Looking at Steven Mithen’s Book (2024) “The Language Puzzle” (Part 13 of 23)
0116 In chapter three, Mithen (working with a paradigm from modern linguistics) distinguishes between lexical and grammatical words. Lexical words have referents. Grammatical words act as clues to how lexical words properly combine to construct prose.
0117 I ask, “How should I associate the labels “lexical” and “grammatical” to elements of the foundational category-based nested form, appearing in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define The Word ‘Religion’ (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), shown below?”

A normal context3 brings an actuality2 into relation with the possibility of ‘something’1.
Definition3 brings a spoken word2 into relation with the potential of ‘meaning, presence and message’1.
0118 Obviously, “lexical” and “grammatical” are spoken adjectives that convey two different presences. “Lexical” says that the word has a referent that (theoretically) can be pictured or pointed to. “Grammatical” says that the word has a referent in the symbolic operations that we call, “grammar”.
0119 If I consider hand-talk as a jigsaw puzzle, a literal metaphor developed earlier, then I see that “lexical” associates to real elements in the content- and situation-level actualities and “grammatical” associates to the contiguities.

0120 To me, this says that there are two aspects to the evolution of language.
The first is displacement. The iconic and indexal sign-relations of hand talk adapt to this aspect.
The second aspect reflects the contiguities that must manifest in order for one sign-relation [to fit with] another sign relation2a and for one assembly to [to fit with] another2b. Contradiction resolving mechanisms operate in order for this second aspect to occur.
0121 May I call the suite of contradiction resolving mechanisms, “grammar”?
For a follower of the philosopher of Charles Peirce, another label comes to mind: “symbolic operations”.
In short, the contiguities cannot actualize if words are not sufficiently distinct from one another. Icons (images) and indexes (pointing) do not have boundaries in the same way that symbols do. So, one feature of the symbolic operationsis to regard only the habitual or conventional aspect of an iconic and indexal word-gesture.
0122 In chapter three, Mithen discusses Noam Chomsky’s proposal of a universal grammar. It was fashionable for a time. Some evolutionary anthropologists still espouse the general approach. However, every explicit attempt at delineating mechanisms for how such a grammar works, fails. How is it that any child can grow up in any culture and become a fluent practitioner of that culture’s language?
What is the mechanism that allows this?
0123 Take a look at the above figure and ask the question, “How is it that any competent person can figure out how to play a jigsaw puzzle without formal instruction?”
The solution is contained within the problem, because the problem is purely relational.
0124 Say what?
Take a look at how the content- and situation-levels fuse into a category-based nested form that looks very similar to the nested form for definition.

0125 Iconic and indexal hand-talk2a,2b presents a problem. How does one place the actuality2 into the appropriate normal context3 and potential1?
Well, part of the solution is already in the problem. Because hand-talk is iconic and indexal, and because these icons and indexes operate on both the content and situation levels (recall the terms, “lexical” and “grammatical”), displacement has already occurred. Displacement is built into the iconic and indexal word-gesture. The sign-object is the referent whether or not the referent is present. Displacement follows the logic of secondness. Displacement says that there is no contradiction between the iconic and indexal sign-object and the referent.
0126 The solution consists in the realization of a normal context3 and potential1.
Following the logic of thirdness, the normal context3 excludes other normal contexts3, which (ironically) seems to include Chomsky’s influential “universal grammar”.
At the same time, the ‘something’1 that supports wholeness3 consists of a suite of properties that might stand under the umbrella of “symbolic operations”. Following the logic of firstness, these symbolic operations are inclusive and allow contradictions.
For the jigsaw puzzle, one can describe one edge [fitting into] another edge in terms of cause and effect (or grammatical rules), but one cannot describe a single jigsaw piece (with four edges) participating in an assembly, where the assembly starts to manifest features of a big picture, in terms of cause and effect.