0021 Of course, Heidegger would (if he could) return the insult, by calling Rorty a liberal propagandist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
After all, Rorty is not concerned with questions of truth3V<\/sub>, preferring issues concerning social consequences3H<\/sub>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0022 Plus, Heidegger (if he could) would have regarded the imprisonment of Rorty and other social democratic philosophers<\/em> as a matter of “petty details”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Petty details?<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Heidegger’s view, the West has exhausted its options1H<\/sub>. And, proof comes later in the title of Rorty’s book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity<\/em>. Are these options? Or, are they signs of exhaustion? Compare that title to Being and Time<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0023 The squishiness of the former title<\/em> is made worse when Rorty’s dichotomy of choice<\/em>, private versus public,<\/em> appears to align with the potentials of good1V<\/sub> and options1H<\/sub>,<\/em> respectively. Is truth3V<\/sub> private? Is reality3V<\/sub> public? If so, then I ask, “Are these affirmations the poisonous fruits of the Treaty of Westphalia?” <\/em> The Treaty of Westphalia<\/em> marks the start of the modern era,<\/em> almost four hundred years ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps, Rorty inadvertently testifies to Heidegger’s proposition. The West has exhausted its options1H<\/sub>. Politics2<\/sub> is the intersection of the actualities of reality3H<\/sub> and truth3V<\/sub>, arising from the potential of viable options1H<\/sub> and good1V<\/sub>. Without a good1V<\/sub>, there are no options1H<\/sub>. So, politics2<\/sub> is dead. But, our love (philo-<\/em>) of wisdom (-sophy<\/em>) endures. So, it is only a matter of time before politics2<\/sub> rises again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Shout it from the rooftops!<\/p>\n\n\n\n Politics2<\/sub> is dead. Long live politics2<\/sub>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0024 My thanks to Michael Millerman for his excellent chapter into how Rorty views Heidegger, chapter three in Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political<\/em> (2020, Arktos Press, London), pages 97-134.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 0021 Of course, Heidegger would (if he could) return the insult, by calling Rorty a liberal propagandist. After all, Rorty is not concerned with questions of truth3V, preferring issues concerning social consequences3H. 0022 Plus, Heidegger (if he could) would have regarded the imprisonment of Rorty and other social democratic philosophers as a matter of “petty details”. Petty […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18,280,13],"tags":[39,311,235,308,309,124,241,216,136,50,307,312,310],"class_list":["post-6113","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-interscope-intersection","category-intimations-of-political-philosophy","category-presence-underlying-religion","tag-category-based-nested-form","tag-contradiction","tag-intersection","tag-martin-heidegger","tag-michael-millerman","tag-philosophy","tag-political-philosophy","tag-politics","tag-reality","tag-religion","tag-richard-rorty","tag-social-democracy","tag-truth"],"yoast_head":"\n