Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (2014) “A Natural History of Human Thinking” (Part 4 of 22)

0208 Tomasello presents his shared intentionality hypothesis in chapter one.  The cognitive adaptation of shared intentionality joins a behavioral adaptation of joint-attention.

The term, “shared intentionality”, like the term, “joint attention”, is difficult to define.

Perhaps, the term is too broad.

So, to narrow the field of inquiry, Tomasello breaks out several components which are more compatible with positivist approaches.  The three components are first (1), the ability to takes one’s perception’s “off-line”, second (2), the ability to make inferences that transform a perception causally, intentionally and logically, and third (3), the ability to self-monitor and evaluate those inferences and how they may produce a desirable behavioral outcome.

0209 Yeah.  The three components sound way more scientific.

At the same time, these three components associate to the one of the three signs contained in the scholastic three-level interscope.

Here is a picture.

0210 The exemplar sign says, “A perception2b (SVe) stands for a judgment2c (SOe) in regards to a common conceptual ground2c operating on the potential of ‘mutual intentions’1c (SIe).”

The perspective-level of the scholastic interscope says, “The normal context of a common conceptual ground3c brings the actuality of a judgment2c into relation with the possibilities inherent in ‘mutual expectations’1c. The potential of ‘mutual intentions’1c puts the individual’s perceptions2b into perspective.”

0211 What about the three components?

First (1), the exemplar sign takes one’s perceptions2b “off-line”, because the sign-object is a judgment2c (which is itself a triadic relation, SOe).  The perception2b (SVe) does not generate an action.

Second (2), the exemplar sign-object (SOe) becomes what the perception (SVe) stands for.  A judgment2c puts a perception2b into perspective.

Third (3), the exemplar sign-object (SOe) is a relation between what is and what ought to be.  If a unique Peircean category is assigned to each element, then the judgment is actionable.  Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.  If a unique Peircean category is not assigned, then the judgment is reflective.  Reflective judgments are more likely to involve self-monitoring, evaluation and estimation.

0212 Surely, the three components that Tomasello identifies as subjects for research in cognitive psychology apply to the exemplar sign.