being that cannot be pointed to goes with situation. Then, the nonbeing that can be pointed to goes with perspective.

This produces the following variation of the bare-bones schema:

0091 The nonbeing that can be imaged and pointed to_2c may enter into the slot designated 2a (real being). In doing so, an implicit abstraction becomes an encountered being_2a.

0092 How can this happen?

The nonbeing_2c can be pictured or indicated through hand talk. The nonbeing could be a self-contradiction, negation, privation or relation. It can be depicted through a grammatically correct but nonsensical proposition. After all, the statement, “A hole is where the ground is no longer there.” does not make much sense. Thus, the relation between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’ may become a gestural utterance that fills the slot designated for a real being_2a.

This conclusion parallels the ideas in A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction. The student may want to take a look at this work.

05/20/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 9 of 19)

0093 Shall I tell the fable of the big rat?

0094 Before the first singularity, our Paleolithic ancestors lived in bands that occasionally congregated into tribes. A lot was accomplished in the apparent chaos of tribal song-fests. It was during such a gathering that Running Goat was given new parents. He was a strapping youth, but he needed guidance. His father died during the winter. His mother was given to his uncle. But, Running Goat was not going to live under his uncle’s tent. His uncle was not much of a hunter. Dashing Bleeter was.

0095 The tribal elders made him the son of a renowned hunter in a different band. The hunter and his wife gladly accepted this, not so much because it would increase their status, but because they had no children of their own. Running Goat was not the first child they adopted.

0096 In the band, a girl was coming of age. Her name was Smiling Water.

One day, she was coming back to her tent with a gourd of water. Running Goat was nearby, working on his bow and arrows. He and his pal had just been out trying the tool. It needed some adjustments. When saw her, he elbowed his friend. Watch this.

0097 “Wait!” he gestured to Smiling Water. “Rat I See Into tent Run.”

Pool of Joy lowered her gourd and put it on the ground. By tradition, she could not speak to a warrior. So, even though he was not yet a warrior, she treated him as one, gesturing, “(Points to tent) Please Rat Chase.”

0098 Leaping Cloven Hoof rushed into the tent, as if chasing a rat. Once in the tent, however, he stopped in his tracks. What did he see? The mother of Smiling Water crouched in a corner of the tent, fixing a pelt coat. She looked up, unhappy at the interruption and knowing that Running Goat was up to no good.

She threw her boot at him. His face flushed. Oh, was he in trouble. He ducked out of the tent.

But, Happy Liquid was outside the ten, ready to see a dead rat, killed by her newfound hero.

Running Goat gestured, “(Points to Smiling Water) (points to inside tent) Mother!”

0099 Then he took off. His friend dropped the construction project and ran after him.

Waters of Smiles picked up the gourd and went into her tent.

0100 She asked her mom, “Rat Running Goat See?”

Her mother looked at her quizzically, then grinned, gesturing “Me Rat Big.”

Smiling Waters suddenly understood. From then on, even after she was married to Running Goat, she called her mom: Big Rat.

0101 What is an implicit abstraction?

An implicit abstraction is a nonbeing that can be imaged or pointed to using hand or hand-speech talk. The nonbeing is a relation between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’. It is imaged or pointed to through a grammatically correct nonsensical statement.

0102 Here is a diagram of the judgment in the fable.

Note how the entire judgment is captured in two word gestures: Big Rat.

0103 As far as triadic relations go, judgment is unusual. Any of its three elements may be assigned to the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness. In this case, the relation belongs to secondness (the realm of actuality), ‘what is’ goes with thirdness (the realm of normal context) and ‘what ought to be’ associates to firstness (the realm of possibility).

0104 The resulting nested form is constructed on the basis of the categories. The example goes like this:

The normal context of the Big Rat (mom)₃ brings the actuality challenging RG’s attempts to impress SW₂ into relation with the possibilities inherent in RG’s desire to capture the love and attention of SW₁.

0105 This raises the question, “Is this category-based nested form indivisible?”

0106 Novotny lists Suarez’s last two claims about the nature of ‘beings of reason’ in the chapter on division.

The student should read Chapter 5 of Novotny’s book.

0107 Suarez struggled to show the relevance of the traditional formulation. He arrived at two conclusions:

SD1: ‘Beings of reason’ have three exclusive and sufficient species: negation, privation and relation.

SD2: Self-contradictory ‘beings of reason’ may define a fourth category, or they may belong to negation.

Put another way, negations, privations and relations are always ‘beings of reason’. Self-contradictions may or may not be inherent.

0108 In order to appreciate these divisions, consider the triad that constitutes judgment on the perspective level. The four traditional items fit into the structure of judgment as ‘what ought to be’.

0109 The element, what it ought to be, typically goes with firstness. The logic of firstness is inclusive. It allows contradictions. Traditional formulas for ‘beings of reason’ are full of contradictions. After all, they are beings that cannot possibly exist by themselves.

How can a negation exist without the reversal of a real being? Yet, these non-existents may be regarded in the manner of being. They may take on a life of their own.

0110 How does this happen?

A relation (in thirdness) becomes the basis on which ‘what it ought to be’ takes on the character of secondness. ‘What is’, the encountered being, takes on the character of firstness. For example, negation_2a arises from a reversal of the potential of the encountered being_2a. ‘The reversed encountered being’ goes with ‘effect’. Negation is projected as a ‘cause’.

0111 Implicit abstraction expresses the whole judgment in the slot designated 2a (real being). Hand and hand-speech talk image and point to an action that may be attributed to a judgment. The result may be a grammatically correct, yet nonsensical, statement. The action… um…the statement_2a is what_2a the judgment_2c stands for. But, the judgment cannot be pictured or indicated in hand talk.

Explicit abstraction places an element of judgment in the slot designated 2a (real being). Why is this so? Spoken words are symbols. Symbols are placeholders in a system of differences. So the whole judgment becomes an order composed of particular elements. Each element may (or may not) get a label.

0112 Suarez’s claims imbue the element of ‘what it ought to be’ with secondness (the realm of actuality). Negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions may now be examined as if they were real beings. At the same time, the real being falls into the background, without a label. The real being becomes an element that is hidden by Suarez’s definition of a ‘being of reason’.

Suarez’s explicit abstraction may now enter the slot designated 2a (real being), without regard to the other elements.

05/19/26

Looking at Daniel Novotny’s Book (2013) “Ens Rationis from Suarez to Caramuel”(Part 10 of 19)

0113 Consider the previous two figures along with the tenth statement on the nature of ‘beings of reason’.

SN10: Negations and privations may be in things (as real negations or privations) or in beings of reason (as negations or privations that are spoken about as if they are real).

0114 Surely, this statement re-enacts the above categorical flip between ‘what it is’ and ‘what it ought to be’. When a negation is regarded as a real privation in a thing, it goes with firstness, the realm of possibility. Why? The real being (secondness) has a potential for reversal (firstness). When the negation is regarded in the manner of being, it goes with secondness, the realm of actuallity. It becomes actual. Meanwhile, the encountered being enters into the category of firstness.

0115 Suarez’s statement on the nature of beings^in_reason explicitly abstracts one feature of the three elements of judgment. The scholastics before Suarez noticed a pattern. If negations, privations, relations and self-contradictions entered into someone’s discourse, then the schoolman ended up discussing nonbeings the manner of being. No one was sure why this was the case.

0116 The observation itself goes into the record as the eleventh and last claim listed by Novotny. Suarez claims:

SN11: Humans think in both the ‘manner of being’ and ‘the manner of nonbeing’.

After all, one could not define the ‘being of reason’ unless one imagined a being in the manner of a nonbeing. Ironically, this is precisely what occurred when Suarez transubstantiated (changed Peircean categories) the encountered real being (what it is) from the category of secondness into firstness.

A being thought of in the manner of a nonbeing may manifest itself it many ways. It may be an existent that one must declare cannot possibly exist. It may be a being existing in pure potential. It may be a being that somehow causes an action to happen. Then, the action exists, and the being that causes it must be regarded in the manner of a nonbeing.

0117 Say what?

Technically, a being belonging to the category of firstness (possibility) within a particular thirdness (normal context)can also be a being that one assumes (as if it is a nonbeing, such as an idea) and then ignores (because one has to deal with secondness, the realm of actuality).

Is that confusing, or what?

It is especially confusing since we evolved to confound the iconic and indexal linguistic act_2a with thinking in the manner of being (existence). Hand talk is experienced as real being_2a. By extension, so is speech-alone talk. What Suarez calls a ‘being of reason’ is experienced_2b as a nonreal being_2a, a being that cannot be pictuerd and pointed to (and therefore cannot be regarded as existing by itself).

0118 This experience_2b is triggered by the presence of talk_2a. The efficient intellect_2b asks the question: What accounts for a linguistic act_2a (in the slot designated for real encountered beings)?

Is a linguistic act_2a the same as an encountered being_2a?

Or is it an encounter_2a regarded_2b in the manner of being_2a?

If that is not confusing enough, consider this: What Suarez defines as ‘a being of reason’ (a nonbeing thought of in the manner of a being) corresponds to a judgment_2c. Judgment_2c is a nonbeing that cannot be imaged or pointed to (hence, hand talked about). But, the action produced by a judgment can be pictured and indicated.

Oh my. An action that can be imaged and indicated may go into the slot for an encountered being_2a.

But, the being that cannot be pointed to_2a is not the judgment_2c that is somehow objectified by the action_2a, it_2a is um… a being^{of reason}_2a.

0119 The following matrix hybridizes hand talk and Suarez’s speech-alone talk concepts.

0120 No wonder Daniel Novotny starts to question Suarez’s approach in the chapter of the division of ‘beings of reason’. The terms “being”, “existence”, “nonbeing”, “image” and “indication” are intertwined in the strangest fashion. To me, Suarez has intuitively constructed a model of implicit abstraction in a philosophical tradition devoted to explicit abstraction.

On one hand, implicit abstraction belongs to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. It also belongs to our current Lebenswelt.

On the other hand, explicit abstraction belongs only to our current Lebenswelt.

0121 Here is the bare-bones schema for implicit abstraction:

Here is the skeletal model for Suarez’ motivation to study ‘beings of reason’:

0122 Implicit abstraction operates when a judgment is imaged or pointed to in hand or hand-speech talk. Icons and indexes are holistic. They are indivisible. Consequently, their referent is the entire judgment.

0123 The nested form model of Suarez’s motivations diagrams an explicit process. The process starts with an encountered being_2a. The efficient intellect reckons a being^in_reason_2a. The formal intellect arrives at ‘a judgment that the efficient intellect has generated something that cannot exist as a mind-independent being. Oops, I meant to say: a nonbeing thought of in the manner of being.

Various scholastics (before Suarez) offered this explicit abstraction in order to explain observations. Suarez aims to construct a comprehensive treatment of these ‘beings of reason’. He formulates a thought experiment. The thought experiment imbues beings^in_reason with secondness. But, in doing so, the schoolman enters unknown territory. Suarez is about to place this explicit abstraction into the slot designated for an encountered being_2a.