Summary of text [comment] page 24

[The other association may best be expressed through an example: marriage.

The (think^divine) norm of “what God has joined let no man sunder” is opposed by the modern norm of “no fault divorce” (think^group).  These two norms are exclusive yet interpellating.  A contest between them plays out in history.  A contest also occurs “outside of history”; that is, in the realm of primordial imagery.

The former associates with the unfolding of law^accept.

The latter associates with law^denial.

Inside of history, the unbinding of marriage by Progressives has had repercussions on every level of society, from the population (demographics) to the personal (the flourishing of resentment).  Think^group necessarily denies the consequences of its policies on human action.

In fact, their symbolic order cannot articulate any deformative impacts because the “words have changed” to accommodate their faultless policies.

The repercussions of no-fault divorce, plus the denial of those repercussions (law^denial), constitute the Real of History (law^essential).

Or rather, more technically, there is a relation of impossibility between law^accept and law^denial. ]

Summary of text [comment] page 23

Free will [specified conscience] relies on norms [think^group and think^divine] .  Many of these norms are built over time.  Many are handed down by God.  Many are created out of the cloth of deception, telling the interpellated what they want to hear.

Sin [think^group] may eclipse awareness of any true (not deceptive) norm [think^divine].

In this regard, sin is opposed to the meaning of history, especially the history of salvation.  Sin is in history.  But since sin derives from freedom, sin is antihistorical.

[To me, this recalls Jung’s archetypes, which are “antihistorical”.  A better word would be “ahistorical”.

Perhaps, here, we may see another delineation of the definition of “religion”.  So far, “religion” has been defined according to the criteria of the intersecting nested forms and relation to sovereign power.

Here, “religion” is archetypal in the precise sense that “primordial images never occur in their archetypal purity” but always specified through historical circumstance.

But there could be another association.]

Summary of text [comment] pages 22 & 23

‘Man’ is not only placed in a reality to which ‘he’ has to conform [law^essential], ‘he’ ‘himself ‘is the summit of that reality [characterized by think^divine((conscience^free))].

‘Man” carries within ‘himself’ the task of “ruling the earth”; that is, of building and molding the world [through human action] and ‘himself’ [conscience and dispositions].

Free will [specified conscience], at the least, establishes the person.

Where do these necessary person-forming attitudes come from?  Nature itself?  No.  Relations with others? Yes.  Relations with God? Yes. Yes.

[One implication of Schoonenberg’s line of thought: “The attitudes that establish one’s free will, or specified conscience”, get confounded with “building the world and oneself”, that is, one’s dispositions.

Also, stepping further back, another implication is that think^divine (building character) may be confounded with think^group (building the world).

Losing perspective is so easy when building the world becomes more important than building character, rather than the reverse.]

Comment on pg. 22 continued from last blog.

[Now, let me consider science for a moment.   The only way to study the realm of actuality is to only consider dyadic relations.  But how do you do that?

The realms of normal context and possibility are always getting in the way.  After all, the nested form is:

Triadic relations₃( dyadic relations₂( monads₁))

Normal context₃( actuality₂( possibility₁))

Perhaps, that is why “exclusion of divine causation” must be methodological.

The normal context must methodically eliminate alternate possibilities.  Empirical scientists are always worried about the quality of their controls and their measurements.   We can only truly see dyadic cause and effect by restricting normal context and by eliminating alternate possibilities.

This is very difficult to do.  We can only see cause and effect when we are restricted to the referential; that is, to true as opposed to false.]

[How could “Divine Providence₃” bring “any form of inquiry₂” into “the possibility that you will succeed only when you methodologically exclude Divine Providence₁“?

Here is another thought.  This follows the same logic as the emergence of unconstrained complexity.

Why would God bring our lowly genus to the threshold where, just by dropping our manual brachial way of talking, our species would become capable of generating a new creation, a multitude of spontaneous orders, just like God Himself?

The Progressive opposition of between God and nature pales in comparison to the Christian imagination.]

[I can now ask: What does this imply?

Does Christianity embrace both “Divine Providence₃” and “the possibility that ‘exclusion’ may be one of the possibilities inherent in divine causation₁”.

How can this be?

How can God reveal His creation only through a method of inquiry that excludes Him as a cause?

How could “Divine Providence₃” bring “any form of inquiry₂” into “the possibility that you will succeed only when you methodologically exclude Divine Providence₁“?

It makes no sense, unless, of course, it fits the premodern scholastic definition of “God’s Passive Will”.]

[Now, let me consider particulars:

“The definitional exclusion of divine causation₁” makes “empirical inquiry₂” possible.

“Empirical inquiry₂” situates “this definitional exclusion₁”.

“Divine Providence₃” brings “empirical inquiry₂” into relation with “the possibilities inherent in divine causation₁”.

“Divine Providence₃” puts “empirical inquiry₂” into context.]

Comment on pg. 22 continued from last blog.

[Here is my technical way of phrasing what I said in the last few blogs.

Religion exists in the realms of mediation₃ and possibility₁.  Science exists, by definition, in the realm of actuality₂.

The relation between the two is not exclusive.  In other words, the phrase “science versus religion” is a red herring, a false trail, and an invalid opposition.

The relation between religion and science has the same nested structure as the relation between religion and sovereign power.

Religion₁ makes science₂ possible.

Science₂ situates religion₁.

Religion₃ brings science₂ into relation with the possibilities of religion₁.

Religion₃ puts science₂ into context.]

[There are advantages for insisting that God and nature are exclusive, especially when Modern Progressives are on the side of “reason” and “scientific advance”, which are just other words for “scientific inquiry”.

Progressives grasp for sovereign power in order to institute their secular expertise, their “reason”, thus constituting their Public Cult for the Promulgation of Reason, under the Guidance of Nature, not God.

Their apparent opponents are derided as think^anti-reason and conscience^superstition.

Even scientists get the scapegoat label if they do not support the “reasonable” political causes, which are “scientific” only because “they rigorously exclude superstitions like Christianity”.

Once the Public Cult of Progressivism declares that “any think^group that rigorously excludes superstitions like Christianity” is “based on reason”, the parody of science comes full circle.

Wicca priestesses and Sociology Professors are two think^groups that rigorously exclude superstitions like Christianity.  Both are, by definition, “scientific”.]

[Why do Modern Progressives imagine that God and nature are exclusive?

In the previous blog, I listed the dynamic sets of differences that ground the Progressive Symbolic Order.

Note how, with each generation, the differences become more and more deceptive.  Words shift meaning.  Does “scientific advance” equal “scientific inquiry”? Progressives will use the terms interchangeably.  The same goes with “divine action” and “superstition”.

Deceptive?  Yes, because “excluding divine action” does not eliminate “superstition”.  It transforms “superstition”.

“Reason” does not guarantee “scientific advance”, especially when the arena of “reason” is limited (by the sovereign) through certification.  Did all those scientists in the Soviet Union not have stellar credentials?]