05/28/25

Examining Biosemiotics at the Juncture between Non-human and Human Agency (A Look Back and Forward) (Part 4 of 4)

0863 Now I want to step backwards then forwards.

The current examination looks at two books, described in point 0830 and 0831..

Here is how the examination starts.

These two examinations are available as e-books, by Razie Mah, under the title, Biosemiotics as Noumenon, Parts 1 and 2.  Part 1 is subtitled, “Semiotic Agency”.  Part 2 is subtitles, “Origins of Life”.

0864 Part 3 concerns nonhuman agency.  This examination is completed.

Part 4, concerning human agency, remains.

0865 The reading list for Part 4 starts with a discussion of Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) “New Beginnings”, by Razie Mah.  The commentary is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

There is cause for this.

0866 The STI noumenal overlay (Sharov and Tonnessen’s semiotic agency along with the interventional sign-relation) not only explains why phenomenology works, but it also recovers some philosophical riches of the much-derided scholastic era.  Modern histories of philosophy during the twentieth century often omit the period from the 500s to the 1400s, corresponding to the birth and development of universities throughout Christendom.  Some call the period, “the dark ages”.

It is sort of like the way modern social sciences pooh-pooh phenomenology.

Academic turf must be protected.  Who is more important, an expert in modern analytic philosophy or a so-called schoolman who can explicate Saint Thomas Aquinas?

0867 One of those treasures is uncovered by John Deely (1942-2017).  Deely is both a Thomist and a semiotician (in the tradition of Charles Peirce).  Deely figures out that Charles Peirce (in the 1800s) arrives at the same definition of the sign-relation as Baroque scholastic, John Poinsot (also John of St. Thomas, in the 1600s).

This discovery is discussed in New Beginnings.  But, it is not the only surprise.

0868 What is of interest to me, in this examination of biosemiotics, is the fact that the specifying and exemplar sign-relations are embedded in a three-level interscope composed of category-based nested forms, which I call, the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

The reason is obvious.  Semiotic agency2 is a reification of the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.

0869 So, the trajectory of this examination proceeds by way of the following script.

0870 So, this juncture between non-human agency and human agency ends and the examinations continue.

05/27/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 1 of 4)

0871 The scholastic three-level interscope for how humans think is introduced in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

The conceptual apparatus is developed in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction.

The semiotic tool is productively used in Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (appearing in July 2024 in Razie Mah’s blog).

0872 Here is a diagram.

0873 The three-level interscope is a category-based nested form composed of category-based nested forms.

For each level, a triadic normal context3 brings a dyadic actuality2 into relation with a monadic possibility of ‘something’1.

Among levels, perspectivec brings situationb into relation with contenta.  Likewise, thirdness brings secondness into relation with firstness.

0874 Here is how each nested form is articulated.

On the content level, the normal context of what is happening3a brings the actuality of sensation2a into relation with the potential of ‘something happening’1a.

On the situation level, the normal context of what it means to me3b brings the actuality of perception2b into relation with the possibility of ‘situating content’1b.

On the perspective level, the normal context of whether this makes sense3c brings the actuality of a judgment2c into relation with the possibility of ‘contextualizing the situation’1c.

0874 Notice that the actualities are not portrayed as dyads.  When they are, the scholastic interscope becomes more… well… beautiful.  And, biosemioticians must be careful when a transcendental manifests, like a beautiful painting at the end of a hallway. There is no telling where that hallway leads.

0875 What about biosemiotics?

Elements of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay fit nicely into various slots in the scholastic interscope.

0876 Can I discern a specifying sign-relation?

Here, the initiating (semiotic)2a is a real event2a.

Information2b virtually situates the initiating semiotic2a, in the same way that a specifying sign-object (SOs) virtually situates its sign-vehicle (SVs).

Notice that both SOs and SVs belong to the realm of actuality.

0877 A specifying sign-interpretant (SIs) enables the SVs to stand for its SOs.

What is that SIs?

SIs consists of the situation-level normal context3b operating on its possibility1b.

In this instance, SIs is the normal context of self-governance3b operating on potential ‘courses of action’1b.

0878 I can go further.

I can imagine the exemplar sign-relation.

0879 A perspective-level goal2c virtually contextualizes situation-level information2b, in the same way that an exemplar sign-object (SOe) virtually contextualizes its sign-vehicle (SVe).

Both SOe and SVe belong to the realm of actuality.

0880 An exemplar sign-interpretant (SIe) enables the SVe to stand for its SOe.

What is that SIe?

This is where the scholastic interscope for how humans think comes in handy.

For semiotic agency, the SIe is vague.  The normal context of salience3c operates on a potential underlying salience1c.  I suppose the potential1c is ‘the possibility1c of contextualizing information2b‘, if that helps.

For the scholastic interscope, the normal context asking, “Does this make sense?”3c operates on the possibility of ‘contextualizing the situation’1c.

0881 To me, this implies that the term, “salience3c((1c))“, supports an actuality2c that weighs perception2b against sensation2a, while asking what goal2c might be attempted.

What does that imply?

0882 The scholastic interscope contains the specifying and exemplar sign relations, which figure so prominently in semiotic agency.

05/24/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 2 of 4)

0883 Here is a diagram showing the way that Sharov and Tonnessen bring a three-level interscope into a dyadic actuality suitable for laying over the noumenon of all biological processes.

Empirio-schematic inquiry into biosemiotics may now fruitfully employ this noumenal overlay as the thing that is objectified by biosemiotic phenomena.

0884 But, there is more. 

The interventional sign-relation is difficult to fathom, because its sign-vehicle cannot be seen.  It must be inferred.  In biosemiotics, that inference represents phenomena.  It is the goal2c as a sign-vehicle (SVi).

More on that in short order.

0885 Here is a picture of the interventional sign-relation within the scholastic interscope.

Before discussing the strangeness of the perspective-level sign-vehicle2c (SVi), I want to dwell on our (human) familiarity of the content-level.

What is more routine than asking the question, “What happening?”, as if this is a normal context3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening’1a?

The question asks for content, and the answer comes by way of sensation2a (SOi).  For animals, sensations do not come packaged with loads of information.  For humans, they do.  A simple statement, like “Where did you put your token?”, which is really a question, gets rapidly decoded into the content-level {SOi}2a.

Yes, the SOi is a real element.  The SVs is a real element.  The contiguity between the two is [message].

That token (SVs) is a ticket to ride (SOs).

0886 The familiar character of the content-level SOi and SIi hides the unfamiliar nature of the perspective-level SVi.

What is going on with judgment2c {SVi}2c?

05/23/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 3 of 4)

0887 The judgment2c in the above figure contains two contiguous real sign-elements.  One is the exemplar sign-object (SOe) and the other is the interventional sign-vehicle (SVi).  As already discussed, the contiguity is [meaning].  For biosemiotics, the medieval scholastic term, “judgment2c“, corresponds to {SOe [meaning] SVi}2c.

0888 At the same time, for postmodern scholastics, judgment2c is a triadic relation.

Indeed, it is the triadic relation that stands at the start of this lengthy examination v(see point 0005).

0889 There are two types of judgment.  The one depicted above is contemplative.  The other is actionable.  Once Peirce’s three categories are assigned, one category to one element, then the judgment becomes actionable.  An actionable judgment unfolds into a category-based nested form.

Does “unfolds” sound like [meaning]?

0890 One example should suffice.

The scholastics harbor an ideal for judgment2c.  As far as they are concerned, this judgment2c is the best.  A rational intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the intelligibility of perception (what ought to be, firstness) into relation with the universality of sensation (what is, secondness).

This is a level-headed judgment, for sure.  The scholastics are trying to be sensible, even when they face the nonsensical mysteries of life and revelation.  No wonder they have such riotous and entertaining debates.  In Latin, no less.

0891 Here is a picture of the scholastic’s ideal judgment.

0892 The assignments of the categories are crucial.

Thirdness goes into the normal context3.

Secondness goes into actuality2.

Firstness goes into the possibility of ‘something’1.

0893 Categorical assignments appear in the above figure.

If the assignments are different, then the judgment would unfold into a different category-based nested form.

This is critical, if I rotate the current assignments one notch counterclockwise, then the intelligibility of my perceptionsbecomes the normal context3, bringing the actuality of my “rational intellect”2 into relation with the possibility that ‘my sensations are universal’1.  Replace “intelligibility of perceptions3” with “knowledge3“, “rational intellect2” with “don’t contradict me2“, and “universality of sensations1” with “universality of what I experience1“. Then, the unfolded nested form says, “The normal context of my knowledge3 brings the actuality of ‘don’t contradict me’2 into relation with the possibility that what I experience is universal1.”

0894 Doesn’t that sound like expertise?

Rotating the categorical assignments one notch counterclockwise takes the inquirer from the scholastic idea to modern expertise.  Experts are knowledgable3, elevate their own experiences1 over others, and do not enjoy being contradicted2.

Scholastics are just trying to be rational intellects3, bringing the universality of what they sense2 into relation with the possibility of ‘an intelligent perception’1.

05/22/25

The Scholastic Interscope For How Humans Think (Part 4 of 4)

0895 So, I have a working definition of [meaning], as a judgment2c (SOs) unfolding into a category-based nested form2c (SVi).

Also, from point 0862, I have a working definition of [message], as the continuity between an expression of intention (SOi) and an initiating (semiotic) event (SVs).  Plus, the initiating (semiotic) event2a (SVs) is not the same as the event that occurs after judgment2c unfolds into an action2c (SVi).

0896 Here is a picture of the interventional sign, along with its contiguities.

0897 These contiguities turn out to be the connections between semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation.

This is shown clearly in the biosemiotic (or STI) noumenal overlay.

In sum, the scholastic interscope for how humans think assists in appreciating the nature of the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

The scholastic interscope contains three boundary-crossing sign relations.  Two belong to semiotic agency.  One belongs to the interventional sign-relation.

The scholastic interscope also contains three contiguities between sign-relations.  These correspond to content-level [message], situation-level [presence] and perspective-level [meaning].

0898 Finally, there is Peirce’s natural sign typology, consisting of icons, indexes and symbols.

An icon is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the qualities of images, pictures, unities, monads and so forth.

An index is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the characteristics of pointing, contact, cause and effect, and other dyads.

A symbol is a sign-relation, whose sign-object is based on the stuff of habit, convention, law, agreement, and so on.

0899 I conclude with a list of the sign-relations that are embedded in the scholastic interscope for how humans think,along with the sign-object and type of natural sign.

0900 This information should prove handy in the upcoming examination of human agency.

05/21/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 1 of 8)

0901 The text before me is chapter seven of Pathways (see point 0831 for book details, pages 137-166).

Examinations of the chapters on non-human agency end up with a suggestion that biosemiotics may include more than semiotic agency.  Semiotic agency contains the specifying and exemplar sign-relations.  The scholastic interscope for how humans think contains one other sign-relation.  The interventional sign-relation is odd, compared to the other two sign-relations.

So is the author’s term, “potential meanings”.

0902 Of course, the terms, “interventional sign-relation” and “potential meanings” are mere labels.  They are tags.  They are spoken words.  They are unlike the manual-brachial word-gestures of fully linguistic hand or hand-speech talk.

For hand talk, in terms of parole, gesture-words picture and point to their referents.  They are icons and indexes.  So, word-gestures (SVs) abstract the natural sign-qualities of these types of signs.  Icons and indexes picture and point to ‘something that could be present’ (SOs).  Presence (SVe) can have many meanings, depending on what is going on.  Consequently, SOe is an intuitive abstraction based on what the word-gesture implicitly pictures and points to(langue).  I call the process, “implicit abstraction”.

For example, the hand-talk word, [image RAVEN], can denote the color black, as well as particular attitudes.

The hand-talk word, [POINT to corner of eye], can denote the color white, as well as particular attitudes and warnings.

0903 Can the term, “potential meaning” be stated using hand-talk?

No.  What is there to picture or point to?

The term is an explicit abstraction.

0904 In speech-alone talk, parole is arbitrarily related to langue.

Since parole comes first, as SVs, the specified referent (SOs) comes into being after a word is spoken.  After all, SVsassociates to message and message precedes presence (SOs).  The specified referent (SOs) associates to information2b.  But, since speech-talk cannot picture or point to anything, that information2b (SOs) may end up being explicitly defined.

0905 I say “may”, because sometimes information2b is obvious.  Consider the word, “chair”.  Everyone immediately intuits a “chair”, even though chairs do not occur in nature.  But, what about the American bureaucratic designation, “chair-person”? 

Sit down for a minute and think about it.

How can a person be a chair?

0906 Sharov’s technical term, “potential meaning” has two descriptors made into one character.  So, one way to approach the term is to step back and consider the initial claim made in Razie Mah’s e-book, How To Define The Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  The normal context of definition3 brings the actuality of a spoken term2 into relation with the potential of its meaning, presence and message’1.

0907 Surely, the reader anticipates my next move.

The words that go into the slot for potential1 are familiar.

Not only do they1 underlie the actuality of a spoken term2, they1 have already been used to label the three intra-level contiguities that occur in the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

0908 Here is a picture.

Since [meaning] is the one contiguity that associates to “meaning”, [presence] and [message] must associate to the qualifier, “potential”

05/20/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 2 of 8)

0909 The introduction (section 7.1) does not disagree.

To me, it seems that the label for the contiguity between SOs and SVe could be changed to “potential meaning”. [Presence] is rich with “potential meaning”.  So is the moniker, “information2b“.

0910 At the same time, the introduction (section 7.1) does not agree.

0911 The author claims that “meaning” associates to how an organism interprets a sign.

Surely, that claim coheres to the SIs.  Or, maybe it goes with the SIe.

0912 Also, the author is interested in writing about resources that are not meaningful, but can be meaningful when an organism happens to discover that they have um… meaning2c.

Sign-relations are essential for the discovery of signification.

So, the author figures that there are potential meanings (where an entity can become meaningful to a semiotic agent) and potential signs (where an entity can come to the attention of a semiotic agent).

The author offers a table to distinguish proper meanings and signs from potential meanings and signs.

Finally, section 7.1 concludes that organisms can actualize potential meanings (and potential signs) by integrating them into their own goal-directed activities, especially when those activities are phenotypic (hence, adaptive in Umwelts past).

In section 17.2, the author develops the theme of form within a sign-relation.

The argument is theoretical.

0913 So, allow me to return a previous example.

A revision is in order.

0914 One fine morning, an unattended dog wanders the streets of my town, looking for what?… a potential sign?  No.  It is looking for a message, in the form of a SVs.

This unfamiliar dog is not an idealist.  Or maybe, the dog is an idealist, because the dog is certain that a form is nearby, and that he can sink his teeth into that form.  Not so much to chew, as to swallow.

0915 No sign-vehicle sends that interventional sign-object (SOi) until a sound, emanating from a pile of leaves, sends a message… er… a specifying sign-vehicle (SVs).

0916 Here is Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay for semiotic agency as a generalization of this canine organismin a semiotic context.

0917 In section 7.3, titled “Semiotic Agency in Biosemiotics”, Sharov references his groundbreaking 2021 work with Tonnessen.  The idea that semiotic agency is contained within biosemiotics is broached, but not with the verve of the above figure, which derives from Razie Mah’s examination of Sharov and Tonnessen’s 2021 text.

0916 “Semiotic agency” is no longer a label.  It is a technical tool for biosemiotics.  The utility of this tool is yet to be determined.  However, what this examination finds is significant.

Semiotic agency reifies specifying and exemplar sign-relations.  At the same time, semiotic agency draws upon an interscope that parallels the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

So, there are several key phenomena to consider.  The first is an initiating semiotic event2a (SVs) that parallels sensation2a.  The second is information2b (SOs [presence] SVe) that parallels perception2b.  The third is a goal or aim2c(SOe) that parallels judgment2c.

0917 Does that reduce semiotics to a tool, as noted in section 7.4?

I guess that sign-relations are tools in the same way that a dog’s snout (one side fitted for detection and the other side fitted for biting into the detected thing) is a tool.

I prefer to use the terms, “adaptations” and “phenotypes”.

0918 So, how should biosemioticians conceptualize potential meanings and potential signs (section 7.5)?

Take a look at the preceding figure.

What is in the pile of leaves?

A potential sign?

The sound and, with investigation, odor coming from a pile of leaves2a (SVs) stands for an animal2b (SOs) in regards to the wandering dog’s detecting3b something going on in a pile of leaves1b (SIs). 

0919 What is salient (SIe) about this hidden animal (SOs)?

May I also ask, “What is the potential meaning of this hidden animal?”

The dog burrows into the leaf pile for further information2b.  The animal may be wounded2b.

Well, that means it2b (SOs) is not going to fight back2b (SVe).  So, the dog’s goal module3c((1c)) (SIe) says, “Yes, I can put this in my mouth.”2c (SOe).

05/19/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 3 of 8)

0920 I am still in section 7.5, what do I know so far?

Meaning as the contiguity between SOe and  SVi lies just outside the purview of semiotic agency, as depicted in the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

Potential meaning lies within the contiguity between SOs and SVe, corresponding to situation level information2b.  Potential meaning dwells within [presence].

0921 Here is a picture of semiotic agency, once again, with [presence] shortened to [p].

0922 Can I say that again?

All biological processes have the biosemiotic noumenal overlay in common.  Semiotic agency belongs to the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.  Semiotic agency contains a contiguity, that I label presence, which throws the reader back to the proposition that presence underlies the definition of a spoken word and now, “potential meaning” is a spoken term that fits into semiotic agency as a characteristic of [presence].

0923 Here is a diagram.

0924 One remarkable feature of this diagram is that presence is technically characterized as a contiguity within semiotic agency.  And, presence1 underlies the spoken term, “potential meaning” in the normal context of definition3.  On top of that, the nested form for definition does not compare to the nested form for agent.  Instead, the normal context of agent3 brings semiotic agency2 (somehow containing a reification of the nested form of definition for a spoken word) into relation with the possibility of a ‘final causality’1.

In sum, the agent3 defines its world within semiotic agency2 according to its ongoing ‘final causalities’1.

0925 At the same time, the agent3 theoretically defines2(3) “potential meaning”2(2) according to the fact that [presence] is intrinsic to semiotic agency”2(1) (as the contiguity within information2b).

That sounds like a formal causality to me.  Formal causality brings harmony between the normal context3 and its actuality2.

0926 So, potential meaning belongs to [presence] in so far as information2b can change [salience] (SIe) in unexpected ways, resulting in impediments or empedoclements.

0927 Here is a picture.

05/17/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 4 of 8)

0928 At this point, I must keep in mind that there are two other potentials1 (besides presence1) that underlie any spoken term2 in the normal context of definition3.  These are not embodied in semiotic agency.  In fact these potentials bridge semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation on the perspective and content levels.

0929 Bridges?

Suspension bridges?

Yes, [meaning] and [message] are contiguities suspended within the perspective-level actuality2c of goal2c and the content-level actuality of real initiating (semiotic) event2a, respectively.

One contiguity spans from semiotic agency to the interventional sign-relation.  One contiguity spans in the reverse direction.

0930 In section 17.5, the author notes that the label of “potential meaning” may also be applied to hypothetical things that have not been observed before.  Well, let’s forget the qualifier, “hypothetical”, and put in the word, “encountered” for “observed”.  “Potential meaning” may be applied to things that we (semiotic agents) have not encountered before.

0931 Daisy knows ducks.  She participated in duck hunts on the farm before she broke her leg and ended up as my pet.  They were going to shoot her, to put her out of her pain, but I paid the vet bills and took her in.  It is funny how things work out that way.

So, when we come upon the unfamiliar dog, standing in a pile of leaves, with that huge ornamental duck in its mouth, I think “That poor ornamental duck.” and Daisy leaps forward and I fail to hold the leash (SVi).  Now, the crisis begins.  Daisy’s goal2c is obvious, that duck is hers and she [means] to take it (SVi).

0932 I grab some rocks from a nearby planter and rush to follow along.  I don’t know whether Daisy knows that I will fight on her side.  But, I figure that, if this fight goes from uncertainty to calamity, I can at least use the rocks as ammunition to protect myself.  Oh, forget that, I am fighting for Daisy’s cause.

0933 The dog can’t defend himself and hold the duck at the same time.  He cannot make up his mind as Daisy makes a quick pass, nipping his front leg on her way.  In the process, he exposes his flank and I throw my first rock, which hits with a resounding thud.  The unfamiliar dog looks over at me.  What the…?  He drops the duck because he expects to engage Daisy.  Daisy parks in front of him in the fierce dog sort of way.  The prize lies between them.  Then, my third rock hits (my second missed completely) and the wayward dog thinks better of it.

0934 The whole incident takes less than two minutes.  The defeated dog trots off, looking back to make sure that we are not following.  I walk over to Daisy, who appears to be guarding the dead duck.

0935 I pick up the leash and Daisy noses the duck, then looks at me, like she is saying something.

0936 This is a good example for why semiotic agency is full of adaptations.

All species adapt to interventional signs within their Umwelt.

Some of these interventional signs are completely unsettling.

They start with {SOe [meaning] SVi}2c.

0937 Here is a diagram of what happened.

0938 For the interventional sign-relation, Daisy breaking loose2c (SVi) stands for her expression of intent2a (SOi) in regards to the content-level normal context of a dog challenge3a operating on the potential of ‘one or the other getting the duck’1a (SIi).

0939 This opens me to wondering whether the message in {SOi [message] SVs}2a also carries a potential sign.

Does the unfamiliar dog dropping the duck and running off signify Daisy’s intent2a (SOi)?

That answer must be yes.

Daisy seems to be perfectly calm and I am unquestionably unnerved.

0940 Did she get what she wanted?

She presses her nose on the duck once again, then looks up at me.

At that moment, I get the message.

The duck is still alive!

05/16/25

Looking at Alexei Sharov’s Chapter (2024) “Semiotics of Potential Meanings” (Part 5 of 8)

0941 Potential meaning resides in [presence].  Potential signs reside in [message].

Does that seem rational?

0942 Here is a picture.

0943 In section 7.6, the author asks whether there can be potential meaning in a world without meaning (that is, life)?

0944 Now, if you (the reader) think that my last story about Daisy is implausible, then approach my answer as if it is a movie.  Movies only work when one suspends disbelief.  Movies are full of implausible moments.  But, the more unlikely feature is that we (humans) imagine that the illusion of moving pictures is real.  What other species watches television and responds as if the moving images convey realness?

My answer concludes at point 0964.

0945 Of course, there are physical processes that have emergent properties.  This topic of inquiry is examined in Parts 1 and 2 of Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  This commentary addresses three books Emergence (2019), Divine Action and Emergence(2021), and Theistic Evolution (2024).  This commentary is echoed in points 0288 through 0300.  These points lead into an examination of chapter 5 of Semiotic Agency (titled “Origins of Life”) and chapter 9 of Pathways (titled “Chemical Origins of Life”).

0946 If I adjust the intensity of the colors, then I can depict a world before meaning.

0947 Since biosemiotics and life are co-extensive (by definition), a non-living anti-entropic emergent being (such as a waterspout or an oil droplet in water) has no “proper semiotics”.  The purely relational structure of biosemiotics dwells in the realm of possibility.

Even stranger, neither [presence] nor [message], the harbors of potential meaning and potential sign, respectively, are real elements.  They are contiguities between real elements.

0948 Here is a picture, highlighting how these contiguities stand between real elements in a single actuality2.  They are like [substance].

At last, I can say, “Without [message], there is no sign to manifest [presence].  Without [presence], there is no [meaning].”

Without content, there is no situation.  Without situation, there is no perspective.

0949 So, the question arises, “Can there be content without perspective?”

The answer is yes and no.

The answer is yes by way of example.

The answer is no, because without meaning, how can there be a message?

How about that example?

Imagine a molecular amino acid floating along a conduit in a hydrothermal vent.  It hits a rock and clings to that rock due to electrostatics.  Then, it finds its way into a micropore, which is completely lined with organic chemicals with similar properties.  They electrostatically cling to the surface of the micropore.  Plus, there is a little circulation.  Occasional pulses bring organic material in, but (since the organic molecules cling to the crystalline walls and to one another) no organic chemicals go out.