0909 The introduction (section 7.1) does not disagree.

To me, it seems that the label for the contiguity between SO_s and SV_e could be changed to “potential meaning”. [Presence] is rich with “potential meaning”.  So is the moniker, “information_2b“.

0910 At the same time, the introduction (section 7.1) does not agree.

0911 The author claims that “meaning” associates to how an organism interprets a sign.

Surely, that claim coheres to the SI_s.  Or, maybe it goes with the SI_e.

0912 Also, the author is interested in writing about resources that are not meaningful, but can be meaningful when an organism happens to discover that they have um… meaning_2c.

Sign-relations are essential for the discovery of signification.

So, the author figures that there are potential meanings (where an entity can become meaningful to a semiotic agent) and potential signs (where an entity can come to the attention of a semiotic agent).

The author offers a table to distinguish proper meanings and signs from potential meanings and signs.

Finally, section 7.1 concludes that organisms can actualize potential meanings (and potential signs) by integrating them into their own goal-directed activities, especially when those activities are phenotypic (hence, adaptive in Umwelts past).

In section 17.2, the author develops the theme of form within a sign-relation.

The argument is theoretical.

0913 So, allow me to return a previous example.

A revision is in order.

0914 One fine morning, an unattended dog wanders the streets of my town, looking for what?… a potential sign?  No.  It is looking for a message, in the form of a SV_s.

This unfamiliar dog is not an idealist.  Or maybe, the dog is an idealist, because the dog is certain that a form is nearby, and that he can sink his teeth into that form.  Not so much to chew, as to swallow.

0915 No sign-vehicle sends that interventional sign-object (SO_i) until a sound, emanating from a pile of leaves, sends a message… er… a specifying sign-vehicle (SV_s).

0916 Here is Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay for semiotic agency as a generalization of this canine organismin a semiotic context.

0917 In section 7.3, titled “Semiotic Agency in Biosemiotics”, Sharov references his groundbreaking 2021 work with Tonnessen.  The idea that semiotic agency is contained within biosemiotics is broached, but not with the verve of the above figure, which derives from Razie Mah’s examination of Sharov and Tonnessen’s 2021 text.

0916 “Semiotic agency” is no longer a label.  It is a technical tool for biosemiotics.  The utility of this tool is yet to be determined.  However, what this examination finds is significant.

Semiotic agency reifies specifying and exemplar sign-relations.  At the same time, semiotic agency draws upon an interscope that parallels the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

So, there are several key phenomena to consider.  The first is an initiating semiotic event_2a (SV_s) that parallels sensation_2a.  The second is information_2b (SO_s [presence] SV_e) that parallels perception_2b.  The third is a goal or aim_2c(SO_e) that parallels judgment_2c.

0917 Does that reduce semiotics to a tool, as noted in section 7.4?

I guess that sign-relations are tools in the same way that a dog’s snout (one side fitted for detection and the other side fitted for biting into the detected thing) is a tool.

I prefer to use the terms, “adaptations” and “phenotypes”.

0918 So, how should biosemioticians conceptualize potential meanings and potential signs (section 7.5)?

Take a look at the preceding figure.

What is in the pile of leaves?

A potential sign?

The sound and, with investigation, odor coming from a pile of leaves_2a (SV_s) stands for an animal_2b (SO_s) in regards to the wandering dog’s detecting_3b something going on in a pile of leaves_1b (SI_s). 

0919 What is salient (SI_e) about this hidden animal (SO_s)?

May I also ask, “What is the potential meaning of this hidden animal?”

The dog burrows into the leaf pile for further information_2b.  The animal may be wounded_2b.

Well, that means it_2b (SO_s) is not going to fight back_2b (SV_e).  So, the dog’s goal module_3c((1c)) (SI_e) says, “Yes, I can put this in my mouth.”_2c (SO_e).

0920 I am still in section 7.5, what do I know so far?

Meaning as the contiguity between SO_e and  SV_i lies just outside the purview of semiotic agency, as depicted in the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

Potential meaning lies within the contiguity between SO_s and SV_e, corresponding to situation level information_2b.  Potential meaning dwells within [presence].

0921 Here is a picture of semiotic agency, once again, with [presence] shortened to [p].

0922 Can I say that again?

All biological processes have the biosemiotic noumenal overlay in common.  Semiotic agency belongs to the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.  Semiotic agency contains a contiguity, that I label presence, which throws the reader back to the proposition that presence underlies the definition of a spoken word and now, “potential meaning” is a spoken term that fits into semiotic agency as a characteristic of [presence].

0923 Here is a diagram.

0924 One remarkable feature of this diagram is that presence is technically characterized as a contiguity within semiotic agency.  And, presence₁ underlies the spoken term, “potential meaning” in the normal context of definition₃.  On top of that, the nested form for definition does not compare to the nested form for agent.  Instead, the normal context of agent₃ brings semiotic agency₂ (somehow containing a reification of the nested form of definition for a spoken word) into relation with the possibility of a ‘final causality’₁.

In sum, the agent₃ defines its world within semiotic agency₂ according to its ongoing ‘final causalities’₁.

0925 At the same time, the agent₃ theoretically defines₂₍₃₎ “potential meaning”₂₍₂₎ according to the fact that [presence] is intrinsic to semiotic agency”₂₍₁₎ (as the contiguity within information_2b).

That sounds like a formal causality to me.  Formal causality brings harmony between the normal context₃ and its actuality₂.

0926 So, potential meaning belongs to [presence] in so far as information_2b can change [salience] (SI_e) in unexpected ways, resulting in impediments or empedoclements.

0927 Here is a picture.

0928 At this point, I must keep in mind that there are two other potentials₁ (besides presence₁) that underlie any spoken term₂ in the normal context of definition₃.  These are not embodied in semiotic agency.  In fact these potentials bridge semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation on the perspective and content levels.

0929 Bridges?

Suspension bridges?

Yes, [meaning] and [message] are contiguities suspended within the perspective-level actuality_2c of goal_2c and the content-level actuality of real initiating (semiotic) event_2a, respectively.

One contiguity spans from semiotic agency to the interventional sign-relation.  One contiguity spans in the reverse direction.

0930 In section 17.5, the author notes that the label of “potential meaning” may also be applied to hypothetical things that have not been observed before.  Well, let’s forget the qualifier, “hypothetical”, and put in the word, “encountered” for “observed”.  “Potential meaning” may be applied to things that we (semiotic agents) have not encountered before.

0931 Daisy knows ducks.  She participated in duck hunts on the farm before she broke her leg and ended up as my pet.  They were going to shoot her, to put her out of her pain, but I paid the vet bills and took her in.  It is funny how things work out that way.

So, when we come upon the unfamiliar dog, standing in a pile of leaves, with that huge ornamental duck in its mouth, I think “That poor ornamental duck.” and Daisy leaps forward and I fail to hold the leash (SV_i).  Now, the crisis begins.  Daisy’s goal_2c is obvious, that duck is hers and she [means] to take it (SV_i).

0932 I grab some rocks from a nearby planter and rush to follow along.  I don’t know whether Daisy knows that I will fight on her side.  But, I figure that, if this fight goes from uncertainty to calamity, I can at least use the rocks as ammunition to protect myself.  Oh, forget that, I am fighting for Daisy’s cause.

0933 The dog can’t defend himself and hold the duck at the same time.  He cannot make up his mind as Daisy makes a quick pass, nipping his front leg on her way.  In the process, he exposes his flank and I throw my first rock, which hits with a resounding thud.  The unfamiliar dog looks over at me.  What the…?  He drops the duck because he expects to engage Daisy.  Daisy parks in front of him in the fierce dog sort of way.  The prize lies between them.  Then, my third rock hits (my second missed completely) and the wayward dog thinks better of it.

0934 The whole incident takes less than two minutes.  The defeated dog trots off, looking back to make sure that we are not following.  I walk over to Daisy, who appears to be guarding the dead duck.

0935 I pick up the leash and Daisy noses the duck, then looks at me, like she is saying something.

0936 This is a good example for why semiotic agency is full of adaptations.

All species adapt to interventional signs within their Umwelt.

Some of these interventional signs are completely unsettling.

They start with {SO_e [meaning] SV_i}_2c.

0937 Here is a diagram of what happened.

0938 For the interventional sign-relation, Daisy breaking loose_2c (SV_i) stands for her expression of intent_2a (SO_i) in regards to the content-level normal context of a dog challenge_3a operating on the potential of ‘one or the other getting the duck’_1a (SI_i).

0939 This opens me to wondering whether the message in {SO_i [message] SV_s}_2a also carries a potential sign.

Does the unfamiliar dog dropping the duck and running off signify Daisy’s intent_2a (SO_i)?

That answer must be yes.

Daisy seems to be perfectly calm and I am unquestionably unnerved.

0940 Did she get what she wanted?

She presses her nose on the duck once again, then looks up at me.

At that moment, I get the message.

The duck is still alive!

0941 Potential meaning resides in [presence].  Potential signs reside in [message].

Does that seem rational?

0942 Here is a picture.

0943 In section 7.6, the author asks whether there can be potential meaning in a world without meaning (that is, life)?

0944 Now, if you (the reader) think that my last story about Daisy is implausible, then approach my answer as if it is a movie.  Movies only work when one suspends disbelief.  Movies are full of implausible moments.  But, the more unlikely feature is that we (humans) imagine that the illusion of moving pictures is real.  What other species watches television and responds as if the moving images convey realness?

My answer concludes at point 0964.

0945 Of course, there are physical processes that have emergent properties.  This topic of inquiry is examined in Parts 1 and 2 of Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  This commentary addresses three books Emergence (2019), Divine Action and Emergence(2021), and Theistic Evolution (2024).  This commentary is echoed in points 0288 through 0300.  These points lead into an examination of chapter 5 of Semiotic Agency (titled “Origins of Life”) and chapter 9 of Pathways (titled “Chemical Origins of Life”).

0946 If I adjust the intensity of the colors, then I can depict a world before meaning.

0947 Since biosemiotics and life are co-extensive (by definition), a non-living anti-entropic emergent being (such as a waterspout or an oil droplet in water) has no “proper semiotics”.  The purely relational structure of biosemiotics dwells in the realm of possibility.

Even stranger, neither [presence] nor [message], the harbors of potential meaning and potential sign, respectively, are real elements.  They are contiguities between real elements.

0948 Here is a picture, highlighting how these contiguities stand between real elements in a single actuality₂.  They are like [substance].

At last, I can say, “Without [message], there is no sign to manifest [presence].  Without [presence], there is no [meaning].”

Without content, there is no situation.  Without situation, there is no perspective.

0949 So, the question arises, “Can there be content without perspective?”

The answer is yes and no.

The answer is yes by way of example.

The answer is no, because without meaning, how can there be a message?

How about that example?

Imagine a molecular amino acid floating along a conduit in a hydrothermal vent.  It hits a rock and clings to that rock due to electrostatics.  Then, it finds its way into a micropore, which is completely lined with organic chemicals with similar properties.  They electrostatically cling to the surface of the micropore.  Plus, there is a little circulation.  Occasional pulses bring organic material in, but (since the organic molecules cling to the crystalline walls and to one another) no organic chemicals go out.

0950 Here is a picture.

0951 Yes, new terminology is proposed.

What is the [message]?

[Inter] is “enters from the Umwelt”.

0952 Something that is outside the micropore’s accreting sludge’s semiotic agency (SO_i) [ inters ] a place where organic molecules_2a (SV_s) stand for what is in a micropore of volcanic glass_2b (SO_s) operating on the potential of content entering into the pore and not leaving_1b (SI_s).

So, the [message] is [inter].

0953 Obviously, “inter” is a new word, technically coining something from outside of the agent that initiates semiotic agency.

The term is a play on “enter” as well as “inter”.  “Inter” derives from the Latin word for “among”, as in the term, “international”.  “Inter” also means to “bury a corpse”.  Here, “inter” alludes to the burial of the sign-object of the interventional sign.  Surely, a burial conveys a message.  That message inters the SO_i.

[Message] can be sort of like being born again.

0954 [Inter] is when the message is born the first time.  [Inter] is like a revelation to an agent that may not exist.  Or, if an agent exists, then [inter] is like a revelation, pure and simple, like the way that I realize that the dead duck is alive.

0955 Here is a picture for the nitrogenous organic molecule entering a micropore on the surface of volcanic glass in an Archean hydrothermal vent.

Organic molecules in the hydrothermal vent (SV_s) stand for accumulation (SO_s) in regards to the self-governance of carbon-based molecules in a micropore operating of possible courses of action (SI_s).

0956 The question arises, “Who is the agent₃?”

Is the “agent₃” the micropore with a hydrothermal vent?

Or, is the agent₃ the sludge accumulating in the micropore?  This agent₃ faces a problem faced by all hoarders.  There is only so much space in a micropore.  So, the micropore stops accumulating.

0957 But, not all micropores give up when sludged out.  Some develop organic subagents that assist in packing the micropore and are capable of latching to the walls of the hydrothermal vent, despite the turbulence.  These subagents then manage to colonize neighboring micropores, pack them over time, then find paths to other micropores.

Does that key into [presence]?

Is information_2b all about accumulation (SO_s) [presence] packing and moving on (SV_e)?

0957 Accumulation and packing_2b (SV_e) stands for colonization of adjacent micropores_2c (SO_e) in regards to packing micropores on the surface of volcanic glass in a hydrothermal vent_3c operating on the potential of these novel molecules that the sludge has inadvertently produced and keeps producing_1c (SI_e).

So, information_2b is more than sustained capture of organic materials floating by in the hydrothermal vent (SO_s).  Information_2b supports the spontaneous production of a suite of molecules that increase the amount that can be packed into a micropore.  Some type of catalyst manifests and this catalyst may leave the micropore and “infect” another micropore.

0958 Here is a picture.

Here, the label, [infold] replaces [inter].  [Infold] is “enters from the Innerwelt”.

Perhaps, the entire community of micropores constitutes the agent₃.

0959 Let me say that again, while focusing on the actualities.

From the outside, organic molecules may pulse into a micropore. That corresponds to [inter]. The same organic molecules tend not to leave, because they bind to the walls of the micropore (through charged interactions and dipoles) or slough out of water solution into the sludge (because water forms hydrogen bonds that exclude many organic molecules).

0960 Particularly configured organic molecules end up getting synthesized as these molecules occasionally covalently bond with one another.  They can form strings, where an organic (hydrophobic) macromolecule has two polar (hydrophilic and glass-loving) ends that can direct molecules entering the micropore to the crystal surface (for electrostatic attraction).  The hydrophobic string can direct molecules towards the organic crud (for getting out of water).

They are like hydrophobic strings with electrostatic glue on either end.

They emerge within sludge [packing tool] accumulation_2b.

0961 If one of these peculiar molecules leaves the micropore, it can “walk” along the glass surface with one end electrostatically holding on to the glass surface and the other coming loose and floating as far as the string allows before coming back to the glass surface.

In this way, one molecule can “walk” to another micropore_2a and catalyze the process of accumulation_2b if it is not already happening.

0962 And, that manifests [meaning] by instigating an interventional sign.

Biphasic macromolecular “walking” along the lining of a hydrothermal vent_2c (SV_i) stands for further settlement of porous space_2a (including micropores already spontaneously accumulating) (SO_i) in regards to the potential of ‘settling novel spaces’_1a in the normal context of a hydrothermal vent_3a (SI_i).

Notice that in the picture, the {SO_i}_2a is the intent expressed by “walking”, rather than further settlement of porous spaces.

0963 Also, I replace [inter], the technical word for [message], with [infold] because the message comes from within the system.  Here, the message, [infold], barely applies.  But, when the normal context_3a belongs to a subagent, then the term definitely applies.

0964 Back in point 0946, the author asks whether there can be potential meaning in a world without meaning (that is, life)?

The answer applies to section 7.6 (Potential Meanings and Complexity of the Non-living World) and 7.7 (Actualization of Potential Meanings by Organisms).

0965 Does the answer also apply to section 7.8 (Potential Signs and Meanings in Human Life)??

Let me go back to that preposterous story about Daisy and the duck.

0966 Here is a picture of how the incident provokes Daisy’s semiotic agency.  The picture is written in the style of a three-level interscope, for the convenience of this examiner.

0967 At the start of the incident, the sudden appearance of an unfamiliar dog pulling out something from a pile of dead leaves_2a (SV_s) stands for a duck in its mouth_2b (SO_s) in regards to Daisy’s self-governance_3b operating on potential courses of action_1b (SI_s).

The encounter with another dog is like a sensation_2a.  Realizing that a duck is in the other’s dog mouth is like a perception_2a.

0968 The duck in the other’s dog mouth_2b (SO_s) [makes present] an opportunity_2b (SV_e).

Daisy’s opportunity_2b (SV_e) stands for the goal of making the duck mine_2c (SO_e) in regards to the normal context of going for it_3c operating on the potential of ‘seizing the moment’_1c (SI_e).

0969 The perspective-level actuality_2c has the character of a judgment.  Daisy’s canine intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the intelligibility of the getting the duck in the other dog’s mouth (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with the universality of Daisy’s sizing up the other dog (what is, firstness).

Say what?

If Daisy’s sizing up the other dog is correct, then she bets that she can get the duck.

0970 Her goal of making that duck her own (SO_e) [means] a fight (SV_i).

0971 [Meaning] connects semiotic agency to an interventional sign-relation.

This is Daisy’s intervention.  I am along as an ally who is capable of throwing rocks.  When the first rock hits solidly, and the other dog looks over at me, I think, “I should have held tighter onto Daisy’s leash.”  Just kidding, I really think, “Wow.  That got his attention.”

Then, I throw the second rock and it misses completely.

0972 Once Daisy positions herself to prevent the other dog from bolting with the prize.  The wandering hound must prepare for a fight.  That means that he must put down the duck.  Then, the third rock lands and its over.

For me, I know that the interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i) has played its course when I pick up Daisy’s leash, still attached to her bodice, and she noses the duck and looks up.

0973 Here is a picture of the interventional sign-relation.

Daisy’s fight_2c (SV_i) stands for her intent at the moment of victory_2a (SO_i) in regards to victory or defeat_3a operating on the potential that the victory affords a message’_1a (SI_i).

0974 The [message] is [infolds] because Daisy and I are now a team.

The intention of Daisy_2c [infold] duck is alive_2a.