0128 The lower category-based nested form (L) describes a civilizational stasis that Marx instantly recognized.

If Hegel’s spirit₃ operates on the possibility of ‘synthesis’₁, then a civilization-exploiting elite₃ will try to ensure that there is no possible resolution₁ to the social conflict₂ that their party benefits from.

0129 An elite party infiltrates institutions in society_C.  Then, elite institutions_C promulgate a thesis that calls for individuals in community_A to join organizations_B that are under management by the elites_C.  Individuals resisting material and instrumental exploitation in an organizational setting produce the antithesis, which unfortunately, gets co-opted by the elite.

0130 So, a thesis is promulgated by elites and its antithesis is co-opted by elites.  The result is that the spirit₃ cannot constellate a synthesis₁.  The system₃ continues as long as there is no potential for a ‘synthesis’ that collapses the promulgated thesis and its co-opted antithesis.

Perhaps, the best way to thwart the spirit₃ is to obsessively focus on material arrangements.

Imagine someone so twisted as to propose that material arrangements are … um… spiritual arrangements.

Imagine the education required forth that.

0131 To me, the downside of Hegel’s nested form (that is, the Marxist nested form) overlays a three-tier nested form, where the society_C tier  brings the organization_B tier into relation with the potential of ‘the individual in community_A tier‘.

Hmmm, maybe I am off target in that impression.

The condition of the individual looks bleak, to say the least.

0132 The upper and lower (U and L) category-based nested forms can reify into things.  Clearly, Hegel’s and Marx’s things are different, because each focuses on one or the other version of two entangled category-based nested forms. 

0133 I derive Hegel’s and Marx’s things from their category-based nested forms for two reasons.

First, the discussion shows that not all confoundings resolve into interscopes.  There are many ways for a confounding to resolve.  For this reason, confoundings can present opportunities and dangers.

Second, Hodder’s argument is bound between these two things.

0134 In other words, Hegel’s and Marx’s things_2c constitute the Overton window_2a for Hodder’s discussion of entanglement as a principle of unity_2bm.

0135 Of course, my digression into the phenomenology of Hodder’s early chapters, may seem a little shocking, especially the part about the author’s cognitive processing_2cm staying within the bounds of an Overton window framed by Hegel and Marx.

0136 To me, the text tells the tale.

For example, the title of chapter 2 (C2), “Humans Depend on Things”, reflects Hegel’s thing, because humans provide the spiritual₃ (or cognitive₃) synthesis₁ that substantiates processes (theses) in the face of difficulties (anti-theses)₂.

The titles of chapter three (C3), “Things Depend on Other Things”, and four (C4), “Things Depend on Humans”, reflects Marx’s point of view, because the interdependence of established things and the vulnerability of established things draw people into organization_B.

The title of chapter five (C5) “Humans Depend on Humans” completes the transit from Hegel to Marx by suggesting that a system_C that thwarts the potential of ‘escaping from a sociological entanglement’_A transforms entanglement_B into entrapment_B.

0137 Read on, because the path from Hegel to Marx overlays a much more significant, semiotic, turn.