01/21/26

Looking at Ekaterina Velmezova and Kalevi Kull’s Article (2017) “Boris Uspenskij…” (Part 10 of 19)

0507 So, where was I?

Where have I traveled?

I have walked through the first of two interviews with a prominent member of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics at its first ascendant.  Because my approach capitalizes (some would say, “exploits”) Peirce’s formulations, my examination adds value to the discussion.  Diagrams of purely relational structures, such as the interscope, permits a visualization of semiotic changes and developments through time.

0508 The second interview, starting on page 425, discusses thirteen questions.  Predefined questions offer an awkward format for an interview.  Given the hyperventilation that occurs during the interview on August 25, 2011, the hope is for a more structured encounter at Uspenskij’s villa in Rome on May 27, 2012.

The interview concerns Uspenskij’s 2007 book, Ego Loquens: Language and the communicative space.

0509 The Latin term, “ego loquens“, roughly transliterates into “I speak”.

Of course, the end of Descartes’ famous slogan immediately comes to mind, “therefore I am.”

I speak, therefore I am.

0510 But, what am I?

Perhaps, I am language2b (that another person can read like a literary text2b) as well as a communicative space (like the way that I, as a literary text2a, entangle a communal cognitive space called “language2a“).

0511 How confounding.

A communal cognitive… er… communicative space2a is the language2am that is entangled by the literary text2af, not as a thing itself2b, but as a model2c of structural3b and semiological3a signification3c.

0512 I hope that this statement justifies the use of the title of Uspenskij’s book to label the fundament and derivative interscopes, as shown below.

0513 Look closely at the above figure.

Can the reader see a triadic relation where a semiological3a structuralist3b model2c (SVi) stands for a literary text as form2af (SOi) potentiated by meaning1a, presence1b and message1c in the normal context of a defining intellect (SIi)?

0514 At this point, I would like to introduce the interventional sign-relation, first brought to visualization in Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols” and then used as a tool in Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal“. Both works are by Razie Mah.  The former may be purchased at smashwords and other e-book venues (while the time lasts!).  The latter appears as a series in Razie Mah’s blog during October, 2023).

0515 The interventional sign-relation?

How informative.

Please tell.

0516 In general, the interventional sign-vehicle (SVi) is a perspective-level actuality2c.

The interventional sign-object (SOi) is the represented content-level actuality2a.

The interventional sign-interpretant (SIi) consists in the content-level normal context3a and potential1a.

0517 An interventional sign-vehicle (SVi) stands for its sign-object (SOi) in regards to an interventional sign-interpretant (SIi).

0518 Here is a general diagram.

0519 This rendition of Peirce’s sign-relation in terms of Peirce’s category-based nested forms is founded on the notion that both the SV and the SO belong to secondness, the realm of actuality, leaving the SI to include both thirdness and firstness.  Since nested forms occupy levels in an interscope, the SO occupies the actuality on the adjacent higher level than the SV.  The SI occupies the same level as the SO.

0520 This rendition implies that there are three signs contained within any three-level interscope.

Each sign connects the levels of two adjacent categories, except for the interventional sign, which goes from thirdness to firstness.  One dare not call that “prescission”.

0521 Unless, one imagines, not precission among levels, but among interscopes.

The interventional sign-relation constellates precission between two interscopes.

In this case, the “tiers” belong to firstness and secondness.

How informative.

0522 Tiers of interscopes is not new.

Precission among tiers of interscopes can be found in Razie Mah’s chapter on presence in How To Define The Word “Religion”.  Ten primers belong to the corresponding course, for those interested in a step-by-step exposition.

Precission among tiers is also intimated in the very structure of the article under examination.  The first interview, part one, deals with the possibility of exact methods3c virtually bringing structuralism3b into relation with the potential of semiology2a.  The second interview, part two, deals with Uspenskij’s literary text2afEgo loquens, and considers the possibility of meaning1a, presence1b and message1c.

01/16/26

Looking at Ekaterina Velmezova and Kalevi Kull’s Article (2017) “Boris Uspenskij…” (Part 14 of 19)

0575 Page 437 introduces a question (#7) concerning translation.

Why is adequate translation between languages impossible?

There are two specifying sign-relations in the TMS regime.

0576 In the first specifying sign-relation, in the fundament interscope, the literary text2bf is substantiated by the language2bm (SOs) that virtually situates spoken words2a (SVs) as langue2am and parole2af of a particular mother tongue.  Translating a literary text into another mother tongue risks misreading the content character of a literary text2af, especially when the text is rich with word-play.

0577 Here is the specifying sign-relation for the loquens interscope, in general.

Parole2af (SVs) stands for language2bm (SOs) in regards to a structuralist paradigm3b((1b)) (SIs).

0578 If the word-play is not translated, the text does not make sense.

In other words, an alien reader may not be able generate an adequate semiological3a structuralist3b model2c of the original text.

The text2bf is not funny anymore.

0579 In the second specifying sign-relation, in the derivative interscope, social interaction2bf is substantiated by a cognition2bm (SOs) that virtually situates the language of meaning2am (SVs) that has been entangled by the literary text2af.  Can this operation be translated into the various languages of a positivist intellect?  What if the positivist language is too different?  Then, will it be virtually situated by a style of cultural inquiry3b that makes no sense at all, such as computer operations3b.

0580 Say what?

Here is the specifying sign-relation for the ego interscope, in general.

A positivist language2am (SVs) stands for cognition2bm (SOs) in regards to a cultural-studies paradigm3b((1b)) (SIs).

0581 What if the literary text2af is a series of apparently irregular scratches2af that the academic thinks are inscribed near the center of only one side of each of the before mentioned pieces of fossilized wood?

What could these scratches2af mean1b in terms of the language of anthropology2am?

0582 Of course, after the excavation, the researchers take the artifacts to Professor Rabenmann, who still has an office at the old Institute of Archaeology. 

What will the old man have to say?

0583 They explain the find and give him the two flat pieces of fossilized wood.  The Professor notes cord markings are on the opposing side of the scratches and much closer to the end of the flat pieces, than the marks.

Are the marks intentional?

What do these artifacts translate into?

0584 Hmmm.  The professor is not sure.  He opens the drawer to his desk and takes out a ball of string.  He measures out a meter, then cuts the string with a scissors.  Then, with a degree of deliberation, he places the stones face to face and starts to wind the string around the two pieces, retracing the one sided cord markings.

0585 Professor, what are you doing?

Give me a moment. I want to see.

You are not going to break them, are you?

Oh no, no breakage, these are hard as stone.  Now, look I have tied them together.

Now what?

0586 Then, the professor takes a walnut that is on his desk, places it between the two pieces, right where the scratches are, and presses the stone slabs together.

0587 The novices almost pass out.

“There you go.  It is a nutcracker.”, the professor says, while picking the meat of the nut away from the shell.

0588 Yes, the word “translation” now applies to two literary texts.  The loquens2bf text (the one everyone talks about) is substantiated by the language of the mother tongue2bm.  The ego2af text (the one that Uspenskij talks about) entangles the language2am of the TMS positivist intellect3a.

0589 Later, the students use interferometry to make three-dimensional images of each fossilized piece in order to demonstrate that, if the two cord-impressed ends are bound by a simulated structure, then enough force could be simultaneously applied to the opposing termini as to compromise the mechanical integrity of a Persian walnut.

Now, that is what I call, “translation”!

0590 I recall that at the very opening of the second interview, Part II, Uspenskij notes that the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics is primarily interested in culture.  It does not regard inanimate and animate processes as significant.

0591 With that recollection in mind, consider a literary2af… er computerized input2af that entangles a coding language2am.

Here is a picture.

0592 Does a cybernetic intellect3a turn computer input2af into machine code2am according to the potential that ‘each word of the input translates into a sequence of machine codes’1a?

0593 Does the answer imply that entanglement is translation, broadly speaking?

Entanglement is translation.

Does this apply especially to the content-level actuality2a of the “ego” interscope, in so far as it embodies the sign-object of an interventional sign-relation (SOi) and the sign-vehicle of a specifying sign-relation (SVs)?

10/17/25

How the Voice Gets Added to Hand Talk in Human Evolution Part B3 (Part 13 of 21)

0400 Steven Mithen does not explore the implications of synaesthesia with respect to what modern anthropologists regard as “symbols”.  So-called “symbols” represent ‘something’, but modern anthropologists do not know what that something is.

Symbols may be artifacts, in the same way that hand-talk word-gestures are artifacts.  To start, hand-talk words (and artifacts) image and point to their referents.  So, the hand-talk word is sensibly specified.  But, something like a vocal utterance, a spoken word, whose referent must be socially constructed, gets added in hand-speech talk.

The vocal utterance enters a cognitive space where its meaning, presence and message are specified (by its association with a hand-talk word).  At the same time, the vocal utterance opens a cognitive space (as SOi) that bears witness to the utterer’s commitment2c (SVi).

Surely, this fits the nature of adornment.

0401 At the start, when speech serves as an adornment to hand-talk, the social construction is minimal.  The vocal utterance is decoded as picturing and pointing to its referent.  Indeed, this is the innate (or default) stance by Homo sapiens in regards to words (irrespective of mode).  If a word exists, so must its referent.  Plus, the word pictures and points to that referent.  A referent precedes the word.

0402 The next step explores the cognitive spaces opened by adornment and… well… the possibility that hand-talk and speech-talk can be decoded independently.

0403 When Homo sapiens first appear in the archaeological record, they practice hand-speech talk.  Spoken words adorn hand-talk word-gestures.  Night-time talk is the motivation.  But, soon enough, hand-speech talk is practiced in the day as well.  As with body decorations, the modes of hand-speech talk are regulated by tribal traditions.

Why?

Speech is linked to synaesthesia and synaesthesia is tied to social construction.

0404 With these associations, I suppose that speech begins to take on a life of its own, not in the arena of sensible construction, but on the stage of social construction.

Nevertheless, even as cultural practices of adornment mount, hand-talk still characterizes species impressa2a.  Sensible construction, typical for team activity, remains dominant, especially during the day.

0405 Here is a picture of the timeline of development.

0406 By 125 kyr, it is obvious that ochre is being used for something (such as body adornment) and sea shells (presumably attached to fiber strings) are found in campsites along with traces of fire.  So, speech must be on the way to taking on a life of its own, after over one-hundred thousand years since the inception of the species.

Okay, the two-fully linguistic modes business takes time, without some “push”.

Humans enter ice-age Europe starting around 90kyr.  Humans walk from Africa into Eurasia in waves, perhaps corresponding to climate transitions or improvements of Paleolithic technology.

0407 Genetic evidence leads to the conclusion that Neanderthals and humans interbreed, in Europe, between 65 and 45 kyr.  Then, interbreeding stops.

Ah, the “push”.

My guess is that this period is when hand-talk and speech-talk take on lives of their own.

0408 When humans first contact Neanderthals, they both engage in fully linguistic hand-talk.  However, the Neanderthal does not speak fluently, nor does the Neanderthal have interest in adornment.  Neanderthal interest in adornment may well derive from exposure to human techniques and technologies.  But, the speech aspect does not change significantly.

Of course, human cultures adapt to take advantage of Neanderthal limitations by increasing occasions for the use of speech.

Today, a business professor would call the process, “market differentiation”.

0409 But, speech is linked to synaesthesia and synaesthesia is tied to social construction.

A cultural shift in favor of speech as an independent mode of talking leads to an explosion in expressions of adornment2b, cross-modal species impressa2a, and um… can I say?… spiritual awareness2c?

In other words, interventional sign-objects (SOi) become more and more significant and, at the same time, awareness that there must be corresponding sign-vehicles (SVi) (or commitments2c) increases.

0410 In some respects, this is what Steven Mithen’s 1996 masterwork, The Prehistory of the Mind, is all about.  He uses historical trends in the construction of cathedrals as a metaphor for the evolution of the human mind.

In the first period of hominin evolution, the open-nave cathedral (of general intelligence) flourishes.  This period lasts from 7 to around 4 My.

In the second period of hominin evolution, the open-nave cathedral gives way to the Romanesque style of separate chapels (specialized mental modules associated with team activities) connected to a small central nave (of general intelligence).  This period lasts from 4 to 0.6 Myr.

Then, in the third period of hominin evolution, the Romanesque style gives way to a Gothic architecture, where chapels (of specialized cognition) integrate into a soaring central nave (of language-enhanced general intelligence) that is supported by massive flying buttresses (of automated neural processing, like decode and evaluate).  This period lasts from 0.6 Myr to 0.01 Myr.

0411 Yes, this period describes the Biblical intention (the appearance of Homo heidelbergensis), creation (the appearance of Homo sapiens) and blessing of humanity (the slow transition of hand-speech talk, from speech as adornment to speech as a fully linguistic modality) quite well.

Yes, synaesthesia and social construction have the potential to greatly enhance Mithen’s 1996 metaphors.

Once humans walk from Africa into Eurasia, the Neanderthal homeland, the Neanderthals cannot keep up with humans.

The human’s Gothic mental architecture develops in highly competitive ways.  Cross-modal impressions2a support phantasms2b that are intelligible within multiple social circles.  Speech develops as a separate mode of talk due to cultural natural selection.

0412 All the while, the bicameral (two-chambered) mind grows strong, pumping interventional sign-relations.

Here is a picture.

0413 The right-side Wernicke’s region is no longer simply assessing the iconicity and indexality of hand-talk gesture-words.  It also introduces a vocal, synaesthetic and symbolic quality  that enhances the intelligibility of the phantasm2b.  The first evaluation supports the human’s commitment2c to sensible construction.  The second contribution lifts the human’s commitment2c to social construction.

The left-side Wernicke’s region still automatically decodes hand-speech talk.  Hand-talk and speech-adornment may be decoded simultaneously or independently.  The independent decoding is particularly notable, given the production of evocative artifacts, such as the “lion man” from Hohlenstein-Stadel, Germany (estimated 41-35 kyr) or the female figurine from Dolni Vestonice in the Czech Republic (dating to 29-26 kyr, see page 28 in Mithen’s book, The Language Puzzle).

0414 Modern anthropologists call these artifacts, “symbols”, because they do not know what they represent.

Steven Mithen’s nyet hypothesis changes the question entirely.

The question now asks, “What are these artifacts speaking?”

09/18/25

Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 11 of 23)

0097 The earliest stone tools show us that, once a team becomes both successful and long-lived, the disjuncture between the two selection pressures remains.  Once a new team habit settles in, individuals adapt to the habit over generations, rather than the habit adapting to the individuals.

One clue to the validity of this conclusion is found in the stability of stone tools.  

Here is a timeline.

0098 Oldowan stone tools are made the same way for almost a million years.  To me, this suggests that the perspective level of the following interscope does not change, because the team activity persists over generations.  Improvements in the Oldowan team activity are not as crucial as discovering another lucrative team activity.  The Oldowan team is one.  We do not know how many others there are.

0099 But, what about the individuals that participate in the Oldowan team activity?  Are they subject to natural selection for abilities to assess which stones to choose for rapid construction and whether a carcass is worth scavenging?

Yes, the content and situation levels of the above interscope show features where natural selection can operate.  Obviously, there are many specialized cognitive abilities that can be rewarded, through natural selection, over many generations.  Indeed, while the Oldowan stone-tool “kit” remains stable, a new species of human evolves, complete with substantially larger brains.

0100 After Homo erectus appears in the fossil record in Africa, a few more hundred thousand years pass before the team changes.  Mithen describes Oldowan and Acheulean stone tools in detail, but does not elaborate on how they were used.

0101 Oldowan stone tools are utilitarian and made on the spot.  Opportunistic scavenging seems to be the likely definition of success2c.

Acheulean stone tools are more sophisticated and are made ahead of time.  Perhaps, this implies new ways to extract food.  Homo erectus hunt some sort of creature that can be taken down with what appears to be a fairly large stone tooth.  This is not the only possibility, but it is the one that appears in the following figure.

0102 Perhaps, the Acheulean stone-tool kit is used by more than one team.

It is difficult to know, without time travel.

If we moderns could time travel, I suspect that we would be amazed at the variety of extractive technologies that Homo erectus masters prior to the domestication of fire.  Homo erectus migrates out of Africa and into Eurasia around a million years ago.  Then, along with the domestication of fire, more refined Acheulean stone tools appear.  New stone tools imply that new teams are constellating, this time with hunting definitely in mind.

0103 Here is the ongoing timeline of hominin evolution.

09/11/25

How The Voice Gets Added to Hand-Talk In Human Evolution, Part A1 (Part 17 of 23)

0154 What a banner!

0155 The evolutionary anthropologist, Steven Mithen, publishes a book in 2024 with the full title, The Language Puzzle: Piecing Together The Six-Million Year Story Of How Words Evolve (BasicBooks: New York).  The book purports to describe the evolution of “language”.  But, what is “language”?  Is language the sole province of speech?  Of course not, deaf communities practice so-called “sign-language”.  I call this practice, “fully linguistic hand-talk”.

0156 Despite the reality that language can be performed in two modalities, manual-brachial gesture and voice, Mithen rules out the gestural origins of language.  Consequently, he faces the challenge of portraying the vocal origins of language.

0157 The problem?

Consider the following comparison.

0158 Two features are integral to language.

The first is displacement.  “Displacement” means that “the referent of the word does not have to be present”.

The second is symbolic operations. Symbols are sign-relations whose sign-objects are based on habit, convention, law and so forth.  Within any symbolic order, a symbol must be sufficiently different from any other symbol as to be readily recognized.  A finite set of symbols constitutes a symbolic order.  Symbolic operations constellate within a symbolic order.  One name for such symbolic operations is “grammar”.

0159 Archaeological evidence for bipedalism predates 3.5 Myr (million of years ago).  At this time, vocalizations are not only involuntary, but they tell everyone that a referent is present. It is the opposite of displacement.  Vocalizations denote placements.

Of course, that means that involuntary calls may be labeled indexes, in so far as the call indicates a presence.  That means that involuntary calls are indexes.

But, an involuntary call cannot be called a linguistic sign-relation whose sign object is determined by pointing, contiguity, cause and effect and so forth.  And, that is an index, too.

0161 Okay, that may be confusing.

Vocal calls are indexes in the same way that an emergency alarm is an index.  The alarm cannot tell me much more than “an emergency is happening”.  That is not displacement.

Manual-brachial gestures can point to something, even when that something is not present (like the location of the sunrise).  Manual-brachial word gestures allow displacement.

0162 In regards to symbolic operations, consider taking the metaphor, a word is like a piece in a jigsaw puzzle,literally.  Then, say, 1.7 million years before present time, while I am digging tubers with my team, not far from the forest’s edge, a vulture lands in a nearby tree and one of us notices that… uh oh… there is a jaguar in that tree.  The vulture sees the jaguar.  The jaguar eyes the little hominins.  We know why the vulture decides to land.  The vulture wants to see what happens.

Everyone gathers what tubers they have into leaf-baskets.  The elder of the team signs the following gestures to me and I reply.

0163 Elder signs [point-YOU][image-RUN][point-RIGHT][image-THROW].

Then in reply, I say, [point-ME][raise ROCK].

0164 Each iconic and indexal gesture-word has already been honed through usage to be sufficiently different from any other word-gesture (in our team-oriented lexicon) as to be instantly recognized.  So, the imagery and the indications snap together into one Gestalt, shared by both elder and myself.

Of course, Mithen discusses displacement and grammar, but not in this manner.  He proposes that displacement for the vocal channel involves synaesthesia, that is, cross-modal sensing.  But, how would this apply to the problems faced by teams, while extracting food under dangerous conditions (which Michael Tomasello labels “collaborative obligatory foraging”)?

0165 So, what is the key point?

Mithen claims to be solving a six-million year old process. But, his metaphor of the jigsaw puzzle, when taken literally, takes us through the period that stretches from the start of bipedalism to the domestication of fire.  This corresponds to Michael Tomasello’s “period two”.

Indeed, Mithen is not aware that his choice of metaphors undermines his claim against the gestural origin of language.

0166 Is that sort of funny?

In what way?

Technically, before the domestication of fire, hand-talk is protolinguistic.  Each team has its own protolanguage.  Plus, this protolanguage is not fully linguistic because it does not permit grammatically correct counter-intuitive statements, such as:

[imageTREE][point to EYES][roll EYEs back and forth]

0167 Oh, yes.  Our kind evolves in a surveillance society.  And we are on the menu.

The trees have eyes and are watching.

08/25/25

Looking at Slavoj Zizek’s Book (2024) “Christian Atheism” (Part 6 of 33)

0066 Before I step further into chapter one, I must take a guess as to where Hegel’s term, “synthesis” resides.

In one way, “synthesis” resides in the normal context3.  In another way, it resides in the potential1, along with ‘truth’1.  Since, the [substance] of [wealth and power]2 emerges from (and situates) its potential1, then there must be something more than ‘honesty’1 in ‘truth’1,  ‘Truth’1 must be accompanied with ‘something substantial’, that is, ‘synthesis’1.

Here is the resulting nested form.

0067 Chapter one opens with a question, “Who cannot handle the truth?”

May I point to those with capital and organizational excess, as well as to those with social influence and institutional excess?

Oh, those excesses.  It seems as if the former pulls the contiguity upwards by reifying [wealth] and the latter drags the contiguity downwards by reifying [power].

0068 Zizek, for his part, associates “truth” with a normative picture of a state of accord.  Accord of what?  Accumulation and order?  Thesis and antithesis?  As such, truth1… and its synthesis1… develops within a particular historical reality2… that is… a particular civilizational moment2.

0069 Does Lacan’s term, jouissance, associate to the potential of ‘truth and synthesis’1?

It may well do so.  For Christians, the [substance] that is contiguous with Father and Son is historically contingent. Why?  One God has only one opportunity to actually enter the flow of the eternal present.  If God enters the flow of the eternal present multiple times, then each time He produces a new dyad, a new historically contingent “timestamp”, if you will.  Each timestamp is a divine mediation.

0070 It is not that timestamps do not abound in Christian… er… Jewish revelation.  There is Adam (corresponding to the start of the Ubaid archaeological period), Noah (touching base with the Uruk), and Abraham (pointing to the end of the Sumerian civilization), followed by Moses and King David.  Then, the exile to Babylon, followed by a return. Construction on the Second Temple begins.  During this time, the five books of Moses come together like never before. Yet, no one imagines that the Pentateuch would one day be labeled, “the Old Testament”.

0071 All these timestamps constitute a thesis, and Jesus marks the antithesis.  

Now, even though the substance (that is, the contiguity) of Father and Sonwill change, depending on the winds of the Holy Spirit3, the potential of ‘truth and synthesis’1 becomes more and more apparent.  The synthesis1 includes the potential of one God1.  The potential of one God1 reminds me of Zizek’s use of the term, “parallax”.  From one location, I see the Father as matter and thesis.  I see the Son as form and antithesis.  But, from another location, the Speaker is matter and the Word is form.  Thesis and antithesis depends on where I stand.

Here, the terms, “thesis” and “antithesis” are bound, into a thing2, by a substance.  That substance includes [begat] and [dies with].  Father and Son are two real elements that, in theory, are distinct and separable, just like the real elements of matter and form are theoretically distinct and separable.  But, they cannot be separated without losing sight of the thing itself2.

0072 When we lose track of the thing itself2, we cannot understand.

Where have the normal context3 and potential1 gone?

0073 Zizek mentions an “irreducible oscillation”.  Here, the oscillation is among matter [and] form2, particle [and] wave2, Father [and] Son2, capital [and] social2, accumulation [and] the exercise of order2.  The oscillation is irreducible because that is the nature of Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements. One real element cannot be reduced to the other real element.  Secondness follows the logics of contradiction and noncontradiction.

What is disturbing about secondness?

What is contradictory2 and what is not contradictory2 will change with the normal context3 and potential1.  

0074 What does this disturbance imply?

Zizek’s parallax belongs to the realm of potential1.  “Parallax” labels the optics of a monadic unity that underlies a quizzical dyadic actuality2 that changes with its normal context3.

08/15/25

Looking at Slavoj Zizek’s Book (2024) “Christian Atheism” (Part 14 of 33)

0151 So, why is Lacan not a Buddhist?

Well, there is more to objet a2c and [petit objet a]2c than illusion.

If Buddhist enlightenment is all about transcending ontological realness, then the adept who attains enlightenment should just wither away from lack of jouissance.  If that happens, then all the insight that the adept has acquired (like capital!) cannot pour (like [wealth and power]) into exercises that train other adepts within Buddhist institutions (like social!).

0152 Zizek points out that Buddhism’s own mandate acknowledges that overcoming illusion is not all there is.

What is the Buddhist mandate for the adept who achieves enlightenment?

The adept must remain in order to guide others.

Here is a picture.

0153 From my brief foray into the topic of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, I know what an evolutionary anthropologist would label this [petit objet a]2c.  The label is “altruism”.

[Altruism] is [wealth and power].

Yes, [altruism] is the contiguity within the actuality2c of the Buddhist mandate.

But, these labels are explicit abstractions that belong to our current Lebenswelt.

0154 So, let me review.

There is a difference between an thing encountered and a thing understood.

0155 The first step in going from encounter to understanding is to regard the thing as an example of Peirce’s category of secondness.  So, when I encounter some good clay, I recognize that it is suitable for making a pot.  Both the clay and the pot constitute – what Lacan calls – an objet a.  The [substance] is petit objet a.  Petit objet a says, “Hey, this it the hylomorphe… er… ‘thing’… that you are looking for.”

0156 The second step on the path to understanding is to conjure a normal context3a and potential1a for the actuality2a.  Here, my understanding depends on my familiarity with the potter’s wheel.

08/14/25

Looking at Slavoj Zizek’s Book (2024) “Christian Atheism” (Part 15 of 33)

0157  If all I wanted to do is acquire a clay pot by exercising my social and technical know-how, then the story would end with content-level understanding.

But, in the prior examples, it does not.  Here is a picture of a virtual nested form in the category of secondness.  A perspective-level actuality2c virtually brings a situation-level actuality2b into relation with the potential of a content-level actuality2a.

0158 If I ask the clay, “What do you get out of this?”

The answer comes back, “Nothing.”

And weirdly, it is the nothing inside the clay where people brew their tea.

Does that sound like “a pair of lacks”?

0159 Now, when I shift from a piece of clay on the content level, to an adept training in the Buddhist tradition, can I say that the adept is a piece of clay?

Does the adept empty himself or herself in order to gain happiness?

0160 The adept, like the clay, creates a hollow in which the objet a of the day can brew, releasing its aromatic [petit objet a], which tells the untrained mind, “This is the reality that you should buy into.”

This will make you happy.

A beautiful, high quality, clay pot is on sale today, at reduced price!

0161 But, what about the one my grandmother gave to me?

Destroy it. Replace it. Then, brew your tea with improved satisfaction.

The adept can see through the disturbance, contain the disturbance, release the disturbance.

It is as simple and as elegant as brewing a pot of tea.

Zen style.

0162 In sipping an illusion down to its dregs, the adept feels happiness.  This is the happiness of the {acquisition of enlightenment [wealth and power] release from the illusions that people are buying}2c.  [Wealth and power] is not what we think it is.  The contiguity between acquisition and the exercise of order is dangerous.  So, why not simply let the suffering go?

“Oh wait!”, the Master intones, “Remember your form.”

0163 Surely, the greatest manifestation of [wealth and power] is what evolutionary anthropologists call [altruism].  Who can afford to give with no expectation of return?  No one can.  The adept begs for his food and for alms, so others can give and expect no thing in return.  Giving to a Buddhist monk is a moment of enlightenment.

0164 Zizek is correct in that Buddhism does not really grasp how jouissance1x, objet a2x, [petit objet a]2x and the big Other3x are radically intersubjective… or should I say?… “suprasubjective”.  They are inscribed, so to say.  But, they are not inscribed like pen on paper.  They are inscribed like the contiguity between pen and paper. {Pen [inscribe] paper}2is the actuality2 that requires understanding.  The inscription itself only requires recitation.

0165 With that, allow me to inscribe an observation.

Buddhism seems to put the evils of Soviet and Chinese Communism into the basket labeled “suffering”.

But, what about “evil”?

Are show trials evil?

Here is the observation as a virtual nested form in the category of secondness.

0166 On the content level, the normal context of a Stalinist state3a brings the dyadic actuality of {policy failures [need for blame] show trials}2a into relation with the possibility of ‘continuing current operations’1a.

On the situation level, the normal context of broadcasting3b brings the dyadic actuality of {accusation [constitutes] theatrical drama}2b or {illusion [transaction] hollow satisfaction}2b into relation with the possibility of ‘mollifying dissatisfaction with current operations’1b.

On the perspective level, the normal context of the Relativist One3c, the one who stands outside of all other jurisdictions, brings the dyadic actuality of {the projection of guilt as a judicial acquisition of “righteousness” [wealth and power] the social ordering of all when the accused confesses guilt}2c into relation with the potential of  ‘a synthetic truth’1c, which claims that current operations are both necessary and inevitable and well… do we feel the jouissance1c?

0167 Oh, it all must make sense, since, if current operations fail, then we enter the night of the world.

Nobody wants that.

08/9/25

Looking at Slavoj Zizek’s Book (2024) “Christian Atheism” (Part 19 of 33)

0205 What does Zizek do?

He investigates the contiguity between a noumenon [and] its phenomena, as if it might be a feature and not a bug.

He gives examples of Bell’s theorem.  He talks about anxiety, when it comes to relying only on phenomena.  What about the noumenon, the thing itself?  Oh, I can take the model, framed within the disciplinary languages of quantum mechanics, and account for the data, the observable and measurable features of the phenomena of really tiny things.  But, I have to take a lot of measurements, because these things are really small.  Plus, I cannot predict the behavior of any single small particle, because they are all identical as far as the measurement apparatus is concerned.

In a fashion, scientists transcend the ontological thing itself.

Scientist prefer to replace the noumenon with what the noumenon must be, according to their models.   Then, the model (standing in the place of the noumenon) [can be objectified as] its phenomena.

0206 Zizek considers space.

Zizek ponders time.

But, these excursions only bring the author to admit that space and time may well be located on the content-level, along with what it is3a and the potential of ‘the thing itself’1a.

You know, that is location with the “Please disregard…” sign.

Zizek writes something like this.  Science?  How crazy is science?  Science pushes symbolizing the real with formulas that don’t make sense to the point where we substitute our own encounters with the thing itself with what we imagine that our symbol-laden formulas are telling us what the noumenon must be.

0207 I suspect that is why Zizek is paid the big bucks.

He says it so much better than me.

Lacan was also paid well.  This fact pissed off competing psychoanalysts.  Lacan did not regard their urinations when he coined the French term, “achoses“.  Achoses gets transliterated into no-things.

For, example, a superposition of states/waves2a is an achose.

Decades later, Zizek nicely ties the ribbon by noting that the “a” of achose is the a of objet a, which I have already encountered as the actuality2x that emerges from (and situates) jouissance1x, as the potential of ‘truth and synthesis’1x.

Or, is it the possibility of ‘a synthetic truth’1x?

0208 How about the following?

What if data1c are syntheses1c of the truth1c of measurements2b?

Then I can use a Lacanian… um… a Peircean re-articulation of a Lacanian schema… to boldly rip the banner of “Please disregard…” from the imaginary noumenon level and reveal the fully exposed achose2a, as what the model says that the thing itself must be.  Oh… what?… a particle composed of superimposed waves2a?… that is not it2a, is it2c?

0209 Here is a picture of the three-level interscope.

0210 Well, it2a may not be the noumenon1a, but it2a is objectified by um… its phenomena1b.

On the content or imaginary or noumenon level, the normal context of what it is3a brings the thing that the model says it is2a (that is, an achose2a) into relation with the possibility of ‘the thing itself’1a.   Or, should I say, “the possibility that it2a can be the thing itself1a, which it2a obviously is not, because it2a is what scientists say it2a must be”?

On the situation or real or phenomenon level, the normal context of a measurement apparatus3a brings the actuality of the dyad2b, {the collapse of states/waves [yields] a measurement}2b, into relation with the possibility of ‘phenomena from what is of the Positivist’s judgment’1b.

On the perspective or symbolic or model level, the empirio-schematic judgment more or less unfolds.  The disciplinary language of quantum mechanics3c brings the actuality of the dyad2c{acquired data [fits into] mechanical or mathematical model}2c, into relation with the possibility of ‘data’1c, which is obviously a mask for jouissance1cdesignated as the potential of ‘a synthetic truth’1c.

0211 After all, doesn’t “data2c” manifest synthetic truth1c?

And, doesn’t “data2c” (as matter) fit into a mathematical or mechanical model2c (as form)?

And, just like Jesus sees Satan fall from the heavens, like a lightning bolt, does not the symbolic cast its own image down to the imaginary?

Lacan follows a sacred vision to its obscene essence.

Metaphysics is not allowed.The achose is the discharge of radical materialism2c into the hollow2a between what it is3a and the potential that it is1a.

08/9/25

Looking at Slavoj Zizek’s Book (2024) “Christian Atheism” (Part 20 of 33)

0212 Once the perspective, the symbolic, and the model2c constellates, then BOOM!

In a flash of… um… illuminatingling… discharge, the believers speak in the tongues of disciplinary languages.

Here is the previous diagram at the moment when the tension between the perspective and content levels cracks down.

The form of a mathematical or mechanical model2c instantiates the achose2a representation of the thing itself2a.

0213 The transmigration of the symbolic into the imaginary is what every ambitious scientist dreams of. 

Ferdinand de Saussure’s model of language as two arbitrarily related systems of differences shocks the discipline of linguistics, then begins to seep into the content-level of psychology, sociology, anthropology and various humanities.

Albert Einstein’s model of relativity shocks the science of physics, then permeates into the content levels of a diversity of disciplines unrelated to physics, as if what it is3a and the possibilities of ‘the thing itself’1a have changed.

0214 It happens in all sorts of sciences.  The model transmigrates into the slot for the noumenon, constituting an imaginary noumenon that can be objectified as its phenomena.  Here, the term, “imaginary”, does not comport with common use.  “Imaginary” is technically a Lacanian label for a psychological being.

Here, the psychological being is the content-level of the above interscope.

The achose corresponds to the content-level actuality2a.

0215 “Imaginary” overlays the level containing the noumenon.

The other two overlays are “real” and “symbolic”.

If I add Peirce to the mix, “imaginary” associates to the category of firstness, “real” to secondness, and “symbolic” to thirdness.  The symbolic virtually brings the real into relation with the possibilities of the imaginary.

The following figure compares the content-level that is disregarded by Copenhagen orthodoxy and the content-level that is electrified by scientists who triumphantly place their model2c into the slot for the noumenon2a

0216 I immediately notice that the actuality2a in the content-level disregarded by Copenhagen orthodoxy is already tracing upwards towards a quantum mechanical model2c.  It is only a matter of opportunity for the normal context of what it is3a and the potential of ‘the thing itself’1a to feel the impact of a symbolic discharge.

0217 What does this imply?

Does this imply that Lacan’s theoretical configuration of one particular level in an interscope fractally scales to the entire interscope?

Say what?

0218 Here is a picture containing both Lacan’s and Hegel’s terminology.  It applies to all levels, but most boldly to the perspective level (and Zizek’s configuration).

0219 Now, consider the thunderstruck three-level interscope, where triumphalist science has covered the noumenon2aover with its model, so that the model (in the slot for noumenon) [can be objectified as] its phenomena.

What if the model2c and model2a correspond to an objet a writ large?

With that question in mind, consider the following figure.

Red denotes the objet a writ large.