0941 Potential meaning resides in [presence].  Potential signs reside in [message].

Does that seem rational?

0942 Here is a picture.

0943 In section 7.6, the author asks whether there can be potential meaning in a world without meaning (that is, life)?

0944 Now, if you (the reader) think that my last story about Daisy is implausible, then approach my answer as if it is a movie.  Movies only work when one suspends disbelief.  Movies are full of implausible moments.  But, the more unlikely feature is that we (humans) imagine that the illusion of moving pictures is real.  What other species watches television and responds as if the moving images convey realness?

My answer concludes at point 0964.

0945 Of course, there are physical processes that have emergent properties.  This topic of inquiry is examined in Parts 1 and 2 of Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  This commentary addresses three books Emergence (2019), Divine Action and Emergence(2021), and Theistic Evolution (2024).  This commentary is echoed in points 0288 through 0300.  These points lead into an examination of chapter 5 of Semiotic Agency (titled “Origins of Life”) and chapter 9 of Pathways (titled “Chemical Origins of Life”).

0946 If I adjust the intensity of the colors, then I can depict a world before meaning.

0947 Since biosemiotics and life are co-extensive (by definition), a non-living anti-entropic emergent being (such as a waterspout or an oil droplet in water) has no “proper semiotics”.  The purely relational structure of biosemiotics dwells in the realm of possibility.

Even stranger, neither [presence] nor [message], the harbors of potential meaning and potential sign, respectively, are real elements.  They are contiguities between real elements.

0948 Here is a picture, highlighting how these contiguities stand between real elements in a single actuality₂.  They are like [substance].

At last, I can say, “Without [message], there is no sign to manifest [presence].  Without [presence], there is no [meaning].”

Without content, there is no situation.  Without situation, there is no perspective.

0949 So, the question arises, “Can there be content without perspective?”

The answer is yes and no.

The answer is yes by way of example.

The answer is no, because without meaning, how can there be a message?

How about that example?

Imagine a molecular amino acid floating along a conduit in a hydrothermal vent.  It hits a rock and clings to that rock due to electrostatics.  Then, it finds its way into a micropore, which is completely lined with organic chemicals with similar properties.  They electrostatically cling to the surface of the micropore.  Plus, there is a little circulation.  Occasional pulses bring organic material in, but (since the organic molecules cling to the crystalline walls and to one another) no organic chemicals go out.

0950 Here is a picture.

0951 Yes, new terminology is proposed.

What is the [message]?

[Inter] is “enters from the Umwelt”.

0952 Something that is outside the micropore’s accreting sludge’s semiotic agency (SO_i) [ inters ] a place where organic molecules_2a (SV_s) stand for what is in a micropore of volcanic glass_2b (SO_s) operating on the potential of content entering into the pore and not leaving_1b (SI_s).

So, the [message] is [inter].

0953 Obviously, “inter” is a new word, technically coining something from outside of the agent that initiates semiotic agency.

The term is a play on “enter” as well as “inter”.  “Inter” derives from the Latin word for “among”, as in the term, “international”.  “Inter” also means to “bury a corpse”.  Here, “inter” alludes to the burial of the sign-object of the interventional sign.  Surely, a burial conveys a message.  That message inters the SO_i.

[Message] can be sort of like being born again.

0954 [Inter] is when the message is born the first time.  [Inter] is like a revelation to an agent that may not exist.  Or, if an agent exists, then [inter] is like a revelation, pure and simple, like the way that I realize that the dead duck is alive.

0955 Here is a picture for the nitrogenous organic molecule entering a micropore on the surface of volcanic glass in an Archean hydrothermal vent.

Organic molecules in the hydrothermal vent (SV_s) stand for accumulation (SO_s) in regards to the self-governance of carbon-based molecules in a micropore operating of possible courses of action (SI_s).

0956 The question arises, “Who is the agent₃?”

Is the “agent₃” the micropore with a hydrothermal vent?

Or, is the agent₃ the sludge accumulating in the micropore?  This agent₃ faces a problem faced by all hoarders.  There is only so much space in a micropore.  So, the micropore stops accumulating.

0957 But, not all micropores give up when sludged out.  Some develop organic subagents that assist in packing the micropore and are capable of latching to the walls of the hydrothermal vent, despite the turbulence.  These subagents then manage to colonize neighboring micropores, pack them over time, then find paths to other micropores.

Does that key into [presence]?

Is information_2b all about accumulation (SO_s) [presence] packing and moving on (SV_e)?

0957 Accumulation and packing_2b (SV_e) stands for colonization of adjacent micropores_2c (SO_e) in regards to packing micropores on the surface of volcanic glass in a hydrothermal vent_3c operating on the potential of these novel molecules that the sludge has inadvertently produced and keeps producing_1c (SI_e).

So, information_2b is more than sustained capture of organic materials floating by in the hydrothermal vent (SO_s).  Information_2b supports the spontaneous production of a suite of molecules that increase the amount that can be packed into a micropore.  Some type of catalyst manifests and this catalyst may leave the micropore and “infect” another micropore.

0958 Here is a picture.

Here, the label, [infold] replaces [inter].  [Infold] is “enters from the Innerwelt”.

Perhaps, the entire community of micropores constitutes the agent₃.

0959 Let me say that again, while focusing on the actualities.

From the outside, organic molecules may pulse into a micropore. That corresponds to [inter]. The same organic molecules tend not to leave, because they bind to the walls of the micropore (through charged interactions and dipoles) or slough out of water solution into the sludge (because water forms hydrogen bonds that exclude many organic molecules).

0960 Particularly configured organic molecules end up getting synthesized as these molecules occasionally covalently bond with one another.  They can form strings, where an organic (hydrophobic) macromolecule has two polar (hydrophilic and glass-loving) ends that can direct molecules entering the micropore to the crystal surface (for electrostatic attraction).  The hydrophobic string can direct molecules towards the organic crud (for getting out of water).

They are like hydrophobic strings with electrostatic glue on either end.

They emerge within sludge [packing tool] accumulation_2b.

0961 If one of these peculiar molecules leaves the micropore, it can “walk” along the glass surface with one end electrostatically holding on to the glass surface and the other coming loose and floating as far as the string allows before coming back to the glass surface.

In this way, one molecule can “walk” to another micropore_2a and catalyze the process of accumulation_2b if it is not already happening.

0962 And, that manifests [meaning] by instigating an interventional sign.

Biphasic macromolecular “walking” along the lining of a hydrothermal vent_2c (SV_i) stands for further settlement of porous space_2a (including micropores already spontaneously accumulating) (SO_i) in regards to the potential of ‘settling novel spaces’_1a in the normal context of a hydrothermal vent_3a (SI_i).

Notice that in the picture, the {SO_i}_2a is the intent expressed by “walking”, rather than further settlement of porous spaces.

0963 Also, I replace [inter], the technical word for [message], with [infold] because the message comes from within the system.  Here, the message, [infold], barely applies.  But, when the normal context_3a belongs to a subagent, then the term definitely applies.

0964 Back in point 0946, the author asks whether there can be potential meaning in a world without meaning (that is, life)?

The answer applies to section 7.6 (Potential Meanings and Complexity of the Non-living World) and 7.7 (Actualization of Potential Meanings by Organisms).

0965 Does the answer also apply to section 7.8 (Potential Signs and Meanings in Human Life)??

Let me go back to that preposterous story about Daisy and the duck.

0966 Here is a picture of how the incident provokes Daisy’s semiotic agency.  The picture is written in the style of a three-level interscope, for the convenience of this examiner.

0967 At the start of the incident, the sudden appearance of an unfamiliar dog pulling out something from a pile of dead leaves_2a (SV_s) stands for a duck in its mouth_2b (SO_s) in regards to Daisy’s self-governance_3b operating on potential courses of action_1b (SI_s).

The encounter with another dog is like a sensation_2a.  Realizing that a duck is in the other’s dog mouth is like a perception_2a.

0968 The duck in the other’s dog mouth_2b (SO_s) [makes present] an opportunity_2b (SV_e).

Daisy’s opportunity_2b (SV_e) stands for the goal of making the duck mine_2c (SO_e) in regards to the normal context of going for it_3c operating on the potential of ‘seizing the moment’_1c (SI_e).

0969 The perspective-level actuality_2c has the character of a judgment.  Daisy’s canine intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the intelligibility of the getting the duck in the other dog’s mouth (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with the universality of Daisy’s sizing up the other dog (what is, firstness).

Say what?

If Daisy’s sizing up the other dog is correct, then she bets that she can get the duck.

0970 Her goal of making that duck her own (SO_e) [means] a fight (SV_i).

0971 [Meaning] connects semiotic agency to an interventional sign-relation.

This is Daisy’s intervention.  I am along as an ally who is capable of throwing rocks.  When the first rock hits solidly, and the other dog looks over at me, I think, “I should have held tighter onto Daisy’s leash.”  Just kidding, I really think, “Wow.  That got his attention.”

Then, I throw the second rock and it misses completely.

0972 Once Daisy positions herself to prevent the other dog from bolting with the prize.  The wandering hound must prepare for a fight.  That means that he must put down the duck.  Then, the third rock lands and its over.

For me, I know that the interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i) has played its course when I pick up Daisy’s leash, still attached to her bodice, and she noses the duck and looks up.

0973 Here is a picture of the interventional sign-relation.

Daisy’s fight_2c (SV_i) stands for her intent at the moment of victory_2a (SO_i) in regards to victory or defeat_3a operating on the potential that the victory affords a message’_1a (SI_i).

0974 The [message] is [infolds] because Daisy and I are now a team.

The intention of Daisy_2c [infold] duck is alive_2a.

1005 On top of that, in chapter seven of Pathways, Alexei Sharov offers another option.

In addition to [meaning], there are potential meanings and potential signs.  Potential meaning goes with [presence].  Potential sign associates to [message].

This is awkward, since the terms, “potential meanings” and “potential signs” take the contiguities out of their brackets (so to speak).

1006 Plus, the exercise of considering “potential meaning” and “potential sign” raises a question concerning how to square the normal-context of agent₃ with the normal context of definition₃.  To me, the agent₃ contextualizes definition₂₍₃₎ as integral to semiotic agency₂.  So, somehow, the nature of spoken words₂₍₂₎ gets imported into semiotic agency₂ as a thing itself (or, should I say, “a noumenal overlay itself”?).

1007 Here is a picture.

The colors are suggestive, but misleading.  [Presence] is wholly contained within the semiotic of semiotic agency.  [Message] spans interventional sign-relation and semiotic agency.  The coloration reminds me that [message] is like passing through a portal to the SV_s.  An interventional sign-object (SO_i) [inters or infolds] the specifying sign-vehicle of semiotic agency (SV_s).

Here is the trick. With [inters], the SO_i enters from the Umwelt.  With [infolds], the SO_i arrives from the Innerwelt.  [Inter] is not wholly contained within the agent.  [Infold] is.

That may be confusing.  And, the above figure exploits that confounding with suggestive, but misleading, coloration.

1008 What I have said concerning how [meaning] may be problematic fits the author’s bold assertion: Knowledge is a language game.

Meaning is like a substance, the contiguity between a manner of matter (the object of an exemplar sign-relation, SO_e) and a manner of form (the vehicle of an specifying sign-relation, SV_s).

Like [message], [meaning] is a portal.  The portal goes from the end terminus of semiotic agency, the goal_2c (SO_e), to the beginning terminus of the interventional sign-relation, the goal in action_2c (SV_i).

1009 At the same time, meaning₁ is a potential that underlies a spoken term₂ in the normal context of definition₃.

1010 So, which is it?

Let the language games begin.

1011 The author relates that a century ago (say, around the 1920s, when the nature of empirical science is debated), linguistic theories of meaning display two fashions.  One academic style concerns how spoken expressions work in terms of symbol manipulation.  The other academic style concerns whether spoken expressions mean what dictionaries say they mean… that is, “semantic content”.

The author makes this accusation in section 8.1, titled, “Do We Ask The Right Kinds of Questions?”

1012 I find this a little funny, along with the author’s note, saying (more or less), “Human adaptive behaviors₃ may be viewed as end-directed activities that construct semiotic agency₂ as a capacity₁ to generate such behavior₃.”

Without the subscripts assigning Peirce’s categories, the note sounds perfectly circular.

With the subscripts, the statement transforms into a category-based nested form responsible for constructing semiotic agency₂ as an actuality₂.

This₂ is semiotic agency₂.

1013 Here is the trick.  “End directed activities” substitutes for “the interventional sign-relation”.

So, the interventional sign-relation [constructs] semiotic agency.

This dyad is a wonderful way to portray the biosemiotic noumenal overlay in speech-alone talk.

1014 Speech-alone talk is different from hand and hand-speech talk.

Hand talk pictures and points to its referents.

1015 In human evolution, hand talk becomes linguistic when manual-brachial icons and indexes become sufficiently distinct from one another as to constitute a system of differences.

Remember dictionaries?  They embody a system of differences.  Each written word differs from all other written words.  Symbols constitute systems of differences.  A finite set of symbols constitutes a symbolic order.  The symbolic order represented by a dictionary is… um… alphabetical.

Once routinized, manual-brachial gestures become symbols, they fall into a system of differences and become linguistic. Then, these linguistic gestural-words support grammar.  Grammar consists in symbolic operations within a finite system of differences.

So, hand talk refers by way of Peirce’s natural signs of icons and indexes (SO_s).  Also, hand talk becomes linguistic when these icons and indexes become more and more symbolic (that is, distinct from one another).  Grammar consists of symbolic operations among hand-talk words.

1016 Hand and hand-speech talk belong to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

Speech-alone talk belongs to our current Lebenswelt.

Speech-alone words cannot picture or point to their referents.

1017 Speech-alone talk simply attaches a label to…. whatever… such as what the term, “end-directed activities” is supposed to mean.  Or, maybe I should say, mean, present and announce.

The spoken term, “end-directed activities” announces, “I am what constructs semiotic agency”. 

The same spoken term presents itself as belonging to the realm of actuality₂.

The same spoken term has a meaning₂ that arises from the potential of ‘the human capacity to generate adaptive behaviors’₁ in the normal context of human adaptation₃.

1018 So, here is the trick.  The term, “end-directed activities”, is just a label.

The interventional sign-relation [constructs] semiotic agency.

1019 Here is a picture.

1020 The interventional sign-relation allows us to imagine that end-directed activities reside “out there”.

But, [meaning] draws the inquirer’s gaze away from the end-directed action (SV_i) back to the goal_2c (SO_e).

And, this is crucial, because the goal_2c resides “in here”, within semiotic agency. 

1021 So, in this language game concerning theories of meaning, I end up with the appearance that “end-directive activities” reside “out there” (as the interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i) expresses an agent’s goal_2c in action) as well as “in here” (as the goal_2c itself (SO_e)).

1022 Dare I continue?

The author calls the SO_e “objective” and the SV_i “objective in parentheses”.

In this terminology, the goal_2c (SO_e) is “objective” and its expression_2c (SV_i) is “objective in parenthesis” because… well… any intervention can go wrong (so, it is better to put the objective in parenthesis).

1023 A rewarding feature of this modern nomenclature is that it allows a clean break between semiotic agency (the Innerwelt aspect) and the interventional sign-relation (the Umwelt and Lebenswelt aspect).

Here is a picture.

For the contiguities, [p] is [presence], [mn] is [meaning] and [mg] is [message].

1024 A clean break makes intellectual labors simpler when [message] is [inter] and more complicated when [message] is [infold].

When I speak to myself, I labor as semiotic agency produces a speech-act that serves as an intervention which activates my… um… semiotic agency.

Is the [message] [inter] or [infold]?

Does it have to be one or the other?

1025 The medieval scholastics come up with terms that are discussed in Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Agency” (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog for October, 2023).  The terms pertain to the levels of the scholastic interscope for how humans think.  The term, “subjective”, labels the content level, where SV_s resides.  The term, “objective”, labels the situation level, where SO_s is located.  The term, “intersubjective” labels the situation level, where SV_e is located.  The term, “suprasubjective”, labels the perspective level, where SO_e is located.

1026 Here is a picture.

1027 This implies that SO_e [meaning] SV_i is, for scholastics, “suprasubjective’ (that is, “subjective from a divine perspective”) and, for modern academics, the locus of both “objective” and “objective in parenthesis”.

In short, the biosemiotic structure of suprasubjectivity contains both objective goal_2c (SO_e) and its (objective) expression in the moment (SV_i).

1027 As if to demonstrate the delicacy of this modern distinction, the author offers the example of spoken language as the arbitrary relation between two systems of differences, parole (speech in act) and langue (speech decoded). 

1028 Can the reader guess how these two systems of differences fit into the above diagram?

Here is what I figure.

1029 The information_2b of semiotic agency is within the agent, even though it_2b concerns what_2a  apparently is located without.

For this reason, I may playfully modify information_2b into -formation_2b (SO_s) [presence] in-_2b (SV_e)

If the goal_2c is to say ‘something’, then SV_i is parole, a speech act.  The parole (SV_i) stands for an intention_2a (SO_i) in regards to what is happening_3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening_1a (SI_i).  Of course, this intention_2a(SO_i) is not the same as the originating goal (SO_e) and that becomes evident when spoken words are instantly decoded by a langue operator_2a (SV_s) as an event akin to sensation_2a.

1030 That brings me (the examiner) back to [meaning] as the contiguity between an objective goal_2c (SO_e) and an (objective) parole (SV_i).

1031 Have I avoided the author’s epistemological trap (section 8.2)?

Does what I am saying (SV_i) seem to support what I think (SO_e)?

At least, to a disinterested observer (SO_i)?

1032 What am I wrestling with?

Here is a picture, relying on a combination of elements from Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay and from the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

1033 I now proceed by way of example.

1034 I say to Daisy, “I guess that we are taking this duck home in order to see whether it lives.”

My expression_2c (SV_i) stands for my intentions in making the statement_2a to Daisy (SO_i) in regards to what is happening_3a operating on the fact that ‘something’ has happened_1a (SI_i).  Daisy got what she wanted.  The other dog did not.  And now, I am Daisy’s master and assigned to make sense of this disaster.  I suppose that is why humans make such good pack-leaders for these domesticated wolves.

1035 I take off my waterproof jacket, toss inside down onto the ground, then place the still-breathing remains on the tarp_2a (SV_s).  The duck is not as heavy as I anticipated.  It is easy to carry home, even with Daisy on the leash and constantly wanting to check on it_2b (SO_s).  The duck is the “form” in “information_2b” (SO_s).  Its presence is contiguous with the… “in- “… of “information_2b” (SV_e).  Yes, I am in it_2c (SO_e) alright.  So, is Daisy and the ornamental duck who is seriously messed up.

1036 Daisy suspects what I am going to do_2c (SO_e) because I did the same for her.

Her suspicions make information_2b pertinent, because it_2b is bound to be salient_3c((1c)) to our goal_2c.  

1037 My written description of Daisy’s suspicions runs right into section 8.3 titled, “The Observer, the Observed, and the Problem of Interpretation”.

Would a biosemiotician say that he (or she) can observe and measure the sign-vehicles and the sign-objects in the following diagram?

1038 Yes, the SV_s and the SO_s become phenomena once the biosemiotic noumenal overlay is regarded as the thing itself.  My particular episode may serve as a case study.  See any article in The Journal on the Care of Injured Ducks.

Daisy is not cognizant that I plan (SV_e) work up a case study to submit for publication.

Publish or perish!

1039 Is this where the author is taking this examiner?

Yes and no.

Yes, there is an epistemic cut between an organism’s observed adaptive response (SV_i) and an observer describing the adaptive response in terms of sign-elements and claiming that an interpretation is plausible (SO_i).  It seems as if what is plausible (SO_e) derives from a sign-object (SO_s) that all biological processes and entities have in common.

No, the epistemologist cries, “Cut!”

1040 Then, members of the audience look around asking, “Who said that?”

The heckler shouts, “I mean… cut between semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation.”

Then, the well-certified members settle back in their chairs and cluck, “Yes, it is epistemic.”

Take a look at “yes” and see that the cut is incorrect.

1041 Epistemic?

Or empirio-schematic?

Where does the epistemic cut go?

Does empirio-schematics care?

1042 We can observe and measure the sign-vehicles and sign-objects in the following figure, once we have the following figure as a diagram of the thing itself.

Then, we can formulate models to account for the sign-interpretants.

1043 On one hand, the inquirer may treat the biosemiotic noumenal overlay as operational, consisting of three sign-relations, which constitute a spiral of semiosis through time.

On the other hand, the inquirer may regard each biosemiotic spiral phenomenologically, that is, as what the noumenon must be.

1044 With this in mind, I may look at one of the real elements that goes with [meaning], SV_i, along with its counterpoint, SV_s.

Parole_2c (SV_i) and langue_2a (SV_s) are worth considering.

Parole_2c (SV_i) is a vocal expression_2c (SV_i) that stands for the expression of an intention_2a (SO_i) in regards to a content-level normal context_3a and potential_1a (SI_i).  Like the actions of an animal, parole (SV_i) is a real event that generates a sign-object (SO_i) that signifies like an icon, a picture that sends a message.

Parole_2c (SV_i) is a real event that belongs to the interventional sign-relation.  It’s counterpart, langue_2a (SV_s) initiates semiotic agency.

1045 Amazingly, over a century ago, Ferdinand de Saussure transforms the discipline of linguistics by proposing that spoken language consists of two arbitrarily related systems of differences, parole (SV_i) and langue (SV_s).

Here is one way to consider the proposition.

Parole, SV_i, as an actuality_2c on the perspective level, has a counterpart, langue, SV_s, serving as an actuality_2a on the content level.  SV_i belongs to the interventional sign.  SV_s belongs to semiotic agency.

1046 With that consideration in mind, suprasubjective parole_2c, SV_i, can be observed by a disinterested observer, and subjective langue, SV_s, cannot.  But, does that invalidate the claim that SV_s is phenomena?   No, langue_2a, SV_s, initiates the specifying sign-relation.  That is phenomenal.

Here, I add a caveat.  There is more than one way to portray parole and langue using diagrams of triadic structures.  Just saying….

1047 Nonetheless, in a complementary fashion, I may look at the other real element that goes with [meaning], SO_e, along with its counterpart SO_i.  Goal_2c connects to [meaning].  Expression of intention_2a associates to [message].

1048 This suprasubjective-subjective pair seems even more evolutionarily ancient than parole and langue.  The goal_2c, SO_e, terminates semiotic agency.  An expression of intention_2a or the expression intended_2a, SO_i, satisfies the interventional sign-relation and activates a [message].  The goal_2c (SO_e) belongs to the Innerwelt.  The intended expression_2a (SO_i) belongs to the Umwelt (and for humans, the Lebenswelt).

Indeed, may I suggest that SO_i is what a disinterested observer would objectify if he were not on the subjective level?

0611 Ah, I see a pattern.  The titular terms of “sentience” and “cell” label the same noumenal elements where subagents reside.  Plus, these are the elements that need to be modeled.  They are not the elements associated to phenomena.

0612 Here are the key words and their respective sign-interpretants.

The specifying sign-interpretant (SI_s) derives from Kull’s criteria for semiotic agency (see points 0026 through 0037). Self-governance associates to a situation-level normal context_3b and a choice of actions goes with situation-level potentials_1b.

The exemplar sign-interpretant (SI_e) is may be labeled, “salience_3c,1c“, in order to avoid articulating (or explicitly abstracting) the perspective-level normal context_3c and potential_1c.  The descriptions in the preceding figure constitute my rough guesses.

After all, what does the spoken word, “salience”, mean?

Why is it present in this particular instance?

Does this particular word send a message?

0613 I suppose that I can compare my descriptions of the specifying and the exemplar sign-interpretants to the scholastic interscope for how humans think, appearing in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) “New Beginning” (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), as well as Looking at John Deely’s Book (2010) “Semiotic Animal” (Razie Mah’s blog for October, 2023).

John Deely (1942-2017) is quite the scholar.  His books plumb scholastic literature for insights into postmodern semiotics.

0614 What does he discover in these explorations?

He finds that Charles Peirce (in the 1800s) comes up with the same definition of the sign-relation as Baroque scholastic, John Poinsot (in the 1600s).

Quite a discovery.

He also sets the stage for Mah’s diagram of the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

0615 The following is a hybridization of terms from the S&T noumenal overlay and features from that scholastic interscope.

0616 At this point, the authors’ language-manipulations become more obvious.

Their title is “the sentient cell”.

The aim of their chapter is to model the cellular basis for consciousness.

And, right away, this examination associates the key titular terms to the sign-interpretants in Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay.

Yes, these sign-interpretants contain subagents.

0617 The authors claim that life and sentience are coterminous (section 13.1 and 2).

Then (section 13.2.1), they assert that unicellular organisms have sensory and perceptual mechanisms (SI_s).  They learn and remember (SI_s and SI_e).  They make decisions (SI_e).

0618 Then (section 13.2.2), the authors explore how biomarkers play roles among these sign-interpretants.  These biomarkers include the actions (SO_e(?)) by one subagent that serve as real initiating semiotic events (SV_s) for another subagent.  One subagent sends a message.  The other subagent receives it.  A biomarker released from one subagent provides information to another subagent.  This information contributes to a goal that, for all practical purposes, both subagents have in common.

0619 At this point (section 13.2.3), the authors explicitly mention the term, “information”.

They note that biological information, unlike “information” in the computer sciences, is ambiguous.  Why?  The computer sciences focus on the transmission of information.  The biological sciences are curious how information_2b(SV_e) stands for a goal_2c (SO_e) with respect to making sense_3c (or, should I say, “sentience”) enough to take action_1c(SI_e).  They also wonder how a real initiating event_2b (SV_s) stands for information_2b (SO_s) in regards to the living cell_3b facing possible courses of action_1b (SI_s).

0620 In section 13.2.4, the authors insist that life and sentience cannot be attributed only to phenotypic expression of the cell.  Yes, DNA allows reproduction to unfold from a template.  But, the genome does not define the nature of biological agency.

What defines semiotic agency?

0621 May I compare the category-based nested forms for agent₃ and definition₃?

Perhaps, such a comparison would assist in addressing the question, “If a sentient cell is conscious… or is conscious by analogy to human consciousness… then what is the sentient cell conscious of?”

0622 Surely, the sentient cell is not conscious of its own membrane.

But, it would be if it were conscious.

The cellular membrane is precisely what is needed for both life and sentience.  So, the cellular membrane is a prime subagent.  It is a foundational subagent.  It is… so to speak… ground floor for both life and consciousness.  Along with a host of other subagents, the cellular membrane gives rise to sentience, but it is not conscious of itself.

0623 Does that answer the question? 

If life and sentience associates to sign-interpretants, then what the cell is conscious of must associate to the respective sign-vehicles and sign-objects.

How obvious is that?

0624 Here is a picture of what a sentient cell is “conscious” of, as it appears in a three-level interscope.

0625 Yes, this interscope is both a category-based and a semiotic arrangement.  The interscope is not suitable for empirio-schematic inquiry because science investigates actualities.  In Semiotic Agency, Sharov and Tonnessen fashion a way to express this interscope in terms of Peirce’s secondness.  The S&T noumenal overlay supports empirio-schematic research.

0626 Now, I want to take my examination in a different direction.

In section 13.2.5, the authors claim that non-biological entities cannot become sentient agents.  This claim reminds me of the problem faced by biologists, in contrast to physicists and chemists.  Semiotic agency₂ is composed of both being (relationality) and matter (physicality).  Consequently, in order to understand the actuality of semiotic agency₂, it₂ must be placed in a normal context₃ with potential₁.

0627 Ironically, the same goes with the spoken word.

Here is a picture.

0628 The juxtaposition is suggestive.

0629 An agent₃ and a definition₃ both follow the logics of thirdness.  The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment.  Here, one agent₃ excludes other agents₃.  The cell membrane₂ plays a role in that exclusion.  Similarly, the definition₃ of one spoken word₂ must exclude the definitions₃ of other spoken words₂ .

Notably, definition₃ does has not have anything like a cell membrane₂.  Rather, spoken words (parole) constitute a system of differences₃.  The Greimas square proves useful for teasing out how one spoken word is distinct from other spoken words.  (See points 0586 through 0591.)

0630 Semiotic agency₂ and a spoken term₂ follow the logics of secondness.  These logics include the laws contradiction and noncontradiction.  If a contradiction exists, then there must be a way to either resolve or formalize the contradiction.

For semiotic agency₂, one source of contradiction comes from the hierarchy of agent and subagents, as well as cooperation (and competition) among subagents.  If the agent and the subagents have difficulty coordinating₂, then the agent₃ may fail in regards to its intentions₁.

0631 But, what are those intentions₁?

Are those intentions₁ what the living cell₃ is sentient of₂?

If so, then I suppose that semiotic agency₂ involves being conscious of ‘something’₁ and this ‘something’₁ could be labeled with spoken words₂, as if a living sentient cell could speak.

0632 ‘Final causality’₁ and ‘meaning, presence and message’₁ follow the logics of firstness.  Firstness is inclusive and allows contradictions.  So, the intentions₁ of an agent₃ cohere to the meaning, presence and message₁ of a… hmmm… spoken word₂?

Uh oh.

The comparison starts to break up.  It is as if definition₃ is what an agent₃ does.  An agent₃ actualizes something₂ that may compare to definition₂₍₃₎ in order to bring semiotic agency₂ into relation with the possibility of ‘final causality’₁.

What does this imply?

Is definition₂₍₃₎ is built into semiotic agency₂?

Can spoken words₂₍₂₎ label what the agent₃ is conscious of?

0633 To me, this suggests that final causality₁ undergirds the actualities of semiotic agency₂ through a passage into meaning, presence and message₂₍₁₎, as if meaning, presence and message₂₍₁₎ (now incorporated into semiotic agency₂) reify final causality₁ for the agent₃.

0634 In other words, the agent₃ defines₂₍₃₎ through its life and sentience (SI_s and SI_e) actualities that it is conscious of₂₍₂₎ (SV_s, SO_s, SV_e and SO_e) by embodying meaning, presence and message₂₍₁₎ as manifesting the potential of ‘final causality’₁.

Here is a picture.

0635 Does this make sense?

The entire nested form that we (humans in our current Lebenswelt) associate with definition₃ becomes a characteristic of semiotic agency₂.  Therefore, all the elements of how to define a spoken word enter into the realm of actuality₂. Definition₃ gets transubstantiated (a change of category) down to actuality₂.  Meaning, presence and message₁ gets transubstantiated up to actuality₂.  And, the spoken word₂ becomes what the living entity would be conscious of, if it were conscious₂.

0659 In section 14.3, the authors report evidence that supports the hypothesis.

0660 What do bacterial researchers observe?

The authors provide examples “hyperstructures” in Table 14.1.  These include cytoskeletal filaments, structures made from enzymes, microcomponents, membrane-associated structures, external appendages, DNA-containing structures, phase separation condensates and more.

0661 What do the hyperstructures tell the researcher?

Hyperstructures vary depending on how much energy is available… oh, I meant to say… nutrients are available.

So, the authors propose two temporal phenotypes, corresponding to the appearance of hyperstructures that use lots of energy (NE, non-equilibrium conditions) and ones that conserve current integrity (E, equilibrium conditions).

0662 Here is a picture.

0663 As one might suspect, the two models of hyperstructure maintenance (SI_s) and plasticity (SI_e) work in tandem.  Some transitions from one temporal phenotype to another are easy.  Some are not so easy.

As one might have anticipated, a tremendous amount of scientific research has gone into almost all aspects of the hyperstructures, especially in regards to genomic regulation of bacterial DNA.  Empirio-schematic research abounds.  The problem is that research discoveries appear to have little in common.  It’s the problem of inquiry into each leaf occludes the reality of the tree.

0664 The authors provide an example, in section1 4.3.2, for the case when lactose is among the nutrients.

The lac operon, when expressed, contributes to NE hyperstructures.  Lactose… transformed into one isomer, allolactose… induces synthesis of the lac operon by binding to a LacI protein that clings to bacterial DNA and represses genomic expression.  Allolactose binds to LacI protein and changes it conformation.  The allolactose-bound LacI protein lets go of the strands of DNA that it is holding on to, providing the opportunity for formerly suppressed genes to be converted into mRNA.

In sum, for bacteria, lactose is both a nutrient and a cue (SV_s) that ultimately says, “Fatten up and divide (SO_e).”

0665 Section 14.3.4 describes cell-cycle hyperstructures and signaling.  That is to say, “The NE route.”  The density of scientific detail stuns the reader.  By my estimate, every two sentences summarizes a doctoral thesis.  In some paragraphs, every sentence boils down years of research by a doctoral student.  The section reads like a biochemical textbook.

After this tour de force of supporting evidence, the authors propose (in section 14.4) that semiotics can be used to explain cues and signals (SV_s) in bacteria.

0666 This is where the authors stand today, in 2024, at the threshold of appreciating the um… message, presence and meaning… that biosemioticians observe and measure, in order to construct models of [being alive] and [sentience].

0667 As noted earlier, message (SV_s), presence (SO_s [&] SV_e) and meaning (SO_e) go with phenomena.

[Being alive (SI_s)] and [sentience (SI_e)] are what need to be modeled.

0668 What does this suggest?

The authors do not need to call for semiotics to explain cues and signals in bacteria.

Cues and signals are already specifying sign-vehicles (SVs) in the specifying sign-relation.

0669 Phenomena do not need to be explained.

Phenomena need to be observed and measured by humans who innately recognize sign-elements.  Plus, in our current Lebenswelt, we can label those sign-elements through explicit abstraction.

Biosemiotic observations and measurements (what is, firstness) are used to build models (what ought to be, secondness) within the purview of a scientific disciplinary language (relation, thirdness).  Such is the empirio-schematic judgment.

0669 Biologist Jakob von Uexkull intuitively senses this.  He does not have the advantage of Peircean diagrams of judgment or interscopes.  He cannot formulate the category-based nested form, where the normal context of definition₃brings the actuality of a spoken word₂ into relation with the potential of ‘meaning, presence and message’₁.  But, he intuitively senses that definition₃, spoken words₂ and the potential of explicit abstraction₁ fit into the conceptualization of semiotic agency.  That is why he frames his research in terms of theoretical biology and theories of meaning.

0670 Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen, in their 2021 book, Semiotic Agency, also intuitively grasp this.  Unlike von Uexkull, they have loads of scientific research into biological systems, from the micro to the macro, at their disposal.  However, like von Uexkull, they do not have the disciplinary language to articulate… um… diagram… their noumenal overlay.

The only way to get to the point of picturing a noumenal overlay is to use diagrams of triadic relations.  One value of this examination comes precisely in the act of diagramming the authors’ arguments using triadic relations. Another value of this examination comes in the act of framing the history of biosemiotics as a historical response to the Positivist’s judgment.

0671 Yes, we stand on the shoulders of giants.

Charles Peirce (1839-1914), Edmund Husserl (1859-1939), Jakob von Uexkull (1864-1944), Thomas Sebeok (1920-2001) and John Deely (1942-2017) are giants upon whose shoulders both the authors (and Razie Mah) stand.

Nonetheless, diagrams can really be useful.