05/13/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 8 of 8)

0975 In the closing, section 7.8, the author mentions a confounding word.

0976 What is that word?

Communication.

0978 Well, at least I can offer two other labels, “inter” and “infold”, which apply when the message comes externally or internally.

I don’t think that either “inter” or “infold” correspond to “communicate”.

And yet, they must.

0979 To this examiner, the conceptual apparatuses of potential meanings and potential signs entangle two features of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay, [presence] and [message].  “Potential meaning” dwells within [presence] and seems integral when an SOs “causes” an SVe.  “Potential sign” dwells within [message] and seems crucial to two types of contiguity between SOi and SVs, [inter] and [infold].

0980 By way of conclusion for this chapter, which harkens back to the beginnings of life on Earth, yet ends with humans in our current Lebenswelt, I would like to repeat the transformation that Sharov and Tonnessen perform(perhaps, unwittingly, but leading to great insight) in Semiotic Agency.  They transform the specifying and the exemplar sign relations into a dyad, suitable to overlay over the noumenon of what all living systems have in common.

0981 Specifically, they transform a fairly mature three-level interscope (comparable to the scholastic interscope for how humans think) into a dyad (matter2b [salience] form2c}) within a dyad (matter2c(2b( [self-governance3b: courses of action1b] form(2a))).

0982 Now, I review.

But, this will be more than a review.

I want to re-enact Sharov and Tonnessen’s construction of semiotic agency.

Plus, I want to add a reification of the interventional sign-relation, which completes the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

0983 And most of all, I wish to perform this transformation and this re-enactment on the Deacon and Tabaczek interscope for emergence, appearing in Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues) and in the Razie Mah’s blogs for April through June, 2024.

0984 Here is a diagram of the three-level interscope for emergence.

0985 The element corresponding to the biosemiotic real initiating (semiotic) event is “the contained circulation of ingredients2a“.

For mitochondria, this is the separation of oxidative and reductive reactions involved in the combustion of glucose with oxygen.  On the oxidative side, glucose loses electrons to biomolecules capable of carrying them, generating a few ATP equivalents in the process.  On the reductive side, oxygen gains electrons from those electron-bearing biomolecules, generating lots of ATP equivalents in the process.

0986 The combustion of glucose with oxygen is disposed to move towards equilibrium3a and, when ignited1a, may do so with the release of lots of heat.

Mitochondria do not allow ignition.  Rather, they use the separation of the oxidative and reductive reactions1b in the normal context of utilizing the nonequilibrium dynamics (of what would be combustion)3b in order to generate emergent beings, ATP2b.  ATP2b then makes its way from mitochondria to various enzymatic sites in the eukaryotic cell.

ATP2b is a high-energy molecule and will decompose if left alone.  So, an enzyme3c that has the potential of using ATP2b “simplifies1c” the situation, by using the energy-released when ATP becomes ADP plus Pi (inorganic phosphate in solution) in order to perform a cellular actions2c, such as building a protein2c or transporting a molecule across a membrane2c.

0987 Back to the diagram.

The content-level category-based nested form for mitochondria “burning” glucose and oxygen follows.  The normal context of combustion3a brings the actuality of separated oxidation and reduction reactions2a into relation with the potential of ‘conducting these spontaneous reactions separately’1a.

For the situation level, the normal context of taking advantage of a nonequilibrium dynamic3b brings actual biosynthesis of ATP2b into relation with the agent’s ability to transfer free-energy from the oxidation of glucose and the reduction of oxygen to the emergent being1b.

For the perspective level, the normal contexts of enzymatic forms3c perform various biophysical operations2c based on the potential of coupling the energy-releasing degradation of ATP with an energy-requiring cellular operation1c.

0988 Here is the transformation to a dyad within a dyad coupled to an interventional sign-relation.

On the perspective level, the persistence of an eukaryotic cell2c [means] the power2c to accomplish various biochemical tasks.

For the interventional sign-relation, power2c (SVi) stands for a disposition2a (SOi) in regards to the normal context of chemical reactivities3a operating on the potential to displace chemicals to distinct compartments1a (SIi).

On the content level, the disposition2a to keep the reagents coming2a {(SOi) [message]} adds more new ingredients to the container2a (SVs).

0989 The actualities go with phenomena.  These are real elements.

The normal contexts and their respective potentials are what need to be explained.  These are the major contiguities between actualities on different levels.

A minor contiguity occurs within each level, [message] for content, [presence] for situation and [meaning] for perspective.

0990 These associations may be subject to revision.  That is the nature of exploration into the topic of “potential meanings”.

I thank the author for his well-referenced chapter and hope that this examination adds value to the text.

05/12/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 1 of 6)

0991 The text before me is chapter eight of Pathways (see point 0831 for book details, pages 167-185).  The full title is “A Constructivist Approach to Meanings in the Universe”.  The author is a linguist at Baikal University, Irkutsk, Russia.

0992 My examination, so far, identifies a biosemiotic noumenal overlay, composed of both semiotic agency (the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay) and the interventional sign relation.  The diagram reifies three sign-relations: specifying, exemplar and interventional.  The specifying and exemplar sign-relations belong to semiotic agency.  The interventional sign relation stands outside of semiotic agency, but is integrated with semiotic agency by way of its participation in a three-level interscope.  A three-level interscope contains all three sign-relations.

0993 The following figure of an interscope contains the three sign-elements (SV for sign-vehicle; SO for sign-object; SI for sign-interpretant) for each sign-relation (subscripts “s” for specifying; “e” for exemplar; “i” for interventional).

0994 An interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.

For each level, a triadic normal context3 brings a dyadic actuality2 into relation with a monadic potential1.

The dyadic actuality2 fits Peirce’s formula for the category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  For clear notation, the contiguity is placed in brackets.

0995 In the above figure, the real elements are sign-vehicles and sign-objects.  The contiguity in each level carries the same label as one of the three potentials1 underlying any spoken term2 in the normal context of definition3.

Finally, among levels, perspectivec brings situationb into relation with the potential of contenta.

0996 Hmmm.  I have an interruption.

Now, what was I saying?

Uh-oh, I better start over.

0997 My examination, so far, isolates a biosemiotic noumenal overlay, composed of both semiotic agency (the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay) and the interventional sign relation.  The biosemiotic noumenal overlay reifies three sign-relations: specifying, exemplar and interventional.  The specifying and exemplar sign-relations belong to semiotic agency.  The interventional sign relation stands outside of semiotic agency, but is integrated with semiotic agency by way of two contiguities, [meaning] and [message].

0998 Here is a picture of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

0999 So far, so good.

The author of this chapter addresses the existence of meaning in the universe from an epistemological perspective.  “Episteme” derives from the Latin word for “knowledge”.  “Logos” comes from the Greek word for “word”.  Or maybe, “intrinsic nature of”?   How about “study of”?

Looking at the above figure, I see a problem.

For this examination, [meaning] is the contiguity between the exemplar sign-object (SOe) and the interventional sign-vehicle (SVi).

Is that the same as “the meaning” that exists in the universe?

1000 It makes me wonder, “What is a contiguity?”

Here are some cases.

1001 Aristotle’s hylomorphe is exemplar.  The much-abused word, “substance”, weirdly captures the way that matter “causes” form.  The verb, “substantiates”, is just as effective.  Can I justify the choice of the term, “substance”?  Well, what is one more technical definition among the many dictionary definitions for the word, “substance”?  Is that good enough?

One thing for sure, [substance] is not one of the real elements.  [It] is neither matter nor form.  [It] is the contiguity between them.  So, what is [substance]?

1002 We (humans) know [substance] because we know [cause], [effect], [contact], [influence] and many more contiguities between real elements.  This is precisely why contiguities cry out to be modeled.  The real elements support phenomena.  The contiguities cry out to be explained.

We (humans) also know actuality2.  Semiotic agency begins with a real initiating (semiotic) event (SVs) (that is, an encounter).  The first step in natural philosophy (for Aristotle’s tradition) is to regard a thing as matter [substance] form.  See Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

Actuality2 belongs to the Peirce’s category of secondness.  Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  Secondness is dyadic.

1003 With this said, I can see why there is a problem with [meaning].  [Meaning] is a contiguity between two real elements.  One of those elements (SOe) belongs to semiotic agency.  The other element (SVi) belongs to the interventional sign-relation.

1004 Earlier, in points 0887 through 0894, I portray [meaning] as the contiguity between the triadic structure of an actionable judgment (such as SOe) and the triadic structure of its category-based nested form (such as SVi).

In this case, another word for [meaning] is [unfolds].

An actionable judgment [unfolds into] a category-based nested form.

This very curious insight is not explored further in this examination.

05/10/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 2 of 6)

1005 On top of that, in chapter seven of Pathways, Alexei Sharov offers another option.

In addition to [meaning], there are potential meanings and potential signs.  Potential meaning goes with [presence].  Potential sign associates to [message].

This is awkward, since the terms, “potential meanings” and “potential signs” take the contiguities out of their brackets (so to speak).

1006 Plus, the exercise of considering “potential meaning” and “potential sign” raises a question concerning how to square the normal-context of agent3 with the normal context of definition3.  To me, the agent3 contextualizes definition2(3) as integral to semiotic agency2.  So, somehow, the nature of spoken words2(2) gets imported into semiotic agency2 as a thing itself (or, should I say, “a noumenal overlay itself”?).

1007 Here is a picture.

The colors are suggestive, but misleading.  [Presence] is wholly contained within the semiotic of semiotic agency.  [Message] spans interventional sign-relation and semiotic agency.  The coloration reminds me that [message] is like passing through a portal to the SVs.  An interventional sign-object (SOi) [inters or infolds] the specifying sign-vehicle of semiotic agency (SVs).

Here is the trick. With [inters], the SOi enters from the Umwelt.  With [infolds], the SOi arrives from the Innerwelt.  [Inter] is not wholly contained within the agent.  [Infold] is.

That may be confusing.  And, the above figure exploits that confounding with suggestive, but misleading, coloration.

1008 What I have said concerning how [meaning] may be problematic fits the author’s bold assertion: Knowledge is a language game.

Meaning is like a substance, the contiguity between a manner of matter (the object of an exemplar sign-relation, SOe) and a manner of form (the vehicle of an specifying sign-relation, SVs).

Like [message], [meaning] is a portal.  The portal goes from the end terminus of semiotic agency, the goal2c (SOe), to the beginning terminus of the interventional sign-relation, the goal in action2c (SVi).

1009 At the same time, meaning1 is a potential that underlies a spoken term2 in the normal context of definition3.

1010 So, which is it?

Let the language games begin.

1011 The author relates that a century ago (say, around the 1920s, when the nature of empirical science is debated), linguistic theories of meaning display two fashions.  One academic style concerns how spoken expressions work in terms of symbol manipulation.  The other academic style concerns whether spoken expressions mean what dictionaries say they mean… that is, “semantic content”.

The author makes this accusation in section 8.1, titled, “Do We Ask The Right Kinds of Questions?”

1012 I find this a little funny, along with the author’s note, saying (more or less), “Human adaptive behaviors3 may be viewed as end-directed activities that construct semiotic agency2 as a capacity1 to generate such behavior3.”

Without the subscripts assigning Peirce’s categories, the note sounds perfectly circular.

With the subscripts, the statement transforms into a category-based nested form responsible for constructing semiotic agency2 as an actuality2.

This2 is semiotic agency2.

1013 Here is the trick.  “End directed activities” substitutes for “the interventional sign-relation”.

So, the interventional sign-relation [constructs] semiotic agency.

This dyad is a wonderful way to portray the biosemiotic noumenal overlay in speech-alone talk.

1014 Speech-alone talk is different from hand and hand-speech talk.

Hand talk pictures and points to its referents.

1015 In human evolution, hand talk becomes linguistic when manual-brachial icons and indexes become sufficiently distinct from one another as to constitute a system of differences.

Remember dictionaries?  They embody a system of differences.  Each written word differs from all other written words.  Symbols constitute systems of differences.  A finite set of symbols constitutes a symbolic order.  The symbolic order represented by a dictionary is… um… alphabetical.

Once routinized, manual-brachial gestures become symbols, they fall into a system of differences and become linguistic. Then, these linguistic gestural-words support grammar.  Grammar consists in symbolic operations within a finite system of differences.

So, hand talk refers by way of Peirce’s natural signs of icons and indexes (SOs).  Also, hand talk becomes linguistic when these icons and indexes become more and more symbolic (that is, distinct from one another).  Grammar consists of symbolic operations among hand-talk words.

1016 Hand and hand-speech talk belong to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

Speech-alone talk belongs to our current Lebenswelt.

Speech-alone words cannot picture or point to their referents.

1017 Speech-alone talk simply attaches a label to…. whatever… such as what the term, “end-directed activities” is supposed to mean.  Or, maybe I should say, mean, present and announce.

The spoken term, “end-directed activities” announces, “I am what constructs semiotic agency”. 

The same spoken term presents itself as belonging to the realm of actuality2.

The same spoken term has a meaning2 that arises from the potential of ‘the human capacity to generate adaptive behaviors’1 in the normal context of human adaptation3.

1018 So, here is the trick.  The term, “end-directed activities”, is just a label.

The interventional sign-relation [constructs] semiotic agency.

1019 Here is a picture.

1020 The interventional sign-relation allows us to imagine that end-directed activities reside “out there”.

But, [meaning] draws the inquirer’s gaze away from the end-directed action (SVi) back to the goal2c (SOe).

And, this is crucial, because the goal2c resides “in here”, within semiotic agency. 

05/9/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 3 of 6)

1021 So, in this language game concerning theories of meaning, I end up with the appearance that “end-directive activities” reside “out there” (as the interventional sign-vehicle (SVi) expresses an agent’s goal2c in action) as well as “in here” (as the goal2c itself (SOe)).

1022 Dare I continue?

The author calls the SOe “objective” and the SVi “objective in parentheses”.

In this terminology, the goal2c (SOe) is “objective” and its expression2c (SVi) is “objective in parenthesis” because… well… any intervention can go wrong (so, it is better to put the objective in parenthesis).

1023 A rewarding feature of this modern nomenclature is that it allows a clean break between semiotic agency (the Innerwelt aspect) and the interventional sign-relation (the Umwelt and Lebenswelt aspect).

Here is a picture.

For the contiguities, [p] is [presence], [mn] is [meaning] and [mg] is [message].

1024 A clean break makes intellectual labors simpler when [message] is [inter] and more complicated when [message] is [infold].

When I speak to myself, I labor as semiotic agency produces a speech-act that serves as an intervention which activates my… um… semiotic agency.

Is the [message] [inter] or [infold]?

Does it have to be one or the other?

1025 The medieval scholastics come up with terms that are discussed in Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Agency” (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog for October, 2023).  The terms pertain to the levels of the scholastic interscope for how humans think.  The term, “subjective”, labels the content level, where SVs resides.  The term, “objective”, labels the situation level, where SOs is located.  The term, “intersubjective” labels the situation level, where SVe is located.  The term, “suprasubjective”, labels the perspective level, where SOe is located.

1026 Here is a picture.

1027 This implies that SOe [meaning] SVi is, for scholastics, “suprasubjective’ (that is, “subjective from a divine perspective”) and, for modern academics, the locus of both “objective” and “objective in parenthesis”.

In short, the biosemiotic structure of suprasubjectivity contains both objective goal2c (SOe) and its (objective) expression in the moment (SVi).

1027 As if to demonstrate the delicacy of this modern distinction, the author offers the example of spoken language as the arbitrary relation between two systems of differences, parole (speech in act) and langue (speech decoded). 

1028 Can the reader guess how these two systems of differences fit into the above diagram?

Here is what I figure.

1029 The information2b of semiotic agency is within the agent, even though it2b concerns what2a  apparently is located without.

For this reason, I may playfully modify information2b into -formation2b (SOs) [presence] in-2b (SVe)

If the goal2c is to say ‘something’, then SVi is parole, a speech act.  The parole (SVi) stands for an intention2a (SOi) in regards to what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a (SIi).  Of course, this intention2a(SOi) is not the same as the originating goal (SOe) and that becomes evident when spoken words are instantly decoded by a langue operator2a (SVs) as an event akin to sensation2a.

1030 That brings me (the examiner) back to [meaning] as the contiguity between an objective goal2c (SOe) and an (objective) parole (SVi).

05/8/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 4 of 6)

1031 Have I avoided the author’s epistemological trap (section 8.2)?

Does what I am saying (SVi) seem to support what I think (SOe)?

At least, to a disinterested observer (SOi)?

1032 What am I wrestling with?

Here is a picture, relying on a combination of elements from Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay and from the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

1033 I now proceed by way of example.

1034 I say to Daisy, “I guess that we are taking this duck home in order to see whether it lives.”

My expression2c (SVi) stands for my intentions in making the statement2a to Daisy (SOi) in regards to what is happening3a operating on the fact that ‘something’ has happened1a (SIi).  Daisy got what she wanted.  The other dog did not.  And now, I am Daisy’s master and assigned to make sense of this disaster.  I suppose that is why humans make such good pack-leaders for these domesticated wolves.

1035 I take off my waterproof jacket, toss inside down onto the ground, then place the still-breathing remains on the tarp2a (SVs).  The duck is not as heavy as I anticipated.  It is easy to carry home, even with Daisy on the leash and constantly wanting to check on it2b (SOs).  The duck is the “form” in “information2b” (SOs).  Its presence is contiguous with the… “in- “… of “information2b” (SVe).  Yes, I am in it2c (SOe) alright.  So, is Daisy and the ornamental duck who is seriously messed up.

1036 Daisy suspects what I am going to do2c (SOe) because I did the same for her.

Her suspicions make information2b pertinent, because it2b is bound to be salient3c((1c)) to our goal2c.  

1037 My written description of Daisy’s suspicions runs right into section 8.3 titled, “The Observer, the Observed, and the Problem of Interpretation”.

Would a biosemiotician say that he (or she) can observe and measure the sign-vehicles and the sign-objects in the following diagram?

1038 Yes, the SVs and the SOs become phenomena once the biosemiotic noumenal overlay is regarded as the thing itself.  My particular episode may serve as a case study.  See any article in The Journal on the Care of Injured Ducks.

Daisy is not cognizant that I plan (SVe) work up a case study to submit for publication.

Publish or perish!

1039 Is this where the author is taking this examiner?

Yes and no.

Yes, there is an epistemic cut between an organism’s observed adaptive response (SVi) and an observer describing the adaptive response in terms of sign-elements and claiming that an interpretation is plausible (SOi).  It seems as if what is plausible (SOe) derives from a sign-object (SOs) that all biological processes and entities have in common.

No, the epistemologist cries, “Cut!”

1040 Then, members of the audience look around asking, “Who said that?”

The heckler shouts, “I mean… cut between semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation.”

Then, the well-certified members settle back in their chairs and cluck, “Yes, it is epistemic.”

Take a look at “yes” and see that the cut is incorrect.

05/7/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 5 of 6)

1041 Epistemic?

Or empirio-schematic?

Where does the epistemic cut go?

Does empirio-schematics care?

1042 We can observe and measure the sign-vehicles and sign-objects in the following figure, once we have the following figure as a diagram of the thing itself.

Then, we can formulate models to account for the sign-interpretants.

1043 On one hand, the inquirer may treat the biosemiotic noumenal overlay as operational, consisting of three sign-relations, which constitute a spiral of semiosis through time.

On the other hand, the inquirer may regard each biosemiotic spiral phenomenologically, that is, as what the noumenon must be.

1044 With this in mind, I may look at one of the real elements that goes with [meaning], SVi, along with its counterpoint, SVs.

Parole2c (SVi) and langue2a (SVs) are worth considering.

Parole2c (SVi) is a vocal expression2c (SVi) that stands for the expression of an intention2a (SOi) in regards to a content-level normal context3a and potential1a (SIi).  Like the actions of an animal, parole (SVi) is a real event that generates a sign-object (SOi) that signifies like an icon, a picture that sends a message.

Parole2c (SVi) is a real event that belongs to the interventional sign-relation.  It’s counterpart, langue2a (SVs) initiates semiotic agency.

1045 Amazingly, over a century ago, Ferdinand de Saussure transforms the discipline of linguistics by proposing that spoken language consists of two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole (SVi) and langue (SVs).

Here is one way to consider the proposition.

Parole, SVi, as an actuality2c on the perspective level, has a counterpart, langue, SVs, serving as an actuality2a on the content level.  SVi belongs to the interventional sign.  SVs belongs to semiotic agency.

1046 With that consideration in mind, suprasubjective parole2c, SVi, can be observed by a disinterested observer, and subjective langue, SVs, cannot.  But, does that invalidate the claim that SVs is phenomena?   No, langue2a, SVs, initiates the specifying sign-relation.  That is phenomenal.

Here, I add a caveat.  There is more than one way to portray parole and langue using diagrams of triadic structures.  Just saying….

1047 Nonetheless, in a complementary fashion, I may look at the other real element that goes with [meaning], SOe, along with its counterpart SOi.  Goal2c connects to [meaning].  Expression of intention2a associates to [message].

1048 This suprasubjective-subjective pair seems even more evolutionarily ancient than parole and langue.  The goal2c, SOe, terminates semiotic agency.  An expression of intention2a or the expression intended2a, SOi, satisfies the interventional sign-relation and activates a [message].  The goal2c (SOe) belongs to the Innerwelt.  The intended expression2a (SOi) belongs to the Umwelt (and for humans, the Lebenswelt).

Indeed, may I suggest that SOi is what a disinterested observer would objectify if he were not on the subjective level?

05/6/25

Looking at Alexander Kravchenko’s chapter (2024) “A Constructivist Approach…” (Part 6 of 6)

1049 Or, should I say?

SOi is what a disinterested observer would objectify if he were actually on the suprasubjective level, which he obviously claims to be.

So, where is the language game?

Is it in our brains or in our minds?

In section 8.4, the author raises a rather frightening option.

The agent3 may be the human nervous system3 rather than the human person3.

Does the potential of ‘final causality’1 implicate my brain1 or my mind1?

1050 Oh my, does my own brain3 bring forth the actuality of semiotic agency2 with the potential of ‘a final causality, where meaning and message bring forth my mind in an entanglement of the suprasubjective and the subjective (very similar to language and also very similar to the idea that both my Innerwelt and my Umwelt are Outerwelt to my nervous system)’1?

How about Daisy’s mind?

Or the duck’s?

1051 Here is a picture of the semiotic three-level interscope, with descriptive dyads for the perspective and content-level actualities displayed.

The colors indicate complementary pairs.

To me, these pairs look like human adaptations into the niche of triadic relations.  The human niche includes the potentials of interscopes and sign-relations.  The pairs link dyadic actualities on the perspective level and the content level of a three-level interscope.  These actualities contain contiguities that bridge the interventional sign-relation and semiotic agency.

1051 If [message] goes with “mind” and if [meaning] goes with the contiguity between two real elements, a goal2c and its expression as a real event2c, I may ask, “Are ‘meaning’ and ‘mind’ brought forth by a… gasp… brain?”

What about “language”?

Or, are mind and meaning organic to the reality that the three-level interscope also contains three sign-relations and the fact that the interventional sign-relation bridges to semiotic agency through the contiguities of [meaning] and [message]?

These are good questions.

1052 Sometimes, it is good to conclude an examination with a few of good questions.

My thanks to the author of this chapter, fully titled, “The Constructivist Approach to Meanings in the Universe”. 

04/30/25

Looking at Arthur Reber, Frantisek Baluska and William Miller Jr’s Chapter (2024) “The Sentient Cell” (Part 1 of 4)

0600 The text before me is chapter thirteen of Pathways (2024).  See point 0474 for book details.  The chapter title is “The Sentient Cell”.  The chapter is the first in Part III, titled “Meaning in Organism Behavior and Cognition”.  The chapter covers pages 281 to 298.

The authors of the chapter hale from diverse locations.  Arthur Reber works in the Department of Psychology at the University of British Columbia, Canada.  Frantisek Baluska is located at the Institute of Cellular and Molecular Botany, at the University of Bonn, Germany, and William Miller Jr. resides in the delocalized Bioverse Foundation.

0601 Delocalized?

Where else is one to locate bioversity?

0602 The abstract covers, in so many words, familiar territory (1 and 2).

First (1), semiotic agents3,1 are characterized by relationality, as well as thingness.  The category-based nested form serves to illustrate.

Semiotic agency is a dyadic “thing”.

The entire category-based nested form is a triadic “thing”.

0603 The category-based nested form includes all three of Peirce’s categories.  Each category expresses its own logic.  Category-based nested forms are fractal.  These lessons are garnered from two e-articles, A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0604 Second (2), agents3 and their potentials1 may be arranged hierarchically.  Lower-level subagents support the functionality of higher-level agency.  At the same time, higher-level agents call upon the operations of lower-level subagents.

Peirce has a technical term for the way thirdness contextualizes secondness and secondness situates firstness.  He calls it “precission”.

Some biologists offer a term for the way that higher-level agents appear to emerge from and situate lower-level agents.  They offer the word, “control”.  Unfortunately, “control” is already a technical term used in mechanical and electrical engineering.  I wonder whether these applications of the physical sciences are appropriate analogies for biosemiotics.

0605 So, I propose a word familiar to modern politics, and more appropriate to entities that are born, live and die.  The word starts like “precission”.  The word ends like “tide”.  And, the word conveys the impression of an agent1 calling subagents2 into a unified exercise of intentionity1.

The word is “presides”.

0606 A higher-level agent3 presides over subagents through the engagement of its semiotic agency2, arising from the potential of ‘something intentional’1.

Subagents are built into an agent’s semiotic agency2 and participate in its sign-interpretants of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations (SIs and SIe).

Here is a picture of semiotic agency and its sign-elements.

0607 The authors do not frame these now-familiar lessons (1 and 2) in terms of agent3((1) and semiotic agency2.

Instead, they marvel at the coterminality of life (cell) and awareness (sentience).

Why use the terms, “life” and “sentience”, as if they are separate concepts, the latter eventually qualifying the former?

Later in the article, the authors couple “sentience” and “consciousness” as if the latter is “what the cell would be if it were… um… subjectively experiencing the world like us (humans).”

0608 Of course, sentient cells are not “conscious” in the same way that humans are when awake (as opposed to asleep).

Clearly, the authors play a language game (typical for speech-alone talk in our current Lebenswelt).

0609 Sentience presides over life.  Life supports sentience.

To me, these key terms associate to the sign-interpretants of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations (SIs and SIe).

0610 Here is how that looks.

04/29/25

Looking at Arthur Reber, Frantisek Baluska and William Miller Jr’s Chapter (2024) “The Sentient Cell” (Part 2 of 4)

0611 Ah, I see a pattern.  The titular terms of “sentience” and “cell” label the same noumenal elements where subagents reside.  Plus, these are the elements that need to be modeled.  They are not the elements associated to phenomena.

0612 Here are the key words and their respective sign-interpretants.

The specifying sign-interpretant (SIs) derives from Kull’s criteria for semiotic agency (see points 0026 through 0037). Self-governance associates to a situation-level normal context3b and a choice of actions goes with situation-level potentials1b.

The exemplar sign-interpretant (SIe) is may be labeled, “salience3c,1c“, in order to avoid articulating (or explicitly abstracting) the perspective-level normal context3c and potential1c.  The descriptions in the preceding figure constitute my rough guesses.

After all, what does the spoken word, “salience”, mean?

Why is it present in this particular instance?

Does this particular word send a message?

0613 I suppose that I can compare my descriptions of the specifying and the exemplar sign-interpretants to the scholastic interscope for how humans think, appearing in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) “New Beginning” (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), as well as Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Razie Mah’s blog for October, 2023).

John Deely (1942-2017) is quite the scholar.  His books plumb scholastic literature for insights into postmodern semiotics.

0614 What does he discover in these explorations?

He finds that Charles Peirce (in the 1800s) comes up with the same definition of the sign-relation as Baroque scholastic, John Poinsot (in the 1600s).

Quite a discovery.

He also sets the stage for Mah’s diagram of the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

0615 The following is a hybridization of terms from the S&T noumenal overlay and features from that scholastic interscope.

0616 At this point, the authors’ language-manipulations become more obvious.

Their title is “the sentient cell”.

The aim of their chapter is to model the cellular basis for consciousness.

And, right away, this examination associates the key titular terms to the sign-interpretants in Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay.

Yes, these sign-interpretants contain subagents.

0617 The authors claim that life and sentience are coterminous (section 13.1 and 2).

Then (section 13.2.1), they assert that unicellular organisms have sensory and perceptual mechanisms (SIs).  They learn and remember (SIs and SIe).  They make decisions (SIe).

0618 Then (section 13.2.2), the authors explore how biomarkers play roles among these sign-interpretants.  These biomarkers include the actions (SOe(?)) by one subagent that serve as real initiating semiotic events (SVs) for another subagent.  One subagent sends a message.  The other subagent receives it.  A biomarker released from one subagent provides information to another subagent.  This information contributes to a goal that, for all practical purposes, both subagents have in common.

0619 At this point (section 13.2.3), the authors explicitly mention the term, “information”.

They note that biological information, unlike “information” in the computer sciences, is ambiguous.  Why?  The computer sciences focus on the transmission of information.  The biological sciences are curious how information2b(SVe) stands for a goal2c (SOe) with respect to making sense3c (or, should I say, “sentience”) enough to take action1c(SIe).  They also wonder how a real initiating event2b (SVs) stands for information2b (SOs) in regards to the living cell3b facing possible courses of action1b (SIs).

0620 In section 13.2.4, the authors insist that life and sentience cannot be attributed only to phenotypic expression of the cell.  Yes, DNA allows reproduction to unfold from a template.  But, the genome does not define the nature of biological agency.

What defines semiotic agency?

0621 May I compare the category-based nested forms for agent3 and definition3?

Perhaps, such a comparison would assist in addressing the question, “If a sentient cell is conscious… or is conscious by analogy to human consciousness… then what is the sentient cell conscious of?”

0622 Surely, the sentient cell is not conscious of its own membrane.

But, it would be if it were conscious.

The cellular membrane is precisely what is needed for both life and sentience.  So, the cellular membrane is a prime subagent.  It is a foundational subagent.  It is… so to speak… ground floor for both life and consciousness.  Along with a host of other subagents, the cellular membrane gives rise to sentience, but it is not conscious of itself.

0623 Does that answer the question? 

If life and sentience associates to sign-interpretants, then what the cell is conscious of must associate to the respective sign-vehicles and sign-objects.

How obvious is that?

04/28/25

Looking at Arthur Reber, Frantisek Baluska and William Miller Jr’s Chapter (2024) “The Sentient Cell” (Part 3 of 4)

0624 Here is a picture of what a sentient cell is “conscious” of, as it appears in a three-level interscope.

0625 Yes, this interscope is both a category-based and a semiotic arrangement.  The interscope is not suitable for empirio-schematic inquiry because science investigates actualities.  In Semiotic Agency, Sharov and Tonnessen fashion a way to express this interscope in terms of Peirce’s secondness.  The S&T noumenal overlay supports empirio-schematic research.

0626 Now, I want to take my examination in a different direction.

In section 13.2.5, the authors claim that non-biological entities cannot become sentient agents.  This claim reminds me of the problem faced by biologists, in contrast to physicists and chemists.  Semiotic agency2 is composed of both being (relationality) and matter (physicality).  Consequently, in order to understand the actuality of semiotic agency2, it2 must be placed in a normal context3 with potential1.

0627 Ironically, the same goes with the spoken word.

Here is a picture.

0628 The juxtaposition is suggestive.

0629 An agent3 and a definition3 both follow the logics of thirdness.  The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment.  Here, one agent3 excludes other agents3.  The cell membrane2 plays a role in that exclusion.  Similarly, the definition3 of one spoken word2 must exclude the definitions3 of other spoken words2 .

Notably, definition3 does has not have anything like a cell membrane2.  Rather, spoken words (parole) constitute a system of differences3.  The Greimas square proves useful for teasing out how one spoken word is distinct from other spoken words.  (See points 0586 through 0591.)

0630 Semiotic agency2 and a spoken term2 follow the logics of secondness.  These logics include the laws contradiction and noncontradiction.  If a contradiction exists, then there must be a way to either resolve or formalize the contradiction.

For semiotic agency2, one source of contradiction comes from the hierarchy of agent and subagents, as well as cooperation (and competition) among subagents.  If the agent and the subagents have difficulty coordinating2, then the agent3 may fail in regards to its intentions1.

0631 But, what are those intentions1?

Are those intentions1 what the living cell3 is sentient of2?

If so, then I suppose that semiotic agency2 involves being conscious of ‘something’1 and this ‘something’1 could be labeled with spoken words2, as if a living sentient cell could speak.

0632 ‘Final causality’1 and ‘meaning, presence and message’1 follow the logics of firstness.  Firstness is inclusive and allows contradictions.  So, the intentions1 of an agent3 cohere to the meaning, presence and message1 of a… hmmm… spoken word2?

Uh oh.

The comparison starts to break up.  It is as if definition3 is what an agent3 does.  An agent3 actualizes something2 that may compare to definition2(3) in order to bring semiotic agency2 into relation with the possibility of ‘final causality’1.

What does this imply?

Is definition2(3) is built into semiotic agency2?

Can spoken words2(2) label what the agent3 is conscious of?

0633 To me, this suggests that final causality1 undergirds the actualities of semiotic agency2 through a passage into meaning, presence and message2(1), as if meaning, presence and message2(1) (now incorporated into semiotic agency2) reify final causality1 for the agent3.

0634 In other words, the agent3 defines2(3) through its life and sentience (SIs and SIe) actualities that it is conscious of2(2) (SVs, SOs, SVe and SOe) by embodying meaning, presence and message2(1) as manifesting the potential of ‘final causality’1.

Here is a picture.

0635 Does this make sense?

The entire nested form that we (humans in our current Lebenswelt) associate with definition3 becomes a characteristic of semiotic agency2.  Therefore, all the elements of how to define a spoken word enter into the realm of actuality2. Definition3 gets transubstantiated (a change of category) down to actuality2.  Meaning, presence and message1 gets transubstantiated up to actuality2.  And, the spoken word2 becomes what the living entity would be conscious of, if it were conscious2.