A thousand points of light<\/em> shine in the immense celestial ocean. Each illumination is immersed in its own righteousness. A leviathan swims high in these heavenly, dense, waters. This leviathan addresses the issue of public education. The states require it. The states pay for it. The states perform it. It works even as Big Government (il)Liberalism turns the ocean into the sky. How it weighs upon us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The U.S. Constitution says that the government shall not establish a religion. So, public education may teach science, which is not \u201creligious\u201d, but not Creation Science nor Intelligent Design, which are religious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here, \u201creligion\u201d means \u201ca Christian faction\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pennock writes in triumph.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0036 Section 6 of Pennock\u2019s essay<\/em> diagnoses and rehabilitates Laudan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Why does Laudan fail at recognizing the distinction between science and religion?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pennock offers four reasons (S-V).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0037 First (S), Laudan does not take the creationist\u2019s claims seriously. Creationists hold epistemological assumptions unfamiliar to science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What does this mean?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The crew of The Creation Science<\/em> promotes bad method. They do not adhere to the empirio-schematic judgment, because their disciplinary language includes metaphysics (that is, Christian theology).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0038 Second (T), Laudan does not frame the demarcation problem properly. We should not expect a \u201cstrict\u201d line, based on criteria about methods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To me, this means that the two-level interscope confuses. There are always two issues, one related to situation and one related to content. Here, the content level concerns scientific practice (that is, method). The situation level pertains to the Naturalist\u2019s judgment (that includes, \u201cno metaphysics\u201d).<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0039 Third (U), Laudan is influenced by Karl Popper\u2019s claims that falsification defines scientific methodology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Once again, the content level is the focus of attention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0040 Fourth (V), the 2005 Kitzmiller<\/em> decision does not appeal to falsification as demarcation criteria. Rather, it appeals to the very issue that Laudan seems to miss: The naturalist intellect3b<\/sub> rules out metaphysics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pennock wonders, more or less, \u201cWhat should we think about philosophers (such as Laudan), if they cannot distinguish between science<\/em> and sectarian religion posing as science<\/em>?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n I suspect both Pennock and his foil, Laudan, recognize the difference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The question is, \u201cWhat makes the difference real?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Laudan says that the distinction is not real, because we cannot ascertain clear and valid demarcation criteria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Well, he may not really say that. Pennock\u2019s foil says that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0041 The real difference concerns following the rules. Naturalism rules metaphysics out. Religion rules metaphysics in. The demarcation should express that fact that the rule of \u201cno metaphysics\u201d applies to naturalism but not Christian factions… I mean to say… \u201creligion\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To me, the issue shifts from methods to something more ambiguous. How does one decide whether the naturalist intellect\u2019s rule is valid or not? The decision cannot be based on physics. The decision must be based on metaphysics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The rule, \u201cno metaphysics\u201d, must ultimately be based on metaphysics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0042 That means that free will enters the picture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pennock takes the naturalist rule at face value. Naturalism rules out metaphysics. Therefore, it is \u201cnot religious\u201d. Does this mean that any institution that self-identifies as \u201cnot religious\u201d can also say that it is \u201cscientific\u201d? Can this rule be gamed?<\/p>\n\n\n\n After all, this is precisely the issue in both 1981 McLean<\/em> and 2005 Kitzmiller<\/em> contests. Creation science blatantly tries to game the rule. Later, Intelligent Design (ID) games the rule in a much more sophisticated style. ID mimics the empirio-schematic judgment, occupying the content-level, while (sneakily) violating the naturalist\u2019s rule of \u201cno metaphysics\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n ID\u2019s logic is easy to see. If an evolved attribute, such as a bacteria\u2019s flagellum, is not possible, then a miracle must have occurred. A \u201cmythical being\u201d must have intervened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0043 What does this \u201cmythical being\u201d do?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The mythical being does not cobble together phenomena<\/em>. The mythical being creates a noumenon<\/em>, the thing itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The merit to ID can thus be articulated, by saying, \u201cGod creates a noumenon<\/em> and the scientists observe and measure its phenomena<\/em>. Sometimes, phenomena<\/em> do not fully account for their noumenon<\/em>. This is the case for the bacteria\u2019s flagellum and other biological structures.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0044 Here is a picture of that statement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0045 What potentiates the naturalist intellect3b<\/sub>?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dyad, a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena1b<\/sub><\/em>, does. This dyad belongs to what is1b<\/sub><\/em> in the Naturalist\u2019s judgment. This element is imbued with firstness, because phenomena<\/em> are defined by their potential1b<\/sub> to be observed and measured1a<\/sub><\/em> and a noumenon1b<\/sub><\/em> has the potential1b<\/sub> of being discussed3a<\/sub> by the naturalist intellect3b<\/sub><\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The two components of this dyad tie into the content-level nested form of methodology<\/em>. A noumenon1b<\/sub><\/em> stands as the presence that is referred to in disciplinary language3a<\/sub><\/em>. Its phenomena1b<\/sub><\/em> virtually (meaning, \u201cin virtue\u201d) emerges from and situates observations and measurements1a<\/sub><\/em>. The contiguity1b<\/sub> is [cannot be objectified as].<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0047 What does this imply?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The contiguity between a noumenon and its phenomena1b<\/sub><\/em> cannot be explained by physics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But, the naturalist intellect3b<\/sub> has a rule that says, \u201cMetaphysics is not allowed.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0048 Hmmm. Have I located the metaphysical commitment within the Naturalist\u2019s judgment?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The naturalist intellect3b<\/sub> assigns the metaphysical aspect of creation to the noumenon1b<\/sub><\/em>, which cannot be objectified as its phenomena1b<\/sub><\/em>. So, disciplinary language3a<\/sub> assumes the presence of the thing itself, the noumenon1b<\/sub><\/em>, but dares not speak of it, for fear of violating the rule of \u201cno metaphysics\u201d3b<\/sub>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Physics cannot justify the rule of the naturalist intellect. So, it must be metaphysical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Also, the source of this commitment<\/em> comes from the empty perspective levelc<\/sub><\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0049 The naturalist3b<\/sub> hides the source2c<\/sub> of its metaphysical rule of \u201cno metaphysics\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n What does this imply?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The system can be gamed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0050 How?<\/p>\n\n\n\n We can cobble together phenomena<\/em> in a manner that will tempt us into believing that a noumenon<\/em> exists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, in the 19th<\/sup>\u00a0century, various physical\u00a0phenomena<\/em>\u00a0point to a\u00a0noumenon<\/em>, which scientists label \u201cthe ether\u201d.\u00a0\u00a0The ether transports force through vacuum.\u00a0\u00a0As it turns out, the ether is completely imaginary.\u00a0\u00a0It is a mythical being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 0051 If science is \u201cnot religious\u201d, then can a \u201cnot religious\u201d religion game Pennock\u2019s criteria, not from the side of Christianity, Judaism and Islam (which cannot shake the designation, \u201creligious\u201d), but from the side of the Big Government (il)Liberalism (where self-identification as \u201cnot religious\u201d is common)?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 0035 In the sixth section of Robert Pennock\u2019s Essay, titled \u201cCan\u2019t Philosophers Tell the Difference between Science and Religion?: Demarcation Revisited\u201d, the author speculates why Larry Laudan fails to see a demarcation between science and religion. After all, it is so easy to see. Look at the rules. Religion inspires the nautical mission of The Intelligent Design, in […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[39,53,52,54,55,56,57,34,50,44],"class_list":["post-4656","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-defining-religion","tag-category-based-nested-form","tag-creation-science","tag-demarcation","tag-intelligent-design","tag-interscope","tag-kitzmiller","tag-mclean","tag-peirce","tag-religion","tag-science"],"yoast_head":"\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.raziemah.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/200516-pennock-image-06.png\")