0042 Here is a picture of the perspective-level that the biologist introduces with his explicit abstraction.

0043 On the content level, the normal context of a match_3a brings the actuality of the dyad, {one edge [fits into] other edge}_2a into relation with the potential of ‘locking in’_1a.

On the situation level, the normal context of wholeness_3b brings the actuality of the dyad, {assemblies [fit with] one another}_2b into relation with the possibilities of ‘assembling sections’_1b.

On the perspective level, the modern biologist explicitly denotes the possibility of ‘a big picture’_1c, that carries the message that biology accounts for the underlying two-level interscope_1c.  If the ability to solve cognitive challenges in order to get to a reward_2c could speak, it would say, “I am a manifestation of general intelligence.”

0044 This implies that the discipline of biology identifies_2c a big-picture_1c (as message_1c) contextualizing the underlying sensible construction (as presence_1c) as a niche (as meaning_1c), within the normal context of primate natural selection_3c.  Natural selection_3c acts like a definition_3c.  One label for the adaptation_2c is “general intelligence”_2c.  Or, maybe, the label is “solving challenges”_2c.

Uh oh, does that make sense?

Here is a picture of what I just said.

The perspective-level actuality_2c is an adaptation.

But, the word, “adaptation”_2c, implicates the entire nested form.

Is that what is displaced?

The entire nested form?

0043 Hmmm, should I mention that only spoken words can apply labels that serve as explicit abstractions?

Manual-brachial word gestures do not apply labels.  Instead, they offer iconic and indexal sign-relations that holistically yield implicit abstractions.

In short, the modern biologist performs displacement for monkeys and apes through explicit abstractions based on the disciplinary terminology of contemporary science (circa 2024).

In the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, hominins somehow figure out how to engage in displacement (that is, use words), without the advantage of explicit abstractions.

0044 The problem with using the jigsaw puzzle as a literal analogy, rather than as a metaphor for what the biologist is doing in the name of evolutionary science, starts with this observation.

Speech-alone talk facilitates explicit abstraction, because spoken words can label anything, even things that cannot be pictured and pointed to.  In other words, speech-alone talk always and automatically engages in displacement.  So, how can a symptom explain the cause that produces it?  It can only do so if a symptom pretends to harbor its own cause.

0045 Say what?

Without displacement, the spoken word does not exist. But, displacement can exist without the spoken word.

Displacement can exist when a manual-brachial gesture serves as an icon or an index (that is, a natural sign) of its referent.  The referent exists before the gesture-word.  The word-gesture pictures or points to its referent, even if the referent is not present.  Yes, that sounds like “displacement” to me.

0046 What does this suggest?

Well, Mithen’s text projects “displacement” into the sensible construction that describes how both words and jigsaw puzzle pieces share similar natures. So, the biosemiotician in me (see Razie Mah’s blogs for January through June, 2025, collected into the e-books, Biosemiotics As Noumenon, 1 though 3, available at smashwords and other e-book venues)…

0047 …offers a biosemiotic version of the perspective level.

The perspective-level normal context of natural selection_3c brings the actuality of displacement (as an adaptation)_2cinto relation with the potential of ‘the hominin niche, an evolutionary big-picture, and the discipline of biosemiotics’_1c.

Does this option appear more elegant?

Surely, the iconicity and indexality of manual-brachial gestures offers a realistic path for bipedal australopithecines to perform displacement.  A manual-brachial gesture can image (pantomime) or indicate (point to) a referent, even when the referent is not present.  It does so because it is a natural sign of the referent.

0048 Of course, Mithen comes to an alternate conclusion in the section (in chapter four) titled “Are ape-gestures the equivalent of words?”.  He rules out the option that language evolves in the milieu of manual-brachial gestures, rather than vocalizations.  Why?  Well, the gestural option does not explain why all civilized folk practice speech-alone talk.  

0049 Okay, somehow, in human evolution, the oral-auditory system gets drawn into fully linguistic hand-talk.

And then, maybe, a hominin species practices this weird hybrid, hand-speech talk, for hundreds of thousands of years.

And then, almost miraculously, two of these many hand-speech talking cultures get forced, by circumstances, into the same territory, where they don’t fight, but rather interbreed.  In doing so, they end up with a pidgin, then a creole, and this creole doesn’t have a hand-talk-component anymore.  That one culture is the first to practice speech-alone talk.  Also, that culture creates one of the first civilizations.

0050 Oh, yeah.  That option is totally outrageous.

0051 Mithen has other reasons for rejecting consideration of gestural origins of language.

Apes do not engage in iconic gestures.

How would apes distinguish one iconic gesture from another?

The highly specialized nature of human anatomy and neurology for speaking and listening implies a very slow and gradual evolution.  What could have caused these changes in the anatomy of the vocal tract and in the neurology of voluntary control of the voice if language has already evolved in the milieu of hand talk?

0052 On these bases, Mithen focuses only on vocalization as the pathway to language.

Which is sort of funny, because this examiner will apply Mithen’s insights to manual-brachial gestures as… um… the milieu in which language evolves.