1230 Now, back to evolution.

May I use the same technique for my examination of evolution?

May I pass from thirdness (M) to secondness (N), then add a twist (O)?

1231 I start with neodarwinism as an intersection (M).  The single actuality₂ may be individual₂, species₂ or genus₂.

The intersection consists two triadic relations, even though the single actuality₂ um.. belongs to secondness.

Here is a picture.

1232 Yes, adaptation_2H is not the same as phenotype_2V.

Not only that, each actuality_2b belongs to a situation-level nested form.

Here is the two-level interscope for adaptation_2H.

1233 In previous examinations, the term, “niche” is a point of contention.  Does the term have a clear technical definition?  Or does “niche” suggest “whatever adaptations are adapting to”?

Surely, a technical definition is implied by the above figure.

A niche_1b is the potential_1b of an actuality of the adapting species_2a.

1234 This introduces another point of contention.

Does the niche have to consist of purely material conditions, whether environmental or ecological?  The answer is no, even though, for almost all species, the niche is the potential of ‘something’ in the environment or the ecology.  The most obvious exception is our own genus, the Homo genus, whose niche is the potential of triadic relations.

Triadic relations are immaterial beings that entangle the material world.  So, a scientist, working under the presumption of the positivist intellect (metaphysics is not allowed), has a difficult time because observations and measurements follow only the entangled material world, rather than the significant observable and measurable facets of the thing itself.

The biosemiotic noumenal overlay changes the game in that respect.  Phenomena consist of sign-vehicles and sign-objects that would be rejected by the modern positivist intellect because they are imbued with formal and final causalities.

1235 As for the potential of triadic relations, consider the e-book, The Human Niche (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

1236 Here is two-level interscope for phenotype_2V.

1237 Hmmm, what is going on with the genotype_1b?

Like “niche_1b“, “genotype_1b” labels a potential: the potential_1b of DNA_2a.  The cellular apparatus for translating DNA into proteins is a complicated arrangement.  Nevertheless, scientists currently have a fairly coherent story for how a DNA world supports a RNA world and a RNA world translates into a protein world.  The phenotype_2b manifests in the protein world.  Proteins get cellular processes done.

1238 Natural historians say, “Consider the adaptation_2H.”

Geneticists say, “Consider the phenotype_2V.”

The two-level interscopes of adaptation_2b and of phenotype_2b have one thing in common.

Both express all the elements of the specifying sign-relation. 

1239 For the natural historian, an actuality independent of the adapting species_2a (SV_s) stands for an adaptation_2b(SO_s) in regards to natural selection_3b operating on a niche_1b (SI_s).

For the geneticist, DNA_2a (SV_s) stands for a phenotype_2b (SO_s) in regards to body development_3b operating on the genotype_1b (SI_s).

1240 Now, I wonder whether I can repeat the same trick as the one performed at the very start of Semiotic Agency (N).

1241 The above figure expresses two styles of triadic relations, the specifying sign-relation and the two-level interscope.  There are two real elements, the content- and situation-level actualities, and they look like a dyad.  The situation level holds one real element, which I associate to matter (or esse_ce, being [substantiating]).  The content level holds the other real element, which I associate to form (or essence, [substantiated] being}.

1242 Why the associations?

That is how the actualities appear in the above figure.

Content-level form (SV_s) stands for situation-level matter (SO_s).  This is like the appearance of a shape (SV_s) standing for the presence of matter (SO_s) in regards to a situation-level normal context_3b operating on the possibility of ‘situating content’_1b (SI_s).  Or, this is like a sensation_2a (SV_s) standing for a perception_2b (SO_s) in the normal context of what it_2ameans to me_3b operating on the potential_1b of situating content_2a (SI_s).

1243 What else do I see?

I see the situation-level normal context_3b and its potential_1b folding into the contiguity between matter (SO_s) and form(SV_s).

Here is a picture.

Surely, this diagram associates to the S&T noumenal overlay, but separately for adaptation_2b and phenotype_2b.

1244 Adaptation_2b looks like information_2b.

1245 Phenotype also looks like information_2b.

1246 Both these figures represent incomplete pictures of semiotic agency, because there are no exemplar sign-relations.

Both tell me how incomplete neodarwinism is, as a model for biological systems.

Natural historians may be satisfied with the way that darwinism fits.

Geneticists may be satisfied with the way that the “neo” of neodarwinism fits.

1247 Why don’t most biologists want to talk about “niche” or “genotype”?

Well, the real elements, SV_s and SO_s, are obvious.

How does one model what needs to be accounted for (the contiguity, SI_s) using observations and measurements of the phenomena of the real elements (SV_s and SO_s)?

Well, natural historians and geneticists are doing research everyday.  They encounter this issue. But, they do not have a complete image of semiotic agency that directs the inquirer.

They do not have an exemplar sign-relation.

1248 Why is this lack of exemplar sign-relation salient_3c((1c))?

Section 3.1 of chapter 3 of Semiotic Agency says that the human individual has three major components: a body (J), cognition (K) and a niche (L).

1249 What does that (J, K, L) tell me?

1250 Take a look at Figure 3.1, which portrays each component in a cut and paste manner.

1251 Surely, the human body (J) corresponds to phenotype_2b as the sign object of a specifying relation.

In section 3.2, the author discusses the human body (J) in terms of subagency.

That is fine, because subagency models [body development_3b operating on the genotype_1a].  Current research in a variety of disciplines related to genetics is relevant.

1252 The niche (L) corresponds to adaptation_2b as the sign-object of a specifying sign-relation.

In section 3.4, the author says that the human niche (L) includes the environment (as well as ecology), human artifacts, semiotic factors (such as information and communication) and social conditions.

Yes, but what about triadic relations?

1253 The author goes on to wrestle with different approaches to the term, “niche”.  Each approach tries to model [natural selection_3b operating on the potential_1b of an actuality independent of the adapting species_2a].  But, no approach identifies the one actuality_2a that accounts for convergent evolution among all hominin species.

Yes, I am talking about triadic relations.

See The Human Niche, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

1254 The author raises the idea of a “cognitive niche”, which brings me to cognition (K).

Section 3.3 discusses human cognition (K) in terms of subagents.

1255 There are mental modules devoted to sensation, perception, memory, integration and action.  They are heterogeneous.  They may be called “cognits” because they knit cogs.  Surely, mental modules and “cognits” are neural… I mean… cognitive adaptations.  Several chapters in Semiotic Agency are devoted to these topics.

Section 3.5 covers periods of human life in terms of age-related phenotype_3V (J), adaptation_2H (L) and cognition (K).  This section rounds off the idea that the human has three components.

1256 Cognition (K) corresponds to the union of both phenotype_2H (J) and adaptation_2V (L) when it comes to human agency.

And, that is very curious.

1257 The issue of the salience_3c((1c)) of the exemplar sign-relation is not raised.

Why is this issue important to me?

Do I see an opportunity?

1258 I see that a living being is an intersection between adaptation_2H and phenotype_2V.

I also notice that, when placed into the purely relational structure of semiotic agency, the specifying sign-relation for both adaptation_2b and phenotype_2b lack exemplar sign-relations.

1259 So, I wonder, does the intersection of neodarwinism provide complementary exemplar sign relations for the specifying sign-relations of natural history and genetics?

0909 The introduction (section 7.1) does not disagree.

To me, it seems that the label for the contiguity between SO_s and SV_e could be changed to “potential meaning”. [Presence] is rich with “potential meaning”.  So is the moniker, “information_2b“.

0910 At the same time, the introduction (section 7.1) does not agree.

0911 The author claims that “meaning” associates to how an organism interprets a sign.

Surely, that claim coheres to the SI_s.  Or, maybe it goes with the SI_e.

0912 Also, the author is interested in writing about resources that are not meaningful, but can be meaningful when an organism happens to discover that they have um… meaning_2c.

Sign-relations are essential for the discovery of signification.

So, the author figures that there are potential meanings (where an entity can become meaningful to a semiotic agent) and potential signs (where an entity can come to the attention of a semiotic agent).

The author offers a table to distinguish proper meanings and signs from potential meanings and signs.

Finally, section 7.1 concludes that organisms can actualize potential meanings (and potential signs) by integrating them into their own goal-directed activities, especially when those activities are phenotypic (hence, adaptive in Umwelts past).

In section 17.2, the author develops the theme of form within a sign-relation.

The argument is theoretical.

0913 So, allow me to return a previous example.

A revision is in order.

0914 One fine morning, an unattended dog wanders the streets of my town, looking for what?… a potential sign?  No.  It is looking for a message, in the form of a SV_s.

This unfamiliar dog is not an idealist.  Or maybe, the dog is an idealist, because the dog is certain that a form is nearby, and that he can sink his teeth into that form.  Not so much to chew, as to swallow.

0915 No sign-vehicle sends that interventional sign-object (SO_i) until a sound, emanating from a pile of leaves, sends a message… er… a specifying sign-vehicle (SV_s).

0916 Here is Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay for semiotic agency as a generalization of this canine organismin a semiotic context.

0917 In section 7.3, titled “Semiotic Agency in Biosemiotics”, Sharov references his groundbreaking 2021 work with Tonnessen.  The idea that semiotic agency is contained within biosemiotics is broached, but not with the verve of the above figure, which derives from Razie Mah’s examination of Sharov and Tonnessen’s 2021 text.

0916 “Semiotic agency” is no longer a label.  It is a technical tool for biosemiotics.  The utility of this tool is yet to be determined.  However, what this examination finds is significant.

Semiotic agency reifies specifying and exemplar sign-relations.  At the same time, semiotic agency draws upon an interscope that parallels the scholastic interscope for how humans think.

So, there are several key phenomena to consider.  The first is an initiating semiotic event_2a (SV_s) that parallels sensation_2a.  The second is information_2b (SO_s [presence] SV_e) that parallels perception_2b.  The third is a goal or aim_2c(SO_e) that parallels judgment_2c.

0917 Does that reduce semiotics to a tool, as noted in section 7.4?

I guess that sign-relations are tools in the same way that a dog’s snout (one side fitted for detection and the other side fitted for biting into the detected thing) is a tool.

I prefer to use the terms, “adaptations” and “phenotypes”.

0918 So, how should biosemioticians conceptualize potential meanings and potential signs (section 7.5)?

Take a look at the preceding figure.

What is in the pile of leaves?

A potential sign?

The sound and, with investigation, odor coming from a pile of leaves_2a (SV_s) stands for an animal_2b (SO_s) in regards to the wandering dog’s detecting_3b something going on in a pile of leaves_1b (SI_s). 

0919 What is salient (SI_e) about this hidden animal (SO_s)?

May I also ask, “What is the potential meaning of this hidden animal?”

The dog burrows into the leaf pile for further information_2b.  The animal may be wounded_2b.

Well, that means it_2b (SO_s) is not going to fight back_2b (SV_e).  So, the dog’s goal module_3c((1c)) (SI_e) says, “Yes, I can put this in my mouth.”_2c (SO_e).

0920 I am still in section 7.5, what do I know so far?

Meaning as the contiguity between SO_e and  SV_i lies just outside the purview of semiotic agency, as depicted in the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.

Potential meaning lies within the contiguity between SO_s and SV_e, corresponding to situation level information_2b.  Potential meaning dwells within [presence].

0921 Here is a picture of semiotic agency, once again, with [presence] shortened to [p].

0922 Can I say that again?

All biological processes have the biosemiotic noumenal overlay in common.  Semiotic agency belongs to the biosemiotic noumenal overlay.  Semiotic agency contains a contiguity, that I label presence, which throws the reader back to the proposition that presence underlies the definition of a spoken word and now, “potential meaning” is a spoken term that fits into semiotic agency as a characteristic of [presence].

0923 Here is a diagram.

0924 One remarkable feature of this diagram is that presence is technically characterized as a contiguity within semiotic agency.  And, presence₁ underlies the spoken term, “potential meaning” in the normal context of definition₃.  On top of that, the nested form for definition does not compare to the nested form for agent.  Instead, the normal context of agent₃ brings semiotic agency₂ (somehow containing a reification of the nested form of definition for a spoken word) into relation with the possibility of a ‘final causality’₁.

In sum, the agent₃ defines its world within semiotic agency₂ according to its ongoing ‘final causalities’₁.

0925 At the same time, the agent₃ theoretically defines₂₍₃₎ “potential meaning”₂₍₂₎ according to the fact that [presence] is intrinsic to semiotic agency”₂₍₁₎ (as the contiguity within information_2b).

That sounds like a formal causality to me.  Formal causality brings harmony between the normal context₃ and its actuality₂.

0926 So, potential meaning belongs to [presence] in so far as information_2b can change [salience] (SI_e) in unexpected ways, resulting in impediments or empedoclements.

0927 Here is a picture.

0928 At this point, I must keep in mind that there are two other potentials₁ (besides presence₁) that underlie any spoken term₂ in the normal context of definition₃.  These are not embodied in semiotic agency.  In fact these potentials bridge semiotic agency and the interventional sign-relation on the perspective and content levels.

0929 Bridges?

Suspension bridges?

Yes, [meaning] and [message] are contiguities suspended within the perspective-level actuality_2c of goal_2c and the content-level actuality of real initiating (semiotic) event_2a, respectively.

One contiguity spans from semiotic agency to the interventional sign-relation.  One contiguity spans in the reverse direction.

0930 In section 17.5, the author notes that the label of “potential meaning” may also be applied to hypothetical things that have not been observed before.  Well, let’s forget the qualifier, “hypothetical”, and put in the word, “encountered” for “observed”.  “Potential meaning” may be applied to things that we (semiotic agents) have not encountered before.

0931 Daisy knows ducks.  She participated in duck hunts on the farm before she broke her leg and ended up as my pet.  They were going to shoot her, to put her out of her pain, but I paid the vet bills and took her in.  It is funny how things work out that way.

So, when we come upon the unfamiliar dog, standing in a pile of leaves, with that huge ornamental duck in its mouth, I think “That poor ornamental duck.” and Daisy leaps forward and I fail to hold the leash (SV_i).  Now, the crisis begins.  Daisy’s goal_2c is obvious, that duck is hers and she [means] to take it (SV_i).

0932 I grab some rocks from a nearby planter and rush to follow along.  I don’t know whether Daisy knows that I will fight on her side.  But, I figure that, if this fight goes from uncertainty to calamity, I can at least use the rocks as ammunition to protect myself.  Oh, forget that, I am fighting for Daisy’s cause.

0933 The dog can’t defend himself and hold the duck at the same time.  He cannot make up his mind as Daisy makes a quick pass, nipping his front leg on her way.  In the process, he exposes his flank and I throw my first rock, which hits with a resounding thud.  The unfamiliar dog looks over at me.  What the…?  He drops the duck because he expects to engage Daisy.  Daisy parks in front of him in the fierce dog sort of way.  The prize lies between them.  Then, my third rock hits (my second missed completely) and the wayward dog thinks better of it.

0934 The whole incident takes less than two minutes.  The defeated dog trots off, looking back to make sure that we are not following.  I walk over to Daisy, who appears to be guarding the dead duck.

0935 I pick up the leash and Daisy noses the duck, then looks at me, like she is saying something.

0936 This is a good example for why semiotic agency is full of adaptations.

All species adapt to interventional signs within their Umwelt.

Some of these interventional signs are completely unsettling.

They start with {SO_e [meaning] SV_i}_2c.

0937 Here is a diagram of what happened.

0938 For the interventional sign-relation, Daisy breaking loose_2c (SV_i) stands for her expression of intent_2a (SO_i) in regards to the content-level normal context of a dog challenge_3a operating on the potential of ‘one or the other getting the duck’_1a (SI_i).

0939 This opens me to wondering whether the message in {SO_i [message] SV_s}_2a also carries a potential sign.

Does the unfamiliar dog dropping the duck and running off signify Daisy’s intent_2a (SO_i)?

That answer must be yes.

Daisy seems to be perfectly calm and I am unquestionably unnerved.

0940 Did she get what she wanted?

She presses her nose on the duck once again, then looks up at me.

At that moment, I get the message.

The duck is still alive!

0941 Potential meaning resides in [presence].  Potential signs reside in [message].

Does that seem rational?

0942 Here is a picture.

0943 In section 7.6, the author asks whether there can be potential meaning in a world without meaning (that is, life)?

0944 Now, if you (the reader) think that my last story about Daisy is implausible, then approach my answer as if it is a movie.  Movies only work when one suspends disbelief.  Movies are full of implausible moments.  But, the more unlikely feature is that we (humans) imagine that the illusion of moving pictures is real.  What other species watches television and responds as if the moving images convey realness?

My answer concludes at point 0964.

0945 Of course, there are physical processes that have emergent properties.  This topic of inquiry is examined in Parts 1 and 2 of Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues).  This commentary addresses three books Emergence (2019), Divine Action and Emergence(2021), and Theistic Evolution (2024).  This commentary is echoed in points 0288 through 0300.  These points lead into an examination of chapter 5 of Semiotic Agency (titled “Origins of Life”) and chapter 9 of Pathways (titled “Chemical Origins of Life”).

0946 If I adjust the intensity of the colors, then I can depict a world before meaning.

0947 Since biosemiotics and life are co-extensive (by definition), a non-living anti-entropic emergent being (such as a waterspout or an oil droplet in water) has no “proper semiotics”.  The purely relational structure of biosemiotics dwells in the realm of possibility.

Even stranger, neither [presence] nor [message], the harbors of potential meaning and potential sign, respectively, are real elements.  They are contiguities between real elements.

0948 Here is a picture, highlighting how these contiguities stand between real elements in a single actuality₂.  They are like [substance].

At last, I can say, “Without [message], there is no sign to manifest [presence].  Without [presence], there is no [meaning].”

Without content, there is no situation.  Without situation, there is no perspective.

0949 So, the question arises, “Can there be content without perspective?”

The answer is yes and no.

The answer is yes by way of example.

The answer is no, because without meaning, how can there be a message?

How about that example?

Imagine a molecular amino acid floating along a conduit in a hydrothermal vent.  It hits a rock and clings to that rock due to electrostatics.  Then, it finds its way into a micropore, which is completely lined with organic chemicals with similar properties.  They electrostatically cling to the surface of the micropore.  Plus, there is a little circulation.  Occasional pulses bring organic material in, but (since the organic molecules cling to the crystalline walls and to one another) no organic chemicals go out.

0950 Here is a picture.

0951 Yes, new terminology is proposed.

What is the [message]?

[Inter] is “enters from the Umwelt”.

0952 Something that is outside the micropore’s accreting sludge’s semiotic agency (SO_i) [ inters ] a place where organic molecules_2a (SV_s) stand for what is in a micropore of volcanic glass_2b (SO_s) operating on the potential of content entering into the pore and not leaving_1b (SI_s).

So, the [message] is [inter].

0953 Obviously, “inter” is a new word, technically coining something from outside of the agent that initiates semiotic agency.

The term is a play on “enter” as well as “inter”.  “Inter” derives from the Latin word for “among”, as in the term, “international”.  “Inter” also means to “bury a corpse”.  Here, “inter” alludes to the burial of the sign-object of the interventional sign.  Surely, a burial conveys a message.  That message inters the SO_i.

[Message] can be sort of like being born again.

0954 [Inter] is when the message is born the first time.  [Inter] is like a revelation to an agent that may not exist.  Or, if an agent exists, then [inter] is like a revelation, pure and simple, like the way that I realize that the dead duck is alive.

0955 Here is a picture for the nitrogenous organic molecule entering a micropore on the surface of volcanic glass in an Archean hydrothermal vent.

Organic molecules in the hydrothermal vent (SV_s) stand for accumulation (SO_s) in regards to the self-governance of carbon-based molecules in a micropore operating of possible courses of action (SI_s).

0956 The question arises, “Who is the agent₃?”

Is the “agent₃” the micropore with a hydrothermal vent?

Or, is the agent₃ the sludge accumulating in the micropore?  This agent₃ faces a problem faced by all hoarders.  There is only so much space in a micropore.  So, the micropore stops accumulating.

0957 But, not all micropores give up when sludged out.  Some develop organic subagents that assist in packing the micropore and are capable of latching to the walls of the hydrothermal vent, despite the turbulence.  These subagents then manage to colonize neighboring micropores, pack them over time, then find paths to other micropores.

Does that key into [presence]?

Is information_2b all about accumulation (SO_s) [presence] packing and moving on (SV_e)?

0957 Accumulation and packing_2b (SV_e) stands for colonization of adjacent micropores_2c (SO_e) in regards to packing micropores on the surface of volcanic glass in a hydrothermal vent_3c operating on the potential of these novel molecules that the sludge has inadvertently produced and keeps producing_1c (SI_e).

So, information_2b is more than sustained capture of organic materials floating by in the hydrothermal vent (SO_s).  Information_2b supports the spontaneous production of a suite of molecules that increase the amount that can be packed into a micropore.  Some type of catalyst manifests and this catalyst may leave the micropore and “infect” another micropore.

0958 Here is a picture.

Here, the label, [infold] replaces [inter].  [Infold] is “enters from the Innerwelt”.

Perhaps, the entire community of micropores constitutes the agent₃.

0959 Let me say that again, while focusing on the actualities.

From the outside, organic molecules may pulse into a micropore. That corresponds to [inter]. The same organic molecules tend not to leave, because they bind to the walls of the micropore (through charged interactions and dipoles) or slough out of water solution into the sludge (because water forms hydrogen bonds that exclude many organic molecules).

0960 Particularly configured organic molecules end up getting synthesized as these molecules occasionally covalently bond with one another.  They can form strings, where an organic (hydrophobic) macromolecule has two polar (hydrophilic and glass-loving) ends that can direct molecules entering the micropore to the crystal surface (for electrostatic attraction).  The hydrophobic string can direct molecules towards the organic crud (for getting out of water).

They are like hydrophobic strings with electrostatic glue on either end.

They emerge within sludge [packing tool] accumulation_2b.

0961 If one of these peculiar molecules leaves the micropore, it can “walk” along the glass surface with one end electrostatically holding on to the glass surface and the other coming loose and floating as far as the string allows before coming back to the glass surface.

In this way, one molecule can “walk” to another micropore_2a and catalyze the process of accumulation_2b if it is not already happening.

0962 And, that manifests [meaning] by instigating an interventional sign.

Biphasic macromolecular “walking” along the lining of a hydrothermal vent_2c (SV_i) stands for further settlement of porous space_2a (including micropores already spontaneously accumulating) (SO_i) in regards to the potential of ‘settling novel spaces’_1a in the normal context of a hydrothermal vent_3a (SI_i).

Notice that in the picture, the {SO_i}_2a is the intent expressed by “walking”, rather than further settlement of porous spaces.

0963 Also, I replace [inter], the technical word for [message], with [infold] because the message comes from within the system.  Here, the message, [infold], barely applies.  But, when the normal context_3a belongs to a subagent, then the term definitely applies.

0964 Back in point 0946, the author asks whether there can be potential meaning in a world without meaning (that is, life)?

The answer applies to section 7.6 (Potential Meanings and Complexity of the Non-living World) and 7.7 (Actualization of Potential Meanings by Organisms).

0965 Does the answer also apply to section 7.8 (Potential Signs and Meanings in Human Life)??

Let me go back to that preposterous story about Daisy and the duck.

0966 Here is a picture of how the incident provokes Daisy’s semiotic agency.  The picture is written in the style of a three-level interscope, for the convenience of this examiner.

0967 At the start of the incident, the sudden appearance of an unfamiliar dog pulling out something from a pile of dead leaves_2a (SV_s) stands for a duck in its mouth_2b (SO_s) in regards to Daisy’s self-governance_3b operating on potential courses of action_1b (SI_s).

The encounter with another dog is like a sensation_2a.  Realizing that a duck is in the other’s dog mouth is like a perception_2a.

0968 The duck in the other’s dog mouth_2b (SO_s) [makes present] an opportunity_2b (SV_e).

Daisy’s opportunity_2b (SV_e) stands for the goal of making the duck mine_2c (SO_e) in regards to the normal context of going for it_3c operating on the potential of ‘seizing the moment’_1c (SI_e).

0969 The perspective-level actuality_2c has the character of a judgment.  Daisy’s canine intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the intelligibility of the getting the duck in the other dog’s mouth (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with the universality of Daisy’s sizing up the other dog (what is, firstness).

Say what?

If Daisy’s sizing up the other dog is correct, then she bets that she can get the duck.

0970 Her goal of making that duck her own (SO_e) [means] a fight (SV_i).

0971 [Meaning] connects semiotic agency to an interventional sign-relation.

This is Daisy’s intervention.  I am along as an ally who is capable of throwing rocks.  When the first rock hits solidly, and the other dog looks over at me, I think, “I should have held tighter onto Daisy’s leash.”  Just kidding, I really think, “Wow.  That got his attention.”

Then, I throw the second rock and it misses completely.

0972 Once Daisy positions herself to prevent the other dog from bolting with the prize.  The wandering hound must prepare for a fight.  That means that he must put down the duck.  Then, the third rock lands and its over.

For me, I know that the interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i) has played its course when I pick up Daisy’s leash, still attached to her bodice, and she noses the duck and looks up.

0973 Here is a picture of the interventional sign-relation.

Daisy’s fight_2c (SV_i) stands for her intent at the moment of victory_2a (SO_i) in regards to victory or defeat_3a operating on the potential that the victory affords a message’_1a (SI_i).

0974 The [message] is [infolds] because Daisy and I are now a team.

The intention of Daisy_2c [infold] duck is alive_2a.

1005 On top of that, in chapter seven of Pathways, Alexei Sharov offers another option.

In addition to [meaning], there are potential meanings and potential signs.  Potential meaning goes with [presence].  Potential sign associates to [message].

This is awkward, since the terms, “potential meanings” and “potential signs” take the contiguities out of their brackets (so to speak).

1006 Plus, the exercise of considering “potential meaning” and “potential sign” raises a question concerning how to square the normal-context of agent₃ with the normal context of definition₃.  To me, the agent₃ contextualizes definition₂₍₃₎ as integral to semiotic agency₂.  So, somehow, the nature of spoken words₂₍₂₎ gets imported into semiotic agency₂ as a thing itself (or, should I say, “a noumenal overlay itself”?).

1007 Here is a picture.

The colors are suggestive, but misleading.  [Presence] is wholly contained within the semiotic of semiotic agency.  [Message] spans interventional sign-relation and semiotic agency.  The coloration reminds me that [message] is like passing through a portal to the SV_s.  An interventional sign-object (SO_i) [inters or infolds] the specifying sign-vehicle of semiotic agency (SV_s).

Here is the trick. With [inters], the SO_i enters from the Umwelt.  With [infolds], the SO_i arrives from the Innerwelt.  [Inter] is not wholly contained within the agent.  [Infold] is.

That may be confusing.  And, the above figure exploits that confounding with suggestive, but misleading, coloration.

1008 What I have said concerning how [meaning] may be problematic fits the author’s bold assertion: Knowledge is a language game.

Meaning is like a substance, the contiguity between a manner of matter (the object of an exemplar sign-relation, SO_e) and a manner of form (the vehicle of an specifying sign-relation, SV_s).

Like [message], [meaning] is a portal.  The portal goes from the end terminus of semiotic agency, the goal_2c (SO_e), to the beginning terminus of the interventional sign-relation, the goal in action_2c (SV_i).

1009 At the same time, meaning₁ is a potential that underlies a spoken term₂ in the normal context of definition₃.

1010 So, which is it?

Let the language games begin.

1011 The author relates that a century ago (say, around the 1920s, when the nature of empirical science is debated), linguistic theories of meaning display two fashions.  One academic style concerns how spoken expressions work in terms of symbol manipulation.  The other academic style concerns whether spoken expressions mean what dictionaries say they mean… that is, “semantic content”.

The author makes this accusation in section 8.1, titled, “Do We Ask The Right Kinds of Questions?”

1012 I find this a little funny, along with the author’s note, saying (more or less), “Human adaptive behaviors₃ may be viewed as end-directed activities that construct semiotic agency₂ as a capacity₁ to generate such behavior₃.”

Without the subscripts assigning Peirce’s categories, the note sounds perfectly circular.

With the subscripts, the statement transforms into a category-based nested form responsible for constructing semiotic agency₂ as an actuality₂.

This₂ is semiotic agency₂.

1013 Here is the trick.  “End directed activities” substitutes for “the interventional sign-relation”.

So, the interventional sign-relation [constructs] semiotic agency.

This dyad is a wonderful way to portray the biosemiotic noumenal overlay in speech-alone talk.

1014 Speech-alone talk is different from hand and hand-speech talk.

Hand talk pictures and points to its referents.

1015 In human evolution, hand talk becomes linguistic when manual-brachial icons and indexes become sufficiently distinct from one another as to constitute a system of differences.

Remember dictionaries?  They embody a system of differences.  Each written word differs from all other written words.  Symbols constitute systems of differences.  A finite set of symbols constitutes a symbolic order.  The symbolic order represented by a dictionary is… um… alphabetical.

Once routinized, manual-brachial gestures become symbols, they fall into a system of differences and become linguistic. Then, these linguistic gestural-words support grammar.  Grammar consists in symbolic operations within a finite system of differences.

So, hand talk refers by way of Peirce’s natural signs of icons and indexes (SO_s).  Also, hand talk becomes linguistic when these icons and indexes become more and more symbolic (that is, distinct from one another).  Grammar consists of symbolic operations among hand-talk words.

1016 Hand and hand-speech talk belong to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

Speech-alone talk belongs to our current Lebenswelt.

Speech-alone words cannot picture or point to their referents.

1017 Speech-alone talk simply attaches a label to…. whatever… such as what the term, “end-directed activities” is supposed to mean.  Or, maybe I should say, mean, present and announce.

The spoken term, “end-directed activities” announces, “I am what constructs semiotic agency”. 

The same spoken term presents itself as belonging to the realm of actuality₂.

The same spoken term has a meaning₂ that arises from the potential of ‘the human capacity to generate adaptive behaviors’₁ in the normal context of human adaptation₃.

1018 So, here is the trick.  The term, “end-directed activities”, is just a label.

The interventional sign-relation [constructs] semiotic agency.

1019 Here is a picture.

1020 The interventional sign-relation allows us to imagine that end-directed activities reside “out there”.

But, [meaning] draws the inquirer’s gaze away from the end-directed action (SV_i) back to the goal_2c (SO_e).

And, this is crucial, because the goal_2c resides “in here”, within semiotic agency.