04/1/23

Looking at Karatzogianni and Robinson’s Article (2017) “Schizorevolutions Versus Microfascisms” (Part 4 of 4)

0028 This article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory (2017, vol 13(3), 282-295). So far, my examination describes how the weird confounded diagram developed in the commentary on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) “The Dawn of Everything” is relevant to Karatzogianni and Robinson’s argument. This blog retells the story.

The weird diagram confounds two independent paths of articulation. The path of Graeber and Wengrow is the way of definition (P). After all, they are academics. Academics are devoted to defining their terms. The path of Razie Mah is the way of differentiation (Q). The differentiation of a nested form into the society_C, organization_B and individual in community_A tiers takes place in the chapter on presence in the masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.

Here is a picture of the situation and content levels of definition (P) confounded with the same levels of the society_C tier (Q).

0029 The above diagram does not include the perspective_c level of the society_C tier (Q). Karatzogianni and Robinson open by describing the securitisation state as exploiting and promoting an atmosphere of fear. Fear is the object that brings everyone into relation_2cC.

Consequently, this confounding (P and Q) is put into perspective by a demiurge_2cC, an entity standing above sovereign power, and this demiurge_2cC defines the state_2b.

0030 This configuration produces a split in the content level of defined_3a institutions_2aC.

Some institutions_3b’ attempt to work with the state_2b. These conforming institutions_3b’ bring sanctioned organizational objects_2b’ into relation with the potential_1b’ of the three imperatives of domination_1c’ as well as the institution’s original righteousness_1b. This is useful for the state_2c’, which relies on conforming institutions_3b’ to situate institutions_3a’ that (for whatever reason) cannot or will not conform.

Conforming institutions_3b’ perform microfascist activities for the state_2c’, increasing the possibility of state control_1c’through forcing choices, limiting and misleading information, as well as protecting reputations. These activities are built into sanctioned organizational objectives_2b’ that presumably emerge from (and situate) the potential of the institution’s original righteousness_1b’. According to my reading this article, Karatzogianni and Robinson do not clearly ideate this side of the splitting.

Other institutions are downgraded (often, by state interference) into networks_3a’. Nonconforming networks_3a’ bring unsactioned organizational objectives_2a’ into relation with the potential of ‘unsupervised righteousness’_1a’. Conforming institutions_3b’ are ofted viewed by the anarchy level as state apparatuses_3b’ whose organizational objectives_2b’ are compromised by the fact they follow the rules, even when not necessary, lie and cover up_1b’.

0031 How do nonconforming networks_3a’ respond?

Not as the state_2c’ would like them do. The state_2c’ now occupies the perspective level of an interscope that expresses the path of definition. Remember, the perspective level typically comes into play on;y when there is a failure on the situation level. In other words, the perspective level is taken for granted, until something goes wrong.

Here is the interscope of securitisation_2cC.

0032 Once again, what about the response of noncomforming networks_3a’ on the anarchy level?

Unsupervised righteousness_1a’ inspires organization objectives_2a’ that appear schizophrenic (they are listening to the voices in thier heads instead of the state) or paranoid (they think that the state is the one to fear, rather than the demiurge that defines the state). Consequently, the two actors of importance in Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article belong to the state and the anarchy levels.

0033 So, what is lacking in this article?

Situation-level institutions_b’ end up being drained of their original righteousness_1b’ due to their compromise with the defining power_3c’. Conforming institutions_3b’ lose respectability by enforcing the three imperatives that underlie the word, “domination”_1b’. Conforming institutions_3b’ lose respectablity by sacrificing their original righteousness_1b’ in the process of enforcing the three imperatives_1b’. Yet, conforming institutions_3b’ maintain respectablility by being the only ones whose organizational objectives_2b’ are sanctioned by state decree_2c’ and therefore less likely to suffer capricious state action_2c’.

0034 It makes me wonder what the word, “respectable”, really means.

The sociological and psychological dynamics of the compliant level are ripe for exploration.

Coloration tells the story.

0035 So much for the political theory aspect of Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article, what about the “international” aspect?

After all, the article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory.

Well, in the introduction and the conclusion, the authors speculate that the security state may be a response to the anarchy generated by… or may be a strategy to control the wealth and innovations produced by… or may aim to wrest control from…

… global capitalism.

Which makes me wonder, “Could global capitalism be a demiurge, just like securitisation?”

If so, then Graeber and Wengrow’s weird confounding diagram is relevant.

And, the prior steps should apply to the following perspective-level nested form.

0036 The rest is left as an exercise for the intrepid inquirer.

03/31/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin” (Part 1 of 13)

0180 If David Graeber and David Wengrow’s recent book, subtitled, A New History of Humanity, is a breakthrough in postmodern anthropology, then it is so because it displays a semitic textual structure, instead of a greek textual structure.

These two styles are discussed in An Instructor’s Guide to An Archaeology of the Fall. Rather than eliminating possibilities in order to arrive at the most likely correct interpretation, these authors play literary tricks, coupling chapters one and twelve, A:A’, chapters two and eleven, B:B’, and chapters three through nine and chapter ten, C:C’.

0182 The semitic structure is A:B:C:C’:B’:A’. In Comments on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) The Dawn of Everything (by Razie Mah, available and smashwords and other e-book venues), the work is discussed in the pattern A:A’, B:B’ and C:C’. Notably, the bulk of the book covers the last layer, C:C’, and balances seven chapters (three through nine, C) against one chapter (ten, C’). Chapter ten is twice as long as any other chapter.

0183 Plus, chapter ten stands on its own, allowing me to place an examination in Razie Mah’s blog, with the title Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”. If the reader first encounters the blog, the commentary is available. If the reader first purchases the commentary, then the reader can call the blog to the attention of others.

03/15/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”(Part 13 of 13)

0255 Graeber and Wengrow’s exploration of the dawn of everything ends with a cruel joke.

The “state”_2b, as defined by social science, cannot indirectly emerge from (and situate) righteousness_1aC, while, at the same time, manifesting the characteristics of “domination”_2a.

So, how is the contemporary left’s dream of achieving the virtues of liberty, equality and fraternity through the apparatus of the state_2b going to work?

Thus ends the third layer, C:C’, of the author’s wide-ranging exercise in the semitic textual style. The Dawn of Everythingis contemporary postmodern social science at its finest. The authors start by searching for the origins of social inequality. They end with the promise of a new history of humanity.

These authors do not know what they do not know. But they do suspect this…

0256 …A new history of the world awaits. There is a new way to describe the dawn of everything, where “everything” corresponds to “our current Lebenswelt”.

Yet, their explorations play out as a dark joke, almost as cruel as the joke that, long ago, a talking serpent plays on a naive young woman.

My thanks to the authors. My condolences as well, on more than one level.

These comments provide views that dramatically re-present the vistas intimated in David Graeber and David Wengrow’s book. Welcome to a new age of understanding: The Age of Triadic Relations.

03/10/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2020) “Derrida” (Part 1 of 5)

0001 A chapter on Derrida appears in Michael Millerman’s Book (2020) Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (Arktos Press), pages 135-166. This fourth chapter considers the writings of the French Jacques Derrida (1930-2004 AD) concerning the German Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).

Millerman’s book consists of a long introduction, followed by chapters on Martin Heidegger, Leo Strauss, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida and Alexander Dugin. The latter chapters discuss what the other philosophers say about Heidegger. The method sounds like a doctoral dissertation.

My interest, of course, is to associate features of the arguments to purely relational structures, such as the category-based nested form or the Greimas square.

0002 Here, I look only at chapter four entitled, “Derrida”. Derrida comments on Heidegger in two notable incidents. First, Heidegger is mentioned in an essay comparing deconstruction to negative theology. Second, Derrida writes an essay entitled, “Heidegger’s Ear”.

Millerman approaches the first incident with caution, asking (more or less), “Is it possible to see how Derrida locates himself in a different place than Heidegger?”

Locates himself?

In slang, the question is, “Where is he coming from?”

0003 Where is Derrida coming from?

The first incident of note is an essay by Derrida in a book, Derrida and Negative Theology, edited by Harold Coward and Toby Froshay (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992). The title of the essay is “How To Avoid Speaking: Denials”. Here, Derrida responds to claims that deconstruction resembles negative theology. He says no. Apophatic mysticism is hyperessential. Deconstruction is all about the machinations of language.

0004 Hyperessential?

In order to appreciate this comment in terms of purely relational structures. I associate the above accusation and responseto Peirce’s category of secondness, the realm of actuality. The category of secondness contains two contiguous real elements. For Aristotle’s hylomorphe, the two real elements are matter and form. I label the contiguity, [substance]. The nomenclature is matter [substance] form.

For apophatic mysticism, the form is the human, as a vessel, having emptied “himself” of all matters.

For deconstruction, I follow Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1857-1913 AD) definition of language as two arbitrarily related systems of differences, the spoken word (parole) and the corresponding thought (langue). Parole corresponds to matter. Langue corresponds to form. [Arbitrary relation] serves as the contiguity.

0005 Here is a picture.

0006 Essence is substantiated form.

Derrida claims that negative theology is hyperessential. This makes sense because the essence, {[emptiness] vessel_2f}, has no corresponding esse_ce (a play on the Latin term, esse, representing [matter_2m [substantiating]}. As soon as matter appears in the slot, —-_2m, then the contiguity becomes very difficult (if not impossible) to maintain, and something passes into the vessel, against all mystical admonishments saying, “Keep the vessel_2f empty.”

Here is a picture of how esse_ce and essence play out in the realm of actuality₂ for hylomorphism, apophatic mysticism and deconstruction.

03/6/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2020) “Derrida” (Part 5 of 5)

0031 What about the second incident (point 0003)?

The next essay that Millerman reviews is titled, “Heidegger’s Ear”.

Here, Derrida waxes on a snippet in Heidegger’s book, Being and Time, that mentions the voice of a friend whom every Dasein carries with it.

0032 To me, if Heidegger’s leap really opens a vista into the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, then Heidegger would have used the word, “gesture”, rather than “voice”.

Or, maybe, the word, “voice” is okay, since, before the first singularity, humans practice hand-speech talk. Two modes of talking co-exist. Cultural tradition determines which mode is more appropriate for any particular social situation.

0033 Derrida reads German. So, he has an ear for Heidegger. German (B), like all spoken languages, carries a conceptual apparatus (D). So, Heidegger must allow Derrida into his pact (B), concerning openness to an inception (C), that is like a concept, but is not a concept, because it complements a secret (A) that makes us present (Da-) to being itself (-Sein) (D).

Because Derrida speaks German, he must be a “friend”. But, Derrida finds that naive, because he can also be an enemy. Derrida figures out that, if you speak the same language, then you can share secrets. Heidegger says “friend” in the most naive way, as if the word reflects a state before the duality of friends and enemies. It seems to me that Derrida could be a real enemy who infiltrated behind the defenses of an opposing camp. And, he knows it.

Derrida is a dangerous philosopher. Everyone respects Derrida. Everyone fears deconstruction. Derrida approaches Heidegger as a “friend”, who speaks the same language. Derrida knows that the fraternal order of philosophy has splintered. First, everyone is a companion (or a compatriot). Then, everyone is either a friend or an enemy. Heidegger marks this transition with a German word: Geschlect.

0034 According to Derrida, Geschlect is a “mark”, a sign of division, a yellow patch for some and no patch for others. Well, maybe the patch can be sex, race, species, genus, status, genealogy or community. The yellow/no patch dualityrelies on concepts (that is, explicit abstractions). Yet, certain phenotypic and physical tags are inceptual (that is, implicit abstractions). But, explicit abstractions end up justifying these implicit abstractions.

0035 Here, I can see the threat of Derrida’s genius. Concepts, as utterances_2m [carrying] information_2f, are manifestations of Saussure’s definition of spoken language, parole_2m [arbitrary relation] langue_2f. This implies that the apparent mechanical substance corresponding to [carry] is really grounded in the slippery substance of [arbitrary relation]. This is the nature of sensible construction in speech-alone talk.

Here is how Derrida’s Greimas square manifests as sensible construction.

0036 What does Geschlect do?

Geschlect traverses the topolitology of secrets. In the city of Geschlect, there is a factory, turning pre-political feelingsinto conceptualized divisions among people. Today, that factory is called “modern politics”. It is run by, for and of the government. But, it claims to be by, for and of the People. Compatriots become friends and enemies.

0037 The voice of the compatriot, Heidegger’s “friend”, is embedded in the constitution of the human. Prior to the first singularity, hand-speech talk relies on manual-brachial gestures. Solidarity is guaranteed by one’s gaze. Someone who word-gestures a falsehood is immediately exposed as one’s enemy. How so? Manual-brachial gestures are defined by what they picture or point to. Word-gestures do not define their referents. They picture and point to them.

In contrast, spoken words do not picture or point to anything.

0038 After the first singularity, spoken language relies on our innate sensibilities until… labor and social specialization starts to spin explicit abstractions, like threads on a spool, and speech becomes something like a secret. You have to know the relation between the utterance and the information, in order to be a member of the club. So, the arbitrary relation between parole and langue slowly, irrevocably, weaves the threads into conceptual apparatuses.

Everyone who speaks the same language starts as a compatriot. But, two parties emerge, ones who are in tune with the conceptual apparatus and the ones who still imagine that our words picture and point to their referents.

0039 Derrida discovers a secret within the secret. The conceptual apparatus is mechanistic. And, like all machines, it can be constructed differently. So, deconstruction is a technique to shake the conceptual apparatus, in order to expose the arbitrariness of its relations. Concepts divide us. Deconstructed concepts unnerve us.

Heidegger discovers the foundation of the secret. The secret is a pact, where information is known only by us, and that pact cannot be articulated in speech-alone words. Instead of a concept, where the utterance is a conspiracy, Heidegger proposes an incept, where the pact manifests as inspiration. An incept draws us into one inspiration.

0040 Heidegger has a word that is translated as “both strife and accord”. I suppose that strife labels the struggle to keep the vessel empty. I suppose that accord is the happy moment when the vessel is full. The word is “Walten“.

Or perhaps, Walten is the originating unity of two real elements. Perhaps I can imagine that these elements are —_2m and vessel_2f. So the unity or the contiguity is [empty]. But also, imagine the unity of …known only to us_2m and vessel_2f. The contiguity is [fill].

Either way, the originating unity of two real elements is inceptual.

No one can open someone else to an inception. Inception is where the seed of conviction germinates. No political philosopher has a recipe for an inceptual institution of the theologico-political domain. No one, except for Jesus, has torn the veil woven by explicit abstraction. In contrast, many theologians and politicians have quested for a magical token that empowers the veil and strands us in the domain of conceptual apparatuses.

0041 In our cutthroat world of concepts, people cling to their worldviews, ridicule other worldviews, and fail to notice that their conceptual apparatuses have closed them off from their inceptual heritage. Concepts pose as things that bring us into organization. But, is organization all there is?

Of late, the United States of America has a humorous tradition in this regard. They name legislative decrees with the conceptual apparatus that they are going to replace. For example, in 2001, the so-called “Patriot Act” is legislated and signed into law. Twenty years later, a surveillance-oriented bureaucracy identifies members of the “make America great again” movement as “domestic terrorists”.

Yes, the utterance of “domestic terrorists” institutes a concept that identifies patriots as enemies of thier surveillance state.

0042 What does this imply?

Is Walten like a secret, that is, information known only to us?

Then, as fast as I can say, “Geschlect.”, there are two parties. One party focuses on information. One party focuses on the “known only by us” business.

How can companions come together after established nomenclature turns everyone into either friends or enemies? As politics invades all aspects of society, each person asks, “Which worldview do I belong to?” Cognitive machinations hustle propaganda and apologetics. Some people get carried away. The last thing they want is to be cut from the pact. No one wants to get cut. Plus, true believers are willing to sacrifice others to their cause.

How does a people become a people?

I suppose that theologico-political topolitologies are required.

Plus, it seems as if the secret allows me to visualize the topolitology of a Walten, an originating unity of two realities.

Here is one reality, corresponding to “information…”.

0043 Here is the other element, corresponding to “…known only by us”.

When does a Walten solidify its current theologico-political domain?

An accord, seeking to be filled with a conceptual apparatus (D), leads to calcification and total domination.

When does a Walten liquify its current theologico-political domain?

A struggle to be open to being filled by God’s meaning, presence and message (H) leads to revelation and new life.

0044 To the extent that Derrida reads German, Derrida is Heidegger’s companion.

What does Derrida see?

Heidegger’s “friend” can speak as either friend or enemy. Geschlect says, “You are either friend or enemy.” Walten says, “Please, remain a companion.”

0045 In one fashion, Derrida’s and Heidegger’s theologico-political constructions mirror one another.

I suspect that Derrida stays his desconstructive hand in recognition of this reality.

In another fashion, these two theological-political constructions derive from a single, undifferentiated, realness, to which we, in our current Lebenswelt, can never return.

We need deconstruction to combat our march towards death by a totalizing conceptual apparatus.

We need inception to seed the fields of our open minds.

In the chapter on Derrida, Millerman finds good reason to start with Heidegger.

Recognize the possibility.

03/3/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2020) “Rorty” (Part 1 of 3)

0001 This chapter appears in Michael Millerman’s Book (2020) Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (Arktos Press). The composition of the book sends a message. A forty-nine page introduction is labeled as a preface, complete with Roman numerals. The first chapter covers Heidegger and stands in the center of the book. Then, chapters two through five covers the responses of four political philosophers to Heidegger’s academic labors (as well as his political affiliation).

Richard Rorty is discussed in the third chapter. This chapter serves as a transition from the weighty chapters on Heidegger and Strauss to the surprising chapters on Derrida and Dugin.

0002 Rorty offers a change of style. Rorty is an American philosopher. This pleases me, since I write like an American, too. I roll, roll, roll down the river of literary endeavors. My paddles are purely relational structures, such as the category-based nested form and the Greimas square.

Consequently, Millerman refers to movies, rather than books. And, if books must be mentioned, then novels come first.

0003 Oh, I should add, the first novel comes from the pen of Cervantes. Don Quixote marks the start of the Age of Ideas. In seventeenth-century Spain, two movements coincide. On one hand, Baroque scholastics finally articulate the causality inherent in sign-relations. On the other hand, Cervantes creates a new literary genre.

Perhaps, these two hands belong to a single entity. The novelist represents the scholastic behind the mask of modernity. Like the heroic character in V for Vendetta, there is no removing the mask. The Spanish innovator spins away from truth (the scholastics were all about mind-independent being) and leaps towards happiness (the novelists are all about mind-dependent beings).

Is it any surprise that, in the next century, France produces a revolution with a similar attitude? Then, two centuries later, today’s social democratic politics perform the same routine.

0003 Richard Rorty wrestles with a strange duality. Politics is contextualized by two distinct masters, truth and reality. Politics emerges from the potential of good (which goes with truth) and the potential of what can be done (which goes with reality).

Here is a picture of two nested forms.

0004 Of course, Rorty wants to step away from truth₃ and find happiness in reality₃. But, one cannot take the mask without the face or the face without the mask. One cannot say, “Look at the mask without thinking about the face.”

Here is where Rorty flounders. His social democratic politics tell him that viable options are the only things that matter. But, as a philosopher, he must face the question as to which options are good.

0005 In short, politics is a single actuality that is composed of two distinct nested forms. Neither nested form can situate the other. So, the actualities for both nested forms fuse, creating one single contradiction-filled actuality, as described in the chapter on message in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.

I call the following diagram, “an intersection”.

0006 Right away, I spy that the single actuality of politics₂ veils two unspoken actualities that emerge from (and situate) the vertical and horizontal potentials. These two actualites are overshone by politics₂, in the same way that Mercury and Venus appear to disappear within the Sun in astrological conjunctions. The technical term is “combustion”.

Here is a Greek parody of politics₂.

0007 Yes, truth_3V and reality_3H exhibit different orbits around politics₂.

According to Millerman, Rorty is a social democrat advocating for truthlessness and hopefulness.

0008 How does that statement mesh with the above intersection? Rorty distains Heidegger’s romance with language and says that there is no such thing as a thing itself that can be put into language. So forget esse_ces (beings substantiating) and essences (substantiated forms). Indeed, forget righteousness. The question is whether the thing is useful. Or not.

At first, it seems that Rorty is only interested in the horizontal axis.

0009 But then, Rorty writes that there are three conceptions of the aim of philosophizing in the modern era. These three are Husserl’s scientism, Heidegger’s poetics and Dewey’s pragmatism. The latter two respond to the former. Husserl idealizes scientists. Heidegger extols poets. Pragmatists, like Rorty, Dewey and James, prefer engineers.

Now, if I associate these embodiments into the above mystery, then I replace Mercury with the engineer and Venus with the poet, resulting the the following intersection.

0010 Once I diagram this, the contradictions become more apparent. The Heideggerian venusian poet_2V and the pragmatist mercurial engineer_2H orbit an all encompassing solar politics₂. From the point of view of an astrologer, sometimes these inner planets run ahead of the solar presence, sometimes they lag behind the solar presence, and sometimes they are in conjunction with the solar presence. Combustion! The Sun’s transit through the constellations, plays this celestial drama over and over again, for those who watch the heavens. For those who watch politics, the Earth orbits the sun.

03/1/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2020) “Rorty” (Part 3 of 3)

0021 Of course, Heidegger would (if he could) return the insult, by calling Rorty a liberal propagandist.

After all, Rorty is not concerned with questions of truth_3V, preferring issues concerning social consequences_3H.

0022 Plus, Heidegger (if he could) would have regarded the imprisonment of Rorty and other social democratic philosophers as a matter of “petty details”.

Petty details?

In Heidegger’s view, the West has exhausted its options_1H. And, proof comes later in the title of Rorty’s book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Are these options? Or, are they signs of exhaustion? Compare that title to Being and Time.

0023 The squishiness of the former title is made worse when Rorty’s dichotomy of choice, private versus public, appears to align with the potentials of good_1V and options_1H, respectively. Is truth_3V private? Is reality_3V public? If so, then I ask, “Are these affirmations the poisonous fruits of the Treaty of Westphalia?” The Treaty of Westphalia marks the start of the modern era, almost four hundred years ago.

Perhaps, Rorty inadvertently testifies to Heidegger’s proposition. The West has exhausted its options_1H. Politics₂ is the intersection of the actualities of reality_3H and truth_3V, arising from the potential of viable options_1H and good_1V. Without a good_1V, there are no options_1H. So, politics₂ is dead. But, our love (philo-) of wisdom (-sophy) endures. So, it is only a matter of time before politics₂ rises again.

Shout it from the rooftops!

Politics₂ is dead. Long live politics₂.

0024 My thanks to Michael Millerman for his excellent chapter into how Rorty views Heidegger, chapter three in Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (2020, Arktos Press, London), pages 97-134.

02/28/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism” (Part 1 of 9)

0001 In late 2022, Americans loathe the Russian civilization because the Soviet Union was a existential enemy during the Third Battle Among the Enlightenment Gods: The Cold War Among Materialist Ideologies (1945-1989 AD).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, not much has been done to alter Americans’ fears, even though lots of water has passed beneath the bridge of history. Indeed, much has been done expressly to conceal those waters, full of greed, ambition, illusion and delusion. The modern intelligensia is guilty of sins of omission.

0002 Here is a brief remediation of that sin, which, unfortunately, may itself be a transgression.

When the Cold War ends in 1989, many difficult to comprehend events follow. Boris Yeltsin supervises a firesale of Russian state property. Maybe, “firesale” is not the right word. “A mind-bending transfer of ownership” may be better. Soon, oligarchs corral entire industries and markets. Russian GDP falls like no tomorrow.

Then, before the wholesale transfer of Russian commodity wealth is fully consummated, Vladimir Putin steps from under the wings of Yeltsin’s weakness and corruption. Following a series of explosive events, Putin manages to secure leadership of the listing ship of the Russian State. He rights the boat, sending many overboard (so to speak).

The predatory wolves of the American Empire do not forget. They lick their wounds. They plan their revenge.

0003 Oh, so that is the reason why nearly every mouthpiece of the American Regime denounces Russia, as if it is still the Soviet Union of old. When the Americans win, they want total surrender. So, the American citizen remains informed that the Cold War never really came to a conclusion.

Just as America once looked to the East and saw an “iron curtain”, Russia now looks West and experiences a “word curtain”.

0004 Of course, this brief transgression into history is required to introduce the tragic philosopher, Alexander Dugin. From 1989 on, Dugin formulates and proposes new ideas concerning the fact that Russia did not totally surrender to America’s empire religion. His struggles culminate in a book that finally breaks through the Western word-curtain about how bad Russia is. That book is titled, The Fourth Political Theory. First published in Russian, an English translation comes out in 2012.

Three years later, Razie Mah electronically publishes Comments On Alexander Dugin’s Book (2012) The Fourth Political Theory. This commentary is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0005 Simultaneously, as well as more amazingly, Michael Millerman decides to make the philosophical work of Alexander Dugin the topic of his doctorate in philosophy. Oh, that does not go well. How dare this young intellect challenge the current narrative. Dugin should go into a box. He is a fascist. Or rather, a communist. Or something similarly unsavory, like a Eurasianist. Yes, that box should never be opened.

0006 Michael Millerman, like Pandora, opens the box. And the last monstrosity to emerge is hope.

He actually graduates with his doctorate.

The subsequently blacklisted Millerman starts his own school. The cancelled Millerman publishes the book that I currently examine: Inside Putin’s Brain: The Political Philosophy of Alexander Dugin (2022: Millerman School). Yes, Millerman starts a school. Look and see.

0007 In these blogs, I comment on chapter two, titled, “The Ethnosociological and Existential Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism”. This chapter is originally published in Telos (Winter, 2020).

In order for the reader gain an acquaintance with the Greimas square, I recommend blogs appearing at www.raziemah.com for January 2023. These blogs include Looking atAlex Jones’s Book (2022) The Great Reset and Notes on Daniel Esterlin’s Book (2020) 2045 Global Projects At War.

02/16/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism” (Part 9 of 9)

0050 Eden, the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, is where we, in our current Lebenswelt, come from, but cannot return to. The myth of Adam and Eve says it all.

The ethnos is where the narod comes from and cannot return to.

0051 The implications weave together psychology, sociology and biology.

How can the ethnos (D), the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, serve as the transit between the narod, emerging in our current Lebenswelt (C), and the person as objectified subject (B)?

Does each -ism appeal to our innate imaginations by offering an explicit abstraction, a forbidden fruit, that is desirous to the eyes, tastes sweet, and is desired to make one wise?

Does a narod (C) accepts the Luciferian suggestions (B) in the process of becoming a people (A)?

0052 Dugin proposes his fourth political theory in a world broken by our appetites for explicit abstractions. We have been sold tickets (B) back to Eden (D). Where do our travels bring us? Our travels meet a flaming sword that turns in all directions. A cherubim blocks the way.

Dugin speaks to the people.

His proposal has ethnosociological and existential dimensions.

We are more than individuals, class members, citizens and role-bearers.

We are a narod, on a quest to find who we are supposed to be.

Who do you say that we are?

0053 My thanks to Michael Millerman for his excellent summary of these two dimensions of Alexander Dugin’s political philosophy.

02/3/23

Looking at Michael Millerman’s Chapter (2022) “…On Strauss and Dugin” (Part 10 of 10)

0128 Millerman’s essay would make Leo Strauss proud.

Millerman’s argument is exoteric. Strauss and Dugin share an interest in Heidegger. That is not the only feature that they have in common. Therefore, a Straussian should not dismiss Dugin’s political philosophy out of hand.

0129 The centerpiece turns out to be a translation, by Millerman, of a list of what needs to be done, according to Dugin, in order to establish the possibility of a Russian philosophy.

0130 The three tasks involve…

…dismantling Russian archeomodernity. Ironically, for Americans and western Europeans, the task is precisely the opposite. For western Europe, the archeomodern groove is a receptor. For Russia, the archeomodern groove is a trap.

…correctly comprehending the West. Ironically, the West may not be comprehending itself. The modern West is all about science. But, what is science? Is science a purely relational structure composed of the Positivist’s and empirio-schematic judgments? Plus, is there something vulnerable within this relational structure? Does phenomenology exploit that vulnerability? Does Heidegger’s Sein correspond to the noumenon? What happens to the West if noumena take on lives of their own?

….elaborating a philosophy of chaos. The narod harbors cautionary wisdom that is ignored by modern political movements, who imitate the practices of the empirio-schematic judgment. Chaos is not necessarily the absence of order. Chaos may be the order that cannot be situated by sovereign power.

0131 The placement of Millerman’s translation, along with its surprising content, offers an esoteric message.